

MICRO-STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The Challenge of Sovereignty

by

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ABSTRACT

The last forty years have witnessed a proliferation of very small states, or micro-states with populations of approximately one million or less. Most of these states are developing economies but in recent years even the smallest European micro-states have won acceptance in the councils of the organised international system. This study is a comprehensive examination of the international relations of these states in three principal areas of concern: issues of status and legitimacy; the conduct of diplomacy and the efforts of micro-states to achieve strategies of self-reliant economic development. While the research has confirmed the vulnerabilities of micro-states in all three areas which have been stressed in the literature of the last decade, it also reveals surprising opportunities for some micro-states to ameliorate their weaknesses and to achieve a constructive engagements within the international system. The international milieu and the many support systems at both the regional and global level have actually reinforced the sovereignty of micro-states while providing them with added resources to exploit the opportunities which an increasingly integrated global economy offers.

Unlike earlier studies in the field, this dissertation treats the experience of micro-states within the broad context of post-1945 history and thus provides an overall perspective for assessing the impact of very small size over 50 years. It also represents a departure from the existing literature in its determination to include both the developed

micro-states in Europe and the more commonly studied micro-states in the developing world. Finally, much of the analysis compares the experiences of micro-states with those of forty larger small states in the next population class, an approach which has not been undertaken elsewhere. The impact of this comparison further confirms the general findings of the dissertation that the international system of the mid to late 1990s has evolved into a largely supportive milieu for micro-states in spite of the serious and occasionally dangerous problems which they continue to face.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ABSTRACT.....	2
TABLE OF CONTENTS	4
INTRODUCTION.....	10
APPENDIX.....	61
TABLE I Micro-states Ranked According to Population	62
TABLE II Micro-states Ranked According to Size of Territory	64
TABLE III Micro-states Ranked According to Size of G.D.P.	66
TABLE IV Micro-states Ranked According to Levels of Per Capita Income	68
CHAPTER ONE: “Sovereignty and Questions of Legitimacy: Problems of Status for Micro-states in the International System”.....	70
CHAPTER TWO: “The Legitimacy of Micro-states in the International System: The Practice of International Organisations”.....	93
CHAPTER THREE: “Decolonisation and the Contest for Legitimacy in Very Small Territories”.....	112
CHAPTER FOUR: “Very Small Size and Other Sources of Status Weakness”.....	159
CHAPTER FIVE: “Sovereignty and the Challenge of Diplomacy: The Relevance of Size in the External Relations of Micro-states”.....	185

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
APPENDIX.....	231
TABLE I Number of Missions Established Abroad	232
TABLE II Missions Resident in Small States and Micro-states	234
TABLE III Small State and Micro-state Memberships in Inter-governmental Organisations	236
TABLE IV Major IGO Memberships for Micro-states	238
TABLE V Major IGO Memberships for Small States	240
TABLE VI Micro-state Participation in the United Nations System.....	243
TABLE VII Small State Participation in the United Nations System.....	247
TABLE VIII The size of Small State and Micro-state Missions to the United Nations (New York)	251
TABLE IX Membership of Selected Micro-Dependencies in Inter-governmental Organisations	253
TABLE X Micro-state and Small State Memberships in Non-governmental Organisations	254
TABLE XI Patterns of Micro-state Diplomacy	257

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER SIX:	
“Economic Dependence in the International Relations of Micro-states: The Structure of the Small Economy”	282
CHAPTER SEVEN:	
“Patterns of Trade and Capital Flows in the International Economic Relations of Micro-states”	310
APPENDIX I.....	355
TABLE I	
Trade Statistics for Small States and Micro-states Ranked According to GNP, (1986)	356
TABLE II	
Small States and Micro-states Ranked According to Ratios of Total Trade (X+M) to GNP (1986)	362
TABLE III	
Small State and Micro-state Trade The Ratio of Imports to GNP (1986)	365
TABLE IV	
Small State and Micro-state Trade The Ratio of Exports to GNP (1986)	368
TABLE V	
Small States and Micro-states Ranked According to the Hirshmann Index of Commodity Concentration of Export Trade (1986)	371
TABLE VI	
Small States and Micro-states Ranked According to the Hirshmann Index of Geographic Concentration of Export Trade (1986)	375
TABLE VII	
Small States and Micro-states Ranked According to the Hirshmann Index of Geographic Concentration of Import Trade (1986)	379

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
TABLE VIII	
Ratio of Indices of Geographic Concentration of Trade (X+M) for Selected Small States (1986)	383
TABLE IX	
Ratio of Indices of Geographic Concentration Trade (X+M) for Selected Micro-states (1986)	385
APPENDIX II	387
TABLE I-A	
Net Capital Flows to Micro-states as % of GNP	388
Net Capital Flows (\$US Millions)	389
GNP at Current Prices (\$US Millions)	390
TABLE I-B	
Net Capital Flows to Small States as % of GNP	391
Net Capital Flows (\$US Millions)	392
GNP at Current Prices (\$US Millions)	393
TABLE II-A	
Net Capital Flows to Micro-states as % of Total Exports	394
Total Exports F.O.B. (\$US Millions)	395
TABLE II-B	
Net Capital Flows to Small States as % of Total Exports	396
Total Exports F.O.B. (\$US Millions)	397
TABLE III-A	
Net Capital Flows to Micro-states as % of Total Imports	398
Total Imports (C.I.F.) (\$US Millions).....	399
TABLE III-B	
Net Capital Flows to Small States as % of Total Imports	400
Total Imports (C.I.F.) (\$US Millions)	401
TABLE IV-A	
Bilateral Receipts as % of Total Net Capital Flows to Micro-states	402
Bilateral Receipts	403
Multilateral Receipts	404

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
TABLE IV-B	
Bilateral Receipts as % of Total Net Capital Flows to Small States	405
Bilateral Receipts	406
Multilateral Receipts	407
 TABLE V-A	
Multilateral Receipts as % of Total Net Capital Flows to Micro-states	408
 TABLE V-B	
Multilateral Receipts as % of Total Net Capital Flows to Small States	409
 TABLE VI-A	
Total Receipts from Arab States (Countries and Agencies) as % of Total Net Capital Flows to Micro-states	410
Receipts from Arab Countries (Bilateral) (\$US Millions)	411
Receipts from Arab Countries (Multilateral) (\$US Millions)	412
 TABLE VI-B	
Total Receipts from Arab States (Countries and Agencies) as % of Total Net Capital Flows to Small States	413
 TABLE VII-A	
Total Receipts from European Economic Community (EEC) as % of Total Net Capital Flows to Micro-states	414
Receipts from EEC and Member Countries (\$US Millions)	415
 TABLE VII-B	
Total Receipts from European Economic Community (EEC) as % of Total Net Capital Flows to Small States	416
Receipts from EEC and Member Countries (\$US Millions)	417
 TABLE VIII-A	
Gross Receipts from CMEA Countries as % of Total Net Capital Flows to Micro-states	418
Receipts from CMEA Countries (Gross) (\$US Millions)	419

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
TABLE VIII-B	
Gross Receipts from CMEA Countries as % of Total Net Capital Flows to Small States	420
Receipts from CMEA Countries (Gross) (\$US Millions)	421
TABLE IX-A	
% of Total Capital Flows received by Micro-states Provided by Private Sector and Official Sources	423
Net Capital Flows, Private Sector (\$US Millions)	424
Net Capital Flows, Official Sources (\$US Millions)	432
TABLE IX-B	
% of Total Capital Flows received by Small States Provided by Private Sector and Official Sources	434
Net Capital Flows, Private Sector (\$US Millions)	441
Net Capital Flows, Official Sources (\$US Million)	443
TABLE X-A	
Principal Sources of Bilateral Aid to Micro-states	445
TABLE X-B	
Principal Sources of Bilateral Aid to Small States	450
APPENDIX III	455
TABLE I	
Micro-states GDP Rates of Growth and Per Capita Income Levels	456
CONCLUSION	465
BIBLIOGRAPHY	
I - Books and Monographs	490
II - Journal Articles, Conference Papers and Selected Chapters	507
III - Government Documents and Official Publications	543
IV - Newspapers and Journals of Record	547
V - Yearbooks and Annual Reviews	549
VI - Supplementary Bibliography	551

INTRODUCTION

The Emergence of a Small State System

At first glance the tapestry of the contemporary state system may seem to be a throwback to mid-19th century Europe with its many principalities, duchies and tiny republics. Dozens of small and, indeed very small societies, have achieved sovereignty in the post-war years. There are now 45 very small states in the international system, that is micro-states with populations of approximately one million or less. This represents nearly a quarter of the current list of sovereign states. But unlike their European counterparts over a century ago, this new generation of micro-states enjoys full access to regional and global councils just as they participate in their own choice of diplomatic agendas, often with surprising initiative.

For those contemplating the architecture of the post-war world in 1945, the proliferation of so many micro-states would surely have seemed fanciful. At the founding of the United Nations there were only two micro-states, Luxembourg and Iceland, with real claims to full participation in the international system. Both of them enjoyed a long-standing separate identity but their recognition and acceptance did not suggest a precedent for other very small jurisdictions. If anything, these states seemed to be the exceptions to prove the rule that there were normal dimensions of statehood. In contrast, the smallest European micro-states, those outside the San Francisco conference, more closely resembled their continental predecessors, highly dependent on a neighbouring mentor state and largely excluded from the mainstream channels of international

diplomacy. It would be another 15 years, with the independence of Gabon and Cyprus, before other very small jurisdictions would be able to stake their claims within the organised relations of the international system.

With the dismantling of European colonialism, the siren call of self-determination reached even the smallest and most remote fragments of European bluewater empire. It was at first a tentative process, its full reach not really expected in the metropolitan countries or even among first generation political leaders in the small territories themselves. In many cases separate independence was granted because the imperial power, particularly Great Britain, had lost interest in a prolonged colonial responsibility or because there was an absence of alternative solutions; or a combination of both. In others, aspirations to sovereignty were emboldened by the apparently successful independence of other very small territories, particularly among similarly placed neighbouring dependencies within the adjacent region. In the end, the emergence of so many micro-states across the developing world paved the way for the previously inhibited and marginal European micro-states to assume a role in international diplomacy once considered preposterous. Today United Nations conferences may be held in Monaco or Liechtenstein as they are in Barbados or Malta. And the International Monetary Fund will send a team to report on the economy of San Marino as readily as it would for St. Lucia or Mauritius.

Nor is this proliferation of very small states necessarily exhausted. There are still those within a few remaining colonial territories, such as the Kanaks in New Caledonia, who look for separate statehood. And there are powerful separatist movements and *de facto* states across the ruins of the former Communist world: Abkhazia, Chechnya, Trans-

Dniester. The relaxation of the taboo against secession, albeit now sanctioned only through recognised and genuinely democratic exercises of self-determination, has encouraged a climate for further fragmentation. Even within many micro-states themselves, archipelagic island states in particular, aspirations for secession among dissident minority communities threaten even the smallest state's territorial integrity. In the case of St. Kitts-Nevis, already having endured one experience of dismemberment with the separation of Anguilla, the separatist agenda in Nevis has become a very real threat in recent months.¹ That the 10,000 islanders of Nevis could entertain separate independence to become the smallest sovereign state in the Americas illustrates just how far conventional notions of statehood have changed. In short, these forces of rampant particularism may justify Colin Clarke's description of the international system in the late twentieth century as one of "miniaturism."²

The notion that the currency of sovereignty was being steadily debased as even smaller and palpably weaker colonial fragments won sovereignty was a recurring lament in the earlier stages of micro-state decolonisation. Yet this was an irresistible pattern. It was impossible to erect or maintain objective criteria in the face of a determined movement for self-determination on one hand and the resignation and exhaustion of metropolitan governments on the other. One improbable state after another entered the system, even

¹ *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), August 30, 1996, A13.

The Miami Herald, April 17, 1997: <http://www.herald.com/americas/carib/docs/053246.htm>

Consider too the case of Tobago

Ralph R. Premdas and Hugh Williams, "Tobago: the Quest for Self-Determination in the Caribbean,"

Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism XIX (Nos. 1-2, 1992), 117-126.

² Colin Clarke, "Third World States: Fragile and Dependent," *Third World Affairs* (1987), 207.

village states with populations of less than 10,000, and with each new level of acceptance, conventional criteria of statehood were overturned.

But an interest in small states was evident long before the full bloom of micro-state independence was fully appreciated. The position of such European neutral states as Finland and Austria seemed to raise new questions of small state survival given the rigidities of a bi-polar world. Similarly, the experience of the Latin American republics facing various waves of American hegemony, the tentative resistance of some Socialist states, and the decolonisation of a number of small dependencies in Africa and Asia all contributed to a burgeoning small states literature. Many of these earlier studies were historical and reflected a continuing fascination with the plight of the smaller European states during the inter-war years.³ What lessons might be gleaned from this period to assess the security concerns of small states in a new bi-polar international system?

This growing body of literature was premised on the notion that small size was a useful analytical tool in the classification of states: Small states faced particular constraints and were inclined to recognisable patterns of behaviour because of their relative small size in the state system. Annette Baker Fox, for instance, emphasised the parochial orientation of the small state: "Small powers are almost by definition 'local' powers whose demands are restricted to their own and immediately adjacent areas, while great powers exert their influence over wide areas... the power of the small state is narrow

³ O. de Raeymaker, et. al., *Small Powers in Alignment* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974).

August Schou and Arne Olave Brundtland (eds.), *Small States in International Relations: Nobel Symposium 17* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell; New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971).

V.V. Šveics, *Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in Unequal Conflicts* (New York: Exposition Press, 1970).

in domain however much or little may be its weight."⁴ Fox concluded that it is this limited scope of attention which is the most distinctive characteristic of small state behaviour,

David Vital stressed the vulnerability of the small state as the most distinguishing factor: "A small state is more vulnerable to pressure, more likely to give way under stress, more limited in respect of the political options open to it and subject to a tighter connexion between domestic and external affairs."⁵ However, model of the small state is the renegade state with at least some independent capacity. For Vital this means that many of the new small states have to be regarded finally as 'psuedo states'.⁶

Robert Rothstein also argued that the small state is typically vulnerable in its relations with the outside world. But, he viewed small size to be a question of psychological handicaps as much as it is a problem of limited capabilities. Small states share a vulnerability which Rothstein called a "security dilemma."⁷ Weakness is an integral aspect of smallness and produces a different self-view and behaviour. It is an abiding sense of danger and the recognition of limited choices in the face of threat which characterises the small state's international relations.

Robert Keohane also stressed behavioural factors in the classification of states. He argued for a need to clarify traditional objective distinctions of power and/or size by incorporating the perceptions of state leaders. He suggested a fourfold classification of

⁴ Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), fn. p.3.

⁵ David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷ Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 24.

systemic roles in which states are differentiated as a) system-determining, b) system-influencing, c) system-affecting or d) system-ineffectual.⁸ It was assumed that most small states would fall into Keohane's fourth group, states with virtually no influence or role in the international system.

In a similar vein, Ronald Barston, after examining various criteria for distinguishing states along size variables, suggested that smallness be understood as a reflection of a state's relative influence in world politics. From this perspective small states are viewed in terms of role and performance rather than physical dimensions. He argued for a formulation of hypotheses about the international behaviour of small states in an effort to identify those shared characteristics which distinguish them from other states.⁹

Of course, none of these earlier explorations into the nature and behaviour of small states concerned those very small states which are the central focus of this study. Indeed, micro-states were conspicuous for their dismissal in the mainstream literature of international relations. They were generally treated, if mentioned at all, as pseudo-states, to use Vital's term, with pretensions that far outreached the capacities normally understood to be those of sovereign statehood.

⁸ Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," *International Organization* XXIII (No. 2, Spring, 1969), 295-296.

K.J. Holsti similarly wedded the psychological and objective dimensions of statehood in his scheme of national role perceptions. A state's behaviour in international politics is rooted in the conceptions which policy-makers have about their country's status and role. Self-image is as important as the assessment of capabilities in any typology of states.

K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* XIV (NO. 3, September, 1970), 233-309.

⁹ Ronald Barston, *The Other Powers: Studies in Foreign Policies of Small States* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1973).

Still, while the burgeoning interest in small states did not initially address the specific concerns of micro-states, many of which were waiting in the wings at the time, hypotheses about the impact of small size for the international relations of small states would find resonance, as we shall see, in the later literature of micro-states. Questions of parochial orientation, vulnerability, security consciousness, and limited influence on the external environment would be recurring themes in any subsequent discussion of micro-states. Moreover, the ongoing debate over the taxonomy of states and the value of small size as an explanatory tool would continue to be a central question in the more specifically directed literature on micro-states. Indeed, a recurring question was whether micro-states were small states *writ small* or whether they constituted an entirely different class of states altogether with their own distinct problems (and perhaps opportunities) as actors in the international system.

Similarly, early efforts to appreciate the consequences of small size for the international economic relations of small states were not at all directed to the exceedingly small economies which now characterise the world of micro-states. The Lisbon Conference participants in 1957 treated a small economy as one with a population of less than 10 million, though it was clear that their principal focus was on much larger states such as Belgium and Switzerland. These are giants in comparison to the very small economies which assumed sovereign powers in ever-increasing numbers after 1960. Yet, the proceedings of the Lisbon Conference¹⁰ are still cited widely in most discussions of micro-state economies. Once again, themes common to all small states, the familiar

¹⁰ E. A. G. Robinson (ed.), *The Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations* (London: Macmillan, 1963).

vulnerabilities of small open economies, continue to be relevant when assessing the opportunities and constraints facing micro-states in the global economy.

The Perennial Problems of Taxonomies

The growing momentum of decolonisation increasingly confirmed the evidence that perhaps the notion of the small state itself was being challenged as even more diminutive territories aspired to independence and then won their place in an increasingly open and tolerant international system. Clearly, this new generation of very small states represented a significant departure from the conventional capacities of statehood assumed to be within the reach of the small European and Latin American states. Finland, Norway and Czechoslovakia represented one model of small state international relations. Western Samoa, Djibouti, and Belize raised very different issues. Not surprisingly, then, early attention to these states was directed to issues of classification. To this day, many studies in the international relations of micro-states begin with an explanation of the parameters of small size relevant to whatever cases or comparative studies are selected.

In introducing the question in the United Nations, the former Secretary-General, U-Thant, referred to these very small states as “those entities which are exceptionally small in area, population and human and economic resources.”¹¹ In a subsequent UNITAR study ‘exceptionally small’ was understood to be a state with a population of approximately one million or less.¹² In an appendix to the UNITAR study Charles Taylor

¹¹ United Nations Document A/6701/Add. 1 (1967).

¹² Jacques Rapoport, Ernest Muteba and Joseph J. Therattil, *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems* A UNITAR Study (New York: Arno Press, 1971).

constructed an impressive matrix of various indices of smallness to reach beyond the simplicities of population size.¹³ Though such an approach initially seemed to have much to offer, most scholars have continued to use a simple demographic classification usually with the argument that states within this class are small in almost every other respect.¹⁴ The most widely used ceiling for very small states or micro-states is a population of approximately one million.

Some have preferred a lower figure of 500,000,¹⁵ 300,000¹⁶ or even 150,000, to be sure we are discussing states which are clearly 'exceedingly small'¹⁷ in every respect. Others have sought to stretch the classification to a little over two million¹⁸ or even five million¹⁹ to ensure a catchment that will include all those states which would seem to share the characteristics thought to be associated with very small size.

¹³ Charles L. Taylor, "Statistical Typology of Micro-states and Territories Towards a Definition of a Micro-state," in Rappoport, Muteba and Therattil, *ibid.*, 183-202.

¹⁴ B. Persaud, "Small States: Economic Problems and Prospects," in John Kaminarides, Lino Briguglio and Henk N. Hoogendonk, *The Economic Development of Small Countries: Problems, Strategies and Policies* (Delft: Eburon, 1989), p. 16.

¹⁵ J. C. Caldwell, G. E. Harrison and P. Quiggan, "The Demography of Micro-states," *World Development* VIII (1980), 956.

¹⁶ Patricia W. Blair, *The Ministate Dilemma* Occasional Paper No. 6, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October, 1967, p. 4.

¹⁷ Stanley A. De Smith, *Microstates and Micronesia* (New York: New York University Press, 1970), pp. 5-6.

¹⁸ Harvey W. Armstrong, Ronan de Kervenoaet, Xiaoming Li and Robert Read, "The Growth Performance of Micro-States: Economic and Social Determinants Considered," paper presented at the International Conference on Cultural Heritage in Islands and Small States, The Foundation for International Studies, Valletta, Malta, 8-10 May, 1997.

¹⁹ Paul Streeten, "The Special Problems of Small Countries," *World Development* XXI, No. 2, 1993, 197-202.

The use of a simple population ceiling is usually accepted with reluctance and with due recognition of the problems of such arbitrary taxonomies particularly given the risks of mis-classification. Inevitably, there is some overlap between the largest micro-states and the smallest states in the next population group. There are micro-states at the upper end of the group (Mauritius, Gabon and Guyana)²⁰ which might be expected to have more in common with Jamaica or Liberia than with Western Samoa, Liechtenstein or Dominica. Similarly, there are small states with populations between one and three million (the Central American republics, Congo, Estonia, Slovenia, Singapore) which seem to share many of the characteristics of micro-states. Seven of the ten states with populations between one and two million were micro-states until very recently: Kuwait, Lesotho, the United Arab Emirates, Bhutan, Trinidad and Tobago, Oman and Botswana. Doubts about a demographic basis for classification are most pressing with these states.²¹

There are further troubling issues of classification of states on the basis of very small size. First, as John Connell noted, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of smallness, peripherality and remoteness.²² For instance, over half of all micro-states are small islands

²⁰ The latest statistics put Gabon and Mauritius just over the one million mark.

²¹ In the Gulf it may be argued that these are still micro-states. The growth in the population is deceptive; the majority is immigrant and, more importantly, transient. Bhutan, Botswana and Lesotho are all dwarf land-locked states whose geopolitical position and international status are still closer to the micro-states in this study than to other larger small states in the next population class. Nevertheless, we are treating these borderline cases as small states, rather than micro-states, except in historical references when they were very much smaller. In discussing the question of status, for instance, initial doubts concerning the legitimacy and viability of independence in Kuwait were based in large part on the shaikhdom's very small size.

²² John Connell, *Sovereignty and Survival: Island Microstates in the Third World* (Sydney: Department of Geography, University of Sydney, Research Monograph No. 3, 1988), p. 1.

James Crawford, "Islands as Sovereign Nations," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* XXXVIII (April, 1989), 277-98.

or small archipelagic island societies. Many of the vulnerabilities of small size and islandness are concomitant. But there are particular characteristics of island geography that are widely and persistently recognised and addressed in the literature: insularity, remoteness, ecological vulnerability. Indeed, there are now international institutes and research programmes specifically directed to the special problems of small island jurisdictions. Within the United Nations itself, the establishment of the Association of Small Island States speaks powerfully to the very special concerns that link this particular group of states, most of which are micro-states. And a growing number of research institutes such as the Islands and Small States Institute at the University of Malta, the Island Institute in Rockland, Maine and the Institute of Island Studies at the University of Prince Edward Island have large research mandates to explore the particular characteristics of small island and archipelagic societies and jurisdictions over a wide range of issue areas. For some, like Percy Selwyn, this ongoing argument over the relative importance of islandness or smallness is an unhelpful distraction. Problems of peripherality and a declining self-reliance, he argues, are the key issues whether we are talking about small islands or small continental jurisdictions.²³ Philippe Hein too reminds us that land-locked small states or enclave small states are “mirror images” of small island states facing the same oft-cited litany of vulnerabilities that characterise the literature of small islands.²⁴

²³ Percy Selwyn, “Smallness and Islandness,” *World Development* VIII (1980), 945.

“The extension of ‘islands’ as a useful category from the concerns of naturalists and ecologists to those of social scientists . . . seems illegitimate. The social sciences abound with examples of the illegitimate extension of biological categories to social relationships. The biological peculiarities of islands are an insufficient foundation for any plausible social or economic theory.”

Ibid., 950.

²⁴ Philippe Hein, “The Study of Microstates,” in Kaminarides, Briguglio and Hoogendonk (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 8.

A further concern which can undermine confidence in a taxonomy based on small size is whether this masks more profound distinctions in the structure of micro-state economies and thus their prospects for economic diversification and self-reliance. Clearly, the European micro-states now enjoy an enviably diversified base of economic activity with healthy development in both the manufacturing and service sectors. The resource rich economies, the petroleum states and Nauru, and even the oil refining states in the Western hemisphere, all enjoy enviable living standards relative to their developing neighbours. But, unlike their European counterparts, they have not developed an intermediate goods sector or a genuinely diversified base of economic activity, even allowing for a sometimes spectacular growth in the services sector. Most other micro-states still rely on primary production of products highly vulnerable to external fluctuations. Some are truly monocultural economies. The prognoses among these weakest micro-states are not encouraging but they may not be as bleak as they might first appear. Services, the advantages of a rentier economy, untapped offshore resources, and even as we shall see the exploitation of jurisdiction or sovereign status itself as a resource, all offer potential relief from familiar patterns of export concentration. Still, whatever the imperatives of very small size, however equalizing the demographic ceiling at the end of the day, there are major differences of opportunity and challenge within the classification of micro-states that must qualify particular cases in the larger conclusions based on the import of very small size.

There is another disturbing tendency in much of the literature which relates to the selection of states within this group: Too often attention is focused exclusively on the developing states of the Third World. Indeed, apart from occasional pieces on Luxembourg and Iceland, and the more unorthodox celebrations of very small size, many of them historical, in the work of Leopold Kohr,²⁵ the European micro-states have been largely ignored. To the extent that these states did receive scholarly attention it was their international legal status which was the focus of analysis. Typically, this involved a spirited defense of their sovereignty in spite of worrying evidence to the contrary. Arguments suggesting these states were not truly sovereign given their exceptionally small size, their limited participation in organised international relations and their seemingly excessive dependence on more powerful neighbours were meticulously countered with legal precedents, conventions and treaties.²⁶ Virtually no attention was given in the comparative literature to issues of economic development or military security in these states.

Since the micro-state phenomenon is primarily a consequence of decolonisation, this is not surprising. Still, this exclusion seems a shame since a closer examination of the post-war experience of European micro-states will reveal some extraordinary success stories in economic development and diversification which could speak to the contemporary circumstances of micro-states in the developing world, particularly those

²⁵Leopold Kohr, *The Breakdown of Nations* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).

²⁶ Much of this literature was centred on the constitutional status of particular micro-states. An excellent comparative treatment, however, can be found in

C. D'Olivier Farran, "The Position of Diminutive States in International Law," in Erik Brüel et. al (eds.), *Internationalrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen-Festschrift für Walter Schätzel zu seinem Geburtstag* (Dusseldorf: Hermes, 1960)

A fine new contribution to this literature focuses on the smallest European micro-states; Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican City.

Jorri C. Duursma, *Fragmentation and the International Relations of Microstates: Self-determination and Statehood* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1996).

more advantaged and prosperous states with encouraging prospects in the manufacturing and service sectors. It is not that long ago, for example, that Iceland, surely a monocultural economy facing severe problems of remoteness, struggled with an underdeveloped infrastructure and a huge challenge of modernisation. Iceland until relatively recently was, like Ireland, one of the poorest countries in Europe. Iceland's development and the subsequent successful diversification of the Icelandic economy has been essentially a post-war phenomenon.²⁷ Liechtenstein too has been transformed in recent years and is now host to an astonishingly significant and profitable high value manufacturing sector in addition to its better known successes in financial services and tourism.²⁸ Moreover, the case for including the European micro-states in international comparative analyses is all the more persuasive since these states have assumed full participation and a normal role in the mainstream of international diplomacy over the last seven years. Issues of small size and representation, for example, are as relevant for these states as for micro-states across the developing world.

Finally, there is the question of non-sovereign micro-jurisdictions. In many cases, as with Bermuda, these dependencies enjoy virtual independence with only rare interventions from the metropolitan power. In some, as in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, jurisdictional latitude has been sufficiently generous to allow for truly autonomous strategies of self-reliant economic development, strategies that could well speak to the needs of very small sovereign states in other parts of the world. Moreover, in some of

²⁷ Jón Hjálmarsson, *History of Iceland: From the Settlement to the Present Day* (Reykjavik: Iceland Review, 1993).

²⁸ Hubert Büchel, *Is There Anything Special About Liechtenstein's National Economy?* (Vaduz: Amt für Volkswirtschaft, 1996).

these dependencies, in the Faroes, the Ålands and the Cook Islands, governments enjoy even a measure of foreign policy autonomy and separate representation. The substantive distinctions between these autonomous territories and sovereign jurisdictions are not as vividly clear as we once assumed them to be. Perhaps further attention should be given to these very small jurisdictions if only to highlight the comparative advantages or disadvantages with sovereign states.

In some significant studies in the literature both the European micro-states and autonomous dependencies are included but the picture is uneven.²⁹ Elmer Plishke's 1977 study, for instance, excluded the European micro-states which he referred to as "submicrostates" or "quasi-nations," even though by then there were a number of other micro-states of similar size and circumstances.³⁰ John Kaminarides' list is curious for its selectivity: Iceland, Luxembourg, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands (together) are included but not the smaller European sovereign states. Cambodia (!), Tuvalu and Niue are included but not Nauru. The Faroes are listed but not Åland, Gibraltar but not the Falklands.³¹

For our purposes in this study, the most commonly used ceiling of approximately one million remains the most persuasive argument for micro-state classification in spite of all the pitfalls and anxieties. The problems of "apples and pears," remain, to be sure, a perennial dilemma for comparativists. And the broad global reach of this study does little

²⁹ Armstrong, de Kervenoael, Xiaoming Li and Read, *op. cit.*

³⁰ Elmer Plischke, *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 12.

³¹ John Kaminarides, "The Small Developing Countries: An Introduction," in Kaminarides, Briguglio and Hoogendonk (eds.), *op. cit.*, xviii and xix.

to inhibit anxieties over such an expansive net. Nonetheless, broadly comparative analysis is a powerful tool in the social sciences and can offer insights which a more conservative and cautious drawing of parameters will not. At the same time, any classification based on such a fluid concept as small size must be flexible enough to allow particular situations at the margins of the taxonomy.³² Clearly, there are cases of former micro-states which have only recently graduated to another population group, that are relevant to our discussion, particularly in historical references. Similarly, there are cases of slightly larger states where an experience mirrors that of a micro-state counterpart and only draws attention to the problem of overlap. Where these examples are relevant and powerful, they will be cited throughout the study.

This study is confined to sovereign states even though there are striking parallels in certain issue-areas with such autonomous jurisdictions as the Cook Islands. The reasons for this decision relate particularly to the first two sections of the dissertation. The first chapters explore the principle of sovereignty in the light of historical problems of status and legitimacy. The second third of the study is directed to issues of representation and the potential for adroit and skilful diplomacy in spite of obvious constraints of small size.

³² Peter Lyon has recently reminded us of the limitations of small size as an explanatory tool and of the need to be sensitive to the specific circumstances of each case.

Peter Lyon, "Small States Reconsidered," *The Round Table* no. 340 (October, 1996), 402. Some critics have been so exasperated with the imprecision of small size, they have dismissed its analytical value altogether.

William E. Paterson, "Small States in International Politics," *Co-operation and Conflict* VIII (No.2, 1969), 119-123.

Others have accepted the problem resignedly and have begun simply with the admission that "by itself the concept of the small state means nothing. . . To be of any analytical use a 'small state' should be...considered as shorthand for "a state in its relationship with greater states."

Erling Bjøl, "The Small State in International Politics," in August Schou and Arne Olave Brundtland (eds.) *Small States in International Relations* (Nobel Symposium 170, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971), p. 29.

While status is an abiding concern for most autonomous dependent territories, indeed for many a central focus for further aggrandizement, and while external representation is increasingly an informal option, the central issues in these sections of the dissertation would, in our judgement, be blurred if we were to treat the autonomous dependent territories in the same fashion as sovereign micro-states. Moreover, there would then be a strong case for going beyond the dependent territories that appear in lists of micro-jurisdictions, to increasingly assertive regions within Europe or, for that matter, to states or provinces within federations, which in the case of Canada, enjoy huge areas of policy autonomy including external representation of their interests. For the purposes of this essay, though not for future consideration, this seemed a Pandora's Box indeed. Thus, while we stress the importance of being conscious of the experience of autonomous very small jurisdictions, they are not formally part of this study. However, where relevant, the experience of these dependencies is noted in the dissertation, particularly in the final sections dealing with economic relations, and especially when insightful comparisons can be drawn with sovereign states.

In short, this study encompasses the 45 sovereign states within the approximately one million population threshold.³³ We seek to be vigilant throughout in whatever issue

³³ There are currently 192 sovereign states in the international system. All but seven (Switzerland, Taiwan and five micro-states, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, Tuvalu and the Vatican City) are members of the United Nations. Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the admission of the former Soviet, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak republics, the micro-state presence in the United Nations stood at approximately one quarter of the world body's membership. Some member states were micro-states upon their admission to the United Nations (Oman, Bhutan, Lesotho, for example) but are now in another population class. There are still likely micro-state members in the queue: those territories still awaiting decolonisation and perhaps a number of potential break-away states sulking in the uncomfortable confines of newly seceded republics. The figure of 192 does not include the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic

we are exploring to the variations within the classification be they economic structures, geopolitical location, historical circumstances and colonial experiences, cultural patterns and demographic composition, anything which might impose upon the priority of small population size assumed as the premise of the study. With these caveats in place, we risk our mix of apples and pears in this exploration of very small states.

Changing Directions in the Literature of Micro-states

The treatment of micro-states in the literature of international relations seems to have gone through different stages in terms of central concerns and preoccupations. Much of the early literature did not address substantive issues concerning the relationship of small size and prospects for development and security within this emerging class of states. Initial preoccupations were those of status, and particularly the impact of this on-going proliferation of micro-states on global institutions, especially the United Nations system.

(Western Sahara) though it is a member of the O.A.U. and is recognised by nearly 100 states. Nor does it include the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or Chechnya.

Two of these states, the Vatican and Andorra, are not included for most purposes in this study. In the most literal sense the Vatican City is a micro-state. However, the international relations of the Holy See have very little to do with its small size.

Andorra's status has changed only with the March, 1993 referendum and consequently data collection has been difficult for many but not all sections of this study.

Tony Horowitz, "Andorra- Tiny Country Faces Big Changes," (originally in the Wall Street Journal), reprinted in *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), April 28, 1993, p. 1+.

Though Andorra has generally been accepted as a separate entity, the sovereignty of the principality was not clearly established and it remained a fragmentary enigma for international lawyers. Note, for example,

Georges Riera, "L'Andorre," *Revue Generale de Droit International Public* LXXII (Avril/Juin, 1968), 361-80.

Wilfried Van Hemelrijck, "Andorre, Seigneurie Medievale ou Etat Moderne?," *Chronique de Politique Etrangere* XXVI (No. 4, juillet, 1973) 423-34.

Andorra was not a party to the normal channels of diplomatic relations. France had always maintained that she was responsible for Andorra's relations with other states since one of the two princes is the president of the French Republic. Spain assumed this responsibility in 1989, though it is clear in the new constitution that Andorra will now be responsible for her own external relations. Indeed, the Principality has already established missions in New York, Madrid and Paris.

Clearly, the recognition of sovereignty in very small territories raised questions concerning the corollary principle of sovereignty, the equality of states. And this in turn engendered a wide body of literature exploring alternatives to full membership or at the very least, variable voting arrangements for these states should they continue to be admitted to international institutions. In short, the micro-state question was seen initially in terms of status, and most importantly, in terms of the well-being of the international system itself, the workings of its central institutions and the credibility of its norms. Indeed, the still respected UNITAR study itself was largely concerned with these issues. For the most part, micro-states, either individually or comparatively, were not themselves the subjects of these early inquiries.³⁴

Much of this initial discussion hinged on the issue of viability. Concerns about the prospects for micro-states were framed within the questions which this notion seemed to raise. It is not surprising that this should be the case. The standard of viability had long been a principal concern in any discussion of self-determination for dependent territories. It was certainly a central issue in the debates concerning the Mandates.³⁵ Similarly, much of the discussion in the metropolitan countries, and indeed in the very small dependencies themselves, focused on the question of whether these very small entities could actually assume the responsibilities of statehood.³⁶ For all of those who were led by their hearts

³⁴ These issues are treated extensively and this body of literature is widely cited in Chapter Two of this study.

³⁵ Walter Holmes Ritsher, *Criteria of Capacity for Independence* (Jerusalem: Syrian Orphanage Press, 1934).

³⁶ Many of these issues were treated extensively in a major volume that was typical of the tone of the debate in the early 1960's.

choose sovereignty, there were others fearful of a lonely and perhaps impoverished existence once the support systems of the colonial administration were removed. Was it possible for such very small territories to maintain any semblance of self-directed economic development? Could these micro-states meet conventional notions of statehood in other respects; the conduct of an independent foreign policy, the responsibility for their own physical security; in general, would they be capable of meeting their responsibilities to their own citizens? Or was statehood for such territories a sham, a cosmetic sop to self-determination when the reality was one of enduring dependence on international guardians?³⁷

Questions of capacity were pressing for scholars who sought to explore the prospects for very small states to engage the international system, particularly when, for so many of them, it would be in the context of highly dependent and asymmetrical relationships. Much of this work called upon a large body of American foreign policy scholarship, particularly associated with the work of James Rosenau and his colleagues, that stressed the porousness of small states and the very limited opportunities for them to protect their own interests and priorities in the face of the penetration of their societies by external players. For Vaughan Lewis, the conclusions were bleak indeed.³⁸ Though he

Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Number 9, December, 1964).

Even as late as the mid-1970's when the smallest Caribbean states were debating the options of associate statehood and independence, the question of viability was still pressing. Note for example the essays in

Independence for Grenada: Myth or Reality? (St. Augustine: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, 1974).

³⁷Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

recognised that diversification or dependence management rather than the elimination of dependency, was the most optimistic goal for small states, the prospects for achieving this were significantly and qualitatively different than that of larger developed states given the asymmetries of small size. Hence, for Lewis, many of these states are sovereign in law but non-viable in practice.

Calling upon a similar body of foreign policy scholarship, George Reid also examined the foreign policy behaviour of micro-states only to conclude that there were substantial barriers to full and genuinely autonomous participation in the international system including limited natural and human resources and excessive dependence on the external environment in most areas of the state's competence.³⁹ Further, there were severe limitations within the decision-making apparatus including a high degree of personalism, low levels of information, a low level of bureaucratic, legislative and interest group players in the foreign policy process and a high degree of penetration by external interests. In short, micro-state foreign policy both in its formulation and execution and in its orientation and impact is disabled in significant ways because of the constraints of small size.

Elmer Plishke also addressed the problems which confronted micro-states in their efforts to engage the international system. Unlike Lewis and Reid, Plishke stressed

³⁸ Vaughan Lewis, *The Structure of Small State Behaviour in Contemporary International Politics*. University of Manchester, Ph.D. dissertation, 1970.

³⁹ George L. Reid, *The Impact of Very Small Size on the International Behavior of Microstates* (Beverly Hills and London: International Studies Series, Number 02-027, Volume 2, 1974.)

See also

George L. Reid, *A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policies of Very Small States with Special Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean*. University of Southampton, Ph.D. dissertation, 1971.

various options available to micro-states in terms of innovative practices of representation and conference diplomacy, including the seemingly perennial question of their role in the United Nations system. While the tone was less pessimistic it was clear that micro-states faced enormous problems in pursuing their national interests on the global agenda, problems which clearly set them apart from more conventional small states.

Many of these disabilities were at the time judged to compromise fatally the sovereignty of these states and their long term viability within the state system. That Caribbean scholars particularly, were so sensitive to the congenital weaknesses of micro-states is not surprising. They were starkly faced with the most dramatic asymmetries of power in a region which the world's dominant power regarded as its backyard and where historically it had rarely been inhibited in exercising whatever discipline was necessary for recalcitrant small states within its purview. But the analysis of micro-state weakness in these early years, indeed the alleged non-viability of micro-states, was assessed within the framework of models that were largely extraneous to the experience and contemporary situation of these smallest of states. In terms of issues of foreign policy and security, for example, the underlying and tacit bench mark was that of a large, self-driven and unyielding state. To what extent this abstraction could be generalised even within the European state system was questionable. These pure models of independence, and viability, the ghosts of another era, were echoed in any discussion of self-reliant economic development.

In recent years, more and more students of very small states are questioning the appropriateness of such models, both political and economic, in assessing the

opportunities and the prospects for micro-states and other very small jurisdictions in the contemporary world. There is, if you like, a backlash against the wholesale import of models of development and diplomatic practice that bear no relationship to the specific needs and opportunities for very small jurisdictions in the contemporary world. We will return to this theme both in this discussion, in subsequent chapters and certainly in the conclusion. Suffice it to note at this point, that if inappropriate models and inappropriate expectations and objectives have discoloured the analysis of micro-state prospects in the international system, then much of this is rooted in the wrong-headedness of notions of viability which exaggerate weaknesses while obscuring constructive options.

The central problem with the concept of viability, and certainly with its most familiar explication, David Vital's conception that 'the viable state is one which can withstand stress on one hand and pursue policies of its own devising on the other.'⁴⁰ Rooted as it is in the Israeli experience, it seems completely irrelevant in a world of micro-states. The notion of viability is riddled with inconsistencies wherever it is applied. It will inevitably disappoint those who expect it to provide a reasonable standard for distinguishing societies and jurisdictions according to systematic criteria. Yet the concept of viability is anything but systematic. It is relative and contextual; its vague conditions are met in unexpected circumstances, and difficult to recognise in others. More important, it is an 'external judgement,'⁴¹ conceived in the metropolitan centres, though it may very well be adopted by the timid within the small territories themselves. But, as Jake Jacobs

⁴⁰ David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 4.

⁴¹ Mike Faber, 'Island Micro States: Problems of Viability,' *The Round Table* no. 292 (October, 1984), 372.

pointed out, metropolitan interpretations of viability have little relevance for the people of a given territory. From the outside world, he argued, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, to use a particularly controversial case, may not seem viable, but it is certainly viable for the citizens who live there and interact with their government on a day to day basis. For Jacobs, then, viability is a "seductive chimera."⁴² For others, like Fawzi Mellah, it is a concept deeply rooted in both Realist traditions of Western political science and conventional market models of the economy.⁴³ If the concept had any value at all, it would be within a more modest definition of survivability, in keeping with Patrick Emmanuel's definition, that is "surviving and functioning in a changing environment."⁴⁴ That modest interpretation is relevant for micro-states at the close of the century. As Tony Payne noted, any other consideration is now a matter of historical record. Whether micro-states might have chosen a wiser course is another issue⁴⁵. But certainly they have justified their right to exist and for a large number of scholars they are here to stay.⁴⁶

⁴²Jake Jacobs, "This Question of Viability: a coup de main," a paper presented to the International Conference on Islands and Small States, sponsored by the Foundation for International Studies, the University of Malta, Valletta, Malta 23-25 May, 1991.

⁴³ Mellah defiantly and, given subsequent events, poignantly rejected such a 'reductionist' concept in judging the international role and durability of his native Kuwait which, he argued, was more viable than most states in the region.

Fawzi Mellah, "Is Kuwait a 'Small State'? Reflections on the Notion of Viability of Small Nations," in Kaminarides, Briguglio and Hoogendonk (eds.), *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 116-121.

⁴⁴ Patrick Emmanuel, "Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis," in Vaughan A. Lewis (ed.), *Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean* (Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1976), p. 3.

⁴⁵ Tony Payne, "Of beauty, vulnerability and politics: survival in the Caribbean," *Third World Affairs* (1987), 222.

⁴⁶ M. S. Rajan, "Small States and the Sovereign-Nation-State System," *International Studies XXV* (Number 1, January-March, 1988), 7-8.

The issue of viability, then, is largely behind us but a concern for the inherent weakness of very small states continues to dominate the literature. Now the emphasis is not so much on absolute criteria wedded to predictions of survival, but rather on the quality of independent statehood and the prospects for reducing constraints while maximising opportunities. The focus now is on the vulnerability of very small states which, while still discouraging in many respects, represents at least a constructive step beyond idle ruminations about the survival of small states, ruminations which seem all the more unconvincing given the ongoing centrifugal trends at play in the international system.

Much of the concern for very small states and much of the analysis of their weaknesses has been within the context of Commonwealth sources both in terms of Commonwealth bodies and Commonwealth based research activities. This is not surprising since it would not be an exaggeration to describe the Commonwealth as a largely micro-state grouping, home as it is to some 25 micro-states. If we also consider the number of genuinely self-governing and autonomous very small dependencies within the Commonwealth then the reach of the Commonwealth into the problems of very small jurisdictions is unparalleled.⁴⁷

The Institute of Commonwealth Studies produced one of the first comparative studies of very small jurisdictions, a still regularly cited collection which addressed the problems of small size across a wide range of concerns.⁴⁸ In this sense, it would be a genuine

⁴⁷Among the Secretariat's many publications concerning a wide range of issues especially relevant to its smallest members, one series is particularly helpful for the students of small states since it includes data for both Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth states.

Small States: Economic Review and Basic Statistics (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, II, May, 1996).

⁴⁸Burton Benedict (ed.), *Problems of Smaller Territories* (London: University of London, the Athlone Press, 1967).

precursor for much of the literature of the last decade. Moreover, the collection was all the more insightful for including established European cases (Luxembourg) along side developing territories (British Honduras, Swaziland and Polynesia). This broad, inclusive approach is one which we stress throughout this study.

It was in the Commonwealth small states themselves, particularly in the Caribbean, and in the Secretariat, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the pages of *The Round Table* that central attention was given to the problems and options facing very small new states. For instance, many of the themes which had been explored at the Lisbon Conference in terms of the consequences of small size, albeit for much larger states, were treated with a micro-state focus in early works by William Demas.⁴⁹ His conclusions that the small size and the openness of micro-state economies would force a strategy of accommodation with international capitalism was central to a fierce debate throughout the Commonwealth Caribbean, not only in the pages of academic journals, but among Commonwealth Caribbean political leaders. Those challenging Demas' analysis argued that small economies were not necessarily locked into the straitjackets of structural dependence if they pursued bold and genuinely self-reliant strategies of development particularly in collaboration with other small states.⁵⁰

⁴⁹William G. Demas, *The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965).

⁵⁰ Note Alister McIntyre's distinction between structural and functional dependence in a volume of essays which captures much of the spirit of the debate.

Alister McIntyre, "Some Issues of Trade Policy in the West Indies," in N. Girvan and P. Jefferson (eds.) *Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean* (Mona, Jamaica: New World Group, 1971), pp. 165-183.

The first official Commonwealth recognition of the problems facing its very small members, particularly the island micro-states, was at a meeting of Finance Ministers in Barbados in 1977. Prior to that a number of Commonwealth conferences and seminars had explored problems of very small size. Now, however, the issue captured the attention of Commonwealth leaders. It has been a priority concern for the Secretariat in the years since the 1979 Lusaka Heads of Government meeting which endorsed the Secretariat's programme to seek ways for the smallest states to overcome the concomitant problems of small size, remote location and limited resources.

However, it was the Grenada Crisis of 1983 which lent such urgency to the issue of micro-states and their prospects in the international system. To be sure, the physical vulnerability and geopolitical precariousness of so many very small territories had been evident throughout the period of decolonisation: the annexation of Goa, the absorption of West Irian, the integration of Sikkim, and certainly the invasions of East Timor, Western Sahara and the Falkland Islands. But, as worrying as these cases were for many micro-states whose sovereignty was only recently granted, particularly for the many very small states which faced recurring and often explicit irredentist threats, these were, in the end, disputes within the context of the decolonisation process. The contest was one of state succession. The invasion of Grenada, however, was the first occasion when a sovereign micro-state found itself in open conflict with a major power. Though the United States role had the support and collaboration of some if not all the Commonwealth Caribbean states, and though the mission might have even been judged to be humanitarian and constructive in the end, given the apparent support of the Grenadian people for a

restoration of democratic government, it still drew considerable criticism both within the region and from Great Britain and her Western European partners. Whatever the long term consequences of the invasion and whatever the legal arguments mustered for military intervention, the events of October 1983 demonstrated vividly the asymmetries of power between very small states and major powers particularly when they share living space within the same region. The lessons were clear: very small states pursue independent policies and partnerships in the global system at their peril. If ever there was a case to arouse the concerns of both students of small states and the political leaders of micro-states, Grenada certainly served as such a catalyst.

Moreover, the invasion was seen to represent a possible watershed for the micro-states of the Caribbean: the clear replacement of British influence in the region with that of the United States,⁵¹ indeed the “deepening and widening” of American hegemony in the Caribbean basin,⁵² the further introduction of the Cold War into the Commonwealth Caribbean,⁵³ the possible militarisation of hitherto staunchly civil regimes,⁵⁴ the deleterious

⁵¹ This was the view of Tom Adams, then prime minister of Barbados.

Paul Sutton, “The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean,” *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* XXXI (No. 2), 14.

Tony Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1985), p. 180.

⁵² Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 224, 199-207.

⁵³ Vaughan A. Lewis, “International, National and Regional Security Arrangements in the Caribbean,” in Anthony T. Bryan, J. Edward Greene, Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), *Peace Development and Security in the Caribbean* (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.294.

⁵⁴ Anthony P. Maingot, “The United States in the Caribbean: Geopolitics and the Bargaining Capacity of Small States,” in Bryan, Greene and Shaw (eds.) *ibid.*, p.73.

Dion E. Phillips and Alma H. Young, “Towards an Understanding of Militarization in the Third World and in the Caribbean,” in Alma H. Young and Dion E. Phillips (eds.), *Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1986), pp. 1-15.

impact on CARICOM including the exacerbation of divisions among Commonwealth Caribbean leaders and the likely weakening of regional co-operation,⁵⁵ the defeat of socialism as an alternative strategy of political and economic development⁵⁶ and the very real limitations of small state collective action.⁵⁷

Following the events in Grenada, there was now an abiding concern in the literature for the security dilemmas of very small states. The evidence for their physical vulnerability was not confined to Grenada alone. The dangers of mercenary led invasions were apparent in the Seychelles, the Comoros and the Maldives. What was striking for so many observers was that these states could be overrun or their governments overthrown by literally a few dozen armed men. It was estimated that Bernard Coard likely had fewer than 50 armed supporters to violently overthrow the government of his erstwhile colleague.⁵⁸ Attention was now given to the geopolitical weaknesses of micro-states: the lack of a defensible hinterland,⁵⁹ the inability to police bays and inlets or remote islands in the case of archipelagic states, the lack of intelligence-gathering facilities and resources for surveillance and policing,⁶⁰ and the need for technical assistance and training for police forces, paramilitary units and the coast guard.⁶¹ And greater attention was now directed

⁵⁵ Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-213.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 213-224.

⁵⁷ Maingot, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁵⁸ George H. Quester, "Trouble in the Islands: Defending the Micro-States," *International Security* VIII (No. 2, Fall, 1983), 161.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ William M. Sutherland, "Struggle for sovereignty: self-determination and vulnerability in the Pacific islands," *Third World Affairs* (1987), 228.

to the security threats increasingly posed by drug runners, arms dealers, money launderers, illegal refugees and a host of non-conventional invasion threats.⁶² Indeed, the prime minister of Belize conceded that the drugs trade was a greater threat to his country's integrity than Guatemala's irredentism!⁶³

In the years immediately following the Grenada Crisis, several major studies explored these areas of micro-state insecurity with a clearly heightened consciousness. The Commonwealth Consultative Group's assessment for the Commonwealth Secretariat was both comprehensive in its description of micro-state vulnerabilities and forward-looking in its suggestions for bi-lateral, regional, Commonwealth and United Nations support for micro-states.⁶⁴ Some of these proposals, regional security arrangements for example, or the identification of very small states as a special class requiring particular consideration within the United Nations, have not been taken up with vigour or notable success. But many of the more modest suggestions for technical assistance and co-operation are constructive ways of meeting the security dilemma for many micro-states.

⁶¹ The Commonwealth Consultative Group, *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat:1985), pp. 51-52.

⁶² Edward Dommen, "Reflections on the Security of Small Island Countries," *Journal of World Trade Law* XX (1), Jan.-Feb., 1986, 10.

Anthony Payne, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Pacific," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* XXXI (No. 2), 126.

Paul Sutton, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* XXXI (No.2), 5, 22-23.

The Commonwealth Consultative Group, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

Payne (1987), *op. cit.*, 219.

⁶³ The Commonwealth Consultative Group. *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

Concluding that “small is dangerous,” a study group of The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies,⁶⁵ identified many of the same areas of weakness and explored many of the same options for enhancing the security resources of micro-states. These abiding concerns were reflected across the literature, particularly within such micro-state regions as the Commonwealth Caribbean. Of course, many of these anxieties were dramatically justified only a few years later with the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. In some respects, this episode was even more ominous for very small states than Grenada, as serious as that was. Not only was the level of destruction in Kuwait appalling, but this was an attempt not just to force a change of government but to eradicate the international legal personality of a sovereign state, a precedent which if it had stood would have been cause for grave concern for other vulnerable small states across the globe. Of course, there are good reasons to believe that both the invasion and the rescue mission were exceptional events. Still, the fate of Kuwait seemed to justify the preoccupation of both the academic and the international public policy communities in the security problems of micro-states which had surfaced in the wake of the Grenada crisis.

The notion of security was soon expanded to embrace a wide range of concerns: territorial integrity and political autonomy, economic freedom and security and environmental protection.⁶⁶ Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne argue that security must be seen in terms of the core values of a society which will include not only conventional

⁶⁵ Sheila Harden (ed.), *Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).

⁶⁶ Edward Dommen, “Reflections on the Security of Small Island Countries,” *Journal of World Trade Law* XX (I), Jan.-Feb., 1986, 10.

concerns of territorial integrity and military defensibility, but the economic well-being of the society and the protection of its environment and its culture and identity. The threats to these very small states are qualitatively different than those facing developed countries. Moreover, the threats can be “difficult to detect” and “ambiguous in their source and intensity.”⁶⁷

The argument that the security of micro-states should be seen in a broader context was reflected in a now abiding concern with the vulnerability of very small states across the broadest range of issue areas. Indeed, the identification of areas of vulnerability have seemed to involve an ever-widening catalogue of concerns: a list which has expanded from Dolman’s ten development constraints,⁶⁸ Diggins’ set of 12 problems⁶⁹, Jake Jacobs’ list of 19⁷⁰ to Kaminarides’ identification of some 29 constraints facing very small states.⁷¹

In many ways it is a litany of woes. The tone throughout the late 1980’s and early 1990’s was one of overwhelming weakness for micro-states on all fronts. In addition to the military and criminal threats which micro-states face from drug dealers, to Mafia

⁶⁷ Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne, “Lilliput under Threat: the Security Problems of Small Island and Enclave Developing States,” *Political Studies*, XLI (1993), 579-580.

⁶⁸ A. J. Dolman, “Paradise Lost? The Past Performance and Future Prospects of Small Island Developing Countries, in E. C. Dommen and P. L. Hein (eds.), *States, Microstates and Islands* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 40-69.

⁶⁹ C.E. Diggins, “The Problems of Small States,” *The Round Table* no. 295, July, 1985, 191-205.

⁷⁰ Jake Jacobs, “The Economic Development of Small Countries,” in John Kaminarides, Lino Briguglio, Henk N. Hoogendonk (eds.), *The Economic Development of Small Countries: Problems, Strategies and Policies* (Delft, Eburon, 1989), pp. 84-88.

⁷¹ John Kaminarides, “The Small Developing Countries: An Introduction,” *ibid.*, xii-xiv.

incursions, resource pirates and long distance trawlers in their newly awarded Exclusive Economic Zones, they are also burdened with the familiar constraints of very small economies: limited resources; often monocultural export sectors vulnerable to external price fluctuations and other shocks; diseconomies of scale in most areas of economic activity thus limiting prospects for diversification; chronic balance of payments problems resulting from an excessive dependence on imports and unfavourable terms of trade for their exports; high degrees of both commodity and geographic concentration in their export trade; remoteness and high transport costs; an inadequate pool of domestic skills and expertise the consequence of limited local educational opportunities; an excessive dependence on official development assistance often linked to problems of gaining access to appropriate types of technical assistance; a serious bargaining disadvantage in highly asymmetrical relations with external sources of investment, banks and multinational corporations and dependence on uncontrollable overseas consumption patterns and foreign government policies which lend insecurity even in those sectors which may offer prospects for diversification: tourism, and off-shore finance for example.

To these economic constraints are added social and political weaknesses which undermine the micro-state's capacity to ensure its interests most effectively in the international system; the intimate face to face social relations of very small societies and the ubiquitousness of government; the difficulties of achieving a merit system in a society given to personalism, clientism and bossism; the temptations for excessive political interference in administrative decision-making; limited career opportunities thus encouraging outward migration and a brain drain. Further, micro-states, particularly

island micro-states, are ecologically fragile and prone to a variety of natural catastrophes which can have grotesquely disproportionate effects on a micro-state's economy and infrastructure whether it is a hurricane in St. Lucia or a volcano in Iceland or global warming in the Maldives.

There is also what Fawzi Mellah has termed "the smallness syndrome," a handicap which has been particularly recurring in the experience of his native Kuwait: a sense of abiding danger and weakness which is itself inhibiting and enervating for political leaders in very small societies.⁷²

Perhaps this exploration of micro-state vulnerability reached its apex with the publication of Lino Briguglio's UNCTAD commissioned "Vulnerability Index."⁷³ As with so many of these studies, the focus is principally on island micro-states and thus, the problem of distinguishing islandness from smallness remains. Moreover, the exercise is still incomplete both for island micro-states and for their continental counterparts which are included for comparative purposes. Tuvalu, Nauru, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, São Tome and Príncipe, Qatar, Brunei, Djibouti, Luxembourg and and the other continental European micro-states are not included in the current index. However, the index represents a valuable contribution to a more rigorous and perhaps less impressionistic assessment of the nature of micro-state vulnerability. But by its very nature

⁷² Fawzi Mellah, "Is Kuwait a 'Small State?'" Reflections on the Notion of 'Viability' of Small States," *ibid.*, 113-122.

⁷³ Lino Briguglio, "Small Island Developing States and Their Economic Vulnerabilities," *World Development* XXIII (No. 9, 1995, 1615-1632.

In some respects this exercise is a mirror image of those efforts to find hard indices of viability. Note particularly

François Doumenge, "Basic Criteria for Estimating the Viability of Small Island States," in Kaminarides, Briguglio and Hoogendonk (eds.), *op. cit.* pp. 39-56.

and focus, it cannot in itself indicate the other side of the picture, that is a more positive assessment of micro-state prospects in a changing global environment.

To be sure, the advantages of small size are not entirely overlooked even among those scholars somewhat numbed by the experience of Grenada. Much emphasis has been given, for example, to the presumed cohesion of small societies which tends to promote a strong sense of national solidarity, an asset which makes "subversion by stealth" less likely.⁷⁴ Such solidarity also contributes to early levels of consensus.⁷⁵ The potential harm of certain courses of action for the community as a whole is more readily recognised. This gives the small society the advantage of resilience in the face of common dangers.⁷⁶ It is of particular value if very small societies must confront, as many of them have, painful demands for adjustment. Changes in the bases of the Icelandic and Maltese economies, for example, have depended on just such resilience among the citizenry. Paul Streeten has suggested that these factors of resilience, which could be a skilled and an adaptable labour force, attractive conditions of political stability and the absence of red tape, can go a long way to giving many small economies a competitive advantage in the search for investment.⁷⁷ Others have stressed the relative invisibility of small players which

⁷⁴ Robert C. Kiste and R. A. Herr, *The Potential for Soviet Penetration of the South Pacific Islands: An Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1984), p. 6.

⁷⁵ Jeff Richards, "Micro-states: A Specific Form of Polity?," *Politics X* (No. 1, 1990), 44-45.

Dag Anckar takes exception these assumptions of small state homogeneity. In a comparative study he identifies a sufficient number of cases where homogeneity is low that one is bound to question the generalisation.

Dag Anckar, "Small is Homogeneous: Myth or Reality," paper presented to the 29th Annual Meeting of the Finnish Political Science Association, Helsinki, 9-10 January, 1997.

⁷⁶ A. Elek, H. Hill and S. R. Tabor, "Liberalisation and Diversification in a Small Island Economy: Fiji since the 1987 Coup," *World Development XXI* (No. 5, 1993), 749-769.

⁷⁷ Streeten, *op. cit.*, 201.

effectively puts them beyond the urgent concerns of major powers, even perhaps beyond view. This can allow for policy initiatives that would not be as easily tolerated in more visible settings.⁷⁸ Very small states, because their interests are not so dispersed, can focus all of their energies on particular target players and here the clever and manipulative use of their diplomatic skills may compensate for structural weaknesses.⁷⁹

Moreover, there is a growing tendency to assess this litany of woes, the misery index of vulnerability, against the underlying premises of the analysis. Many of these arguments are rooted in theories and models of development based on the experience of large, developed states. For Godfrey Baldacchino, for example, the willingness of small state leaders and scholars to accept these models without question reflects a tragic gullibility on their part. It has also discouraged the development of home grown analysis.⁸⁰ Perhaps most dramatic is the work of Geoffrey Bertram who has virtually turned conventional orthodoxies upside down. In assessing the rentier economies of the South Pacific, for example, Bertram argues that such sources of income as the remittances from migrants, the exploitation of global markets in philately, tourism and off-shore banking are not necessarily indices of deepening weakness and vulnerability. They are the foundations of the modern economy in these societies. And they are entirely in keeping with the objectives of sustainable development!⁸¹

⁷⁸ Robert O. Keohane, "Economic Dependence and the Self-Directed Small State," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* VI (No. 2, 1982), 56-59.

⁷⁹ Dømmen, *op. cit.*, 117.

⁸⁰ Godfrey Baldacchino, "Between Scylla and Carybdis: The Track Record for Very Small, Insular Economies," in David Milne (ed.), *Constitutional Status and Economic Space in Very Small Jurisdictions* forthcoming.

In recent years, the literature on micro-states has reflected this more optimistic reading of their circumstances. Surely, they continue to face many of the problems alluded to thus far. But they also enjoy the supports, both at the regional and global levels, of an international system marked by unprecedented levels of institutional co-operation. Indeed, as both Scottish and Quebecois nationalists have argued, their respective regional support systems have actually strengthened their arguments for separate independence. There is no doubt that many of the world's smallest states rely on a remarkable array of programmes for information, technical assistance and international access. It is not unreasonable to assume that separate independence would indeed have been unlikely were it not for the existence of such supports. Clearly, for the micro-states of the Commonwealth the fact that so many Commonwealth programmes are highly sensitive to the needs of the smallest members gives those states incalculable resources in engaging the international economy.

Globalisation too is recently being viewed not just as a new set of dangers with threats of marginalisation but also as a set of opportunities for very small jurisdictions to exploit niches. And only tiny niches are necessary, in an increasingly complex global economy. The recent work of Harvey Armstrong and Robert Read, for example, with their rigorous comparative economic analysis of small jurisdictions, suggests that many micro-states, particularly in Europe, are enjoying higher economic performances and greater levels of prosperity than those contiguous small regions which lack jurisdictional

⁸¹ Geoffrey Bertram, "Sustainable Development in Pacific Micro-economies," *World Development* XIV (1986), 809-822.

Geoffrey Bertram, "Sustainability, Aid, and Material Welfare in Small South Pacific Island Economies, 1900-1990," *World Development* XXI (No. 2, 1993), 247-258.

identity and competence.⁸² Recent emphasis in the literature then reflects a greater disposition to opportunity and a willingness to challenge conventional assumptions of development, security and diplomatic practice which animate the arguments for small state vulnerability.⁸³

The Direction and Structure of this Study

This study is as much directed to the scope of opportunity for micro-states in the post-war world as it is sensitive to the constraints which continue to hamper their international relations. Indeed, the course of the research has surfaced often surprising evidence of the continuing successful integration of these states into the global system. For a significant number, post-independence developments have not borne out the deep anxieties of many serious and conscientious observers in the early stages of decolonisation. The thrust of our argument, then, is that an evolving international system offers a range of supports and opportunities for micro-states which increasingly give substance to the capacities and prerogatives presumed in their sovereignty. Indeed, sovereignty itself is in many respects the currency by which they can augment their autonomy and enhance their economic well-being.

⁸² Harvey Armstrong and Robert Read, "Western European Micro-States and EU Autonomous Regions: The Advantages of Size and Sovereignty," *World Development* XXIII (No. 7, 1995), 1229-1245.

⁸³ In some cases the enthusiastic tone for very small jurisdictions is reminiscent of the work of Leopold Kohr.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe, "Small is Beautiful and Efficient: The Case for Secession," *Telos* CVII (Spring, 1996), 93-101.

The dissertation attempts to present a comprehensive picture of micro-state development in the post-war world over three main issue-areas: questions of legitimacy and status reinforcement; problems of engagement, representation and participation in the mainstream of international diplomacy and challenges of diversification and dependence management in the international economic relations of micro-states. The study represents a different approach than most of the existing literature in its emphasis on development patterns of micro-state participation over the broad period of the post-war years. Not only did the unexpected proliferation of micro-states in the 1960's and 1970's alter the international landscape, it also gradually overturned conventional prejudices concerning the nature of statehood, as conditions for participation themselves changed. It is useful to consider this broad time frame, to reflect upon an earlier climate which gave rise to scepticism, anxiety and even despair if we are to appreciate fully the opportunities which are open to micro-states in the closing years of the 1990's. Much of the literature is as limited in time frame as it is in geographic scope. It is not surprising then that in the immediate aftermath of the Grenada crisis, it was difficult to see beyond the overwhelming asymmetries of power that seemed to frustrate the expectations and aspirations of very small states at every turn. But there has been a profound change in the international climate over the last forty years, a change which now presents new conditions for micro-states, even the smallest European micro-states, to be integrated more fully into the international system, often with unexpected opportunities for promoting their interests. These changes have affected all three areas under consideration in this study: status reinforcement, diplomatic engagement and economic diversification. Our focus throughout

is to explore the value of status itself, jurisdiction as a resource for very small states, in their efforts to take advantage of global changes which favour their long term interests. By viewing our material against the broad tapestry of post-war history, we should be better placed to assess the consequences of very small size and the opportunities for ameliorating those constraints in a continually changing global milieu.

A second departure from almost all the literature thus far is our determination to adopt a universal basis for comparative analysis. Much of the literature is, of course, case-based. And a significant body of the comparative literature is region-focused. Both have yielded valuable insights into the particular inhibitions and limitations of very small size. Indeed, those insights may be all the more vivid for their close examination of unique settings within fairly intimate parameters of analysis. But, as we have already noted, the global comparative literature has been weaker for a lack of inclusiveness and universality. We have, throughout this study, included the experiences of the developed European micro-states along with the very small states of the developing world. There is no demographic reason to exclude these states any longer, since there are a significant number of micro-states with populations of less than 100,000. Moreover, since most of these states have experienced industrialisation and diversification only in recent years, there is the opportunity to seek parallels especially in terms of public policy initiatives and development strategies. The European states now engage the international system as fully as their Third World counterparts, particularly in targeted issue areas. Any comparative analysis of micro-state diplomacy should include *all* of the states within this group if we

are to have a fuller understanding of the impact of very small size on their international relations.

In short, the study offers a broad context of analysis, comprehensive both in its time frame and in the parameters of the micro-state class. Within that context we make use of a wide variety of examples and case studies, particularly in the chapters relating to perennial problems of status reinforcement, and a broad and detailed use of cross-comparative data for all 45 micro-states in both the sections on micro-state diplomacy and micro-state international economic relations. In both the diplomatic and economic sections of the study we have used exhaustive comparative data for some 40 states in the next population class, that is states between one and six million. This provides a perspective on the relative impact of small size between the very small and the small, a perspective which thus far is not available in the existing literature.

The dissertation is structured around the following three sections:

(a) The System Dependence of Micro-States: Problems of Status and Legitimacy

The first argument is a familiar one in any discussion of small states: Because of the vulnerabilities inherent in very small size, micro-states will stress those values and practices at the international level which reinforce their status as sovereign and equal members of the international community.

The indisputability of a state's legal status may be seen as a front line of defence. Typically lacking even rudimentary military forces, micro-states rely largely on tacit, and occasionally explicit agreements with friendly powers, the restraints of international law and the inhibitions which potential adversaries are likely to face in international

organisations. A state with a strong case for its own existence will be better positioned to exploit the norms of the international system to prevent its demise than a state where separate independence has always been viewed sceptically, even among sympathetic powers. Of course, in the face of a determined adversary and the counter-interests of major powers, even an appeal to conscience and law could mean little. However, to the extent that status itself can be a source of security, then a state's reserve of legitimacy is a critical issue. The survival of micro-states depends far more on systemic factors than on their own capacities and most important among those are the rules and diplomatic practices which support the separate independence of small and very small states. Consequently, these states give priority to those international bodies, particularly the United Nations system, the Commonwealth and major regional organisations, which serve as constant acknowledgements of their sovereignty and equality in international law.

At first glance the status of micro-states would now seem to be secure. Universal acceptance of the doctrine of self-determination for *all* colonial peoples would appear to have established the rights of the very small beyond doubt. The process of decolonisation itself has undermined prejudices of viability and traditional views of statehood which have so regularly dominated any discussion of micro-states. Still, the status of very small states in the international system has been typically fraught with controversy. Until very recently the very notion of separate independence for most of these states was seen as absurd. Their full participation in international organisations was certainly problematic. And for many micro-states, confidence in their eventual survival is undermined by an anxious recognition of the interests, and sometimes long-standing claims, of larger

neighbouring states. Indeed, as we have already noted, the experiences of Kuwait and Grenada, recent as they are, have served as sobering reminders of the continuing vulnerability of very small states even when international norms and organisations serve to support their sovereignty.

We have approached these problems of status in the first section of this study as questions of international legitimacy. A problem of legitimacy arises when there are discrepancies between formal status and real status. As Lagos pointed out in his analysis of international stratification, real status is determined by both objective and subjective evaluations.⁸⁴ A state's legitimacy is questionable if the reality of its position does not appear to be in accord with existing assumptions of sovereignty. Legitimacy is also undermined if the legal sovereignty of a state is seen to be inimical to prevailing norms in the international system.

The first chapter is an analysis of the concept of legitimacy within the context of the historical development and contemporary usage of the principle of sovereignty. If sovereignty is understood as a legal acknowledgement of actual independence, micro-states can appear as anomalies whose real status should be understood to be something different from, if not less than, normal states. Similarly, when sovereignty is viewed as the culmination of self-determination, micro-states may be seen as remnants of larger states in transition rather than as nations deserving the equality which sovereignty accords.

Chapter Two examines the questions of status which attend the issue of micro-state participation in international organisations in the twentieth century. Resistance to

⁸⁴Gustavo Lagos, *International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), pp. 22-29.

unconditional universal membership involved both aspects of the legitimacy question. Whatever their formal status, micro-states were not seen to possess the capabilities which would make their membership a practical option for international organisations. Moreover, stretching the equality of states doctrine to this extent appeared as unfair as it was impractical. This chapter is a review of the historical experience of very small states in confronting these reservations and in winning acceptance for their status in the assemblies of the international community.

The third chapter examines the legitimacy question within the context of the principle of national self-determination. It is focused on the problems of applying the principle to extremely small and fragmentary dependencies when there is a contest of claims. While those challenging separate independence in these cases are also likely to question the lack of resources and capabilities commensurate with statehood, their major attack is directed to the historical and geographic credentials of these communities as national peoples. We look at the experience of three very small dependent territories—East Timor, Western Sahara, and Belize—where separate independence, while fully meeting the provisions of latter day United Nations doctrine and practice, was, nonetheless, challenged as a violation of larger principles of territorial integrity. In all three cases we see how crucial the consolidation of legitimacy is for controversial small territories seeking a separate future in the international system.

The fourth and final chapter in this section examines how very small size underscores other sources of the legitimacy problem; territorial and geopolitical liabilities, the questionable historical and social foundations of statehood and ambiguous and unequal

treaty relationships. In particular we review the problems of status and legitimacy in Kuwait, The Gambia and Bhutan. The argument is not that micro-states alone confront problems of legitimacy or that the credentials of all micro-states are open to question and challenge. Rather, there are particular aspects of the legitimacy issue which are directly related to the very small size of states, and these compound other sources of status weakness. Because some micro-states may be seen as states in name only, the consolidation of their legal status is a primary objective in their relations with other members of the international system. It is this formal status in international law which justifies their continued sovereignty just as it allows opportunities for carving out areas of actual independence, however modest they might be.

(b) The Limitations of Very Small Size in the Scale and Direction of Micro-state Diplomacy

The ability of micro-states to cope with problems of status, and the potential for achieving some measure of real autonomy in both domestic and external policies, will depend largely on their diplomatic resources. International lawyers have emphasised the importance of the capacity to engage in international relations as an essential mark of sovereignty. The absence of a diplomatic service or the delegation of diplomatic powers to another state have usually meant a compromise of status. Similarly, some measure of diplomatic authority has allowed governments in dependent territories a degree of international personality, and even access to inter-governmental organisations, approximating the privileges accorded sovereign states.

Among micro-states the question of diplomatic capability is not only important for those controversial states which may face some challenge to their sovereignty. The capacity to diversify relations through active bi-lateral and multi-lateral diplomacy is crucial for governments which seek to reduce their large, or in some instances overwhelming, dependence on mentor powers. As most micro-states are developing economies, there are also high stakes in terms of development assistance and capital investment which largely depend on the ability to mount an effective diplomatic presence in foreign capitals and international organisations.

In the second section of the study, we turn to this aspect of micro-state international relations. Much more than other small states, micro-states engage in very few international relationships and are concerned with a narrow range of issue-areas. A micro-state typically concentrates its limited diplomatic resources on the relationship with its mentor power.

Not surprisingly, the very limited diplomatic capabilities of micro-states have led some observers to conclude that these states do not really engage in foreign policy at all. Chapter Five begins by examining the influence of the 'political realist' school in foreign policy theory, which accounts for these initial impressions. It also reviews those empirical studies which have attempted to validate theoretical assumptions about the impact of size: specifically typologies of foreign policy behaviour based on diplomatic exchange date and events-data research. At this early stage of the subject, diplomatic exchange date provides a more reliable profile of micro-state behaviour than events-data sources. The first section of this chapter concludes with an overview of the total volume of micro-state and small

state relations based on patterns of diplomatic accreditation and membership in international organisations. Though it would be rash to argue that micro-states are unable to engage in foreign policy, there is, even in this initial and broad survey, clear evidence of a progressive correlation between small size and the scale of diplomatic activity. In the second part of this chapter we compare the level of micro-state diplomatic representation abroad to that of small states in the next population group. There are also great disparities between micro-states and other small states in their capacities to establish overseas missions and to maintain direct relations with other states and international organisations. There are also significant differences within the micro-state class itself. We assess the relevance of such factors as the size of the economy, the duration of independence and the geographical location of the state. We also examine the opportunities for expanding the base of micro-state relations with the outside world through such alternative diplomatic practices as multiple accreditation, co-operative arrangements with other states, and the use of the consular system.

This chapter also considers the other side of micro-state diplomacy: the importance of resident accreditation in micro-state capitals. The diplomatic attention which a micro-state receives is not only a measure of its international status. It also serves as a vital link to the outside world, supplementing the micro-state's own meagre diplomatic resources. Most micro-states host very few missions and some receive no resident accreditation at all. This low level of diplomatic attention, particularly in sharp contrast to other small states, would seem to support the notion that micro-states are as peripheral and inconsequential as they are weak and inactive. Though the overall pattern is one of

neglect, there are still important distinctions within the micro-state class, such as the economic and strategic interests of other states, cultural and historical links, and the political leadership and ideological orientation of micro-state governments,

The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the direction of micro-state diplomacy and the relative importance of bi-lateral and multi-lateral commitments as evident in our comparative analysis of the data. Given the very limited diplomatic resources of micro-states, total diplomatic interaction is confined to a few critical relationships. International organisations, particularly the United Nations and the Commonwealth, are a primary focus of attention. Both are important not only for status reinforcement but for development assistance, information resources, and access to the regional economic commissions. Regional relationships are increasingly important, particularly in conference diplomacy, though there are great variations among the cluster areas of the micro-states group. Most critical, however, is the micro-state's relationship with its mentor power. Fox's argument that small state diplomacy is narrow or local in focus is particularly evident among micro-states. The 'local' power may be a neighbouring state but more often it is the former metropolitan power which still dominates the micro-state's economic interests and political orientation. In some instances, as in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the South Pacific, or in southern Africa, this relationship is shared with a dominant regional power or powers. The initial evidence clearly confirms assumptions that micro-state diplomacy is primarily focused on inter-governmental organisations and on bi-lateral relationships with mentor powers.

(c) The Economic Dependence of Micro-states in the International System

The final section of the study is directed to the proposition which may seem to be the most critical: Because of their very small size and limited resources, the international economic relations of micro-states are characterised by patterns of extreme dependence, with little opportunity for diversification and bleak prospects for genuine autonomy. Chapter Six is a review of the concept of dependence, particularly in the literature of dependency theory, and an examination of small size and problems of independent economic development. The central issue in this discussion is the extent to which the limitations of very small size are fundamental and structural, thus precluding strategies for the self-determination of national economic priorities.

Chapter Seven begins with a comparative assessment of micro-state trading patterns with that of other small states. It examines the overall importance of trade in micro-state economies and, more particularly, the levels of commodity concentration in micro-state export trade. One of the most striking indices of dependence is a narrow base of primary production for export and the consequent vulnerability of the very small economy to price fluctuation, product substitution and market change. These patterns of dependence for micro-states are extreme; in many cases dependence is underlined further by the low value of their few products and their marginal share of world production.

The depth of dependence is even clearer in the geographic concentration of micro-state trade and sources of aid and investment. Micro-states are typically dependent on a single source of supply and a single market. Using the Hirschmann index of geographic concentration, we see the extent of micro-state trade dependence in comparison with other small states which are themselves largely dependent on a few trading partners. For micro-

states, trade dependence is typically centred on the mentor power confirming patterns already apparent in the previous section. However, the data also suggests recent encouraging trends to diversification in both the commodity and geographic indices of micro-state export trade.

When we turn to patterns of capital investment and development assistance the initial impression is again one of extreme dependence among the developing economies of the micro-state group. In the final section of this chapter we consider the problems which micro-states face in the competition for investment and aid, the relative significance of bilateral and multilateral assistance, and the opportunities for diversification. And we consider whether the character of micro-state trade and capital flows support the scepticism of those who view small size as imposing chronic and permanent obstacles to self-reliant development.

The conclusion reviews our general hypotheses on the impact of very small size in the international relations of micro-states and those particular propositions which served as the focus for research in this study. Much more than other small states, there is a want of confidence and a still contingent status which micro-states bring to international politics, an early ceiling on the extent of their participation, and limited opportunities for diversification and independence. However, it is by no means clear that these disabilities doom micro-states to a palsied existence on the margins of an indulgent international system. On the contrary, the new international climate and the new global economy present as many opportunities for very small states as they do constraints. The conclusion is an appropriate time to review the balance of options facing micro-states, particularly

the advantages rooted in their newly won status. Our assessment will be within the context of themes developed in the literature thus far. But we also want to consider the prospects for micro-states against the backdrop of changes in the global milieu and within the context of our findings across the chapters of this study.

APPENDIX

TABLE I**MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO POPULATION**

	MICRO-STATES	POPULATION
1	Mauritius	1,056,660a
2	Gambia	1,025,867b
3	Gabon	1,011,710b
4	Guinea-Bissau	943,000c
5	Guyana	739,553d
6	Cyprus	725,000e
7	Fiji	715,375f
8	Swaziland	681,059f
9	Djibouti	519,900g
10	Bahrain	508,037h
11	Qatar	486,000g
12	Comoros	446,817h
13	Suriname	404,310d
14	Luxembourg	384,400h
15	Solomon Islands	359,000
16	Equatorial Guinea	356,000d
17	Malta	345,000l
18	Cape Verde	341,991a
19	Iceland	262,193e
20	Brunei	260,482h
21	Barbados	257,082j
22	Bahamas	255,055a
23	Maldives	213,215a
24	Belize	189,774h
25	Vanuatu	175,000
26	Western Samoa	159,862h
27	St. Lucia	133,308h
28	São Tomé and Príncipe	116,998h
29	St. Vincent and Grenadines	106,499h
30	Micronesia	100,749k
31	Grenada	94,806h
32	Tonga	94,649f
33	Kiribati	72,335a
34	Dominica	71,183h
35	Seychelles	68,598l
36	Antigua and Barbuda	62,992h
37	Andorra	54,507a
38	St. Kitts and Nevis	44,000m
39	Marshall Islands	43,380n
40	Monaco	29,876a

TABLE I

MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO POPULATION

	MICRO-STATES	POPULATION
41	Liechtenstein	29,868o
42	San Marino	23,719e
43	Palau	15,122a
44	Nauru	9,500d
45	Tuvalu	9,043h
46	Vatican City	1,000

TABLE II**MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO
SIZE OF TERRITORY¹**
(square kilometres)

	MICRO-STATES	SIZE
1	Gabon	267,667
2	Guyana	214,969
3	Suriname	163,820
4	Iceland	103,000
5	Guinea-Bissau	38,125
6	Solomon Islands	28,370
7	Equatorial Guinea	28,051
8	Djibouti	23,963
9	Belize	22,963
10	Fiji	18,333
11	Swaziland	17,400
12	Bahamas	13,864
13	Vanuatu	12,190
14	Qatar	11,437
15	Gambia	11,295
16	Cyprus	9,251
17	Brunei	5,765
18	Cape Verde	4,033
19	Western Samoa	2,831
20	Luxembourg	2,586
21	Mauritius	2,040
22	Comoros	1,862
23	Palau	1,632
24	São Tomé and Príncipe	1,001
25	Dominica	751
26	Tonga	748
27	Kiribati	717
28	Micronesia	701
29	Bahrain	688
30	St. Lucia	617
31	Antigua and Barbuda	482
32	Seychelles	455
33	Andorra	453
34	Barbados	430
35	St. Vincent and Grenadines	388

¹ *Statistical Yearbook 1993* (New York: United Nations, Department for Social Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division, 1995)

TABLE II

**MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO
SIZE OF TERRITORY**

(square kilometres)

	MICRO-STATES	SIZE
36	Grenada	345
37	Maldives	298
38	St. Kitts and Nevis	262
39	Malta	246
40	Marshall Islands	181
41	Liechtenstein	160
42	San Marino	61
43	Tuvalu	24
44	Nauru	21
45	Monaco	195ha
46	Vatican City	44ha

TABLE III**MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO
SIZE OF G.D.P.¹
(in \$US millions, 1992)**

	MICRO-STATES	\$
1	Luxembourg	11,848
2	Qatar	7,473
3	Cyprus	6,639
4	Iceland	6,613
5	Gabon	4,864
6	Bahrain	4,364
7	Brunei	3,919
8	Bahamas	3,059
9	Mauritius	3,036
10	Suriname	2,807
11	Malta	2,705
12	Liechtenstein	1,529
13	Barbados	1,574
14	Fiji	1,407
15	Swaziland	955
16	Andorra	836
17	Monaco	646
18	Djibouti	578
19	San Marino	485
20	Belize	468
21	Antigua and Barbuda	439
22	Seychelles	409
23	Cape Verde	385
24	Gambia	339
25	St. Lucia	302
26	Comoros	273
27	Guyana	239
28	Grenada	217
29	Solomon Islands	207
30	St. Vincent and Grenadines	193
31	Dominica	187
32	Equatorial Guinea	185
33	Vanuatu	180
34	Maldives	178
35	Nauru	163

¹ *Statistical Yearbook 1993* (New York: United Nations, Department for Social Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division, 1995) pp. 35-46.

TABLE III

**MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO
SIZE OF G.D.P.**

(in \$US millions, 1992)

	MICRO-STATES	\$
36	Guinea-Bissau	134
37	St. Kitts and Nevis	131
38	Tonga	124
39	Western Samoa	123
40	Marshall Islands	79
41	Kiribati	39
42	Palau	31.5
43	São Tomé and Príncipe	27
44	Tuvalu	9

TABLE IV**MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO LEVELS OF
PER CAPITA INCOME¹**

(in \$US thousands, 1992)

	MICRO-STATES	\$
1	Liechtenstein	54,607
2	Luxembourg	31,343
3	Iceland	25,436
4	Monaco	23,082
5	San Marino	21,099
6	Nauru	18,111
7	Andorra	17,781
8	Qatar	16,497
9	Brunei	14,516
10	Bahamas	11,587
11	Cyprus	9,273
12	Bahrain	8,188
13	Malta	7,536
14	Suriname	6,408
15	Antigua and Barbuda	6,646
16	Barbados	6,078
17	Seychelles	5,684
18	Gabon	3,938
19	St. Kitts and Nevis	3,114
20	Mauritius	2,756
21	Dominica	2,594
22	Micronesia	2,484
23	Grenada	2,384
24	Belize	2,364
25	Palau	2,286
26	St. Lucia	2,206
27	Fiji	1,904
28	St. Vincent and Grenadines	1,771
29	Marshall Islands	1,618
30	Tonga	1,280
31	Djibouti	1,238
32	Swaziland	1,205
33	Vanuatu	1,149
34	Guinea-Bissau	1,071
35	Cape Verde	1,002

¹ *Statistical Yearbook 1993* (New York: United Nations, Department for Social Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division, 1995), pp. 35-46

TABLE IV

MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO LEVELS OF
PER CAPITA INCOME
(in \$US thousands, 1992)

	MICRO-STATES	\$
37	Tuvalu	713
38	Solomon Islands	606
39	Kiribati	528
40	Equatorial Guinea	502
41	Comoros	466
42	Gambia	374
43	Guyana	296
44	São Tomé and Príncipe	218

CHAPTER ONE

Sovereignty and the Question of Legitimacy: Problems of Status for Micro-States in the International System

The initial and usually recurring theme which characterises any discussion of micro-states is the problematic nature of their sovereignty; the discrepancies between legal status and the limitations of very small size. Typically, micro-states have been described as 'ceremonial states',¹ 'statelets' or 'quasi-states'² with formal credentials that bear little relationship to those powers normally associated with sovereign authority. Against traditional models of statehood they appear as caricatures. More often than not this is a perfunctory and instinctive response. It seems self-evident that these tiny states could hardly be 'genuinely' sovereign: No support beyond an appeal to common sense is thought to be necessary.³ In one of the earliest studies of micro-states Roger Fisher noted that "there is inevitably an attempt on the part of lawyers and others who look at the micro-state problem to adopt the solution of Procrustes, . . . we tend to insist that a small entity fit the bed that we have constructed. If it is not big enough to be a traditional state, 'a viable international unit', then it should go back where it came from."⁴

¹Ronald P. Barston (ed.), *The Other Powers* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1973), p. 21.

²Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. 81.

³For example: "To speak of San Marino as a 'sovereign state' when its total area is only 38 square miles seems to strain the imagination."

Charles G. Fenwick, *International Law* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948, 3rd ed. rev.), p. 114. In the closing days of decolonisation such candid incredulity gave way to more polite and circumspect language, though a sense of disbelief remained. Joseph Frankel, *International Politics: Conflict and Harmony* (London: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 37-38.

⁴Roger Fisher, "The Participation of Microstates in International Affairs," *The American Society of International Law-Proceedings*, Washington, D.C. (April 25-27, 1968), 166.

This abiding scepticism about the reality of micro-state sovereignty is reflected not only in academic literature and popular journalism but in the practices of the international system. The traditional European micro-states have long confronted doubts which inhibited and limited their participation in international diplomacy. Much of their diplomatic activity was given to asserting the historical basis of and legal justification for their own international status.⁵ With the onset of decolonisation and the unexpected appearance of so many new micro-states, official and explicit doubts were muffled in the clamour for self-determination. But the long-term viability of statehood on a miniscule scale is still open to question.

The problematic nature of statehood in so many cases is a dominant characteristic of the contemporary international system. New states, but particularly new micro-states, appear as "more hope than actuality."⁶ Many exist within the shadow of opposing interests and with few military or economic capabilities, even in relation to other small states. The case for separate independence is often questionable in both practical and moral terms. For many of these tiny states, then, the consolidation of their legal status and the acceptance of their credentials of statehood are recurring and urgent issues. In these conditions, the durability of the state may be seen, as John Herz suggests, as a question of its legitimacy.⁷

We begin our examination of micro-states by considering those questions which might undermine their status in the international system and determine their survival as

⁵C. D'Olivier Farran, "The Position of Diminutive States in International Law," in Erik Brüel (and others, eds.), *Internationalrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen—Festschrift für Walter Schätzel zu seinem Geburtstag* (Dusseldorf: Hermes, 1960), pp. 131-147.

⁶Robert C. Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in Laurence W. Martin (ed.) *Neutrality and Non-Alignment* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 3.

⁷John Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, rev. ed., 1969), p. 82.

separate entities. It is the concept of legitimacy as a dimension of statehood which is our central concern in this and the following three chapters. Initially, we explore the use of legitimacy as an analytical concept in international relations. More particularly, we focus on the problems of legitimacy for micro-states against the backdrop of the historical development and contemporary understanding of statehood and the principle of sovereignty in the international system. In the next chapter we assess the experience of tiny communities in asserting their case for separate existence and rooting their sovereignty in the international community of states.

The Legitimacy of States

When we speak of the legitimacy of a state in international relations we are referring to the justification for its existence in both practical and moral terms;⁸ the credentials of statehood. In the first sense legitimacy refers to an assessment of the state's capabilities. Can the state (or would-be state) act in the capacities normally understood to be the functions of a state? Here the emphasis is on viability: that is, "surviving and functioning in a changing environment."⁹ The capacity to fulfill the functions of statehood can be seen as a measure of a state's "survivability." A state with intrinsic disabilities may be viewed by other members of the international system (and even by its own subjects) as an aberration likely to succumb eventually to a more rational and capable political system. Legitimacy is withheld to the extent permanence is doubted.

⁸In discussing the legitimacy of governments, David Apter chose to see legitimacy as the composition of two sets of values: those which can be described as "consumatory," that is normative, and those which he calls "instrumental," that is utilitarian.

David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965) pp. 83-87.

⁹Patrick Emmanuel, "Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis," in Vaughan A. Lewis (ed.), *Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean* (Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1976), p.3.

But the legitimacy of a state is not only a reflection of its power and capacity. It is also a consideration of moral justification, of its 'right' to a separate destiny. The justification for a state's existence is a question of both domestic and international support. The internal basis of legitimacy reflects the extent to which the state is identified with primary community loyalties. Legitimacy is present if the state is believed to be " . . . the basis of which a particular group organizes its separate and distinct existence . . . "10 The international judgement of a state's legitimacy is based, in part, on an assessment of this evidence. It is also the belief that these majority sentiments can be accommodated within the framework of other principles, particularly commitments to the territorial integrity and historical claims of other peoples and states. It is the conviction that a particular community has a *right* to be constituted as a state and to enjoy the privileges of sovereignty and membership in the international system.

Legitimacy, then, is most evident if the separateness of the state as a sovereign community is seen to be in accord with prevailing norms of self-determination. This aspect of the legitimacy of the state is also an issue of viability. Clear domestic consensus in support of the state's separate independence, buttressed by a favourable international climate is particularly important in times of crisis when a state's survival is threatened by larger interests and alternative versions of a just settlement.

The legitimacy of the state in international relations refers, then, to the extent to which there is positive commitment to the state's right to exist and confidence in its ability to survive. The legitimate state is the state which is accepted as authentic, credible and, perhaps most important, durable. In this sense, the concept of legitimacy conveys more than the acceptance derived from legal recognition, though recognition and admission to

¹⁰Herz, *op. cit.*

international organisations do invest even the most improbable states with at least some measure of legitimacy.

Every state jealously protects the rituals, symbols and privileges of its sovereign status. For some, the legal prerogatives of sovereignty may contribute in time to legitimacy where it is not yet confidently established. No state, then, is wholly illegitimate. However, when there are misgivings about a state's right to exist and about its likelihood of survival, a state can be said to suffer 'a crisis of legitimacy.' In such cases, self-justification becomes a foreign policy priority, reflecting both the lack of confidence felt in the state itself and the perceived scepticism or indifference in the outside world.¹¹ Behind the weakness of a state's credentials is the fear that the identity of the state will be surrendered to more persuasive claims or to more expedient interests. Legitimacy is a bulwark against expendability and for the smallest and weakest of states the appeal to the legitimacy of their independence is often their only defence in periods of challenge.

Sovereignty as the Basis of Statehood

We have suggested that legitimacy is a qualitative assessment of a state's status in international relations and is thus a notion distinct from that of the legal principle of sovereignty. Nonetheless, this usage of legitimacy only accentuates the complex web of assumptions and tenets which lie at the core of sovereignty itself. Sovereignty is traditionally and widely understood to be the most indispensable attribute of the state, but there has been little agreement as to its essence. A consideration of these shifts in emphasis and interpretation in the usage of sovereignty is central to assessing the initial problems of status for micro-states and the long-term issues of diplomatic and economic competence examined in the later chapters of this paper.

¹¹Good, *op. cit.*, p. 8

There are two prevailing themes in the historical development of sovereignty which are directly related to the international status of micro-states. First, sovereignty has been seen as the legal prerogatives derived from the possession of supreme power in the political system. Second, sovereignty has been viewed as the legal authority expressing the will or self-determination of the community. For micro-states, both interpretations of sovereignty pose difficult problems of legitimacy. The sovereignty of these tiny states has appeared questionable because the capabilities crucial to the exercise of this power are seen to be wanting. Moreover, micro-states are typically fragments of territory, small islands and enclaves whose separate sovereignty may seem absurd and pernicious when set aside larger claims to national self-determination. Diminutive size is not reconciled easily with either the powers ascribed to the sovereign state or with claims for genuine nationhood. We will examine some of these particular cases in the next chapter.

(a) Sovereignty as Independent Power

Whatever the differences in the understanding of sovereignty and the assessment of its implications, the concept has always conveyed supremacy and finality of authority. "Sovereignty," noted one publicist, "is the power finally to divide and dispose."¹² The notion that such a power exists within the state has been complemented by its corollary; sovereignty is the assertion of that authority's independence in relation to other organised political communities. As a theory of obligation within the state, sovereignty is fraught with controversy. It has been attacked as morally unacceptable,¹³ as irrelevant in practice,¹⁴ as impossibly indeterminate,¹⁵ and as logically inadequate.¹⁶ Nonetheless, the

¹²W.R. Bisschop, "Sovereignty," *British Year Book of International Law*, II (1921-22), 122.

¹³Jacques Maritain, *Man and State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 28-53.

¹⁴The pluralists argued that the interdependence and complexity of modern social life preclude the concept of sovereignty as an exclusive attribute of state authority. "It is a matter of degree and not of kind that the State should find for its decrees more usual acceptance than those of any other association." Harold J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917), p. 17.

development of sovereignty as a theory of obligation within the state has fundamentally influenced its understanding and usage as a principle of international relations.

The term sovereignty was first used for feudal chieftains and bore the connotation of excellent or highest.¹⁷ During the Middle Ages it referred to a variety of final authorities but it meant only superiority or appellate finality and not supremacy.¹⁸ It was not until 1557 that a coherent theory of sovereignty was woven in response to the establishment of separate and independent political authority in states. Bodin defined sovereignty as ". . . the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and

See also: H. R. G. Greaves, *The Foundations of Political Theory* (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltds., 1966, 2nd ed.) pp. 11-30.

Hymen Ezra Cohen, *Recent Theories of Sovereignty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937) pp. 38-56.

¹⁵"Is it (sovereignty) some organ of government, or the government in general, or the constitutional convention of the electorate, or the nation or State organically conceived, or the whole mass of the State's population organically regarded public opinion, sentiment, or will? Where is this ultimately controlling power, and how shall we communicate with it?"

C. E. Merriam, *History of the Theory of Sovereignty Since Rousseau* (New York: The Columbia University Press, 1900), pp. 17-21.

See also:

K. W. B. Middleton, "Sovereignty in Theory and Practice," in W. J. Stankiewicz, *In Defense of Sovereignty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 135.

¹⁶Sovereignty as a command theory fails because it must rely on the sanction of coercion that can not fully explain obligation.

The state can bring force to bear at need, only because it uses force exceptionally because normally it rests on something which is not force, and because the society, which alone can furnish it with force to use, approves of it being used in such cases.

J. L. Briery, *The Basis of Obligation in International Law*, ed. by Sir Hersh Lauterpacht and C. H. M. Waldock (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958), pp. 25-26.

¹⁷Johannes Mattern, *Concepts of State, Sovereignty and International Law*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1928), p. 1.

The earliest definition of sovereignty, as distinct from common usage, can be traced to the Roman jurist Proculus who spoke of it as "that which is subject to the power of no other people." Proculus used this term in relation to "a foreign power." His influence on later Renaissance writings on political authority was not inconsiderable.

E. N. Van Kleffens, "Sovereignty in International Law," *Recueil Des Cours*, LXXXII (1953), 16, 27-28.

¹⁸Georg Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics* (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1951, 2nd ed.), p. 84.

subjects in a Commonwealth."¹⁹ It was not to be confused with proprietarial rights. Sovereignty was a quality which could only be held and exercised by the prince and his magistrates. It was a political authority, different in kind from any other claim to authority, for it was comprehensive and it was ultimate. It was the presence of such a power which constituted a political community.

The essential feature of this sovereign power was its exercise free of any consent.²⁰ Yet, while Bodin used both "absolute" and "supreme" to describe the powers of his sovereign, his understanding of this authority should be interpreted more modestly. The sovereign was bound to the laws of nature and God, and subject also to the Salic laws which constituted the customary laws of the kingdom and kingship.²¹ Given Bodin's understanding of these limitations, sovereign power could be described more accurately as superiority.

It was Hobbes who pursued the route from superiority to supremacy with such ruthless logic. Sovereignty was the means by which people could be saved from their own egocentricity.²² There could be no middle ground between complete anarchy and absolute

¹⁹Jean Bodin, *The Six Books of a Commonweale* trans. by Richard Knolles (1606), ed. and intro. by Kenneth Douglas McRae (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962), I, 8, p. 84.

²⁰*Ibid.*, I, 10, p. 159

²¹*Ibid.*, I, 8, pp. 92, 95.

Positivist critics have viewed such limits as simply decisions of conscience, ethical imperatives but not legal limitations. Yet, as Max Adams Shepard noted, this argument denies the legality of medieval law because it was not issued as command backed by coercive sanction. For Bodin, the dictates of natural law were legal imperatives. Moreover, Bodin subjected his sovereign to specific obligations derived from natural law including the inviolability of private property, the legality of contractual obligations and the proscription of arbitrary murder. Though sovereignty was supreme, it was not absolute. A sovereign was subject to certain restraints if not to other princes.

Max Adams Shepard, "Sovereignty at the Crossroads: A Study of Bodin," *Political Science Quarterly*, (December, 1930, No. 4), 587-588, 591.

Bodin, *op. cit.*, I, 8, p. 95.

²²Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* ed. by Michael Oakeshott, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), I, pp. 13-14, 80-92.

sovereignty and no limitation or incumbrance on the sovereign as Bodin had allowed. Law was the exercise of sovereign will and upon that will there could be no restraint save that of the discretion and interest of the sovereign.²³ The covenant by which men surrendered their rights issued no obligation upon the sovereign. The only release was failure.²⁴

Hobbes' brutal reasoning had a permanent impact on theories of sovereignty. "If a determinate human superior," wrote John Austin, "not in the habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society."²⁵ With his doctrine of a legally omniscient sovereign and his notion that law was ultimately personal command, Austin reduced all relations of law to a *de facto* basis. The supreme power had neither *legal* rights nor *legal* duties. Law could only be the command of the sovereign. The sovereign must be definable, recognisable, final and absolute.²⁶ The attributes of sovereignty—inalienability, indivisibility, and even irresponsibility—were the logical conclusions of the demand for finality. Sovereignty as absolute command supported by coercive sanction incorporates the supremacy of political power and the finality of legal authority, and it is this which is often seen as the fundamental attribute of the modern state.²⁷ The rights and prerogatives of states are due to their "fundamentally unlimited and absolute authority."²⁸

²³*Ibid.*, II, pp. 18, 93-120.

²⁴*Ibid.*, II, 21, pp. 144-145.

²⁵W. Jethro Brown (ed.), *The Austinian Theory of Law* (London: J. Murray, 1906), p.35.

²⁶It is the "definiteness" and the "determinateness" of the sovereign which is its most characteristic feature. On the issue of "determinateness" in sovereignty see: Ivor Wilks, "A Note on Sovereignty," in Stankiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-205.

²⁷"Austin's theory represents the completion of a movement of thought which paralleled the gradual increase, on the practical political side of the power, of the modern nation-state, . . . Now the doctrine of sovereignty offered the national kind the most convenient theoretical weapon with which to combat the claims of rival feudal or ecclesiastical authorities, refractory estates or competing systems of law. The idea of one unified legal scheme affording order, consistency and certainty in the governing of all social

The development of sovereignty as a theory of obligation, then, has stressed the finality of authority based on the supremacy of political power. Sovereignty in its international sense and external usage is a statement of those powers and prerogatives in terms of others beyond the boundaries of its jurisdiction. It is sometimes referred to as sovereignty in its negative sense, for now the stress is on independence rather than overlordship. It is the declaration of the scope of a state's jurisdiction, a formulation of deterrence, a claim that ". . . the State may not receive orders from anyone."²⁹ Sovereignty conceived as supreme authority within the state implied absolute independence outside and this could mean, if necessary, the unlimited exercise of the state's authority in securing its objectives.³⁰

relations within a given national area, overriding all contradictory rules and injunctions, and flexible enough to be modified at the command of a single sovereign will, made a strong appeal." Shepard, *op. cit.*, 581-582.

²⁸D. M. Kooijmans, *The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1964), p. 128.

²⁹Marek Stanislaw Korowicz, "Some Present Aspects of Sovereignty in International Law," *Recueil Des Cours*, CII (1962), 12.

For Georg Schwarzenberger, negative sovereignty meant ". . . non-recognition of any superior authority. On the level of legal relations, this situation may be expressed in terms of a right, or freedom, not to have to recognise any superior." Schwarzenberger, in Stankiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

³⁰"External sovereignty, as one manifestation of it came to be called, was assimilated to internal sovereignty, so that the state was regarded as possessing the same legal right to exercise its will *a l'exterieur* . . . that it has over subjects in its own territory."

J. W. Garner, "Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Relations," *American Political Science Review* XIX (February, 1925), 5.

Such absolutist interpretations of the sovereign rights of states were particularly troublesome in German political philosophy and jurisprudence. The grand notions of the Hegelian state were as embarrassing logically as they were exhilarating sentimentally. Jellinek, for instance, argued that sovereignty did, indeed, mean the unlimited and absolute exercise of the state's will, but that will could bind itself. For Jellinek, this auto-limitation (*selbstverspflichtung*) was the very essence of sovereignty. The uniqueness of sovereign authority was that it could be bound by no other will than its own. Every will has the self-imposed limitation of its own definition. To be consistent, free will must be allowed to pursue every option including that of obligation. To deny it such a course would be a limitation in itself.

Kooijmans, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-135.

Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-56.

Merriam, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-196.

Sovereignty not only meant the legal right to pursue any course of action deemed vital to a state's interests. It also implied the capacity to effect those decisions. The problem in this view of sovereignty has always been one of identifying those capabilities which justify the recognition of sovereignty in law. Which powers and to what extent must they be possessed before sovereignty is clearly established or eroded? Responses to this question have been typically as vague as they are confident. In the most fundamental sense it meant the capabilities for armed conflict to ensure the continued independence of the state. It was widely felt that if a state lost its power to make war, it lost its sovereignty. For Treitschke, for instance sovereignty finally meant "drawing the sword when (the state) sees fit."³¹ "A defenceless State may still be termed a Kingdom for conventional or courtly reasons," he said, "but . . . in point of fact such a country can no longer rank as a State."³² Self-help was the fundamental "mark of sovereignty"³³ and often used as a criterion for distinguishing states as sovereign and non-sovereign. The notions of the state as fortress and the capacity to use force as the principal feature of sovereign power have been persistent themes in international relations. "The key consideration,"

³¹Heinrich von Treitschke from *Politics I* in H. Cox (ed.) *The State in International Relations* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965, pp. 53-54.

³²*Ibid.*

Bisschop, *op. cit.*, 123.

"States, however, usually have many other powers, and in practice a state is not regarded as fully sovereign unless it has substantially all of the powers of normal states at the time. . . . Among the powers commonly possessed by states is that to convert a state of peace into a state of war, to defend itself . . . to occupy *res nullius*, to perform wrongful acts rendering itself responsible . . ." Quincy Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), pp. 292-293.

"While every sovereign state continued to hold as of right whatever it possessed, every sovereign state continued to be entitled to challenge the existing order by invoking an unlimited *jus ad bellum*. Changes to that order might be the outcome of unilateral resort to force and duress, but they were also the outcome of this right, and they were legitimised by virtue of its universal recognition."

F. H. Hinsley, *Nationalism and the International System* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), p. 110.

³³Fenwick, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

noted Andrew Scott, "is whether a group of persons desiring to proclaim themselves a "nation" have the capacity to assert their independence and act on that basis."³⁴ Scott concluded that, given the vulnerability of their security conditions, most contemporary states " . . . are not sovereign in the meaningful sense of the term . . . "³⁵

In this sense, then, sovereignty as independence is not simply a passive notification of frontiers, a statement of legal identity. Sovereignty is seen as the legal rights derived from the possession of specific conditions of state power. In addition to capabilities for self defence, this notion of sovereign power implies actual or potential capacity for economic independence and certainly the freedom to pursue independent relations with other states. Until very recently, independent competence in areas of economic and fiscal management were seen as critical indicators of sovereignty. States which were largely or wholly dependent upon other states (or latterly upon other international actors) in areas of economic policy were questionable. Both in the Mandates system³⁶ and in the earlier stages of decolonisation, the Great Powers consistently justified delays in granting sovereignty to their dependent territories on the grounds that they lacked the resources and capacities for the economic independence expected of a sovereign state. The importance of economic independence to the continued relevance of the principle of sovereignty was also emphasised by the first generation of integration theorists who anticipated the demise of the territorial state and

³⁴Andrew M. Scott, *The Functioning of the International System* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967), p. 235.

³⁵*Ibid.*

"A country is independent only insofar as it has the power to enforce its freedom of decision-making, regardless of which other countries want to influence it."

Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers* (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 38.

³⁶For a useful discussion of the expected standards of statehood both in the Mandates system and in the League see, Walter Holmes Ritsher, *Criteria of Capacity for Independence* (Jerusalem: Syrian Orphanage Press, 1934), pp. 1-14, also Chapter Six.

the obsolescence of the principle of sovereignty. As competences in areas of economic and social policy were transferred to other actors, so the state's sovereignty would be drained. Eventually the concessions are so cumulative that even the core areas of sovereign power are eroded and the state is eclipsed by a new political system. For some, economic interdependence, particularly in post-war Europe, had become so advanced that sovereignty seemed to be "more a state of mind or an aspiration rather than a condition..."³⁷

In the traditional view, then, the validity or reality of sovereignty in law depends on the extent to which it reflects independence in fact. Sovereignty as independence means the possession of powers sufficient to ensure that the state can enjoy those rights in practice which it is acknowledged to possess in law. For some, the glaring disparities between the impotence and dependence of states on one hand and the exaggerations of their legal prerogatives on the other only serves to confirm doubts about the continued relevance of sovereignty and the contemporary understanding of statehood. Since "sovereignty claims its birthright of overriding competence,"³⁸ it should at least approximate its own logic if it can not fulfill it.³⁹ "At the root of the perplexities which attend the problem of the loss of sovereignty," complained Hans Morgenthau, "there is the

³⁷Paul Taylor, *International Co-operation Today* (London: Elek Books, Ltd., 1971), p. 39.

Disenchantment with the relevance of sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world was typical of the integration literature of the late fifties and sixties.

Karl Loewenstein, "Sovereignty and International Co-operation," *American Journal of International Law*, XLVIII (1954), 225.

"(Sovereignty) has little application or use in a world in which nations continually interact and interpenetrate and in which there are international organizations such as the United Nations, broad alliances such as N.A.T.O., and supranational organizations such as the European Economic Community."

Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft* (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 162.

³⁸Rosalyn Higgins, *The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 55.

³⁹Frederick M. Watkins, *The State as a Concept of Political Science* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1934), pp. 42-62.

divorce in contemporary legal and political theory, of the concept of sovereignty from the political reality to which the concept is supposed to give legal expression."⁴⁰ If sovereignty is so casually reduced to legal fiction, both the tenets of international law and the practices of international organisation could be undermined. Nowhere does this seem more apparent than with the corollary of sovereignty, the doctrine of the equality of states. From the time of The Hague Conferences, and certainly with the apparent recognition of small state rights in the League of Nations, the doctrine of equality has been attacked as a dangerous fiction. As one publicist put it, ". . . the doctrine of equality has served heretofore to divorce the theoretical system of international law set forth in text books from the facts of international life."⁴¹ He went on to warn that such a discrepancy has become "a positive political danger" with the establishment of international institutions. If equality was clearly and universally understood in a limited forensic sense then there would be less reason for concern. The anxiety stems from claims for comprehensive participation in the name of equality of rights.⁴²

⁴⁰Morgenthau's reassessment of sovereignty was written in the early days of the new post-war international order. Most of the existing states were weak and dependent, with far less influence than they now enjoy. While Morgenthau emphasised that sovereignty did not mean "actual independence," he also maintained that sovereignty was lost when a state could no longer ensure the "impenetrability" of its territory and when it no longer possessed the capacity "to make "fundamental decisions." Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered," *Columbia Law Review*, XLVIII (1948), 349.

⁴¹P. J. Baker, "The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States," *British Year Book of International Law*, IV (1923-24), 4.

Baker was clearly relieved that the architects of the Covenant did not wholly embrace the doctrine of equality. "To allow a State of one million inhabitants to hold the same constitutional position as a State of one hundred million inhabitants, is not only theoretically but practically indefensible. To have done so in the League would have been undemocratic in the true sense of the word; it would have led to the establishment of institutions that could not have exercised real influence or authority for the reason that they would not have represented the political forces of the human race."

Ibid., 19.

⁴²Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, *The Equality of States in International Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), p.4.

In some cases this has been interpreted as the possession of equal natural rights (Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Wolff, deVattel) or as the equal potential or aptitude for acquiring rights (Pradier-Fodere, Amari).

In her study of statehood in United Nations practice Rosalyn Higgins argued it is essential for the future of international organisations that some attempt be made, however difficult, to assess the sovereignty of an entity on the basis of its conformity to objective criteria:

What is important is that policy questions will have to be decided during the years to come; and in the future— even if this were not so in the past— the definition of independence will have real relevance. There would seem to be very good grounds for insisting upon the importance of actual independence; not only will such a policy keep more firm the marriage between law and fact, but it will also prevent certain abuses of the right of popular self-determination which might otherwise occur.⁴³

For Higgins, the obvious discrepancies between law and fact can only be accommodated if we acknowledge the relativity of sovereignty and the variable nature of statehood. An entity may be a state for some purposes, (which would allow them admission to specific functional organisations, for example), but not for all.⁴⁴ Presumably, the fully sovereign state is the state whose credentials and capacities would allow it to

See also: Arnold D. McNair, "Equality in International Law," *Michigan Law Review*, XXVI (December, 1927), 136-137.

Considered as the corollary of sovereignty, the equality of states has involved such rules as the unanimity principle and equal voting. It is true that in certain international organisations and regional associations both unanimity and equal voting have given way to a majority vote and/or weighted voting. However, the general practice has been to maintain the traditional rules of equality. Small states particularly have resisted attempts to undermine these privileges.

C. Wilfred Jenks, "Unanimity, The Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple Majorities and Consensus as Modes of Decision in International Organizations," in R. Y. Jennings, (ed.), *Cambridge Essays in International Law—Essays in Honour of Lord McNair* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1965), pp. 48-63.

⁴³Higgins, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 44.

enjoy comprehensive participation in international society.⁴⁵ In this view, then, the dilemmas of the sovereignty-as-power view are resolved if we admit varying degrees of sovereign status (and the rights and prerogatives therein) to reflect the varying conditions of power and independence of states in the real world. "Sovereignty in international law is . . . a relative term," wrote Quincy Wright. "Each international person differs to some extent in its capacity in law or fact to establish normal legal relations with others. The line between a fully sovereign and a partly sovereign state is not precise and is continually changing with the development of international relations."⁴⁶

While the notion that states can be "more or less" sovereign has been a recurring theme among political scientists and publicists in international law, it has been fiercely resisted by the huge lobby of new states insisting on the full rights and prerogatives which are theirs as equal members in law of the international community. Nor have they abandoned the assumptions and aspirations to power traditionally associated with sovereignty. However, the new states have shifted the basis of sovereignty from the elements of power and actual independence to the criteria for national self-determination and particularly the rights of colonial peoples.

b) Sovereignty as the Self-Determination of a Political Community

The notion that sovereignty is not so much a set of particular powers as it is the expression of societal will belongs to Rousseau. It has come to be the prevailing sense of sovereignty in the post-war period of decolonisation. With Rousseau, as with Hobbes, it is the absolutist character of sovereignty which is central: "Il est de l'essence de las puissance souveraine de ne pouvoir être limitée: elle peut tout, ou elle n'est rien."⁴⁷

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁴⁶Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

⁴⁷Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from *Lettres de la Montagne* quoted in Alfred Cobban, *Rousseau and the Modern State* (London: Archon Books, rev. ed., 1964), p. 71.

Supremacy derives from ultimacy: The source of law can not at the same time be subject to it. Yet Rousseau, unlike Hobbes, attempted to separate sovereignty from the officers of government by equating the state with the body politic.⁴⁸ The base of sovereign authority is the populace itself. It is the General Will of the people which is the essence of the state.⁴⁹ Ultimate and supreme authority is vested in them and this can not be alienated whatever functions may be delegated to government.⁵⁰ It is this inalienability which is the essential feature of the sovereignty of the General Will. As the state has been absorbed by the government in Hobbes, so the government has been absorbed by the society in Rousseau.⁵¹ The illimitable and plebiscitarian nature of Rousseau's sovereignty has endured both in the celebration of sovereignty in new states, and in the analysis of the essence of sovereignty in political theory.⁵²

⁴⁸Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses* trans. and intro. by G. D. H. Cole (London: Everyman's Library, 1966), *Social Contract*, II, chaps. 1 and 2, pp. 20-22.

⁴⁹The notion of popular sovereignty had already been expressed by Althusius, who contended that sovereignty was the permanent authority of the people conceded to governments for administrative convenience. It was inalienable. Frederick S. Garney (trans. and ed.) *The Politics of Johannes Althusius* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1965).

Locke's version of popular sovereignty was based on the distinction between state and government. Political society retained a passive sovereignty with its ultimate power to dissolve government, which was the active sovereign. The distinction between Althusius and Locke on the nature of delegation is interesting in any discussion of political integration. For Althusius, sovereignty itself was not conceded, only administrative competence. For Locke, sovereignty in its active dimension was, in fact, granted. While the government endured it was sovereign, subject only to the final test of dissolution.

John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, intro. by Peter Laslett (Toronto: Mentor Books, 1965), II, chap. 13, p. 413. Also, chapters 2, 9, and 12.

⁵⁰Rousseau, *Social Contract*, op. cit., II, 1, p. 20.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, II, 4, p. 24.

⁵²For Rousseau's influence on the development of nationalism see: Cobban, op. cit., pp. 99-125. Kenneth Minogue, *Nationalism* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1967), pp. 39-42.

This view of sovereignty is from a sociological rather than a juridical vantage. The power of the state is ultimate and indivisible, but it is power based on national will and not on the government's command of particular capabilities and sanctions. As Francis Rosentiel put it in his attack on the pretensions of the European Community: "The vigour of a state lacking jurisdictions remains more formidable than an ensemble of jurisdictions in search of a state."⁵³ As in the power view of sovereignty, this is a sense of authority which allows for arguments of both divisibility and indivisibility. Some writers, Karl Deutsch for instance, have maintained that in the process of integration the sovereignty of the state is dissipated as loyalties shift to institutions beyond those of the state. When cross-national interaction at the popular level intensifies, a new socio-psychological community is established, and with it, the substance of sovereignty.⁵⁴ Others insist that identification with the state is deeply rooted. States may concede an enormous range of competences before they allow outsiders to determine the character of their political culture, or even the agenda of their domestic priorities. And substantial shifts of

⁵³Francis Rosentiel, "Reflections on the Notion of 'Supranationality'," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, II (1963), 135.

Rosentiel's observations may seem almost poignant in the current debate over the terms of Quebec's potential secession from Canada. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and the Federal Government insist that any "Yes" vote in a referendum is but a consultative exercise, the results of which must be taken into account by Ottawa in determining whether or not to engage the process of separation. Premier Lucien Bouchard and the Parti Québécois Government in Quebec City, on the other hand, see such a referendum result as a definitive act of self-determination in itself by the people of Quebec, with no need for approval from the Government of Canada. Sovereignty is vested in the will of the Québécois. As for the Federal Government, in this view it is indeed seen as an "ensemble of jurisdictions in search of a state." The thrusts and counter-thrusts of this debate were covered thoroughly in *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), May 13-20, 1996.

⁵⁴Karl Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 27-69.

competence to external institutions can occur before the popular base of the state is weakened.⁵⁵

This view of sovereignty, which clearly minimises the importance of power, has been particularly emphasised in the doctrine of national self-determination. For nationalists, the essence of sovereignty lies in the historical experience and national self-consciousness of the people. In some cases accession to independence was seen not so much as the birth of a new nation, but as the restoration of original rights.⁵⁶ In the absence of national popular support, the sovereignty of imperial governments was hollow, however great the advantages of power. Similarly, there should be no reason to delay sovereignty for dependent peoples on the grounds their governments would lack the capabilities requisite to statehood. Once again, we see a distinction between formal sovereignty and real sovereignty.

The crux of this approach to sovereignty is the definition of a nation deserving recognition of separate status in the international system. Rupert Emerson put the question succinctly: ". . . who are the people of what country? . . . With whom does the prerogative rest to delimit the relevant 'self' and, once this determination has been made, who within the designated community has the authority to speak for it, binding the whole?"⁵⁷

⁵⁵For instance, Stanley Hoffmann was one of the earliest critics of the view that the sovereign state would give way to new political systems as competences were transferred to regional bodies. "As for what it can no longer provide . . . by itself," he said, "the state can still provide . . . without committing suicide, through cooperation."

Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," *Daedalus*, XCV (Summer, 1965), 893.

⁵⁶Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination," *American Journal of International Law*, LXV (July, 1971, no. 3), 469.

⁵⁷Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 9, December, 1964), p. 36.

Prior to the end of the Second World War we acknowledged, with few exceptions, only European peoples with long established and identifiable national cultures. We looked to the familiar attributes of nationhood: language, religion, distinctive customs and rituals. These were visible and viable national communities with justifiable claims to equality and independence in the international community. The apparent absence of these familiar attributes among most non-European peoples precluded any serious consideration of a transfer of sovereignty, even for those liberals most committed to the principles of national self-determination. Similarly, while regional and sub-cultural groups deserved some measure of autonomy and a guarantee of protection within the constitutional framework of larger states, sovereignty was neither the most appropriate nor the most equitable solution to meet their interests.⁵⁸ Initially, then, sovereignty was seen as the deserved status for a people whose credentials as a national community were clear and whose rights in the international community had long been denied.

By 1960, however, the movement for self-determination had changed radically. The definition of a people was no longer based on ethnic or cultural properties. Those to benefit from self-determination were colonial peoples whose national credentials were formed in their common subjection to imperial rule. As decolonisation proceeded, the new states, particularly in Africa, insisted upon an absolute commitment to the colonial territory as the only basis for statehood. No residual rights to sovereignty would be recognised for distinct peoples within the boundaries of colonial territories or existing states. Moreover, all colonial peoples, whatever their material limitations, were nations whose rights to self-determination were beyond question.⁵⁹ And, solutions short of

⁵⁸ Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (London: Collins, The Fontana Library, rev. ed. 1969), Ch. 6.

⁵⁹ Perhaps the most outstanding example of the uncompromising tone of the new majority's commitment to self-determination as sovereignty was the United Nations debate on the future of Nauru. With a population of only 5000, it must surely have seemed at the time leading up to its independence in 1968 as the most improbable candidate for separate statehood. However, the Nauruan demand for nothing

sovereignty were seen by the new majority in the international community as incompatible with the logic of self-determination. With few exceptions such proposals were regarded with suspicion and contrary to the national interests of the people concerned.⁶⁰

However, as we shall explore in the next chapter, this apparently simple interpretation of the rights to national self-determination and the basis of sovereignty has not gone unchallenged. In some cases, the definition of the nation, and claims to separate independence, have been fiercely contested. For others, counter-claims are less explicit, but the threat of controversy undermines the security of their international status. In such a contest, it is the credibility of national identity and the justice of historical claims which are finally crucial.

Once again sovereignty is seen as the legal expression of political reality; if not the conditions of power, then the collective will of a credible national community.

c) Sovereignty and International Recognition

For some, these attempts to explain sovereignty are beside the point. Sovereignty exists whether or not particular powers are evident and whether or not there is a confident and integrated national community coincident with the territorial boundaries of the state. Sovereignty is not primarily a question of capacity, actual or potential; nor is it the independent exercise of national will in history. More modestly, sovereignty expresses the international identity of a territorial community as a state. It affirms the constitutional self-containment of the state and therefore its equality in international law. The supremacy

less than independence was readily supported by a sympathetic General Assembly. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 226 (XXI), 20 December, 1966.

⁶⁰In the Cook Islands, for example, association with New Zealand was defended on the grounds that the Islanders had determined this course for themselves in an election observed by United Nations representatives. However, the vigilant Committee of Twenty-Four accepted the results somewhat reluctantly, mollified only by the provision that the Cook Islanders could opt for separate sovereignty if they so wished at any time in the future.

and finality of a state's authority are derived from its separateness from other states. "A state which is separate from all others is, by virtue of that fact, in sole control of its domain;" wrote Alan James. "It cannot but be supreme. Supremacy and separateness are therefore inextricably intertwined, each of them expressing, with a different emphasis, that constitutional self-containment which is the core and condition of sovereignty."⁶¹ Whether a state chooses to exercise certain powers; whether it has the capabilities to invoke those powers; whether its writ genuinely reflects the will of the populace; these are questions which unnecessarily confuse the simple usage of sovereignty in relations among states. Sovereignty is that authority which entitles a state to invoke final and supreme powers within its territorial jurisdiction. It is the right to undertake certain competences, not the competences themselves, which is the essence of sovereignty.⁶² And it can be said to be present if those rights are recognised by other members of the international system.⁶³ In this view, then, sovereignty is seen as the possession of those legal rights which accord the state its international status and privileges and it is enjoyed by those societies which are recognised in law to possess it.

This view of sovereignty does seem to command more support in what John Burton has called "the altered political environment"⁶⁴ characterised by both wide

⁶¹ Alan James, "The Contemporary Relevance of National Sovereignty," in Michael Leifer (ed.), *Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), p. 18.

Professor James is determined to retrieve the notion of sovereignty from the confusion which has bedevilled the concept in much of the literature of international relations. Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986).

⁶² Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-36.

⁶³ There are, of course, dangers in the constitutive theory of recognition. The legal status of the former Bantustans seemed to be clear in the absence of any recognition apart from the Republic of South Africa. However, the position of the Western Sahara, a member of the Organization of African Unity, recognised by nearly 100 members of international community, is more difficult to determine. In spite of widespread recognition, it would be premature to argue that the Western Sahara enjoys sovereignty when its territory is occupied and its people confined to refugee camps in a neighbouring state.

⁶⁴ J. W. Burton, *International Relations - A General Theory* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1967), pp. 108-127.

disparities among states and by the emergence of influential and autonomous non-state actors. Many states are neither independent powers nor confident and integrated national communities. The emphasis on legal rights should support the separate independence of micro-states when even the smallest and most destitute state is wholly sovereign if its legal right to act finally and independently within its own territory is recognised by other members of the system.⁶⁵

But there is neither consensus nor consistency about sovereignty, even among spokesmen for small and weak states. Sovereignty as power, sovereignty as the exercise of national self-determination and sovereignty as legal prerogatives are often expressed at the same time. For micro-states these varying emphases in the explanations of sovereignty have been central to their status in the international system. Until very recently micro-state participation in the international system was limited and frequently controversial because the sovereignty of these states, and the rights and obligations which that entails, seemed more formal than real, given their exceptionally small size and obviously limited capabilities. Micro-states have been seen as too small to command sovereign powers and often too diminutive and too fragmentary to claim acceptance as distinct and viable national communities. This is particularly pressing if neighbouring states view the independence of these 'local' peoples as an insult to their own national history and an impediment to their aspirations for national integration.

In summary, we have argued that the status of these tiny states in the international system has been problematic and controversial. This does not mean that all micro-states are subject to question or that only micro-states are burdened with problems of self-justification. It does mean, however, that legitimacy has been a recurrent problem in this class of states. In the next chapter we examine the experience of micro-states in both aspects of the problem of legitimacy.

⁶⁵Middleton, *op. cit.*, 153-154.

CHAPTER TWO

The Legitimacy of Micro-States in the International System: The Practice of International Organisations

Doubts about the long term status of micro-states are rarely evident in the protocol and open diplomacy of everyday international relations. Larger states are careful to respect the sensibilities of the smallest and weakest members of the international community. However, there have been two areas where doubts and questions about the international status of micro-states have surfaced.

The first is that of micro-state participation in international organisations. This has always been a difficult issue and it constitutes the bulk of the early literature on micro-states.¹ Reservations about micro-state membership reflect both the normative and the practical dimensions of the question of the legitimacy of statehood. First, there is concern about the capacity of these states to undertake the responsibilities and obligations of normal states in the organisation of the international system.

¹For example:

Urban Whitaker, "Mini-Membership for Mini-States," *War/Peace Report*, VII (April, 1967), 3-5.

P.C. Rao, "Micro-States and the United Nations," *Indian and Foreign Review*, V (November 15, 1967), 17, 21.

Jacques G. Rapoport, "The Participation of Ministates in International Affairs," *Proceedings, American Society of International Law*, April 25-27, 1968, 155-163.

Roger Fisher, "The Participation of Microstates in International Affairs," *Ibid.*, 164-188. Comments, 179-186.

William L. Harris, "Microstates in the United Nations: A Broader Purpose," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, (No. 1, 1970), 23-53.

M. H. Mendelson, "Diminutive States in the United Nations," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, XXI (October, 1972), 609-630.

James S. Bowman, "Participation in the United Nations: Mini-States," *Polity*, (Winter, 1972), 191-208.

Michael M. Gunter, "The Problem of Ministate Membership in the United Nations System: Recent Attempts Towards a Solution," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, (No. 3, 1973), 464-486.

Joseph R. Harbert, "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972," *International Organization*, (Winter, 1976), 109-128.

Further, there are misgivings about the justice of a system which allots equal voice in the determination of international issues to states which would be little more than small cities in most countries. These doubts were clearly evident in the early membership debates in the League of Nations and persisted with the United Nations system until the late 1960s. It has continued to be a recurring theme in the domestic debate in the United States about the future of American participation in the United Nations.²

The second period when the legitimacy issue has surfaced is in the lead-up to self-determination. It is always easier to raise questions about the suitability of separate independence for a would-be state than for a community whose sovereignty is already recognised in the international system. In some cases sovereignty was seen as absurdly inappropriate and metropolitan powers were either resigned to indefinite imperial administration or they looked to alternative methods of decolonisation in association with other territories. Once again, the controversy involved both sides of the legitimacy question. Much of the debate focused on the potential capacity of the new state. Was separate independence a reasonable means of meeting the best interests of the people? Could this state assume the responsibilities implicit in the accession to sovereignty?

But, in many cases, there were also misgivings about the justice of recognising fragments of the colonial system as separate nations. These sentiments were all the more compelling if there was a credible irredentist claim to challenge the legitimacy of separate statehood. In the next chapter we will examine this contest in the experience of three very small colonial territories; East Timor, Western Sahara, and Belize. The nature of the debate and the tentativeness of their international acceptance have implications for many micro-states which have successfully attained sovereignty but whose long-term survival must be assessed in the context of similar doubts and claims. We begin in this chapter,

²Cynicism and frustration with "rep by pop" in the United Nations is still a matter of concern in some quarters. Note the following leader from *The Globe and Mail*: "Sharing the U.N. Costs," *The Globe and Mail*, (Toronto), October 29, 1985, A6.

however, with an examination of the issue of very small size and membership in international organisations.

Micro-states and the League of Nations

Initially, the League of Nations was widely seen as a confirmation of the values of national self-determination and small state security. The aspirations of small states at The Hague Conferences were now established in the provisions of the Covenant. The League represented the notion that the world could be made safe for the smallest and the weakest. And to a great extent, membership in the new organisation was itself a measure of international personality.³ Yet this did not mean the League should accept the universal suffrage of states. The diminutive sovereignties of Europe were accorded some of the courtesies of statehood but they were still regarded as the anomalies of a well-ordered international system. This was not surprising since such diminutive sovereignties had all but disappeared by the end of the war. Apart from the Holy See, only six very small states

³Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (London: Collins, The Fontana Library, rev. ed., 1969), p. 79.

"The results of several years of work, along empirical lines, by those who made the Covenant and those who built up the League, enable us to assert that admission to the League is, for the post-war world, what recognition of a sovereign 'state' was before 1920, and that the qualifications laid down in Article One of the Covenant, judged as they are judged by the Committees of the Assembly, are the essential qualities of any independent state today. "

Lilian M. Friedlander, "The Admission of States to the League of Nations," *British YearBook of International Law*, IX (1928), p. 100.

See also:

Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1968), pp. 401 f.

Quincy Wright, "Some Thoughts about Recognition," *American Journal of International Law*, XLIV (1950), 548-559

Quincy Wright, "Recognition and Self-Determination," *Proceedings, American Society of International Law*, (April 22-24, 1954), 32-33.

Malbone W. Graham, *The League of Nations and the Recognition of States*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1933), pp. 33-34.

Sally Marks, "The Small States at Geneva," *World Affairs* CLVII (Spring, 1995), 191-196.

retained any measure of international personality: Luxembourg, Iceland,⁴ Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Andorra.

Liechtenstein applied for membership in the League on July 15, 1920. Though the Fifth Committee (Admissions) acknowledged Liechtenstein's sovereignty in international law, it rejected the Principality's application on the grounds that Liechtenstein's treaty arrangements with Switzerland had so compromised her sovereignty that she could not be expected to fulfill her obligations under the Covenant.⁵ Liechtenstein's pre-war relations with Austria-Hungary did not promote her case and, if anything, reinforced existing prejudice that such ties were compelled by her exceptional smallness. In referring to the 1912 postal agreement between Liechtenstein and Austria, Pierre Raton concludes that although

⁴From 1918 Iceland was self-governing but in monarchical union with Denmark. Until 1920 the Danish High Court was still the supreme judicial body for Iceland. Denmark retained responsibility for Iceland's foreign affairs and security until April, 1940. This relationship was to last for 25 years at which time either party could abrogate the Act of Union or ask for its revision. Donald E. Neuchterlein, *Iceland-Reluctant Ally* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 3-4.

⁵"1. The application of Liechtenstein is in order.

2. The Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein has been recognized de jure by many States. It has concluded a number of Treaties with various States, for instance in 1852 it concluded a treaty of extradition with Belgium, in 1863 it signed the Sanitary Convention of Dresden.

3. The Principality of Liechtenstein possesses a stable Government and fixed frontiers. The area of the Principality is 157 sq. km., and the population between 10,000 and 11,000.

4. and 5. There can be no doubt that juridically the Principality of Liechtenstein is a sovereign State, but by reason of its very limited area, small population, and its geographic position, it has chosen to depute to others some of the attributes of its sovereignty. For instance, it has contracted with other Powers for the control of its Customs, the administration of its Posts, Telegraphs and Telephone Services, for the diplomatic representation of its subjects in foreign countries, other than Switzerland and Austria, and for final decisions in certain cases of law. Liechtenstein has no army. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the Principality of Liechtenstein could not discharge all the international obligations which would be imposed on it by the Covenant."

Report of the Second Sub-Committee to the Fifth Committee, League of Nations, *Records of the First Assembly, Plenary Meetings*, p. 667.

. . . the Principality had proved that it knew how to negotiate successfully, and shown the world that it was not simply another province of the Danubian realm (this) was not everywhere recognized...partly out of ignorance and partly because of a refusal to bother about the question of Austrian-Liechtenstein relations. Many countries were accustomed to regard the Principality as an Austrian province with a sort of special status, similar to that of Andorra in its relation with France.⁶

Under the treaty of 1884 Austria administered Liechtenstein's interests abroad⁷ with the result that " . . . the country was practically unknown in the diplomatic world,"⁸ and regarded "as merely another province of an enemy state."⁹ The Customs Union with Austria was renounced by the Principality,¹⁰ however, in 1919 after the Austrian Republic was established, and some of the attributes of sovereignty which the Committee claimed that Liechtenstein had deputed to Switzerland were not concluded until after Liechtenstein's application had been rejected.¹¹

⁶Pierre Raton, *Liechtenstein: History and Institutions of the Principality* (Vaduz: Liechtenstein-Verlag, 1970), pp. 49-50.

⁷Liechtenstein did remain neutral officially throughout the war even though popular sentiments, underpinned by essential economic relations, were with the Central Powers. This changed with Allied victories when the Principality then opened negotiations with Switzerland. Nonetheless, even the official neutrality proved important when it came to the definition of Austria's frontiers in the Treaty of St. Germain (September 10, 1919) which had the effect of also recognising Liechtenstein's borders. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-58.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Walter Kranz (ed.) *The Principality of Liechtenstein* (Vaduz: The Government of Liechtenstein, Third edition, rev., 1973). p. 20.

¹¹*Ibid.*

The Customs Union with Switzerland was signed on March 29, 1923 and came into effect on January 1, 1924. The Postal Agreement came into effect on January 31, 1921.

Raton, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

That Liechtenstein's treaty relations should have been seen to impair the quality of her statehood appears all the more disputable given the provisions of Article One of the Covenant enabling any self-governing Dominion or Colony to achieve membership. Moreover, unlike such dependencies, Liechtenstein's treaty arrangements were revocable should the Principality have so decided.¹²

Whatever prejudice there was against Liechtenstein initially could only have been reinforced by the decision of the Liechtenstein Government to seek special concessions, primarily to safeguard their neutrality and to avoid a return to armed forces which they had not maintained since 1868.¹³ By so doing " . . . they showed that the country was not able to meet all the requirements of the Covenant and they thus exposed themselves to the criticism which was not long in coming."¹⁴

Yet, for all of this, the real reason for Liechtenstein's rejection was her size, as Lord Robert Cecil (South Africa) confessed to Dr. Emil Beck, the Liechtenstein Minister in Berne.¹⁵ The Lilliputian dimensions of Liechtenstein served to exaggerate the alleged disabilities of her diplomatic and military situation in a way which might not have been so

Liechtenstein's intentions regarding a new relationship with Switzerland were apparent, however, as early as April 22, 1919 when Prince Karl, the Governor of the Principality, opened negotiations with the Head of the Swiss Political Department. The agreement on Swiss representation of Liechtenstein's interests abroad went into effect on October 24, 1919.
Ibid., p. 73.

¹²Walter S. G. Kohn, "Politics in Liechtenstein," *Parliamentary Affairs*, XXV (No. 4, Autumn, 1972), 326-338

Raton, *op. cit.*, 83.

Feuille Federale Suisse, 1923, II, 406, cited in:

Pierre Vellas, "Les Etats Exigus en Droit International Public," *Revue Generale de Droit International Public*, LVIII (October-December, 1954), 559-81.

¹³Kranz, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

¹⁴Raton, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 61.

resolutely disqualifying for a larger state. In his study of the case Michael Gunter concluded

. . . that the League made a political decision when it turned down the membership of Liechtenstein and by inference, those of other ministates which might apply in the future. Other states also had or were to surrender certain sovereign attributes and yet were permitted to join. The real reason for the rejection of Liechtenstein was her smallness, not her deputation of some sovereign attributes.¹⁶

The underlying assumption throughout was that smallness must necessarily compromise a state's sovereignty.¹⁷ Surely, it seemed, diminutive states could not exist apart from a dependent relationship such as Liechtenstein's former association with Austria and now probable arrangement with Switzerland. The inevitable disabilities of very small size set these states apart from the class of normal states. That assumption was reinforced by Switzerland, which in spite of acting as Liechtenstein's sponsor,¹⁸ argued for

¹⁶Michael M. Gunter, "Liechtenstein and the United Nations: A Precedent for the United Nations' Ministate Problem," *American Journal of International Law*, LXVIII (July, 1974), 499.

¹⁷This view is often taken for granted in the literature. Note, for example, the indignation of the following in response to just such assumptions.

Vellas, *op. cit.*, 564-565.

A. Sottile, "L'Organisation Juridique et Politique de la Republique de St.-Marin et Sa Situation Internationale," *Revue de Droit International de Sciences Diplomatiques, Politiques et Sociales*, I (No. 1, 1923), 26.

C. D'Olivier Farran, "The Position of Diminutive States in International Law," in Erik Bruel et. al. (eds.), *Internationalrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen: Festschrift für Walter Schatzel 70 Geburtstag* (Dusseldorf: Hermes, 1960), pp. 135-136.

¹⁸This decision that Switzerland should submit Liechtenstein's application was unfortunate for that in itself suggested dependence and the abdication of sovereign prerogatives.

Raton, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

establishing a special committee to examine the League's future relations with those states
" . . . which, because of their small size, cannot be admitted as ordinary members. "¹⁹

The rejection of Liechtenstein constituted a judgement 'by inference' for other micro-states. San Marino failed to respond to the Secretary-General's request for further information in support of her application²⁰ and Monaco,²¹ though endorsed by France in her application, withdrew on further consideration.²²

Luxembourg was admitted to the League, though the question of smallness did arise in the Committee.²³ Luxembourg strengthened her case by applying directly and by abandoning her neutrality. With a standing army Luxembourg could justify her capacity to

¹⁹League of Nations, *Records of First Assembly Plenary Meetings*, p. 652

This special committee (a sub-committee of the First Committee) suggested three possible forms of League association for very small states: a) full representation but without voting rights; b) representation by another League member; c) limited participation, restricted to those matters of particular concern. These proposals provoked so much controversy, especially in relation to the principle of the equality of states, that the whole question was postponed pending an application from a particular state. This was not considered an urgent question because the issue was only relevant for a handful of European diminutive states.

League of Nations, "The Position of Small States," *Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings* pp. 683-688.

²⁰Vellas, *op. cit.*, 573.

Manley O. Hudson, "The Members of the League of Nations," *British Year Book of International Law*, XVI (1935), 148-149.

League of Nations, *Official Journal*, 1924, 264.

²¹Georges Grinda, *Les Institutions de la Principaute de Monaco* (Monaco: Conseil National, 1975), p. 13.

Jean-Pierre Gallois, *Le Statut International de la Principaute de Monaco* (Paris: A. Pedone, 1964), p. 80.

²²Farran, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

Jacques Rapaport, Ernest Muteba and Joseph J. Therattil, *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems. A UNITAR Study* (New York: Arno Press, 1971), p. 116.

²³League of Nations, *Records of the First Assembly Meetings*, Annex E, 610.

League of Nations, *First Assembly Committee Meetings*, Vol. II, 184, 225-227.

See also: Albert Whrer, "Le Statut International de Luxembourg et las Societe des Nations," *Revue Generale de Droit International Public*, XXXI (1924), 169-202

fulfill the obligations of the Covenant.²⁴ Moreover, the Grand Duchy was, as the Rapporteur noted in the Plenary, ". . . an ancient state . . . recognised by all civilised states (which) has always scrupulously carried out her international obligations."²⁵ Neutralised in 1867 by agreement of the Great Powers,²⁶ Luxembourg's foundations in the international system were far more certain. Long establishment and an active diplomatic tradition can counter the adverse effects of very small size.²⁷

Iceland first approached the League in 1918 when the Danish ambassador in Paris inquired of the French government the feasibility of Icelandic membership.²⁸ Though it was by then too late for Iceland to become a founding member, a further overture was made to the Secretary-General on July 2, 1919.²⁹ This inquiry was not pursued and on October 20, 1920³⁰ the League concluded that Icelandic accession was no longer a consideration. Iceland's position was complicated by the fact that Denmark was still responsible for her foreign relations and that League membership would seem to require a departure from her traditional neutrality in order that she could fulfill the obligations of

²⁴Luxembourg's original application on February 23, 1920 requested that she be granted the privilege of maintaining her neutrality. By November 28, 1920, Luxembourg had withdrawn this request and agreed to alter her status of neutrality to the extent that Covenant obligations required. Hudson, *op. cit.*, 141.

²⁵League of Nations, *Records of the First Assembly Plenary Meetings*, 585-586.

²⁶L. Oppenheim, *International Law* ed. by H. Lauterpacht (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 8th ed., 1955), pp. 248-249.

²⁷Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 184
The status of San Marino, however, has always been problematical in spite of the Republic's ancient origins and proven diplomacy. Sottile, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-31.

²⁸Benedikt Gröndal, *Iceland—from Neutrality to N.A.T.O. Membership* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974), p. 24.

²⁹League of Nations, *Official Journal*, 1920, 265.

³⁰Gröndal, *op. cit.*

membership under the Covenant.³¹ Some Icelanders regarded League membership as an essential buttress to their independence and in 1930, the 1000th anniversary of the Althing, Jonás Jónsson, the Minister of Justice, went to Geneva to discuss the possibility of Iceland's accession to the Covenant.³² But Jónsson's enthusiasm for League membership was not widely shared among his countrymen and Iceland did not pursue the question " . . . because of smallness, poverty and a kind of shyness."³³ Smallness, then, was an inhibiting and compromising factor which seemed to qualify the acceptance of diminutive states in the international system. Only Luxembourg was able to perform a role in international relations comparable to that of larger states.³⁴

Micro-states in the United Nations

Unqualified universality was no more accepted at San Francisco in 1945 than it had been for the League in 1920.³⁵ Luxembourg was the only micro-state to be a founding member of the United Nations and only Iceland was to join subsequently until the great wave of decolonisation began in 1960.³⁶ It did not follow that Luxembourg and Iceland would serve as precedents for other micro-states.³⁷ None of the other European micro-

³¹Only Switzerland had been able to reserve the privilege of neutrality. *Switzerland and the United Nations*, Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning Switzerland's Relations with the United Nations, (Berne: 1969), 8-11, 141-144, 153-155.

³²Gröndal, *op. cit.*

³³*Ibid.*, p. 25.

³⁴Unlike Iceland and Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, San Marino and Monaco were not invited to accede to the Treaty for the Renunciation of War (August 27, 1928) though all five states were listed as "entitled to appear before the Permanent Court of International Justice." Hudson, *op. cit.*, 148-149.

³⁵Aleksander W. Rudzinski, "Admission of New Members— The United Nations and the League of Nations," *International Conciliation* (April, 1952, No. 480), 147.

³⁶Iceland joined the United Nations on November 19, 1946. Among the many new states admitted on September 20, 1960 were the first of the new micro-states: the Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon and Cyprus.

³⁷" . . . there would be great reluctance to adopt rules that demote such old-timers as . . . Luxembourg." Whitaker, *op. cit.*, 4.

states sought to risk the rejection which Liechtenstein incurred in 1920. Their inhibitions, even with the affiliated agencies of the United Nations, left no doubt that smallness was a consideration affecting eligibility for full participation.³⁸ San Marino and Liechtenstein were both accepted as parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice but not without many of the same objections being raised which had prevented Liechtenstein from joining the League.³⁹ And, Monaco's admission to the World Health Organization was qualified by the reservation that her membership would not constitute a precedent for other micro-states.⁴⁰ These reservations were intended as a protection against the possible use of the estoppel doctrine in subsequent cases.⁴¹

Reservations about micro-state participation in the United Nations system were raised with even greater urgency once the extent of decolonisation was clear. The implications of this process for international organisations were not recognised immediately, in spite of the uncompromising tone of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). The Declaration affirmed that small size should never be an impediment to any colonial peoples' right to independence.⁴² However, at the time, it was not certain that the General Assembly intended this to mean independence for the "bits and pieces of empire."⁴³ Passed during the same session, Resolution 1541 (XV) allowed for the

Sir Hilary Blood, *The Smaller Territories: Problems and Future* (London: Conservative Political Centre, C.P.C. No.183, Commonwealth Series No. 4, 1958), p. 7.

³⁸Wright, *Proceedings, op. cit.*, 26.

³⁹Reservations about Liechtenstein's accession were expressed by the Soviet and the Ukrainian representatives. SCOR (IV), S/PV. 432, 3.
San Marino's application four years later was accepted without controversy. SCOR (VIII), S/PV 645.

⁴⁰Rapaport, Muteba and Therattil, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.

⁴¹Rosalyn Higgins, *The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 45.

⁴²General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 14 December, 1960.

⁴³Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination," *American Journal of International Law*, XLV (July 1971), 469.

achievement of self-determination short of independence: a voluntary association or even integration with another state.⁴⁴ It was hoped that these alternative provisions would be encouraged to effect decolonisation in the smallest territories.⁴⁵

The metropolitan powers were particularly committed to the merits of Resolution 1541. Though the British had recognised "the wind of change" sooner than any other colonial power, even they did not contemplate independence for their smallest colonies.⁴⁶ Several possibilities were considered: the indefinite continuation of direct British rule, some form of association or integration with the United Kingdom, association or integration with a neighbouring state, or the creation of a federation.⁴⁷ Separate independence for small countries such as Jamaica⁴⁸ or Sierra Leone⁴⁹ was unlikely, let alone tiny colonies like the Bahamas or The Gambia.⁵⁰ The existing European micro-states were still the exceptions to prove the rule.

The conviction that smallness would preclude separate independence was often shared by the political leadership in the colonial territories. In anticipation of impending change in the relationship with France in 1958, some African colonial elites worried about

⁴⁴General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December, 1960.

⁴⁵Rapaport, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁶"Some territories are so small that there is no prospect of their becoming effectively self governing." Alan Lennox-Boyd, British Colonial Secretary 1954-1959, quoted in Blood, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 10-13.

⁴⁸Vaughan Lewis, Commentary on Basil Ince, "The Decolonization of Grenada in the United Nations," in *Independence for Grenada— Myth or Reality?* (Proceedings of a Conference on the Implications of Independence for Grenada sponsored by the Institute of International Relations and the Department of Government, the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, 11th - 13th January, 1974) St. Augustine: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, 1974, p. 53.

⁴⁹Colin Cross, *The Fall of the British Empire—1918-1968* (London: Paladin, 1968), p. 341.

⁵⁰Blood, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

the problem of small size and looked to independence within a larger Equatorial association.⁵¹ These anxieties and doubts were typical of first generation national leaders in very small dependencies. In the Caribbean, for instance, even Grenada's Eric Gairy, the first of the small island leaders to renounce the associated state relationship, at one time believed that Grenada's size was an obstacle to her separate independence.⁵²

Perhaps the most dramatic example was that of James Mancham, the Chief Minister of the Seychelles, who argued for years that his tiny archipelago would be best served by the continuation of colonial rule. Mancham complained bitterly of the relentless pressure of the Organization of African Unity⁵³ and the United Nations to force independence on all colonial territories, even if it was neither the most suitable nor the most preferred alternative: "Why should the Seychellois not be allowed to pursue their wish to remain British?," he demanded.⁵⁴ However, by March, 1974⁵⁵ Mancham had

⁵¹In anticipation of impending change in the relationship with France in 1958, the Abbe Fulbert Youlou of the Congo-Brazzaville emphasised the problem of size and the need for a larger Equatorial political community: ". . . I would like to preserve the unity that has been gradually achieved between us, for I do not believe that any of our territories has the potential to go it alone in a world that is being drawn even closer together in large groups." Rene Gauze, *The Politics of Congo-Brazzaville*, trans. and ed. by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University), p. 48. The critical question was: Could unity be achieved prior to independence, or was separate independence a regrettable but necessary first step? The major spokesman for 'union first' was the Ubangi leader Barthelemy Boganda who envisaged the four French Equatorial territories achieving independence as a single state. However personal rivalries ran deep and most other F.E.A. leaders, particularly Leon M'Ba of Gabon, were suspicious of Boganda's proposals. *Ibid.*, p. 59
Brian Weinstein, *Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogooue* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 215.

⁵²In a letter to the Premiers of the Associated States, Coard Papers, June 25, 1969, quoted in Richard Jacobs, "The Movement Towards Grenadian Independence," in; *Independence for Grenada— Myth or Reality?*, *op. cit.*, p.30.

⁵³The O.A.U. had supported the Opposition Leader, France Albert René, and the Seychelles Peoples United Party, which was committed to independence. This support included a contribution of £75,000. *The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 23 May, 1974, 2.

⁵⁴John M. Ostheimer, "Independence Politics in the Seychelles," in John M. Ostheimer (ed.), *The Politics of the Western Indian Ocean Islands* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 185.

⁵⁵*Africa* (London), June, 1975, 23-24.

conceded that he was resisting the inevitable. He took over the sovereignty issue reluctantly and led his country to independence in June, 1975.⁵⁶

Though the prospects for separate independence may have been underestimated in the smallest colonial territories—or even viewed with some apprehension—expectations were altered with the very momentum of decolonisation. The General Assembly's Special Committee on Colonialism, reflecting the increasing influence of the new states, stressed the primacy of Resolution 1514 and the right to full independence whatever the circumstances. The independence of one micro-state, and its subsequent admission to the United Nations, raised expectations in even smaller territories. Vaughan Lewis has called this process 'independence by demonstration.'⁵⁷ By 1965, with the independence of the Maldives, the undeclared barrier of 100,000 had been overturned, provoking the Western powers to urge a review of the "micro-state problem" in the United Nations.⁵⁸

It was also true that the United Kingdom was not prepared to associate the Seychelles with Britain as Mancham had hoped.

⁵⁶*The Times* (London), 28 June, 1976,

⁵⁷Lewis, *op. cit.*, p.54.

⁵⁸In reference to the admission of the Maldives the United States representative in the Security Council stated,

"Today many of the small emerging entities, however willing, probably do not have the human or economic resources at this stage to meet (Charter obligations). We would therefore urge that Council Members and other United Nations members give early and careful consideration to this problem in an effort to arrive at some agreed standards, some lower limits, to be applied in the case of future applicants, for United Nations membership. "

SCOR (XX), S/PV. 1243, 14-15.

The Secretary-General also raised the issue in his annual report for 1965:

"A different aspect of the question of the extent of participation by countries in organized international activities is raised by the recent phenomenon of the emergence of exceptionally small new States. Their limited size and resources can pose a difficult problem as to the role they should try to play in international life . . . I believe that the time has come when Member States may wish to examine more closely the criteria for the admission of New Members in the light of the long-term implications of the present trends. "

United Nations Document A/6001/Add.1. (1965).

In the Secretary-General's annual report of 1967 he urged " . . . a thorough and comprehensive study of the criteria for membership in the United Nations, with a view to laying down the necessary limitations on full membership while also defining other forms of association which would benefit both the 'micro-states' and the United Nations."⁵⁹ In response to this report the United States wrote to the Secretary-General⁶⁰ suggesting the revival of the Committee on Membership to examine the increasingly infectious problem of micro-state independence. The United States renewed its concern again during the Security Council debate on the admission of Mauritius in 1968⁶¹ and by August, 1969 the Americans were successful in bringing the micro-state issue to the Plenary Council.⁶² Though the Council was not prepared to endorse the American proposal for the creation of a category of Associate Membership for micro-states, it did establish a Committee of Experts to investigate the whole problem.⁶³ The United States and the United Kingdom each submitted proposals for associate membership.⁶⁴ However, though the Committee finally produced a report in June, 1970 with the two Western proposals appended, no recommendations were made and the Committee merely pledged itself to further study.⁶⁵

⁵⁹United Nations Document A/6701/Add.1. (1967).

⁶⁰United Nations Document S/8296 (1967).

⁶¹United Nations Document S/PV.1414 (1968).

⁶²United Nations Document S/9327 (1969).

⁶³United Nations Chronicle, August-September, 1969, 106 f.

⁶⁴For a detailed analysis of those proposals see Gunter, *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, *op. cit.*, 474-482.

Stephen M. Schwebel, "Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations," *American Journal of International Law* LXVII (January, 1973), 110-116.

⁶⁵At its tenth meeting on March 1, 1971, the Committee requested that the Legal Counsel of the United Nations study the proposals and inform the Committee "whether they (could) be implemented within the framework of the United Nations without requiring amendment thereof." The Legal Counsel concluded that the U.S. and U.K. proposals would require amendment of the Charter but it was possible to exploit further the opportunities for associate status which now exists on an *ad hoc* basis within the United Nations. Memorandum by the Legal Counsel on the proposal of the United States of America

Underlying the concern over the micro-state problem were deep-rooted misgivings about the quality of statehood in such exceptionally small states. Though an attempt was made to distinguish 'the right to sovereignty' from 'the right to United Nations membership', it proved impossible to avoid the humiliating implications which the latter question held for the former.⁶⁶ If the legitimacy of self-determination is measured by success⁶⁷ then United Nations membership is part of that success.⁶⁸ To be denied membership or to be accepted in less than full and equal standing could only have the effect of qualifying the legitimacy of a state's sovereignty, no matter how explicit the assurances to the contrary. This was all the more true for micro-states, since their international status had always been precarious and controversial.

These intractable difficulties resulted in the eventual neglect of the micro-state issue, though the United States sought to raise it as late as 1970 in the context of Fiji's

(S/9836, Annex 1) and the suggestion of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (S/9836, Annex II) regarding special membership for exceptionally small states in the United Nations, Committee of Experts Established by the Security Council at its 1506th meeting, Conference Room Paper No. 8, July 23, 1971. (mimeograph).

⁶⁶This was emphasised by the Secretary-General in his 1967 report: "It is, of course, perfectly legitimate that even the smallest territories, through the exercise of their right to self-determination, should attain independence as a result of the effective application of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) . . . However, it appears desirable that a distinction be made between the right to independence and the question of full membership in the United Nations." *Op. cit.*
The United States found this awkward. In spite of its expressed reservations on the micro-state question in general, the United States *did* vote for the admission of the Maldives and other very small dependencies.

⁶⁷Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 9, December, 1964), p. 63.

⁶⁸" . . . most of the ministates in the contemporary world are products of the decolonization process. They view membership in the United Nations as the final stamp of approval for their independence. Opposition to their admission would be equated by some members with a pro-colonialist stand. The willingness of the United Nations to admit ministates goes hand in hand with one of the principal values of the present international system, the dismantling of the colonial system."
Gunter, *American Journal of International Law*, *op. cit.*, 501.

application for membership.⁶⁹ Since then another 25 micro-states⁷⁰ have joined the United Nations including Western Samoa, whose decision not to apply at independence in 1962 was due, in part, to the fear that her application might have been rejected, particularly in light of the Commonwealth controversy over the admission of another micro-state, Cyprus.⁷¹

As more very small dependencies attained sovereignty the issue of micro-state participation in international organisations receded. Even the European micro-states have been encouraged by the precedents of the decolonisation process to pursue a more prominent diplomatic role. San Marino joined the World Health Organization in 1980, having been refused admission in 1950.⁷² Liechtenstein, San Marino and Monaco are all full parties to U.N.C.T.A.D. and, perhaps more significantly, to the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe. Liechtenstein is now committed to a more independent and active diplomacy once considered inappropriate. In 1978 Liechtenstein joined the Council of Europe, though not without controversy. Some members expressed reservations reminiscent of the League debate and concern for the dangers of precedent.⁷³ But by 1988 the climate of acceptance was such that San Marino, once again looking at

⁶⁹United Nations Document S/PV. 1554 (1970) The Committee was revived to consider the applications of Bahrain, Bhutan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
Stephen Schwebel, "What Should the U.N. Do About the Mini-States," *The Washington Post*, 26 September, 1971.

⁷⁰Three of these countries (Bhutan, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) are now included in the next population class of states.

⁷¹R. A. Herr, "A Minor Ornament: The Diplomatic Decisions of Western Samoa at Independence," *Australian Outlook* XXIX (December, 1975), 308-309.

⁷²Rapaport, Muteba and Therattil, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.9
San Marino had joined U.N.E.S.C.O. in 1976.

⁷³*The Times* (London) 29 September, 1978, 6; 17 November, 1978; p. 6.

Alpine initiatives, was emboldened to change its status in Strasbourg. The observer standing of this most ancient of European states was easily converted to full membership.⁷⁴

No change, however, could be more significant than Liechtenstein's decision in December, 1989 to apply for full membership in the United Nations.⁷⁵ The admission of Liechtenstein during the 45th plenary session of the General Assembly comes a full 70 years after 'the precedent' for very small states was set. It reflects the extent of the victory of egalitarian norms in the organised relations of states.

The Landtag's decision was unanimous, which itself reflects the dramatic changes in the Principality in the last 25 years and its new-found confidence in international relations. Liechtenstein has been transformed from a pastoral Ruritanian community to an industrial economy characterised by advanced technologies and a sophisticated service sector. Its G.N.P. is larger than many Third World states which pursue a high-profile declaratory foreign policy.

Liechtenstein's diplomatic emergence was gradual and tentative. The memory of rejection in 1920 had been inhibiting in the early post-war years and was clearly still present during the Council of Europe debate in the late 1970s. Yet, in 1984, when he assumed his father's responsibilities, Crown Prince Hans Adam declared his country's intention to join the United Nations eventually and noted that Liechtenstein might very well take this step before Switzerland.⁷⁶ The fact that the Swiss reaffirmed their intentions to remain outside the Organisation in the 1986 referendum⁷⁷ did not affect Liechtenstein's commitment to a more independent and active diplomacy once considered inappropriate.

⁷⁴*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1988), 36231.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, (1989), 37162.

⁷⁶*The Times* (London), 27 August, 1984, 5.
The Economist (292: 25 August, 1984), 43.

⁷⁷*The Times* (London), 17 March, 1986, 1.

The notion that the Principality might be considered as a special Swiss canton is now clearly misleading.⁷⁸

And, consistent with precedent, San Marino followed Liechtenstein's example by assuming full membership in the United Nations in February 1992 along with most of the former Soviet republics. Emboldened by its access to international councils, this ancient republic is now clearly committed to a policy of full international participation.⁷⁹ With the precedents now firmly established, Monaco and even Andorra were emboldened to join the United Nations in the summer of 1993.

Micro-states can now expect to participate in international organisations without controversy. Any challenge to the rights of the very small would be as embarrassing as it would be ineffectual. To what extent does the acceptance of the universality principle lend support for the legitimacy of micro-states, particularly those with recurring problems of status and security? It is early yet to assess the depth of the international community's commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of many of its smallest members. Post-war developments have not been wholly reassuring for micro-states. In some cases aspirations for sovereignty have been defeated by larger claims. In others, independence is marred by the presumptions and ambitions of neighbouring states. It is this more critical aspect of the legitimacy problem that we consider next.

⁷⁸In a well-known text on Swiss government, Liechtenstein is treated as virtually a Swiss canton. George Arthur Coddington, Jr. *The Federal Government of Switzerland* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1961) p. 166.

Pierre Raton concedes that the Principality has been viewed as a monarchical canton in the past but argues that this description is oversimplified and inaccurate. Raton, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-98.

⁷⁹Andrew Cohen, "San Marino, The Vest-Pocket Republic Has Big Ideas About Its Place in the World," *The Globe and Mail, Destinations*, (Toronto), April, 1993, 53-57.

CHAPTER THREE

Decolonisation and the Contest for Legitimacy in Very Small Territories

Separate independence in very small dependencies is based on a nearly sacrosanct principle: The colonial state is the foundation of the nation. The people as defined in the imperial experience is the "self" in self-determination. So new states anxiously defend the validity of inherited colonial frontiers, however they might offend traditional ethnic, cultural, economic, and even geographical sensibilities. For dissident peoples within these territories there are "no residual rights of self-determination."¹ General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), which allows no obstacle to the self-determination of colonial peoples, stresses the importance of territorial unity.² Moreover, the inviolability of colonial frontiers is as sacred in the period leading up to independence as it is after the transfer of sovereignty. Metropolitan decolonisation policies have been monitored vigilantly in the United Nations to assure that the natural unity of the would-be state is protected against colonial dismemberment. Only on rare occasions has partition been accepted.³ It is this principle of the inviolability of colonial frontiers which has allowed for

¹U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 1960.
Note especially Clause 6.

²Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 9, December, 1964), p. 28.

"As against either internal or external challenge the established governments work to hold on to the 'going concerns' which they now control, in evident fear that the existing frontiers, however unsatisfactory they may be, might give way to unforeseeable catastrophies if they were once allowed to be called into question. A basic reshuffling of the political map would not only endanger the power and prerogatives of those now in control but might also destroy much of what has so far been accomplished under independence, with no promise whatsoever that the next stage would not be worse than the last."
Ibid., p. 31.

³The British decision to accept Anguilla's secession from the Associated State of St.Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla in 1967, the implementation of direct rule in 1969 and the restoration of the island's colonial status in 1976 were met with suspicion and hostility in the region.

the nationalisation of the colonial state and for the security of the new state's international identity.

The legitimacy of new states, however small or problematic, would seem, then, to be clearly established in the ideological commitments and the elaborate institutional arrangements of contemporary international relations. The United Nations system itself, in Stanley Hoffman's words, provides " . . . a solemn endorsement to the nation state and . . . (wraps) the rights and privileges of the Charter around the frail and the shivering."⁴

Yet colonial frontiers, particularly in very small dependencies, may be outrageous violations of the territorial integrity of existing states. It is not surprising that separate independence for tiny colonies can provoke indignation from larger contiguous states. Crucial to the self-esteem of any state, and especially a new state seeking to establish the foundations of nationhood, is the satisfaction of geographic symmetry. The map is the cartographic mirror-image of the nation and states are " . . . uneasy with strong irregularities, enclaves, detached portions, and protuberances or hollows."⁵

Basil A. Ince, "The Diplomacy of New States: The Commonwealth Caribbean and the Case of Anguilla," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LXIX (Summer, 1970), 382-396.

Similarly the Comoros maintained Third World support in the United Nations for its attack on the French decision to retain Departmental status for Mayotte when that island voted against independence by a majority of 65% in the referendum of 22 December, 1974. For a useful discussion of the Mayotte question in the period leading up to the independence of the Comoros see:

John M. Ostheimer, "The Politics of Comorian Independence," in John M. Ostheimer, *The Politics of the Western Indian Ocean Islands* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 73-101.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1975), 27036A.

⁴Stanley Hoffmann, "Regulating the New International System," in Martin Kilson (ed.), *New States in the Modern World* (Cambridge, Mass.: and London: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 56-57.

Inis Claude pointedly addressed the importance of United Nations membership and its implications for rooting the international personality of new states in his thoughtful essay:

Inis L. Claude, Jr. "Collective Legitimization as Political Function of the United Nations," *International Organization* XX (Summer, 1966), 367-379.

⁵Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," in Wolfram R. Hanrieder (ed.), *Comparative Foreign Policy* (New York: David McKay Co. Ltd, 1971) p. 95.

"The most striking single characteristic of the national states is the apparent naturalness of the territorial state."

Ibid., p. 97.

Given this concern, those tiny colonies aspiring to independence and those micro-states already established, betray most strikingly the accident of their foundation. Many of them are continental enclaves⁶ or off-shore islands whose political separateness may be seen as an affront to the 'completeness' of a neighbouring state.

Other factors may also draw the interest of the larger state: the disproportionate existence of valuable resources; the strategic importance of the smaller territory; the irredentism of pre-colonial political or cultural ties. The relative importance of these interests may vary as national circumstances change but justification is always most satisfying if the grounds for integration are many and mutually reinforcing.

In the United Nations the interests of those states most directly concerned with the separate independence of very small colonial entities has been acknowledged on various occasions. General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) does allow for the association or even integration of a colonial dependency with another state providing that such an act of self-determination has been exercised freely (i.e. by means of a referendum with United Nations participation)⁷ " . . . in full knowledge of the option available to them,"⁸ and, in

⁶A purist definition of an enclave would apply only to Lesotho and San Marino.

"An enclave may be said to exist where territory is entirely surrounded by the territory of another state: Hence a piece of territory which is entirely surrounded on the landward side by the territory of another state, but which has direct access to the sea . . . cannot be considered as being a true enclave.'

C. D'Olivier Farran, "International Enclaves and the Question of State Servitudes," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, IV (April, 1955), 295.

See also: G. W. S. Robinson, "West Berlin: The Geography of an Enclave," *Geographical Review XLIII* (October, 1953), 540-547.

However, as Rigo Sureda noted, "In the context of General Assembly practice this concept is enlarged to mean a small sized territory entirely surrounded by a foreign country except for those parts where it is limited by sea."

A. Rigo Sureda, *The Evolution of the Rights of Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973), p. 176.

It is this usage which is employed in this study.

⁷The United Nations supervised referenda in the Trust Territory of British Togoland (1956), which resulted in that territory's integration with the Gold Coast; in the Trust Territory of British Cameroons (1961), where separate referenda resulted in the northern part of the territory being integrated with Nigeria and the south united with the Republic of Cameroon; the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-

cases of free association, with the option of choosing full independence in the future.⁹ Moreover, the United Nations has even been willing to accept the principle of retrocession and the recognition that a state has a right to round off its borders. In certain cases, where a small territory has been claimed as an integral part of the contiguous state, the claim has been acknowledged. The United Nations has consistently urged that the future of these territories be determined by the colonial power in consultation with the interested state. United Nations resolutions on Ifni,¹⁰ Gibraltar,¹¹ the Falkland Islands,¹² and until

Urundi (1961), which confirmed the desire for separate independence for each part of the territory; the Trust Territory of French Togoland (1958), and the New Zealand Trust Territory of Western Samoa (1961), both resulting in independence. In the case of the Cook Islands, the administering power, New Zealand, invited the United Nations to oversee the elections to the Legislative Assembly and the subsequent debate on the future of the territory. The 1964 Cook Islands Constitution Bill providing for full internal self-government in association with New Zealand was the major issue of the election. The Constitution was not to come into effect until the new Assembly had passed it. The election resulted in the massive victory (70% of the vote and 14 of the 23 Assembly seats) of the Cook Islands Party, the major proponents of the Constitution. The General Assembly did accept the Mission's recommendations and passed a resolution recognising this act of self-determination and releasing New Zealand from any further obligations to transmit information on the Cook Islands as required under Article 73(e) of the Charter. However, significant reservations were expressed because the decision had been made indirectly and not by means of a United Nations administered referendum. The fact that the association with New Zealand could be abrogated at any time by the Cook Islands was the most persuasive factor for its eventual acceptance. For the Cook Islands debate in the "Committee of Twenty-Four" see United Nations Document A/Ac 109/PV244, 15 April, 1964.

Government of New Zealand: *An Act to Make Provision for Self-Government by the People of the Cook Islands and to Provide a Constitution for those Islands* Wellington: (17 November, 1964).

Arnold H. Leibowitz, *Colonial Emancipation in the Pacific and the Caribbean: A Legal and Political Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 132-196.

David Stone, "Self-Government in the Cook Islands, 1965," *Journal of Pacific History*, No. 2, (1967), 168-178.

David Stone, "Self-Determination in the Cook Islands—A Reply," *Journal of Polynesian Society* LXXIV (1965), 80-111.

⁸United Nations Document A/6300 Rev. 1, 769, 770.(1966).

⁹United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), Principle VII.

¹⁰The doctrine of retrocession or reversion recognises the importance of contiguity but in United Nations practice it has applied only to very small enclaves such as Ifni.

A. Rigo Sureda, *The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973), pp. 176-177, 197-198.

¹¹United Nations General Assembly Resolutions: 2072 (XX), 16 December, 1965.

1972, Spanish Sahara,¹³ have recognised the interests of the claimants. The colonial powers were urged to negotiate the future of those territories with the states concerned.¹⁴

The inviolability of colonial frontiers as the basis for self determination has been challenged most directly then in the smallest territories. In this chapter, we shall examine some of those cases where aspirations for separate independence have been frustrated by the assertion of larger claims. East Timor, the Western Sahara and Belize are all territories where the demand for separate independence was challenged by powerful neighbouring states arguing the cause of national integration and territorial integrity. Though all three territories are exceedingly small, underdeveloped and peripheral, their aspirations to independence were consistent with the post-war understanding of self-determination and the precedents established in the decolonisation process.

The definition of a colonial people with rights to self-determination is based on the recognition of a separate colonial experience. In the United Nations the prerequisite of a distinctive colonial history was recognised in all three cases. In spite of this, the course of

2229 (XXI),	20 December, 1966.
2354 (XXII)	19 December, 1967.
2428 (XXIII)	18 December, 1968.

¹²United Nations General Assembly Resolutions.

2070 (XX)	16 December, 1965.
2231 (XXI)	20 December, 1966.
2353 (XXII)	19 December, 1967.
2429 (XXIII)	18 December, 1968.

¹³United Nations General Assembly Resolutions

2229 (XXI)	20 December, 1966.
2354-II (XXII)	19 December, 1967.
2428 (XXIII)	18 December, 1968.
2711 (XXV)	14 December, 1970.

"Independence" was added to the "right to self-determination" in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2983 (XXVII) 14 December, 1972, though consultation with the Governments of Morocco and Mauritania and any other interested party was still included.

¹⁴Rigo Sureda, *op. cit.*, pp 78-81, 172-177, 183-198.

decolonisation was one of controversy and struggle. The conclusions were different in each case. In East Timor the campaign for self-determination ended in total defeat.

East Timor

Indonesia's interest in East Timor was stirred by the April 1974 revolution in Portugal, which opened the door to the rapid decolonisation of the Portuguese empire. Desperately poor and underdeveloped, the tiny colony of Portuguese Timor was hardly considered with great urgency in Lisbon; the Portuguese had intended to remain until at least October of 1978.¹⁵ With the end of the Salazar dictatorship, three political parties emerged in the colony: the Social Democratic Party, which later became Fretilin and which called for early independence;¹⁶ the U.D.T.,¹⁷ which favoured a continuation of Portuguese rule for as long as possible, and Apodeti,¹⁸ which promoted integration with Indonesia. Each party had its support among the Portuguese *colons* in Timor.

Indonesia's position on decolonisation in East Timor was ambivalent. As early as July, 1974 the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, put his country's public position very clearly: "Indonesia had no territorial ambitions over Timor."¹⁹ Yet, in private,

¹⁵*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, (1975), 27266A.

¹⁶The Associacao Social Democratica de Timor (ASDT) was formed immediately after the Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974. The movement included those Timorese nationalists (like the future Fretilin leader Jose Ramos Horta) who had been active in informal groups prior to the coup. In September 1974 the A.S.D.T. changed its name to Frente Revolucionaria de Timor L'Este Independente (Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor) or Fretilin in order " . . . to broaden the representation of the Party to include independence forces rather than confining the movement to those who accepted social democratic politics."

The Struggle for East Timor (London: Europe-Third World Research Centre, 1976), pp. 5-6.

¹⁷Unao Democratica Timorese (U.D.T.), established largely by more moderate dissidents in the A.S.D.T.

¹⁸Associacao Popular Democratica Timorese (APODETI).

¹⁹*Australian Financial Review*, 16 July, 1974, as quoted in Nancy Viviani, "Australia and the Timor Issue," *Australian Outlook* XXX (No. 2, August, 1976), 198.

Indonesian authorities were certain decolonisation could only mean integration with Indonesia.²⁰ This conviction was shared by the Australian Labour Party prime minister, Gough Whitlam, who feared "an independent Timor would be an unviable state and a potential threat to the stability of the area."²¹ This was also the view of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs²² and the Australian ambassador in Djakarta who regarded the stability of the Australian-Indonesian relationship as a major priority of Australian foreign policy.²³

Indonesia's A.S.E.A.N.²⁴ partners also accepted Indonesia's arguments for integration. The annexation of such a small and insignificant territory would hardly arouse

²⁰*Ibid.*, 200.

²¹Australian Department of Foreign Affairs briefing, *Canberra Times*, 9 September, 1974, quoted *ibid.*, 199.
See also *The Sunday Times* (London), 24 November, 1974, 12.

²²Peter Hastings, "The Timor Problem," *Australian Outlook* XXIX (No. 1, April, 1975), 19.

²³"The Department of Foreign Affairs has consistently and persistently put forward the view . . . that Indonesia is the linchpin of Southeast Asian security . . . thus the maintenance of the bilateral relationship is the paramount consideration in policy even when Australian and Indonesian interests are in direct conflict as they were over the West Irian issue. Because of Indonesia's capacity to disturb or enhance the regional balance of power, because Indonesia can facilitate or check Australia's entrée . . . to regional political institutions and because of great power interests in Indonesia, Australian diplomats have been loath to offend Indonesia by too forceful a statement of their views on particular issues, and are extremely wary of the often capricious sensitivities of Indonesian politicians."
Viviani, *op. cit.*, 200-201.

The opposition view came not from the anti-Communist Liberal-Country benches but from within the ranks of the Australian Labour Party.

²⁴The Association of Southeast Asian Nations includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and, since 1985, Brunei. Each of these states was concerned with Communist backed insurgencies. For Malaysia, particularly, the strengthening of the relationship with Indonesia became a primary objective of her foreign policy.

Sevinc Carlson, *Malaysia: Search for National Unity and Economic Growth* (Beverly Hills and London: The Washington Papers, Volume III, No. 25, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 54-57.

Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand supported Indonesia on General Assembly Resolution 3485 (XXX), which condemned the Indonesian invasion. Singapore and Papua-New Guinea abstained. The Philippines and Malaysia also joined the Security Council debate on East Timor, in order to support the Indonesian case.

See particularly SCOR, (XXI), 1915th meeting, 22 April, 1976.

anxieties over Indonesian expansion. On the contrary, it was a positive step for regional security, especially given the alleged Soviet and Chinese links to the major party of independence, Fretilin.²⁵ In any case, the A.S.E.A.N. states saw Indonesian annexation as ". . . inevitable—now or 50 years hence . . ." ²⁶ and were not prepared to stand in her way.

Unlike West Irian,²⁷ East Timor was truly a colonial remnant. The Portuguese colony occupied only a part of one of the smaller islands of the archipelago and, even at that, it was geographically bifurcated, with the enclave of Ocussi-Ambeno separated from the main colony. Concern over the potential hazards of superpower intervention in the region through an independent government in Dili and the obvious geographical eccentricity of the colony within the Indonesian archipelago were only reinforced by the

Papua-New Guinea achieved independence at the very time of East Timor's own bid for sovereignty. From the outset Papua-New Guinea sought close relations with the A.S.E.A.N. states. Moreover, facing the dangers of a secessionist movement in Bougainville, Papua-New Guinea had reason to be concerned about the precedent for fragmentation in the region implicit in the independence of East Timor. However, "the Indonesian threat" was of equal concern given the fate of fellow Papuans in West Irian. One PNG minister condemned the Indonesian invasion as "imperialist intervention."
Robert Lawless, "The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor," *Asian Survey* XIV(No. 10, October, 1976), 962.

²⁵*International Herald Tribune*, 17 March, 1975, 7.

²⁶Patrice de Beer, "Timor: Obsession for Indonesia," *Le Monde*, 5 November, 1975, translation in *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 16 November, 1975, 13.

²⁷This was not the only difference in the two situations. In East Timor, Indonesia could not summon the same arguments which had served her well in West Irian. In her long-standing dispute with the Netherlands over this western part of New Guinea, Indonesia had consistently maintained that West Irian was an integral part of pre-colonial Indonesia to which the Republic was the successor state. Indonesia "could only be the boundaries of the former Netherlands East Indies with whose freedom the national movement had been concerned."

Rigo Sureda, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

The Dutch case for self-determination in West Irian was regarded as a "perversion" and an "amputation" of Indonesian territory designed to prevent the completion of her independence.

Ibid., p. 145.

Racial, ethnic and cultural considerations had no bearing on the definition of a colony for the purposes of self-determination. It was the colonial administrative unit, in this case the whole of the Netherlands East Indies "from Sabang to Merauke," which was the exclusive basis for national self-determination.

Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 125.

smallness of the projected state of East Timor. Prime Minister Whitlam had already proposed schemes for limiting micro-state proliferation in the Pacific.²⁸ And for Djakarta, the emergence of an independent state within the corpus of Indonesia could only encourage the secessionist aspirations of the South Moluccans and others. A Fretilin republic could well be an asylum for self-defined exiles and nationalists in this huge, diverse archipelagic state.²⁹ It is not surprising that the prejudice against an independent East Timor state was well-established within the region and among extra-regional allies.

Prospects for an easy transition to independence were further undermined with the deterioration of civil order in the colony. The fragile Fretilin-U.D.T. coalition, which, by its formation, had isolated Apodeti and given considerable impetus to the independence alternative, finally came apart amidst mutual recrimination. Indonesia had successfully exploited the anti-Communist fears of the U.D.T. and encouraged them to leave the coalition.³⁰ On August 6, 1975, after a series of top-level meetings with the Indonesians in Kupang (capital of Indonesian Timor) and Djakarta, the U.D.T. leader, Francesco Xavier Lopes da Cruz, announced that U.D.T. would move soon against Fretilin: "We are nationalists. If we want to be independent we must follow the Indonesian political line. Otherwise, it is independence for a week or a month."³¹ Five days later the U.D.T. seized the key installations in Dili.³² This provoked a Fretilin counterattack which plunged the colony into full-scale civil war. The U.D.T. was now in coalition with the pro-

²⁸For example, his proposal for a union between the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides. Viviani, *op. cit.*, 203.

²⁹*Ibid*, 214.

³⁰*Keesings Contemporary Archives*, (1976), 27533

³¹*Ibid*.

³²*Ibid*.

integrationist Apodeti, though that party had had very little support hitherto.³³ By September 1, 1975 Fretilin was in full control of Dili and Fretilin forces dominated most of East Timor except for the borderlands.³⁴

On September 8 Fretilin dropped their original demand for immediate independence, calling instead for a provisional government and the election of a constituent assembly leading to independence within a few years.³⁵ Though Fretilin expected the *de facto* writ of their authority would force the Portuguese into a settlement, they also recognised the need for the blessing of the colonial power to give their independence legitimacy. This was all the more difficult because the Portuguese were preoccupied with their own domestic situation and because the Portuguese governor, discredited for his collaboration in the U.D.T. coup, had retreated to the island of Atauro.³⁶

Though apparently strong on the ground, Fretilin's position was one of isolation. Any possibility of coming to terms with the other parties in the colony had been precluded by Fretilin's "fatal error"³⁷ of boycotting, in protest at the presence of Apodeti, the Macao talks of May 1975, which were designed to find a consensus. The civil war which ensued

³³Viviani, *op. cit.*

³⁴*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 1 September, 1975, 3.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op. cit.

³⁵*Ibid.*

Viviani, *op. cit.*

Moreover, the Portuguese, in negotiations with the Indonesians in London in March, 1975, had agreed to support East Timor's integration with Indonesia and to allow Indonesia to strengthen Apodeti's position prior to the elections anticipated in 1976.

Michael Richardson, *Age*, 9 September, 1975, quoted in Viviani, *op. cit.*, 213.

³⁶Viviani, *op. cit.*

³⁷By October 30, 1975 the Australian Foreign Minister, Donald Willesee, told Parliament that Australia could not accept the claim of Fretilin or any other single party to solely represent East Timor.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1976), 27534.

only confirmed the allegations of those who contended that Fretilin did not represent the majority opinion in Timor and that the integrationist forces commanded genuine and substantial support.

The Indonesians were determined there would be no Fretilin-led independent Timor. Indonesian support for the anti-Fretilin parties continued to intensify during October, to the extent that Indonesian forces were "responsible for virtually all the fighting presented to the world as a 'counter-attack' by Timorese freedom fighters."³⁸

Portugal's position became more intractable. Whatever earlier sympathies the Portuguese may have had for the integrationist solution, they were not now anxious to sanction an outright Indonesian annexation: They refused Djakarta's proposal made at the time of the Fretilin counter-coup for Indonesia to restore order in the colony.³⁹ Yet, clearly, Indonesia was prepared to countenance no other solution than that of integration, having been encouraged earlier by both Portugal and Australia. Portugal, lacking the means to support any initiative in defiance of Indonesian determination, could only stand by. Unable to facilitate integration tantamount to annexation or to grant independence to the Fretilin Government, Portugal was now of little consequence in the course of events.

Faced with mounting Indonesian military pressure and anticipating an invasion, Fretilin could only hope to be saved by achieving immediate sovereignty. The international censure which would follow the invasion of a sovereign state might be

³⁸*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 13 November, 1975, 3.

Fretilin claimed that they were battling Indonesian forces which had air and naval support. Indonesia rejected this charge and claimed, as in the October 8 capture of Butugade, that only U.D.T.-Apodeti forces were involved. On October 23 Malik acknowledged that Indonesia trained "the refugees" but insisted that Indonesia did not ". . . send soldiers or supply weapons, but (they did) teach them to steal weapons from Fretilin."

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op. cit.

³⁹*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 1 September, 1975, 3.

sufficient to dissuade the Indonesian generals.⁴⁰ Unable to secure sovereignty legitimately from Portugal, Fretilin declared independence unilaterally in the hope it would bring sufficient international recognition to inhibit the Indonesians and stave off invasion.⁴¹ However, a unilateral declaration of independence (U.D.I.) was unlikely to elicit immediate or extensive recognition except from the lobby of "progressive" states, and even that measure of success required more time and greater diplomatic resources than Fretilin possessed.⁴² Moreover, U.D.I. was directed not at a discredited European colonial power, as was the case in Guinea-Bissau, for Portugal was no longer the obstacle to Timorese independence. It was aimed at Indonesia, a Third World state with considerable

⁴⁰It was reported that President Suharto himself had consistently resisted the hawkish pressures of his generals. He was particularly sensitive to the diplomatic repercussions of an overt invasion that could revive anxieties of Sukarno-style expansionism.
de Beer, *op. cit.*

⁴¹The Democratic Republic of East Timor was proclaimed on November 26, 1975. The new President was Francesco Xavier do Amaral. A Government was sworn in on 1 December, 1975, with Nicolau dos Reis Lobato as Prime Minister and Jose Ramos-Horta as Foreign Minister.
The Guardian (Manchester and London), 29 November, 1975, 2, and 2 December, 1975, 2
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1976), 27534-27535.

⁴²Mozambique recognised the new state on 1 December, 1975 and was followed soon after by the other former Portuguese territories: Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and by China, North Korea, Vietnam and Benin.

East Timor Information Bulletin, No. 2, February 1976, London: British Campaign for an Independent East Timor.

Guinea-Bissau declared its independence from Portugal on 24 September, 1973 ". . . at a meeting place within the region of Bo . . .". Within a month 66 states had recognised Guinea-Bissau's U.D.I., though the Western powers withheld recognition and opposed the admission of Guinea-Bissau to the United Nations on the grounds that the Portuguese authorities were still in Bissau.

Basil Davidson, *Growing from the Grass Roots: The State of Guinea-Bissau* (London: Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, 1973), pp. 3, 11.

The Comoros declared independence from France on 6 July, 1975. France did not attempt to defeat U.D.I., except to reserve sovereignty over the island of Mayotte. The new state was recognised immediately by the O.A.U., which on 10 July urged all African states to recognise the independence of the Comoros. On 22 July France withdrew from Grand Comoro but maintained its presence on Mayotte.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1975), 27282.

diplomatic support of its own among the very ranks which an independent Timor had to win over.

Though it was a desperate attempt to secure the new state, U.D.I. was a fatal decision. Even the possible shelter of Portuguese jurisdiction had been abandoned. The anti-Fretilin coalition announced that U.D.I. had "removed the last remains of Portuguese sovereignty in Timor"⁴³ and that "liberated towns" had now been integrated with Indonesia. On December 7, 1975 Indonesia, in what was described as "the biggest single military operation in the country's history,"⁴⁴ invaded the new republic and established a provisional government, which would eventually lead to East Timor's incorporation as Indonesia's 27th province.⁴⁵

The likelihood that East Timor could have become an independent micro-state was probably doomed from the beginning.⁴⁶ Though Adam Malik had stated as late as August

⁴³*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1976), 27535.

⁴⁴*The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 25 July, 1976, 7.

The Indonesian force was estimated to be between 10,000 and 20,000.

⁴⁵*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 2 July, 1976, 1.

The Peoples Republican Council in East Timor voted for integration on 31 May, 1976. The territory became a province of Indonesia on 17 August, 1976, the anniversary of Indonesia's independence.

The Guardian (Manchester and London), 2 July, 1976, 4.

The resistance in East Timor had been determined and widespread, with ten percent of the population estimated as killed in the ensuing struggle.

Ibid.

Indeed, the severity of Indonesian policy in East Timor had resulted in defections among some U.D.T. and Apodeti supporters who had abetted the Indonesian invasion.

The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 25 July, 1976, 7.

⁴⁶Referring to the Portuguese territories of Timor and Maçao in 1964, David Wainhouse noted that ". . . those colonies exist more or less at the sufferance of large neighboring Asian powers, as Goa did. Portuguese Timor has surely been marked as one of the targets for Indonesian 'liberation' now that the Dutch have been crowded out of Dutch New Guinea . . . For some time Indonesia has had designs on Portuguese Timor . . . it would appear to be a matter of time before Indonesia takes over this Portuguese territory."

David Wainhouse, *Remnants of Empire: The United Nations and the End of Colonialism* (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, Harper and Row, 1964), p. 38.

14, 1975 that "Indonesia did not wish to make Portuguese Timor another Goa"⁴⁷ there were reliable reports of an Indonesian military build-up in Timor as early as February 1975.⁴⁸ The helplessness and vacillation of the Portuguese and the intransigence of Fretilin meant that there never was the necessary understanding between the nationalists and the colonial authorities to conclude a common presentation to the outside world. The remoteness of East Timor made any external assistance impractical. Those states which did pledge their support, the former Portuguese colonies, were not in a position to offer anything material. The states of the region had already acquiesced in the logic of integration.⁴⁹ Even the Soviet Union and China, though sympathetic to Fretilin, were discouraged from offering material aid, given the bleak prospects for East Timor's survival.⁵⁰ East Timor was small enough, insignificant enough and anomalous enough to be dispensable.

The United Nations was thwarted in its efforts to see that self-determination was not dismissed entirely. Indonesia had prevented the United Nations Special Mission from ever reaching East Timor.⁵¹ Faced with a *fait accompli*, the United Nations possessed

⁴⁷*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1976), 27533.

⁴⁸*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 26 February, 1976, 4.

The original report was made by Peter Hastings, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 February, 1975, quoted in Viviani, *op. cit.*, 207.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰deBeer, *op. cit.*

⁵¹The United Nations Special Representative had spent three weeks in an abortive attempt to reach the Fretilin leaders in East Timor.

The Guardian (Manchester and London), 30 January, 1976, 4 and 9 February, 1976.

The envoy, Sr. Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, Under Secretary-General and Director-General of the United Nations in Geneva, was appointed by the Secretary-General on 29 December, 1975 in accordance with Security Council Resolution 384 (XXX), 22 December, 1975.:

The Special Representative's Report, United Nations Document S/12011, 12 March, 1976.

neither the means nor the will to ensure national self-determination in this tiny colony.⁵² Resolutions in the Trusteeship Council, the General Assembly, and the Security Council called for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces. Indonesia rejected these resolutions; the only Indonesian forces in Timor were volunteers; the invasion was that of patriotic forces led by the U.D.T. and Apodeti.⁵³

In spite of the United Nations stand, the inevitability of the Indonesian case was widely accepted. On September 1, 1975 General Ali Murtupo, the Indonesian Deputy Chief of Intelligence, claimed that ". . . world opinion is beginning to accept that the final solution to the Timor problem is integration with Indonesia."⁵⁴ A sense of inevitability and the unspoken conviction that the inevitable may well be the best for such territories is the most ominous source of insecurity for many new states.

Since 1975 the issue of independence for East Timor has been met with muted indignation in the international community. The campaign to consolidate Indonesian authority in the face of sporadic but determined guerilla resistance has resulted in deportation, famine and widespread deprivation.⁵⁵ In the United Nations there is clearly

⁵²*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 2 December, 1976, 4.

⁵³For example, S.C.O.R (XXX), 18 December, 1975, 1868th meeting.

⁵⁴*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1976), 27535.

⁵⁵Reports of human rights abuses in East Timor surfaced repeatedly in the early years of Indonesian occupation. Concern was not confined to the various public-interest groups which were promoting the Fretilin case in Australia, Britain and the United States. A United Nations General Assembly resolution in 1982 called upon the concerned parties to renew their efforts for a comprehensive settlement because of the international community's concern for "humanitarian conditions" in the territory. However, even at that, the Timor lobby was not strong: 50 votes in favour, 41 against and 50 abstentions; the portent of inertia to come.

United Nations General Assembly (XXXVI) Resolution 37/30. 23 November, 1982.

An Amnesty International Report on human rights abuses in 1985 estimated that 500,000 Timorese had been killed or "resettled." Amnesty cited Indonesian military manuals setting out the guidelines for torture.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1988), 34236.

In spite of these initial concerns, there was little will to pressure Indonesia for long. For example, in 1985 the United Nations Human Rights Commission cancelled its review of human rights abuses in

concern for the plight of the people of East Timor and every year there are appeals to the unnamed administering power to withdraw so that "the inalienable rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence" might be realised.⁵⁶ But this is a hopeless cause. Those in favour are themselves the weak and the peripheral. The "no" vote on the East Timor resolutions, reinforced by the abstentions, is finally prevailing for it is based on a coalition of regional and major powers.⁵⁷ The case for an independent East Timor has never carried any sense of legitimacy in the face of more rational and powerful interests.

Western Sahara

The inviolability of colonial frontiers as the basis for national self-determination was also compromised in the former Spanish territory of Sahara. "The Western Sahara

East Timor. Even more damaging to the cause of an independent Timor state is the apparent consensus of weary, and perhaps embarrassed, resignation in the General Assembly. Since 1984 the General Assembly has deferred debate on East Timor, leaving it to the Decolonisation Committee, on the grounds that there were "delicate negotiations" between Indonesia and Portugal.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1986), 34236; (1984), 33281.

By December, 1988, Indonesia, following President Suharto's visit to the territory in November, felt sufficiently confident to declare East Timor open territory in the hope that this would invite investment, tourism and, above all, international acceptance for a return to normalcy. Various observer teams including members of the European Parliament and British M.P.s, along with vigilant organisations such as Asia Watch, still noted human rights violations by Indonesian authorities, but the tone was muted. The British, for example, accepted the evidence that abuses had ended in late 1987.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1989), 36934.

The New York Times, 21 November, 1988, I: 13.

As late as March 1986 Fretilin and the apparently now-aligned U.D.T. were announcing military initiatives. Any confirmation of continued hostilities in East Timor is hampered by lack of access and intermittent and unreliable sources. However, we do know that pro-independence demonstrators braved Indonesian security forces to appeal to the Pope during his visit to the territory in October, 1989. Amnesty International expressed concern over reports that these Fretilin sympathizers were tortured by Indonesian authorities.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1987), 35329.

The New York Times, 13 October, 1989, I:3; 19 October, 1989, I:17.

⁵⁶In 1979 a resolution calling for the self-determination and independence of the people of East Timor was passed with 62 votes in favour, 31 against, and 45 abstentions. Now it is no longer on the agenda.

⁵⁷The A.S.E.A.N. states and the Western powers.

could have the unhappy distinction of being the only country to be decolonised out of existence," wrote John Gretton,⁵⁸ though clearly other small entities, like East Timor and West Irian, have met the same fate.

Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara was part of an irredentist policy which also included the whole of Mauritania and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta, Melilla⁵⁹ and Ifni. King Mohammed V had proclaimed Mauritania to be an integral part of "le Grand Maroc" in February, 1957⁶⁰ and unsuccessfully invaded Spanish Sahara in November of that year in the hope of preventing France from granting independence to Mauritania. Ironically, Morocco's failure to prevent the independence of Mauritania was due largely to her geographical separation from Mauritania by the Spanish Sahara, though the latter constituted part of her claim "from Tangier to Saint-Louis-du-Senegal."⁶¹ The Spanish presence in Sahara gave considerable credence to the French argument that Mauritania

⁵⁸John Gretton, *Western Sahara: The Fight for Determination* (London: Anti-Slavery Society and the Committee for Indigenous Peoples, Research Report, No.1, 1976), p. 9.

⁵⁹Ceuta, (pop. 70, 864) and the offshore island of Athucemas were captured in 1415, the first European colony in Africa. Melilla (pop. 58,458), along with the offshore Chaforinas islands, was colonised in 1497. Both towns have large Spanish populations, though the Moroccan population has been steadily increasing. An entire Spanish division is maintained in each town and Spain has consistently rejected or deflected Moroccan overtures for their retrocession.
The Guardian (Manchester and London), 17 November, 1975, 2.
International Herald Tribune, 24 February, 1975, 6; 17 March, 1975, 4.
Ceuta (March, 1981 census) and Melilla (1986 estimate); *The Statesman's Yearbook*: 1987

⁶⁰*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1958), 16223A.

⁶¹*The White Book* (Rabat, 1958) sets out Morocco's claims. Morocco also tried to suggest that the real feelings of the Mauriticians were for 'reunion' by co-opting traditional leaders, a tactic that was attempted later in Western Sahara and one which was also used by Sukarno in West Irian. See also United Nations Document A/445. Item proposed by Morocco: The Problem of Mauritania (XV). Letter dated 20 August, 1960 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Morocco addressed to the Secretary-General, 22 August, 1960.
United Nations Document A/4594. The Problem of Mauritania. Agenda item 79 (XV). *Report* of the First Committee, 26 November, 1960. S.C.O.R. S/PV 911, 910th meetings, 17 November, 1960.
In 1960 the independence of Mauritania, a vast poverty-stricken desert tract with a very small population, then 620,000, would have seemed less sensible if there had been geographical contiguity with Morocco.

and Morocco had never had a common frontier.⁶² Morocco charged that France was creating an "artificial state like Katanga"⁶³ for the purpose of maintaining a military presence in north-west Africa.

For a time, Morocco was able to sustain a cloud of controversy over Mauritania's legitimacy as a sovereign state. The Moroccan case was received with some sympathy by other new states, particularly in the Arab world. This uncertainty, along with the charge of French neo-colonialism, allowed the U.S.S.R.⁶⁴ to veto Mauritania's application for membership in the United Nations. However, with widespread recognition from francophone states⁶⁵ and Western support, Morocco's objections were defeated by Mauritania's very existence and Mauritania was admitted to the United Nations at the next session (as the fifth micro-state). Morocco was more fortunate in pursuing the doctrine of retrocession over Ifni. With a population of only 50,000 and completely surrounded by Morocco, Ifni was an obvious candidate for absorption. Spain quietly conceded the logic of the Moroccan case and Ifni was integrated with Morocco in January, 1969.

King Hassan had hoped for a similar settlement over Spanish Sahara.⁶⁶ In the summer of 1974, Spain, which had already been under considerable pressure in the United

⁶²The boundaries of Western Sahara were drawn by France and Spain between 1884 and 1912.

⁶³*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1960), 17800.

There was some irony in Morocco's reference to Katanga, since Tshombe had based his claim on the artificiality of colonial boundaries, the very argument that Morocco now used to restore national unity. However, the artificiality of Mauritania was striking with the French construction of a capital city for the new state on the site of a desert village.

⁶⁴At first Khrushchev had sent congratulations to Mauritania.
Ibid., 17799.

⁶⁵This included Tunisia, Mauritania's sponsor.

⁶⁶In November 1975 he offered to allow Spain to retain sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla in return for Spanish Sahara. This was a proposal which had been made once before in regard to Ifni.
The Guardian (Manchester and London) 17 November, 1975, 2.

Nations to expedite the process of self-determination, announced that a referendum would be held in the Sahara to determine its future status. In partial response to this pressure Spain had established in May 1967 the Yema'a, an assembly of elected representatives of tribal chiefs.⁶⁷ Though Spain extended the authority of the Yema'a, the United Nations persisted on the question of Sahrawi independence, and in December 1972 the General Assembly passed a resolution, which *inter-alia*, called for Spain "to determine in consultation with the governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum under United Nations auspices to enable the indigenous people of the Sahara to exercise freely its right to self-determination and independence."⁶⁸ In February of 1973 the Yema'a had also declared "the population's desire to determine their own future through a referendum."⁶⁹

In response to this declaration, and to increased nationalist agitation, Spain announced in August 1974 that a referendum for self-determination would be held in the Sahara under U.N. auspices in early 1975.⁷⁰ Morocco was determined that any act of self-determination would not include the possibility of independence. "If the question of independence is raised," the King warned on August 20, 1974, "Morocco will categorically say no to a referendum."⁷¹ The choice would be confined to remaining Spanish or "being taken back into the bosom of the motherland."⁷²

⁶⁷Gretton, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁶⁸Gretton, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁶⁹Gretton, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁷⁰*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1974), 27614.

⁷¹Paul Botha, "Spanish Sahara— A Highly Coveted Prize," *Le Monde*, 27, 28 November, 1975, translated in *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 7 December, 1975, 13, 14.

⁷²*Ibid.*

At first glance, the possibility of an independent Sahrawi state looked promising in spite of the Moroccans' determined irredentism. The International Court of Justice, ruling on a reference which Morocco herself had initiated in the hope of stalling a referendum, acknowledged the existence of " . . . legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara . . ." and ". . . the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties with the Mauritanian entity, and the territory of Western Sahara . . ." but concluded, nonetheless, that this did not ". . . establish any ties of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity."⁷³ Thus the Court had not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of Resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonisation of Western Sahara and ". . . the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory."⁷⁴ There was insufficient reason, then, to abandon the colonial territorial unit as the basis for an act of self-determination. Moreover, there was less ambiguity about Sahrawi sentiment than could have been argued in East Timor. Though the Moroccans had created an integrationist party, the F.L.U. (Front pour la Libération et l'Unité), ". . . it appeared mostly to have consisted of members of the Moroccan army."⁷⁵ The major Sahrawi nationalist party, Polisario,⁷⁶ commanded nearly unanimous support throughout

⁷³International Court of Justice, *Reports of Judgements, advisory opinions and orders*. Western Sahara; (Request for advisory opinion), Order of 3, January 1975. October, 1975.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*

⁷⁵Gretton, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁷⁶Popular Front for the Liberation of Sequiet el-Hamra and Rio de Oro. In addition to Polisario and the F.L.U., there was also a Spanish sponsored movement, the Saharan National Unity Party (PUNS). However, when Spain vacillated in search of a settlement PUNS soon disintegrated. The secretary of the party, Hennaould-Er Rach'd, defected to Morocco with the party's funds.

"The Polisario Front," *Africa*, No. 55, March 1976, 23-25.

the territory and this was recognised in the October 1975 report of the United Nations Mission which visited the Sahara the previous May.

Within the territory, the Mission noted that the population, or at least almost all those persons encountered by the Mission, was categorically for independence and against the territorial claims of Morocco and Mauritania. . . . The population showed, by its demonstrations and statements, that it supported ...the independence of the Territory . . . The Frente Polisario, although considered a clandestine movement before the Mission's arrival, appeared as the dominant political force in the Territory.⁷⁷

Nor did the Moroccan case seem unassailable. Though many of the states in the immediate region supported Morocco, the Sahrawis had at least one powerful ally: Algeria.⁷⁸ Unlike Fretilin, Polisario was not entirely isolated. Algeria provided the advantages of geographical contiguity, considerable resources, the diplomatic prestige of a distinguished Third World state and a well-defined interest of her own which would sustain her support.⁷⁹

⁷⁷United Nations Document (XXX), A/10428.

⁷⁸Polisario was supported initially by Mauritania until President ould-Daddah shifted Mauritania's policy to an arrangement with Morocco.

⁷⁹Algeria's huge iron ore deposits near Tindouf serve to explain Algeria's position. Morocco's "expansionist" ambitions concern Algeria particularly since Moroccan claims have included this wealthy area of south-western Algeria. Moreover, to export the iron ore profitably Algeria needs a reliable corridor to the Atlantic, which an independent (and presumably grateful) Western Sahara could provide.

Yet within weeks of the I.C.J. judgement and the United Nations Mission's report, the possibility of an independent Sahara had been lost. King Hassan's "Green March" into the Sahara on November 6, 1975⁸⁰ was followed only eight days later by the Tripartite Agreement which ended Spanish sovereignty in the area and divided the territory between Morocco and Mauritania.⁸¹ Polisario, their Algerian supporters, and the United Nations were simply out-manoeuvred by the sheer pace of events. The agreement allowed the Moroccans and the Mauritians to gain full control of the territory prior to the official withdrawal of Spain on February 28, 1976, thereby exploiting the remaining period of Spanish sovereignty to cover the consolidation of their authority and to prevent any interregnum which could allow the establishment of a Sahrawi state. Polisario was forced to mount a diplomatic offensive at the same time as it was trying to cope with the Moroccan military occupation and the critical refugee problem which that created.⁸²

The Polisario decision to delay a unilateral declaration of independence was understandable but fatal. Spain was still the legal sovereign power in the Sahara. Any independence which did not involve the colonial power would be illegitimate and hold little promise of support. As long as Spain was still the sovereign authority there might yet be a way of reversing the Tripartite Agreement and winning from Spain at least the

⁸⁰The "Green March," a peaceful invasion of the Sahara by thousands of Moroccan citizens and supporters from other Arab states, was announced on October 16, 1975 and began on November 6 despite negotiations, warnings, and the indefatigable travels of the United Nations Secretary-General. The Moroccans did not advance beyond Spain's defence lines and withdrew on November 9, following negotiations at Agadir the day before. At first the withdrawal appeared to be a defeat for King Hassan but the "understanding" between Spain and Morocco was the basis for the Madrid Agreement. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1976), 27576.

⁸¹United Nations S.C.O.R. (XXX), Supplement for Oct. Nov. Dec., 1976, S/11880, Annex III. The text of the Madrid Agreement has also been translated by John Gretton, *op. cit.*, Appendix 4, pp. 52-53.

⁸²"Independence— Polisario's Answer to Moroccans," *Le Monde*, 29 February, 1 March, 1976 translated in *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 7, 1976, 11.

referendum which had been promised. This decision to take advantage of the Spanish legal presence as long as possible depended on the success of (a) wooing the Mauritians out of the agreement and (b) mounting a diplomatic offensive which would allow the United Nations to intervene.

Mauritania had been the principal supporter of Polisario until the October 1974 agreement with Morocco at the Rabat Summit which divided the Sahara between the two states. The ethnic and cultural links between the Sahrawis and the Mauritians were recognised by both parties.⁸³ In August 1975 the Polisario had even suggested the possibility of a Mauritanian-Sahrawi confederated state, with Mauritanian president Ould Daddah at its head.⁸⁴ Colonel Gaddafi also encouraged the Sahrawis to unite with Mauritania. Though ". . . bowled over with enthusiasm for the young (Polisario) nationalists . . ."⁸⁵ and anxious to thwart the expansion of the conservative monarchy in Morocco, he was, nevertheless, opposed to any further fragmentation of the Arab world.

There were several practical reasons for Daddah's decision to collaborate with the Moroccans. Mauritania's own historical links to the Sahrawi people were as valid as those of Morocco; the possible economic benefits to be derived from any mineral wealth in the Sahara would be of considerable relief, given the country's desperate poverty, and Mauritania's communications for its iron ore fields in the east to the coast would be eased greatly by the alteration of the borders.⁸⁶ However, the most important consideration was

⁸³One uncomfortable problem for Ould-Daddah was the widespread popular support for Polisario in Mauritania. *Africa*, No. 57, May 1976, 78.

⁸⁴*The Times* (London), 19 August, 1975, 4.

⁸⁵*The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 7 December, 1975, 14.

⁸⁶*Africa*, No. 38, October, 1974, 31.

Daddah's assessment of Hassan's determination and the likelihood that his resolution was indomitable. Daddah stood to lose altogether.⁸⁷

Mauritania was more receptive to an acceptable solution than was Morocco.⁸⁸ Daddah recognised that his country could not sustain a long anti-guerilla struggle and, whatever the rewards the Sahara might bring, they could be more than offset by the cost of a long and unpopular war⁸⁹ of attrition against Algerian-backed guerillas.⁹⁰ Daddah admitted that he was subjected to considerable pressure from the Algerian president, Houari Boumoudienne, in the weeks following the Tripartite Agreement. Boumoudienne reminded Daddah that the Sahara and Mauritania were part of the same Moroccan claim,⁹¹ and the successful absorption of the former could allow Morocco to "recover" the latter at any time.⁹² Mauritania's resistance to these pressures was reinforced by Morocco's own diplomatic advantages.

⁸⁷*The Manchester Guardian Weekly, op. cit.*, 13.

Daddah also resented Algeria's domination in Mauritanian foreign policy, the price which had been exacted for Algeria's support for Polisario.

Gretton, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁸⁸Daniel Junqua, "Sahara Occidentee: la Mauritanie recherche l'apaisement," *Le Monde*, 3 December, 1976, 1.

⁸⁹*Africa*, No. 57, May 1976, 78.

⁹⁰These fears were borne out by the subsequent success of Polisario attacks on Mauritania. The guerillas moved with such ease that they could bring their war into Noukachott itself.

The New York Times, 5 July, 1977, 5.

The Times (London), 5 July, 1977, 6.

⁹¹Gretton, *op. cit.*

Boumoudienne's frustration had provoked him to leak the Rabat agreement between Morocco and Mauritania.

The Observer (London), 1 February, 1976, 9.

⁹²*The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 12 December, 1975, 13.

The majority of Arab states supported the Moroccan position. Many of them had sent delegations to the Green March.⁹³ Even Syria, whose ideological position was more in line with Algeria, was sympathetic to King Hassan, remembering the Moroccan sacrifices on the Golan Heights.⁹⁴ Presidents Bourguiba of Tunisia and Senghor of Senegal had also advised Morocco and Mauritania to divide the Sahara as the most sensible solution to the problem. And French President Giscard D'Estaing was entirely supportive of Hassan's claim in spite of the obvious contradictions, given French determination to create an independent state in Djibouti.⁹⁵

At the United Nations, the General Assembly had passed two resolutions on December 20, 1975. The "Algerian Resolution" did not mention the Tripartite Agreement and called for Spain to take immediate steps to enable ". . . all Saharans originating in the territory to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination under United Nations supervision."⁹⁶ The "Moroccan resolution" called for similar action but ". . . through free consultation organised with the help of a United Nations representative."⁹⁷ On January 31, 1976 the Secretary-General announced that a special mediator, Hr. Olof Rydbeck, the Swedish permanent representative at the United Nations, would be sent to arrange for "an act of self-determination" to take place in the Sahara.⁹⁸ After the first of two missions to Western Sahara in February 1976 Rydbeck reported to the press that ". . . the military

⁹³*Ibid.*

⁹⁴*Ibid.*

⁹⁵"Sahara repercussions," *Le Monde*, 8 January, 1976, translated in *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 18 January, 1976, 13.

⁹⁶United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3458 (XXX), 10 December, 1975, Resolution A.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, Resolution B.

⁹⁸*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, (1976), 27746.

situation as it stands makes a meaningful consultation of the Saharans very difficult if not impossible."⁹⁹

This candid disclosure of Moroccan attempts to frustrate his mission did not augur well for a positive United Nations role. An even more frank criticism of Morocco was made by United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim when he refused an invitation by the Moroccan foreign minister to send a United Nations observer to the February 26 meeting of the Yema'a which was expected to ratify the Madrid agreement.¹⁰⁰ Waldheim replied that neither Spain nor the interim Tripartite Administration had taken the necessary measures to assure the exercise of "the right of self-determination" of the Sahrawis and therefore ". . . under these conditions the presence of an observer would not satisfy the demands of the General Assembly."¹⁰¹ The final assault on United Nations efforts came in March, 1976, when Rydbeck, in his second mission, attempted to circumvent Moroccan obstruction by visiting Polisario leaders in Algiers and Sahrawi settlements in Tindouf.¹⁰² Morocco and Mauritania claimed Rydbeck's Tindouf venture had constituted a "violation of the mandate entrusted to him,"¹⁰³ and declared they would no longer co-operate with the Mission.

The failure to extract Mauritania from the agreement and the bleak prospects for a successful United Nations intervention made the course of U.D.I. inevitable. The Sahrawis

⁹⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰At least one third of the Yema'a's members had joined Polisario. Spain's decision to withdraw by February 26, two days earlier than announced in the Madrid Agreement, was due in part to Spain's reluctance to collaborate with Morocco's attempts to gain international legitimacy for Moroccan annexation at the meeting of the Yema'a.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1976), 27747.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*

¹⁰²By March 1976 virtually the whole Sahrawi population was at Tindouf.
Ibid., 27748.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*

knew that a declaration of independence would require some physical presence in the territory if it was to possess any legitimacy and any chance of quick and widespread recognition. The Moroccans were already occupying El Aiaun and Smara. Polisario hoped, then, to take the southern coastal town of Villa Cisneros (later Dakhla) when Spain pulled out on January 18.¹⁰⁴ The opportunity for taking Villa Cisneros seemed most optimistic when the Spanish departure was advanced to January 12.¹⁰⁵ However, anticipating Polisario strategy, Morocco sent troops into Villa Cisneros on January 11. Realising they now risked losing the town which had been allotted to them, the Mauritians moved north. Their advance was forestalled by a Polisario attack and the Moroccans consolidated their presence in Villa Cisneros.¹⁰⁶ Polisario's position could not have been worse. They were now compelled to wait until the official Spanish withdrawal before proclaiming their Saharan Democratic Arab Republic on February 28 at the Birhelu oasis near the Algerian border.¹⁰⁷ The failure to secure Dakhla was fatal to the chance of a Sahrawi state being established. Had they been able to proclaim the new republic in Dakhla their diplomatic position would have been far stronger.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴There was even a suggestion that Mauritania had been persuaded by Colonel Gaddafi to allow Polisario to take the town first.

The Times (London), 1, March, 1977, 14.

¹⁰⁵*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1976), 27578.

¹⁰⁶Gretton, *The Times*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁷*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1976), 27747.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*

“ . . . the Polisario were not able to announce the creation of the S.A.D.R. until the end of February, by which time the Mauritians had driven them out of the southern part of the Sahara and they had no territory they could call their own except for Gulta-Zeniour and a tiny corner up near Tindouf; all they could claim to govern, in fact, were the refugees on Algerian soil. The difference between that and the effect that would have been produced by a proclamation coming from Dakhla in the middle of January is not hard to imagine.”

Gretton, *The Times*, *op. cit.*

Morocco and Mauritania had threatened to leave the Organization of African Unity if that body recognised the S.A.D.R. Seventeen members of the O.A.U. did vote in favour of recognition in spite of this ultimatum.¹⁰⁹ Several states joined Algeria in recognising the S.A.D.R. and both Fidel Castro and General Giap pledged their support for the Sahrawi cause.¹¹⁰ Algeria was also successful in constructing a coalition consisting of Libya, Niger, and Mali to support the Sahrawis as a counter to the otherwise formidable regional support for Morocco.¹¹¹ Yet initial diplomatic recognition was limited because the republic existed as a refugee camp under Algerian auspices and the Western Sahara was now effectively under Moroccan and Mauritanian control.¹¹² The major Western powers were anxious to maintain their friendly relations with Morocco¹¹³ and the U.S.S.R., though pro-Algerian, was not prepared to be isolated from the majority of states in the region.¹¹⁴ The Soviets at no time offered any criticism of Morocco even though they supported the Algerian resolution in the United Nations. And, during the Soviet Communist Party Congress in Moscow, Chairman Brezhnev's support for national liberation movements did not include mention of Polisario at a time when it would have been most timely.¹¹⁵ On the

¹⁰⁹Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Malagasy, Niger, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Tanzania.

¹¹⁰*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1976), 27579, 27748.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 27748.

¹¹²Early recognition was granted by Angola, Benin, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, North Korea, the Malagasy Republic, Mozambique, Togo.
Ibid.

¹¹³*Africa*, No. 57, May, 1976, 78.

¹¹⁴*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 9 March, 1976, 3.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*

whole, the Soviets were reluctant to support movements for new tiny states when a desirable alternative was possible.¹¹⁶

The failure of the Sahrawis was not only the result of being out-manoeuvred by the overlap plan of the Tripartite Agreement and by the pace of events. In spite of the findings of the United Nations Mission and the I.C.J., there was considerable concern in many countries as to the wisdom of creating yet another micro-state with dubious prospects.¹¹⁷ Even if it could be assumed that the Sahrawis could sustain the infrastructure of a modern state with a population base of a few thousand nomads, would that state be competent to manage its enormous phosphate reserves? And, should that be possible, is there justice in allocating these resources to the exclusive benefit of a tiny population merely on the basis of arbitrary colonial frontiers? The Tripartite Agreement suggested these resources would now benefit the region as a whole. Mauritania's participation seemed deserved and gave the agreement the appearance of justice which an exclusively Moroccan annexation might not have done.

These doubts as to the legitimacy of a separate Sahrawi state were largely responsible for the widespread diplomatic acceptance of the *fait accompli* of the Tripartite Agreement, even though the execution of that agreement was clearly not in keeping with U.N. and I.C.J. findings. Though Morocco's annexation of the Western Sahara was an embarrassment, given the sanctity of the self-determination principle, the strength of the unspoken arguments (the Sahrawis were not legitimate candidates for separate

¹¹⁶This was also true of their attitudes at the time on the future of Djibouti.
The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 21 March, 1976, 16.

¹¹⁷This view was expressed even in Qatar, itself in the ranks of the smallest micro-states.
The Guardian (Manchester and London), 9 February, 1976, 12.

statehood)¹¹⁸ ultimately prevailed in the early period of the dispute and protected Morocco from serious diplomatic retaliation and international censure.

With Spain's departure, the Moroccans and the Mauritians soon controlled every settlement in the territory. However, their fixed positions were subject to constant and devastating lightning attacks by highly mobile Polisario units. Dashing across the desert in Land rovers, Polisario forces were able to attack enemy positions not only throughout the Sahara but also deep inside Morocco and Mauritania. Moroccan counterattacks from fortified bases were extremely vulnerable to ambush, and even air strikes were rarely effective. Polisario forces consistently exploited their understanding of the desert to their tactical advantage, even to the extreme of burying themselves in the sand and breathing through straws to escape detection.¹¹⁹

Polisario's strategy was not only one of sapping the resources and undermining the morale of their adversaries militarily. The international image of Polisario resistance was an important component in the diplomatic offensive which they have waged since 1975. Typically, Polisario leaders would use every opportunity to let journalists see for themselves the evidence of their victories before returning to their bases. Visits to the refugee camps were encouraged, demonstrating the progressive character of the Polisario social programme and the extent of Sahrawi solidarity for the nationalist struggle. The image of Polisario was increasingly romantic and heroic; a deeply committed and fiercely determined people who were proving the Sahara belonged to them. The tenacity of their

¹¹⁸"The chief restraint on relatively sympathetic nations is their belief that a nation of only 70,000 is non-viable."

Africa, No. 57, May, 1976, 73.

It is significant that many African states, particularly conservative pro-Western governments, were initially persuaded by these pragmatic concerns despite their commitments to the sanctity of colonial frontiers.

¹¹⁹For instance, note John Andrews' report in *The Manchester Guardian*, 8 June, 1978, 7.

resistance clearly confirmed a sense of Sahrawi national identity and strengthened the claim for self-determination.

In the first years of the war the Polisario guerillas intensified their attacks on Mauritanian positions, even in Noukachott itself, and this strategy was finally successful in forcing Mauritania's withdrawal from the conflict. The war had never been supported by southern Mauritians, who regarded the issue as a "Moorish affair." The Berber-Arabs of the North were unenthusiastic for a war against a people with whom they had long-established ties of kinship. And, there was growing hostility to the overbearing presence of the Moroccans in the Mauritanian sector of the Sahara and in Mauritania itself.¹²⁰

The enormous costs for Mauritania, a small and poor country, were soon glaringly evident. Ould Daddah was overthrown in a military coup in July 1978 and Polisario responded by declaring a cease-fire, releasing Mauritanian prisoners and calling for negotiations with the new Mauritanian leadership.¹²¹ Sympathy for Polisario in the new military government and the obvious hopelessness of continuing the war led to the formal withdrawal of the Mauritians from their allotted sector of the Sahara in 1979 and the eventual alignment of Mauritanian policy with that of Algeria and Libya.¹²² The former Mauritanian sector was immediately incorporated into Morocco and representatives for

¹²⁰*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1979), 29674.

¹²¹*The Times* (London), 11 July, 1978, 1, 6; 12 July, 1978, 8.

Colin Legum (ed.) *Africa Contemporary Record 1978-79* (London: Africana Publishing Co., 1979), B699-B708.

¹²²*The New York Times*, 6 August, 1979, 5.

Mauritania's withdrawal was expected given the catastrophic costs of the war. The country's 14,000 man army was absorbing 65 percent of the Government's budget.

The New York Times, 18 October, 1978, 74.

With the withdrawal of Mauritania, King Hassan once again alluded to earlier Moroccan irredentist claims in his reference to Mauritania as an artificial creation of colonial powers.

The New York Times, 22 August, 1979, 6.

the "restored" province of Ould Eddahad were elected to the Moroccan parliament in May 1981.¹²³

The Mauritanian withdrawal from the war and the emergence of pro-S.A.D.R. factions in the Mauritanian military government¹²⁴ also served to strengthen the Polisario cause. The participation of Mauritania had lent some justification to the Tripartite Agreement and blurred the reality of Moroccan ambitions. African states are particularly sensitive to the inviolability of colonial frontiers as the basis for self-determination. The legitimacy of the Sahrawi case became all the more persuasive, then, as the elemental irredentism of the Moroccan policy was exposed.

The ferocity of the war intensified as Morocco launched huge expeditionary operations and Polisario adopted conventional tactics. Instead of hit-and-run encounters there were long, drawn-out pitched battles. By late 1981 the Polisario units were deploying sophisticated tanks and missiles in increasingly frequent clashes with Moroccan forces. Morocco's response to the emboldened tactics of Polisario was to build a massive Maginot Line of sand walls across the territory. These extraordinary fortifications extend from Zag in south-eastern Morocco to the Atlantic coast south of El Aioun—the so-called "Useful Triangle."¹²⁵ The effect has been the consolidation of Moroccan control and the denial of access for Polisario to the territory of the S.A.D.R. Polisario has still mounted major attacks within Morocco itself but they have not been able to weaken the Moroccan

¹²³*The New York Times*, 16 August, 1979, 5.

¹²⁴*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1981), 31001-31004.

¹²⁵The construction of the wall by Moroccan military forces was an eight year enterprise over six stages of construction. The final section of the wall to the Atlantic coast at Guegurat was completed in April 1987. Of the territory's 260,000 square kilometers, 200,000 were enclosed within the wall. *The Times* (London), 20 April, 1987, 5.

hold on the Western Sahara. The military position is one of stalemate and the prospects for either side achieving a decisive military victory are remote.¹²⁶

While Polisario's guerrilla war has failed to force the Moroccans out of the Sahara, their diplomatic efforts have been remarkably successful. The principal targets of the S.A.D.R.-Algerian political campaign have been the African states. As early as July 1976 the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Mauritius, supported the "just struggle" of the Sahrawi people and called for the withdrawal of "foreign occupying forces."¹²⁷ Subcommittees were established to study the issue and to explore opportunities for mediation. These proposals were accepted by more conservative states for advantages of delay and in the expectation that the Moroccan military position would improve.¹²⁸

Any assumption, however, that Algeria's particular interest could be met within the framework of an exclusively Moroccan-Algerian settlement proved to be mistaken. Nor did the death of Houari Boumoudienne offer any prospect of a softening in the Algerian position. Algeria's material and diplomatic commitments to the S.A.D.R. have been so extensive that any future agreement to a "Kurdish deal" would be extremely difficult.

¹²⁶Sporadic but intense fighting has continued in spite of the wall and in spite of regular mediation attempts by both the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. Direct talks between King Hassan and Polisario officials in January 1989, and a subsequent unilateral Polisario ceasefire declaration, did not alter the course of the war. Exchanges between Moroccan and Polisario forces are represented very differently by each side, of course, but both versions agree that such incidents involve heavy fighting and major casualties. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1987) 35216-35218; (1989), 36409, 36748, 36988, 37014; (1990), 37220-37221.

¹²⁷At the O.A.U. meeting in Mauritius in July 1976, Benin led a number of states in a call to support "the just struggle of the Sahrawi people" and to demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Benin's efforts were deflected by a promise to hold a special session on the Western Sahara in the future. Still, there was already a significant measure of support for the Sahrawis among "progressive" African states. A pro-Sahrawi resolution at the February, 1976 meeting of the O.A.U. resulted in 17 votes in favour, 9 against and 21 abstentions. Zdenek Cervenka, "The Organization of African Unity in 1976," in Colin Legum (ed.) *Africa Contemporary Record 1976-1977* (London: Africana Publishing Co., 1977), A77.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*

Algerian influence was particularly evident in the immediate region. Though Senegal and Tunisia were favourable to the Moroccan position, Libya, Mali, Niger, Chad and eventually Mauritania supported Algeria and the S.A.D.R. At a summit meeting in Bamako in March 1980 the leaders of these Saharan states together with Algeria declared their commitment to the rights of the Sahrawi people to self-determination in accord with United Nations and O.A.U. resolutions.¹²⁹

By 1981 there was widespread support in the O.A.U. for a ceasefire and a referendum under the auspices of the United Nations and the O.A.U. At the O.A.U. summit meeting in Nairobi in June 1981 King Hassan responded to these concerns by proposing, himself, a referendum, confident that the people of "the recovered province" would demonstrate their loyalty to Morocco.¹³⁰ However, Hassan was not prepared to negotiate a cease-fire with Polisario or to withdraw Moroccan forces from the Sahara prior to the referendum.

The stalemate in the Western Sahara was reflected in the immobilism of the O.A.U. At one point division within the Organization on the Saharan issue brought it to the brink of collapse. The S.A.D.R. was admitted to the O.A.U. as the fifty-first member in February, 1982 and as a result twenty African states joined Morocco in boycotting the Tripoli summit in August.¹³¹ Without a quorum the summit was doomed. The admission

¹²⁹*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1981), 30714.

¹³⁰*The Times* (London), 28 November, 1981, 5.

Hassan originally saw little need for a referendum since the people of the Sahara had already expressed their loyalty and wished "to be integrated with Morocco in the traditional manner," as his prime minister put it. The King eventually gave in to the pressure of the O.A.U. *ad hoc* Committee on Western Sahara at the Nairobi summit in June, 1981. However, he viewed the exercise of the referendum in a very constricted sense as "an act of confirmation" of union.

Tony Hodges, "Western Sahara: The Mahgreb Under the Shadow of War," in Colin Legum (ed.), *African Contemporary Record 1980-1981* (London: African Publishing Co., 1981), A69-A70.

The Times (London), 27 June, 1981, 1.

¹³¹*The Times*, 23 February, 1982, 6; 24 February, 1982, 7; 25 February, 1982, 6; 1 March, 1982, 4.

of the S.A.D.R. in the face of such entrenched opposition, and clearly at the risk of the Organization's future, was a measure of the S.A.D.R.'s diplomatic gains and of the constancy of their support. The most important successes were with such major Third World states as India and Nigeria, the latter especially critical for their victory in the O.A.U.¹³² However, the subsequent paralysis of the O.A.U. demonstrated equally the determination of Morocco and her allies. Clearly, S.A.D.R. leaders were persuaded by consideration of the Pyrrhic nature of their victory when they agreed to withdraw "temporarily" from the O.A.U. in October.¹³³

The cause of the S.A.D.R. has been promoted successfully at every level of the international system. In contrast to U.N. inertia on the East Timor issue, General Assembly resolutions in support of the "inalienable rights of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence" are endorsed by the great majority with only a handful of states in opposition.¹³⁴ In 1979 the S.A.D.R. was recognised by 19 states (14 of which were African). But by late 1981 45 states representing every region of the international system had granted formal recognition, received S.A.D.R. ambassadors or

Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "The Organization of African Unity in 1982: A Severe Setback to African Unity," in Colin Legum (ed.) *Africa Contemporary Record 1982-1983* (London: Africana Publishing, Co., 1983), A44-50.

¹³²Nigeria recognised the S.A.D.R. in November 1984. Lagos was exasperated at Hassan's continued procrastination both in terms of the proposed referendum and in respect to direct negotiations with Polisario. Nigeria's support was instrumental in the O.A.U.'s decision to seat the S.A.D.R. delegation at the Council of Ministers meeting later that month.
The Times (London), 7 November, 1984, 12; 12 November, 1984, 4.

¹³³*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 31 October, 1982.

¹³⁴On 22 November, 1989, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution (XLIV) 43/4 which, *inter alia*, called for the Secretary-General to appoint a special United Nations representative for Western Sahara and urged negotiations to implement a United Nations-supervised referendum to effect the "self-determination of the people of Western Sahara." The vote was 88-0 in favour with 56 abstentions. Morocco did not participate.

exchanged notes of accreditation.¹³⁵ The success of the diplomatic campaign is particularly evident in Spain's eventual acceptance of the Sahrawi case for self-determination and the necessity of ". . . allowing the conclusion of the process of decolonisation in line with the just and legitimate aspirations of the Sahrawi people."¹³⁶

The future of the Western Sahara is still in doubt. However, unlike East Timor, the case for self-determination and separate independence has survived the threats of military annihilation and international indifference. Polisario's two-track strategy of guerilla resistance and diplomatic offensive has meant that the Sahrawi cause is still on the international agenda. Yet mere survival after 21 years offers cold comfort to Sahrawis looking beyond Morocco's formidable irredentism so tenaciously defended by the sand walls of the Zag line. United Nations resolutions, Third World recognition and O.A.U. membership have not weakened Morocco's determination. Morocco has not been isolated diplomatically. Nor has she had reason to fear the consequences of her resolve among friendly powers. Indeed, those powers, particularly the United States and France, have

¹³⁵Within four years of the proclamation of its independence the S.A.D.R. was recognised by some 40 states, including the Arab "resistance" front of Syria, South Yemen and the P.L.O., along with Algeria and Libya. Polisario had ambassadors in eight capitals. By February 1982 a bare majority of 26 African states had recognized the S.A.D.R., thus paving the way for its admission to the O.A.U. Council of Ministers. The S.A.D.R. is currently recognised by nearly 100 states, including such relatively pro-Western countries as Guatemala and Venezuela, which might be expected to be particularly sensitive to the Moroccan case.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1981), 30714; (1984), 33307; (1985), 33325; (1987), 35218; (1988), 35996.

¹³⁶*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1981), 30716.

Spain's recognition, as Portugal's, was motivated in part by the plight of some of her fishermen held by Polisario forces. It was also a response to Algeria's successful manipulation of a campaign for the independence of the Canary Islands. Moreover, as in France, the Socialist government was more predisposed to the Polisario case than its predecessors had been. The S.A.D.R. opened an official bureau in Paris in 1982 and a diplomatic mission in Madrid in 1984. Though relations with Spain were broken in 1985 following the death of two Spaniards in an exchange at sea, Polisario representatives were invited as observers to the Congress of the Spanish Socialist Party in January 1988.

Ibid. (1982), 31489; (1984), 33306; (1988), 35596.

been constant in their support. In most of the Arab world, as in the West and even in the former Soviet bloc, Moroccan determination has been embarrassing at most. Though the case for separate independence in Western Sahara was clearly established in the practice of United Nations decolonisation and in the judgements of the International Court of Justice and the United Nations Special Mission, both principle and precedent gave way to the determination of a powerful regional state and to the indifference and inertia of major powers. The legitimacy of a difficult case for separate independence depends as much on the judgement of the major powers as on the support of the weak and poor majority. That lesson was clear in both East Timor and the Western Sahara. The principled case for a separate Sahrawi state hardly justified the political and strategic costs of offending a formidable power. Even Algeria's support was not finally weighty enough to sway major powers to support the cause of a very small nomadic people whose aspirations to self-determination could be readily seen as both questionable and expendable.

Belize

As in the Western Sahara, the case for self-determination in Belize was challenged by arguments for the restoration of territorial integrity. Guatemala's case was that of state succession. Belize lies within the historic frontiers of Spanish sovereignty, once subject to the jurisdiction of the Captaincy-General of Guatemala.¹³⁷

The first British settlements in the coastal areas adjacent to the Belize River were established as early as 1650, though British Honduras did not become a Crown colony until 1862. The British regarded the terms of the Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty of 1859 as a recognition of British sovereignty. Guatemala argued that the treaty did not provide for

¹³⁷For a review of the Belize dispute see C. H. Grant, *The Making of Modern Belize* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

delimitations of sovereignty but only for a Guatemalan "cession of territory"¹³⁸ in return for a British commitment to develop communications links between Guatemala and Belize. As Britain had failed to honour these commitments the treaty was no longer valid.

Since 1859, Guatemala pursued its irredentist claim, relying on Latin American solidarity and on the support of the United States. The American predicament on the Belize issue was not unlike their dilemma in the Falklands crisis. Though they were responsive to Britain's overtures as an ally, they were also concerned for the sensibilities of the Latin American republics and for the security of their role as mentor and protector, particularly on an issue of "external threat" to the region.¹³⁹ Against these considerations, separate independence for a few thousand English-speaking people in Central America could be seen as residual British colonialism. In the post-war years the United States was principally concerned with the threat of Communism and the potential for Soviet penetration in the region. The Americans feared Belize would follow the course of other left-leaning governments in the Commonwealth Caribbean and that an independent Belize would become a toehold for Cuba in Central America.¹⁴⁰

The British, anxious to divest themselves of imperial responsibilities, faced the problem of implementing independence in one of their smallest territories in the face of a serious irredentist threat, regional isolation, and the suspicion of the most powerful state in the world. Though the British were prepared to make territorial concessions in their

¹³⁸J. Ann Zammit, *The Belize Issue* (London: The Latin American Bureau, 1976), pp. 9-19.

¹³⁹Prior to 1981 the United States had abstained whenever the issue of the Falklands was raised. *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, (1981), 30935.

¹⁴⁰*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 26 April, 1976, 3.

negotiations with the Guatemalans,¹⁴¹ a complete "sell-out" would have been indefensible in Parliament, in other Commonwealth Caribbean countries and in Belize itself.

In contrast to the acquiescence of Portugal and Spain to events in East Timor and Western Sahara, Britain worked to establish the international legitimacy of Belize and to prepare the case for independence long before the transfer of sovereignty. While the British were resolute in their defence of Belize against a Guatemalan threat prior to an independence settlement,¹⁴² no British government before Mrs. Thatcher's was prepared to guarantee the security of Belize in the post-independence period. The protection of the new state had to be vested in international acceptance. This meant that Britain would have to root and cultivate a separate Belize in the international community well before the transfer of sovereignty.

The international identity of Belize was established with the introduction of ministerial government in 1964. The prime minister of Belize was empowered with responsibilities in foreign affairs, which allowed him to promote his country's case in the international system,¹⁴³ particularly in the United Nations, where support for the separate independence of Belize increased every year.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹During a six month period in 1977 the British had discussed three different "territorial adjustments" with Guatemala. The initial and most generous proposal was a concession of 2,000 square miles of land south of the Monkey River, nearly one quarter of Belize's total area.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1980), 30349.

¹⁴²The British military reinforcements of November 1975 were just such a demonstration.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976), 27573-27574.

¹⁴³Grant, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-235.

¹⁴⁴United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3512 (XXXV), 11 November, 1980.

The tone of the resolution was unequivocal. "The differences that exist between the United Kingdom and Guatemala do not in any way derogate from the inalienable right of the people of Belize to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity and that the continuing inability of the parties to resolve such differences should no longer delay early and secure exercise of that right." The resolution called for independence by the end of 1981.

There were 139 votes in favour, seven against (Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Paraguay, Uruguay) and three absent.

The most important asset in the diplomatic campaign for an independent Belize was the active role played by the states of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Belize joined CARICOM in May 1974.¹⁴⁵ The CARICOM states sponsored Belize's case at the Organization of American States, at the Conference of Non-Aligned States and at the United Nations. CARICOM support for Belize is consistent with Commonwealth concern for Guyana, the only other mainland English-speaking state in Latin America and itself subject to irredentist claims.¹⁴⁶ With the Commonwealth Caribbean initiative, the Belize debate in the United Nations¹⁴⁷ went far beyond the predictable exchanges between the Guatemalan and British delegations. Resolution 3432 (XXX) calling for the independence of Belize was passed in the General Assembly by 110 votes to nine.¹⁴⁸ By 1978 there were no votes at all cast in opposition to the resolution calling for self-determination and independence, and by 1980 even the United States, which had previously abstained, voted in support of the resolution.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1975), 27208.

¹⁴⁶The following is typical of Guyana's determined support:

"For over ten years the people of Belize have seen their yearnings for independence frustrated because of the spurious and absurd territorial claims of a neighbour whose friendship they seek but whose overlordship they emphatically reject. Guyana calls on the international community to set aside indifference and to identify itself, uncompromisingly and unequivocally, with the people of Belize struggling for independence, and the preservation of their territorial integrity."

Statement by Frederick R. Wills, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Justice of Guyana at the Thirtieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, October 1, 1975. Georgetown: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975, 9. (mimeo).

Guyana also supported Fretilin in East Timor.

See also: R. Stephen Milne, "Impulses and Obstacles to Caribbean Integration," *International Studies Quarterly* XVIII (No. 3, September, 1974), 308-309.

¹⁴⁷For a record of the Belize issue in the United Nations see: *West Indies Chronicle*, December, 1975, January 1976.

¹⁴⁸Guatemala had the support of the Central American republics and Indonesia. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3432 (XXX), 8 December, 1975.

¹⁴⁹Prior to 1980 the United States had abstained.

The diplomatic efforts of the Commonwealth Caribbean states had succeeded in breaking up Guatemala's solid Latin American support. The earlier strength of Guatemala in the O.A.S. was due, in large part, to increasing concern among the Latin American states over the implications of micro-state proliferation in the Caribbean and particularly for the consequences which that held for the Spanish/English balance in the region.¹⁵⁰ However, the Commonwealth states persisted in an aggressive campaign on behalf of Belize within the region. In 1975 Barbados even threatened to leave the O.A.S. over the Belize issue.¹⁵¹

Eventually, Guatemala's position was one of international isolation. The case for the independence of Belize was supported at the 1975 Commonwealth Heads of State Conference in Jamaica,¹⁵² and more important, in the same year, at the Lima Conference on Non-Aligned States, where a motion calling for Belize's independence was passed while Guatemala's bid for observer status was refused.¹⁵³ In this forum, as in the United Nations, Cuba was a principal advocate of Belizian independence, a policy consistent with Cuba's efforts to establish friendly relations in the Commonwealth Caribbean. And, in spite of a similar territorial dispute with Guyana, Venezuela too was anxious to cultivate her relations with the English-speaking states.¹⁵⁴ Mexican support was due, in part, to her own

¹⁵⁰Roy Preiswerk, "The Relevance of Latin America in the Foreign Policy of the Commonwealth Caribbean States," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* XI (No. 2, April 1969), 258-260.

The Foreign Minister of Guyana suggested this was a primary motivation in the support of the Spanish speaking states for Guatemala.

Frederick R. Wills, *The Test of Sincerity* (Georgetown: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975).

¹⁵¹*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 17 November, 1975, 2.

Barbados' support for Belize was consistently unequivocal. See, for instance:

Barbados Ministry of External Affairs Bulletin I (No. 2, September, 1975), 25.

¹⁵²*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1975), 27208.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 17 November, 1975, 2.

self-view as a progressive Latin American state, sensitive to the prominent role of Cuba in the Belize lobby. Moreover, Mexico was not prepared to concede the justice of the Guatemalan case, having withdrawn her own claims to Belize.¹⁵⁵

When Belize finally achieved independence in September 1981, the credentials of statehood were well-established in the international system even though British attempts to reach a settlement with Guatemala had failed. The long-standing issue of post-independence security was not resolved in the first decade of Belize's independence. Mrs. Thatcher's government was prepared to concede the issue and to guarantee the defense of Belize as long as both countries wished to maintain the agreement.¹⁵⁶ And the very presence of the British defence force demonstrated the concern still felt in Belize and in Whitehall.¹⁵⁷

There is no doubt that Britain's role in protecting and guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Belize was pivotal and stands in stark contrast to the impotence of Portugal and Spain. Britain was the most important of the Commonwealth mid-wives that attended the birth of Belize. As long as British forces were stationed there, supported by the impressive Harriers, there was a formidable deterrent to sober even the most reckless of Guatemalan generals. And, though Britain was prepared to consider territorial concessions, she was not willing to accept a cosmetic settlement that would lead to

¹⁵⁵*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1976), 27574.

¹⁵⁶Thatcher's willingness to stand by Belize was crucial to ensuring full U.S. support for independence. The British committed themselves to stay in Belize for an "appropriate time" after independence. *The Times* (London), 27 July, 1981, 6; 25 September, 1981, 6.

¹⁵⁷Since independence U.K. military aid to Belize has increased substantially. The British and the Guatemalans resumed negotiations in 1987, only to have them fail once again within weeks. However new efforts in 1988 and 1989 have brought the parties somewhat closer. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* 1989, 36998. Alma H. Young, "The Central American Crisis and Its Impact on Belize," in Alma H. Young and Dion E. Phillips (eds.) *Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1986), pp. 147-149.

integration with Guatemala. Had Britain been less conscientious, the people of Belize may have eventually faced the fate of another British imperial outpost on the isthmus, the Nicaraguan Mosquitos.

Nonetheless, this was never an open-ended commitment.¹⁵⁸ Guatemalan leaders might have been encouraged by the reluctance of British governments to guarantee Belize's post-independence security. Guatemala had, after all, been pressing the claim for more than a century. Had they been able to maintain the loyalty of other Latin American states and the passive support of the United States they might well have expected to stare down the British military presence in the long run. It was not the Harriers or even the fortitude of Mrs Thatcher's government in the end which saved Belize. It was the success of Commonwealth diplomacy. Britain and other Commonwealth states, particularly those in the region, undercut the Guatemalan claim for territorial integrity by marshalling the arguments for Belize's national self-determination in the very capitals and international organisations where Guatemala had to make her case. Britain's military presence bought time for this effort, certainly. Britain's policy of giving the elected government of Belize a long rein to make its own case was also critical. And Britain's obvious search for a respectable withdrawal undermined arguments of vestigial imperialism. But, Britain's military presence, her commitment to an orderly transition to independence, and the case for the rights to self-determination of a minority anglophone community in Central America, could determine the fate of Belize only to the extent that Britain and Belize won support in the region and among those powers in a position to tilt the balance. The determination to support Belize in compatriot anglophone communities in the

¹⁵⁸Indeed by May, 1993 Britain was confident enough that Belize's security was now sufficiently well-rooted that she could announce the withdrawal of all but 100 British training troops by October 1994. Responsibility for the nation's security was transferred to the Belize Defence Forces in January, 1994. Still, Guatemala reiterated her claim to Belize in a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in March, 1994, 13 years after independence.

The Europa World Yearbook 1995, (London: Europa Publications, 1995), p. 548.

Commonwealth Caribbean that were already established as states gave access to leading Latin republics— Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico— whose own international aspirations stretched beyond regional prestige to positions of influence on a larger global agenda. That agenda included decolonisation and the rights to self-determination of colonial peoples.

Britain's reluctant steadfastness made this possible, to be sure. But the successful independence of Belize was secured when the people and the government of Belize, supported by the regional powers and Commonwealth friends, made their case in the international community. It was this success which isolated Guatemala and cauterised its irredentism.

The efforts of Belize's patrons and the duration of independence itself augurs well for the future security of this small anglophone outpost in Latin America. Until recently O.A.S. membership was closed to those states involved in territorial disputes with original member states. This meant that both Belize and Guyana were unable to benefit from existing regional security arrangements. Now both states are members of the Organization and are thus able to claim the principles of the Charter for themselves.¹⁵⁹ If nothing else, such changes, with United States approval, will be sobering and inhibiting for irredentist forces in neighbouring states. The international identity of these states, at least, is more secure.

Sovereignty and the inviolability of colonial frontiers may not in the end protect Belize from a determined irredentist government in Guatemala, however well its independence may seem to be anchored in the structure and the power centres of the international system. But the lesson of the experience in Belize is clear. The case for separate independence in Belize was well-established in the principles and the practice of

¹⁵⁹Both countries finally joined the OAS on January 8, 1991, in the middle of the United Nations effort to rescue Kuwait!

Keesings Contemporary Archives, (1991), 37957.

the decolonisation process in the United Nations, as it was in East Timor and the Western Sahara. But the efforts of Belize's supporters to secure recognition of the rights to sovereignty prior to the withdrawal of colonial authority, particularly in important capitals, is itself an acknowledgement that some measure of international legitimacy may save a state when all other defences are lacking.

Conclusions

Questions of justification, credibility, and durability mar the international relations of many new small states. For some, helplessness in the face of economic pressures may force concessions to a larger and perhaps more rational political system, federalism, for example, rather than separate independence. For others, the identity of the state may not correspond to the priorities of internal loyalties. And for others still, they exist in the shadow of irredentist claims which are never entirely laid to rest. In this chapter we have begun to explore the question of legitimacy by examining the contest of claims in small and problematic territories during the difficult period of decolonisation. In each case, aspirations to separate independence were consistent with the principle that self-determination should be exercised within established colonial frontiers. But in all three cases this understanding of self-determination was challenged by more powerful actors in an appeal to the equally honoured principle of territorial integrity. From this perspective, self-determination for these 'colonial peoples' would be tantamount to endorsing the secession of an undeserving minority at the expense of the natural and historical unity of the larger state.

In all cases, the process of decolonisation was painful; finally defeated in East Timor; yet uncertain in Western Sahara, and eventually successful in Belize. The experience of these territories exposes the misgivings which underlie the uncompromising official tone of

the principle of self-determination. In the face of a larger state's claims these doubts may be reflected in the inertia of diplomatic response. Even indignation and outrage can be expressed safely, given the assurances of a *fait accompli*. The components of vulnerability have varied in each case. East Timor, with its tiny population, was an eccentric colonial remnant within the confines of a powerful new state. The abdication of the colonial power's responsibility and the lack of support in the region proved fatal. And the pace of events allowed no time to mobilise international support based on United Nations resolutions. Unlike the Western Sahara, the Indonesian annexation was not based on deeply-rooted irredentist passions. It was a decision to ensure their long-term security by correcting territorial anomalies. The logic of integration was apparent from the outset and the Indonesian decision to annex East Timor was encouraged by widespread evidence that integration was seen as a legitimate solution.

In the Western Sahara too, the weakness of the colonial power, combined with the pace of developments in the colony, prevented any attempt to stall the implementation of the Tripartite Agreement. However, unlike East Timor, the case for an independent Sahrawi state was a prominent issue in the international system, particularly given the findings of the I.C.J. and the conspicuous role of the United Nations Special Mission. Moreover, Moroccan annexation was in clear defiance of African states' commitments to the inviolability of colonial frontiers as the basis for self-determination. And the Sahrawis, unlike the Timorese, enjoyed the support of a powerful patron, which has been a critical factor in the ability to sustain both their military and diplomatic campaigns. Yet Morocco is not without powerful allies to counter Algeria's influence. The case for an independent Sahrawi state is not supported among Western states and, Algeria herself, could have been isolated for sponsoring a hopeless and dubious cause. Nonetheless, the dogged resistance of the Sahrawis, and especially their aggressive diplomacy within the region, has resulted

in a measure of international support that might yet shift the burden of the argument to King Hassan and his efforts to defend his Grand Maroc.

The problems of achieving independence for Belize as a tiny anglophone community in a fragment of Central America were recognised from the earliest days of decolonisation. Initial Latin American solidarity with Guatemala and the ambivalence of the United States were principal obstacles in the course of self-determination. In the case of Belize, however, the colonial power, along with Commonwealth Caribbean states, themselves essentially a micro-state community, aggressively promoted the cause of separate independence. It was a very long gestation period, but by 1981 the credentials of Belizian statehood were established sufficiently to allow for the transfer of sovereignty.

Does the equivocation and helplessness in the cases of East Timor and Western Sahara or the painstakingly cautious approach to sovereignty in Belize have any bearing on the future of controversial and vulnerable states which are recognised members of the international system? The successful independence of so many diminutive colonial territories and the comparatively few cases of failure do not settle the question beyond doubt. The renunciation of colonial frontiers has occurred only in the smallest territories and with those peoples whose case for separate independence raises the most doubts and whose future, from the vantage of the major powers at least, is expendable. In the next and final chapter of this section we will assess these problems of status for established micro-states and summarise our conclusions on the relevance of the legitimacy question as a salient feature of the international relations of very small states.

CHAPTER FOUR

Very Small Size And Other Sources Of Status Weakness

For some micro-states, long-term security may be threatened by the same issues which have frustrated aspirations to self-determination in East Timor and the Western Sahara. Though sovereignty has been granted and recognised, these states exist uneasily, facing a possible revival of past claims and unspoken doubts. Of course, the components of vulnerability vary with each case. The extent to which a micro-state can stave off its own demise depends on factors which compensate for the disabilities of very small size, particularly economic resources and geopolitical situation.

Resource rich micro-states are most vulnerably positioned to face challenges to their status and security. Kuwait is the most dramatic of examples. The recurring nightmare of invasion and occupation finally befell the Kuwaitis in August, 1990 when Iraqi forces simply overwhelmed the sophisticated but hugely outnumbered Kuwaiti defences. Though Iraq had been considered a dangerous and predatory neighbour from the time of Kuwait's independence in 1961, and though that danger had surfaced on various occasions since the initial threat, Kuwait's leaders, and indeed her allies in both the Gulf Cooperation Council and the West,¹ were caught unsuspecting even in the face of Iraqi mobilisation. There was a determined effort to see Iraqi troop movements as pressure tactics to force Kuwait to comply with Iraq's demands for a forgiveness of loans incurred during the war against Iran and, more importantly, for a reduction in Kuwait's oil production which had the effect of depressing world oil prices thereby denying Iraq the scale of prof-

¹Yet, there is also persuasive evidence that the United States, at least, was aware that Iraq would use force but that its actions would be "pragmatic" and limited to a legitimate settlement of the border dispute with Kuwait. In this view, American "nods and winks," particularly in the now infamous July interview with the hapless American ambassador, April Glaspie, encouraged Saddam in the conviction that military action against Kuwait would not meet with opposition in Washington.

Christopher Hitchens, "Realpolitik in the Gulf," *New Left Review* (186, March-April, 1991), 89-101.

its it needed if it was ever to recover the staggering costs of its war of attrition against Iran.

Since the invasion a debate has raged among Middle Eastern scholars as to the motives for Saddam Hussein's attack against Iraq and, more particularly, whether there was sufficient evidence of his intent to warrant a more engaged and prepared stance on the part of Kuwait and her friends. While much of the conventional wisdom at the time explained the invasion as the opportunism of an impetuous despot,² others were to view a triumphal march of Iraqi armies into Kuwait City as the culmination of a long-held strategy.³ In this view, Saddam's objectives were to secure control of Middle East oil production and to establish Iraq as the leader of the Arab world, a just reward for its sacrifices against a common Persian enemy. The "recovery" of Kuwait was essential in both respects. It would surely give Iraq huge leverage over the remaining Gulf oil-producers. And it would support the oft-cited claim that recovery of Kuwait was a major step towards Arab unity and the assertion of popular Arab democratic forces against the corrupt and collaborationist feudal regimes which both fragmented and betrayed the Arab world.

What is of interest to us in this discussion is not the strategic considerations which both Iraqi and Coalition forces entertained. Nor is the conduct of the war itself particularly relevant. What is central, however, is the nature of Saddam's irredentist claim against Kuwait, the assumptions which he must have held about the strength and persuasiveness of those claims in the Arab, Muslim and international communities, and the implications of his defeat for other similarly vulnerable micro-states.

²Laurie Mylroie, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," *Orbis* (Winter, 1993), 123-124.

³*Ibid.*, 124-134.

Another, and perhaps more persuasive view, is that this was a window of opportunity wherein long standing ambitions might be achieved.

Fred Halliday, "The Gulf War and its Aftermath: First Reflections," *International Affairs* (LXVII: Number 2, April, 1991), 225-227.

Perhaps what is most striking in reviewing this episode is the sheer confidence, indeed the brazenness of Saddam Hussein,⁴ in challenging the most central commitments of the Charter: the respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of member states. While those assumptions have been violated time and again, they have been done so discreetly, that it is with a determined effort to respect the international legal personality of the victimised state. One might argue that that means little if your state is occupied and administered by hostile external forces. But, as long as there is international legal personality, there remains a chance of political recovery. States and territories which are annexed soon find themselves locked in solitary confinement, beyond reach of outside help. They are now victims to the rules which protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the absorbing states. That was clearly the case with the Baltic states, even though most Western powers never recognised the legal annexation of these republics. The move to annex Kuwait, and to incorporate it as a recovered province of Iraq, was particularly grave. But it was also brazen in the extreme. No member state of the United Nations has forcibly lost its international legal personality since 1945. Many have been humiliated and compromised but they live on to fight another day. Witness the Czechs and Slovaks in 1993 compared to the bowed heads of 1968. Witness too Afghanistan and scores of other countries which have been able to recover some measure of independence implicit in their long-standing formal status as sovereign states. Had Iraq's annexation stood, Kuwait's future would surely have been doomed, and indeed, the prospects for other micro-states in the eyes of avaricious predators would have been far less secure.

Had Saddam arranged for a "populist" and "democratic" overthrow of the regime without the blatant dependence on Iraqi troops; had that regime called for "fraternal" and

⁴As Christopher Greenwood noted, ". . . Iraq's violation of the law is so blatant and extreme. Unlike previous cases, there was no confusion over the facts, no provocation or menace emanating from the invaded state, no real attempt to justify the invasion in terms of contemporary international law." Christopher Greenwood, "Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: Some Legal Issues," *The World Today* (XLVII, Number 3, March, 1991), 40.

even "confederal" relations with their Iraqi brethren, then it might have been much more difficult to pull together an international coalition to rescue Kuwait. It was not an easy task given public misgivings about such a commitment over the autumn months, particularly in the United States. But Saddam provided no face-saving way out for the nervous and the timid who preferred any solution but direct engagement. The annexation of a member state of the United Nations allowed no cover for the tremulous. It was the blatant defiance of the most central United Nations principles which turned opponents into abstainers and reluctant bystanders into supporters.

Saddam's gamble was that the age old claims to Kuwait would find resonance in both the Arab world and in the West. To some extent he was right.⁵ Popular demonstrations in the Arab world from Morocco to Jordan clearly demonstrated the power of Saddam's Arab solidarity message in the streets. And in the Congressional debate in the United States, as in other Western countries, there were grave misgivings about defending a tiny feudal city state where democratic values were lost in a sea of wealth and privilege. Stout-hearted Americans found their democratic and republican values irrelevant as the Sabah sheikhs engaged White House protocol.

Yet the foundations of Kuwait's statehood were not exceptionally questionable in the contemporary international system and certainly not in the Arab world. Saddam recklessly underestimated the resistance of Arab states to a direct attack on one of their own by their own. Nor could even the most reluctant states in the United Nations finally defend the indomitable defiance of the Iraqi regime down to the eleventh hour.

Saddam clearly expected that Iraq's claims to Kuwait would speak to the anti-colonial and anti-Western constituency in the United Nations. It was a gamble as ill-

⁵Fouad Ajami, "The Summer of Arab Discontent," *Foreign Affairs* (LXIX, No. 5, Winter, 199/91), especially 1-7.

conceived as that of General Galtieri in his mission to recover the 'Malvinas' islands in 1982.

To be sure, Iraq's claim's to Kuwait have not been entirely defeated, in spite of the Coalition victory and the United Nations demarcation of the border, which Iraq still refuses to accept. Irredentist wounds fester long after peace treaties and agreed settlements are thought to put them to rest. Kuwait had been similarly convinced on other occasions, particularly when Iraq sponsored Kuwait's membership in various inter-governmental organisations only two years after the initial challenge to Kuwait's independence. The now obvious dependence of Kuwait on the United States and the expulsion of much of the suspected collaborationist Palestinian community in Kuwait only serves to underscore again the problems of legitimacy which bedevil this little state and so many others whose demographic, political and geopolitical situations are equally vulnerable.

The arguments against separate sovereignty in Kuwait presented to the Arab world and the international community in 1990 were a reiteration of those claims made by Karim Kassem at the time of Kuwait's independence from Great Britain in 1961; that is that the shaikhdom was "an integral part of Iraq."⁶ Baghdad charged Britain with taking a few oil wells and calling it a state.⁷ Independence for this "overgrown village"⁸ was a bla-

⁶*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1961), 18187. Iraq condemned "the spuriousness of the independence granted to Kuwait," and reiterated Iraqi "determination to uphold its right and . . . restore Kuwait to the motherland."

The Government of Iraq, *The Truth About Kuwait* (Baghdad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1966), 5.

⁷United Nations General Assembly Resolution (XVI)A/PV 1028, 6 October, 1961. Iraq claimed that the (secret) agreement of 1899 between the Kuwaiti ruler and the British Government, itself the basis for the new agreement of June 19, 1961, was invalid. "If Kuwait was not legally a British protectorate, then independence was not something which Britain could confer. What is beyond dispute is that the definition of protection does not apply in any sense to Kuwait, since Kuwait has never been a state by any stretch of the definition of statehood; never possessed the qualifications for statehood which are required by international law; or ever was a member of the family of states, having been, in fact, a part of the Ottoman State or more precisely an administrative unit (Qaimmaqamiyah) attached to the Governor of Basrah, which is part of Iraq. It had no territory with an internationally clear frontier. Its inhabitants were a section of the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, and enjoying Ottoman nationality and linked to the Ottoman Empire by a permanent legal and political tie. There was no such thing as Kuwaiti nationality, and the Shaikh of Kuwait was an Ottoman subject and an Ottoman official collecting rates and taxes in

tant example of imperialist efforts to balkanise the Arab world.⁹ A British rescue mission forced the League of Arab States to intervene and ultimately ensure Kuwait's sovereignty.¹⁰ However, neither the support of the League nor the fall of Kassem and the subsequent Iraqi recognition of Kuwait has removed the danger completely. "Built into

the name of the Ottoman Government to which he was subject. There was in Kuwait an Ottoman garrison and the Ottoman flag flew over the town of Kuwait".

The Truth About Kuwait, op. cit., 17.8

Having concluded that Kuwait was part of the Ottoman province of Basrah and that Iraq was the successor state to the Ottoman Empire in Basrah, Iraq then claimed Kuwait as a part of Basrah which had been detached from the province (and Iraq) by imperialist perfidy. A Mandatory Power was obliged to safeguard the territorial integrity of the mandated territory. By detaching Kuwait for its own purposes, Britain had contemptuously disregarded her responsibilities to the League.

Ibid., 18.

⁸ United Nations S.C.O.R. (XVI), S/PV 984, 30 November, 1961.

⁹ The conspiratorial role played by the Western powers in the fragmentation of a natural Arab unity is a recurrent theme in Arabist literature. See, for example: Albert Hourani, "The Decline of the West in the Middle East-I," *International Affairs*, XXIX (January, 1953), 29-30.

Kuwait countered by claiming that the shaikhdom was never part of Ottoman Basrah but of the Arabian peninsula "with which she has strong bonds of kinship, character and customs." The title "qaimmaqam" was not an administrative designation subject to the Governor of Basrah but ". . . an honorary title similar to Effendi, Bey, or Pasha, which Ottoman authorities often bestowed on Ottoman subjects and close friends." The Kuwaitis insisted that this Turkish title was invested with no significance in Kuwait; nor did it affect "the independence or sovereignty of Kuwait." However, even if it could be argued that Kuwait was an Ottoman territory, it did not follow that Iraq was the successor state to Ottoman administrative divisions. If this were so, then Jordan should be a Syrian province ". . . with Dara, a Syrian town today, as its administrative center." But, the most important Kuwaiti counter-argument was that the Iraqis themselves had consistently recognised Kuwaiti statehood. Official correspondence from Iraq, including letters from General Kassem, had always been addressed to Kuwait as an independent state. Iraq had helped Kuwait to join a number of international organisations.

The Government of Kuwait, *The Truth About the Crisis Between Kuwait and Iraq* (Kuwait: Printing and Publishing Department, 1961), p. 4.

Hussain al-Barhana suggests that Kuwait's disavowal of the Ottoman link was not entirely justified.

Hussain M. al-Barhana, *The Legal Status of the Arab Gulf States— A Study of Their Treaty Relations and International Relations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968), p. 253.

See also: Naseer H. Aruri, "Kuwait— A Political Study," *Muslim World* LX (October, 1970), 323-324.

¹⁰The fact that Kuwait called upon the British only corroborated Kassem's claim that the shaikhdom was in reality a British dependency. The Soviet Union concurred with Iraq's position. They vetoed a British resolution in the Security Council calling for recognition of Kuwait's independence. For a full account of the Arab League's role in the dispute see: Benjamin Shwadran, "The Kuwait Incident," *Middle Eastern Affairs* (January, 1962-Part I,) 2-13; (February, 1962- Part II), 43-53.

Hussein A. Hassouna, *The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes— A Study of Middle East Conflicts* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc. and Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1975), Chapter Six

Kuwait's psyche is the trauma of 1961. . ."¹¹ and the realisation that the Iraqi danger could materialise at any time. Still, the enormous wealth of this little country allowed it in part to compensate for the misfortune of its geopolitical situation. Prior to the war it was the world's sixth largest oil producer, with the third largest known reserves, and was able, therefore, to achieve an economic importance far out of proportion to its size. The shaikhdom's foreign aid programme was long regarded as the means by which " . . it buys its right to exist."¹² The generosity of aid disbursements was thought to shield the Kuwaitis against the envy of their bonanza, but the programme had "its base in apprehension and nervousness."¹³ The questions haunting Kuwait's future also affect other micro-states clustered in the Gulf and the oil rich sultanate of Brunei.¹⁴ Though the bounty of oil may allow these states some prominence in the international community, it also exposes them to other dangers, particularly as tiny feudal remnants in a rapidly changing social and political environment.

The population of oil-based micro-state economies is simply not large enough to support the infrastructure of an integrated developed economy. The management of the petroleum industry, from extraction to the marketing of refined products, demands a huge influx of both skilled and unskilled labour. It is an invitation to caste politics. Prior to the War, Kuwait functioned as a large corporation with management and working classes integrated into the corporate/national enterprise. Still, there was the worrying constituency

¹¹*The Financial Times* (London), 28 March, 1973, 9.

¹²*The Times* (London), 4 November, 1976, VIII.

¹³*The Financial Times* (London), 25 February, 1976, 15.

¹⁴Brunei's vulnerability to irredentist claims and subversion explains the Sultan's longtime resistance to independence. For many years Southeast Asia was an Oriental Balkans with all states as claimants and targets. Brunei's position as a tiny feudal and colonial remnant was particularly sensitive. According to Michael Leifer, Brunei was viewed similarly to East Timor.

Michael Leifer, "South-east Asia," in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *Foreign Policy Making in Developing States* (Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House, 1977), p. 37.

of non-Kuwaitis; 46% of the population sulking beyond the fence of nationality. Kuwaitis meet only 26% of the country's manpower needs.¹⁵ From the outset they have feared that their city state could easily be overwhelmed by the strangers within their suburbs, and the evidence during the occupation for some Kuwaitis confirmed these fears though many of the Palestinian and other foreign communities were themselves victims of the occupation. At present, restrictive nationality laws ensure that only a fraction of non-Kuwaitis are admitted into full citizenship each year.¹⁶ Any relaxation of these restrictions are still seen as a risk to the future of the Sabah dynasty and the fragile control which Kuwaitis hold in their own shaikhdom.¹⁷ But a restrictive policy remains dangerous, disaffecting as it surely must the majority population from any identification with the Kuwaiti state.

Legal distinctions between Kuwaiti citizens and immigrants underlie a comprehensive pattern of discrimination that leaves the non-Kuwaiti majority with little basis for national loyalty.¹⁸ The disaffected are susceptible to an alternative orientation for political

¹⁵*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 29 April, 1975, 4.

The increasing ratio of the non-Kuwaiti population also poses a dilemma for the state's economic development. Labour-intensive schemes to diversify Kuwait's economic base must be regarded warily, since they can exacerbate the balance. These anxieties have resulted in a policy of extreme caution towards industrialisation and even to the abandonment of certain projects.

The Times (London), 4 November, 1976, I.

Kuwait's population increased from 206,473 in 1957 to 1,697,301 in 1985. Between 1963 and 1970 the average annual increase was ten percent, the highest of any state in the world. Between 1957 and 1983 the non-Kuwaiti population rose from 93,000 (45%) to 870,000 (57.4%).

The Middle East and North Africa 1987 (London: Europa Publications, 1988), 532.

¹⁶Naturalised citizenship can be obtained only after ten years residence for Arabs and fifteen years for non-Arabs. Only fifty persons can be naturalised in any one year. Moreover, naturalised citizens do not acquire voting rights unless naturalisation occurred at least ten years prior to the date of promulgation.

Aruri, op. cit., 328.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 333-339.

¹⁸The pattern of discrimination is particularly apparent in the social services. Immigrant Arabs are not allowed to own property. For the wealthy, who can afford exorbitant rents, it is a manageable restriction. For the large population of menial labourers, however, it means a shanty-town existence. Only ten percent of immigrants are admitted to the state school system. For the remainder it is a choice between expensive private schools or no education at all. Immigrants are not protected under the Kuwaiti

identification particularly if it is exploited by a contiguous state with irredentist claims to further weaken the state's credentials.¹⁹ The advantages of wealth, then, only compensate in part for the disabilities of very small size in questions of status and security.

In some cases, as in Djibouti, where an irredentist claim might have been advanced, the local complex of interests has proven favourable to the separate independence of the small territory.²⁰ In these situations, unlike East Timor, the regional balance is clearly threatened by the territorial expansion of one local power over another. Geopolitical considerations of this kind were also important in the case of Kuwait as long as such a balance was in place. Both Iran and Saudi-Arabia would find Iraqi absorption of Kuwait as intolerable, just as Iraq and Saudi-Arabia could be expected to thwart any attempt by Iran to annex the island micro-state of Bahrain.²¹ The disabilities of very small size for vulnerable

health programme and must use private medicine. Citizens enjoy a range of privileges and sinecures in Kuwait which are not open to the majority of the population.

Ibid., 329.

The Times (London), 4 November, 1976, 11.

The Guardian (Manchester and London), 29 April, 1975, 4.

Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans* (London: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 431-440.

Hassan Ali Al-Ebraheem, *Kuwait and the Gulf-Small States and the International System* (Washington: Center for Arab Studies; London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 70-74.

¹⁹India, for example, was able to tap the disaffection of the non-Sikkimese majority to build a constituency for the integration of Sikkim into India. The British had encouraged Nepalese immigration into Sikkim from the middle of the nineteenth century in order to counter Tibetan influence among the Bhutias. The Chogyal relied on the support of the Bhutias and the Buddhist-Lepchas, but they accounted for less than 25 percent of the population. His consistent refusal to respond to Nepalese aspirations, fearing that this would lead to the constitutional diminution of his own powers and an end to the traditional exclusive privileges of the Bhutia-Lepcha constituency, ensured that the Nepalese majority would look to India.

Ranjan Gupta, "Sikkim: The Merger with India," *Asian Survey* XV (No. 9, September, 1975), 788.

²⁰For nationalists committed to the cause of a greater Somalia, Djibouti was one of "the five parts" of the Somali nation.

Lee C. Buchheit, *Secession- The Legitimacy of Self-Determination* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 176.

²¹For a review of the Iranian claim to Bahrain see H. al-Baharna, "The Fact-Finding Mission of the United Nations Secretary-General and the Settlement of the Bahrain-Iran Dispute, May 1970," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* XXII (July, 1973, No. 3), 541-552.

Edward Gordon, "Resolution of the Bahrain Dispute," *American Journal of International Law* LXV (July, 1971), 560-568.

and insecure micro-states may be compensated in part, then, by the skilful exploitation of regional diplomacy and local power interests.

Yet the security and the territorial integrity of a micro-state may depend on the blatant sufferance of the larger, and possibly dangerous, neighbour. This is particularly evident in Bhutan's agonizingly slow emergence into the international system and the very strict limitations placed on her participation in international affairs by India's interpretation of the 1949 treaty between the two states.²² The treaty provides that Bhutan will be "guided by the advice of India in its external relations."²³ For Bhutan the phrase merely

Hooshang Moghtader, "The Settlement of the Bahrain Question: A Study in Anglo-Iranian-United Nations Diplomacy," *Pakistan Horizon* XXVI (No. 2, 1973), 16-29.

The case of Bahrain is a disturbing example of the potential danger of irredentist revival. The 'settlement' with the Shah had little effect on the Khomeini regime's determination to brandish old arguments in 1980. *The Times* (London), 18 July, 1980, 8.

The Daily Telegraph (London), 21 September, 1980, 47

The Bahrainis charged Iran with backing an attempted coup in the island in 1982.

The Times (London), 5 January, 1982, 5; 29 March, 1982, 1; 24 May, 1982, p. 4.

Saudi-Arabia's commitment to the causeway linking the mainland to Bahrain was partially in response to a perceived Iranian threat.

The New York Times, 3 December, 1979, IV, 1.

²²At the time of its accession to the United Nations in 1971, Bhutan had a population of approximately 800,000. The kingdom's international status had always been ambiguous. The United Nations did not regard Bhutan as a candidate for decolonisation since it could not be described accurately as a 'non self-governing territory.' Yet, its sovereignty was not fully established either. Bhutan was regarded generally as a protectorate of India. Protectorate status was likened to that of suzerainty.

L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, ed. by H. Lauterpacht (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955, 8th ed.), p. 192.

It was long argued that the protectorate relationship involved a "definite diminution (if not a total deprivation) of sovereignty" when applied to the peoples of Asia and Africa.

T. Baty, "Protectorates and Mandates," *British Year Book of International Law* II (1921-22), 112.

²³The text of the Treaty of Friendship Between India and Bhutan, 8 August, 1949 (Darjeeling) is reproduced in L. S. Rathore, *The Changing Bhutan* (New Delhi: Jain Bros., 1974), Appendix VIII, pp. 144-149.

The treaty does not include the term 'protectorate' but it does maintain the essential features of the 1910 treaty between Britain and Bhutan. India inherited the British policy of containing Chinese influence across the Himalayas.

The text of the Treaty Between the British Government and the Government of Bhutan 1865, and of the Treaty Between Great Britain and Bhutan 1910 (Punakha), are also reproduced in Rathore, *ibid.*, Appendix V, pp. 134-139; Appendix VII, pp. 142-143.

Though the wording of the 1949 and 1910 treaties is identical, it has been argued that the former does not constitute a protectorate relationship given the explicit commitments to Bhutanese sovereignty by

suggested consultation, not obligation.²⁴ For India, however, the phrase meant that "Bhutan (had) given India the right to formulate its foreign policy."²⁵ At the very least, India insisted that Bhutan could not initiate any relations with a third state except through New Delhi.²⁶ Though this overbearance has provoked "an obsession with status consciousness"²⁷ in Bhutan, any alternative to the relationship with India has been impracticable and potentially ruinous. There has been little enthusiasm in Bhutan for the Nepali model of defiant independence.²⁸ For Bhutan such presumption is too precarious. Not

the Indian Government and the international personality which Bhutan has assumed. Since the conditions of the 1910 relationship were so different, then, that treaty must be regarded as one of protection. Kapileshwar Labh, *India and Bhutan* (New Delhi: Sendha Publications, Ltd., 1974), pp. 187-207; 220-230.

²⁴By 1959, irritation with the constrictions of India's patronage was beginning to surface in Bhutan. In his report to the Bhutanese government on the relationship with India, D. K. Sen, the constitutional advisor to the Government of Bhutan, argued that the phrase "to be guided" merely suggested consultation and not obligation. He stressed that Bhutan was a fully sovereign state which had not surrendered its final control over external relations. Indeed, the treaty itself was a voluntary act of a sovereign state. Though Indian advice would be sought as outlined in the treaty, Bhutan was not bound by that advice; nor did the treaty preclude diplomatic initiative. Accordingly, Sen announced to the press that Bhutan was about to open direct relations with major powers. Prime Minister Nehru promptly wrote to the young Maharajah to state the inadvisability of pursuing such a course.

Asian Recorder (1959), 2903.

Nagendra Singh, *Bhutan—A Kingdom in the Himalayas* (New Delhi: The Thomson Press, 1972), p. 133.

K. Krishna Moorthy, "Bhutan: Thoughts of Sovereignty," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (February 16, 1961), 297.

²⁵Pradyumna P. Karan, "The Geopolitical Structure of Bhutan," *India Quarterly* XIX (No. 3, July-September, 1963), 207.

²⁶Leo E. Rose, "Bhutan's External Relations," *Pacific Affairs* XLVII (Summer, 1974), 197.

²⁷T.T. Poulouse, "Bhutan's External Relations and India," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* XX (No. 2, April, 1971), 204.

²⁸Leo E. Rose, "Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan Border States," *Orbis* V (No. 2, Summer, 1961), 206-208.

Nepal's choice was dictated by a fear of India as great as that of China.

George N. Patterson, "Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and towards the Himalayan Border States," *The China Quarterly* (October-December, 1962), 196.

Nonetheless, it was a policy which left Nepal, unlike its diminutive neighbours, as "an arena for big-power competition."

Rose, *Pacific Affairs*, *op. cit.*, 199.

only is Bhutan's status more ambiguous than that of Nepal but her very smallness made any disciplinary measures less problematical than with Nepal.

It was precisely the example of Nepal which perturbed India.²⁹ In its attempts to balance its relations with India and China, Nepal was considered as an unreliable buffer. There was no guarantee that Bhutan and Sikkim would not act similarly if given the opportunity. From the perspective of New Delhi, any independence on the part of the Himalayan states was bound to result in some Chinese penetration. India was determined to prevent any further breach in its defence cordon. When the Chogyal of Sikkim sought to establish separate international personality, he lost his usefulness to India. New Delhi then supported the Chogyal's opponents, an intervention which led to the complete absorption of Sikkim into India.³⁰

To avoid a similar fate, the Bhutanese attempted to push India's understanding of the treaty as far as possible while constantly reassuring New Delhi of their loyalty. Their sensitivity to India's security interests was realistic. It meant that they would have to enhance their international status gradually and within the scope of the 1949 treaty. In the first two decades of independence these attempts to conduct external relations were met with determined Indian resistance, particularly on the sensitive issue of contacts with China.³¹ When several Western powers were approached by Bhutanese agents on the

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰The Chogyal of Sikkim believed that the post-war climate was favourable to the rights of small states and that this in itself was conducive to a change in Sikkim's treaty relations with India. Eventually Sikkim's sovereignty would be recognised in the international system.

Gupta, *op. cit.*, 788.

During Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to Sikkim in 1968, the Chogyal spoke of Sikkim's "rightful place in the comity of nations." This lack of loyalty was bewildering in New Delhi and meant that the Chogyal and an independent Sikkim were no longer useful.

Leo E. Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship," *Pacific Affairs* XLII (No. 1, 1969), 34.

³¹India's anxieties were clear in accusations of Chinese "cartographic aggression against Bhutan," the occupation of Bhutanese territory, and the violation of Bhutanese air space.

Note Given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India,

possibility of direct relations, India quietly intervened to prevent any response.³² Eventually, however, Bhutan's resolve, underscored by constant and friendly reassurance, elicited a more flexible stance in New Delhi. As early as 1962 India sponsored Bhutan's accession to the Colombo Plan.³³ Formal diplomatic relations between the two states were established in 1968.³⁴ The stage was set for United Nations membership when the kingdom joined the Universal Postal Union in 1969.³⁵

30 June, 1962. *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China*, November, 1961-July, 1962, *White Paper No. VI*, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1962, 105.

India consistently claimed that Chinese maps included some 300 square miles of Bhutanese territory as part of Tibet, though these lands were not occupied by the Chinese. China treated these charges as spurious attempts to disguise India's own designs.

Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China and A Note on the Historical Background of the Himalayan Frontier of India, September-November, 1959, *White Paper No. II*, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1959, 41.

In the face of the Sino-Indian conflict Bhutan sought to retain formal neutrality, fearing that too explicit an alignment with India would increase its vulnerability. Though he welcomed Nehru's assurance that "an attack on Bhutan was an attack on India," the Bhutanese prime minister still refused to allow the positioning of Indian troops on Bhutan's soil

Asian Recorder (1959), 2587, 2903.

K. N. Agrawal, "Indo-Bhutanese Relations," *Political Scientist* IV (Part Two, January-June, 1968), 44-45.

³²Moorthy, *op cit.*, 297.

India's determination to quarantine the kingdom from all contacts and influences save those of India went so far as to deny Bhutan's request for the channeling of PL480 funds to Bhutan on the grounds that Indian aid was sufficient unto itself.

Karan, *op cit.*, 212.

For a review of India's aid programme for Bhutan during this period see:

Valentine J. Belfiglio, "Indian Economic Aid to Bhutan and Sikkim," *International Studies* XIII (No. 1, January, 1974), 94-104.

³³" . . . admission has its own bearing on the legal status of Bhutan and registers Bhutan's first entry into a regional group of states. . . "

Nagendra Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

Participation in the Colombo Plan gave Bhutan its only contact with the outside world.

Daniel Wolfstone and M. P. Gopalan, "The Road to Bhutan," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (April 9, 1964), 85-86.

³⁴The heads of the Missions were called 'Special Officers.' The function of the Bhutanese Special Officer in New Delhi was ". . . to co-ordinate, expedite and facilitate the implementation of various Indian aided projects in Bhutan and to also act as the Liaison Officer of the Government of India with the Government of Bhutan on all other matters of mutual interest."

Nagendra Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 139.42

For Bhutan, United Nations membership was viewed as the ultimate security for its separate international identity.³⁶ But in India there was concern that this would allow Bhutan free rein to pursue a Nepali-style foreign policy.³⁷ However, to oppose such a popular issue in Bhutan and to be seen as obstructing a legitimate case of self-determination as well as flouting the principle of universal membership was clearly unacceptably embarrassing.

Though Bhutan finally joined the United Nations in 1971, Indian sponsorship was based on the understanding that membership would not alter the treaty relationship between the two countries. Barring a major threat to India's northern frontiers, United Nations membership has probably relieved the danger of the kingdom slipping into the fate of Sikkim.³⁸ It would be much more difficult to absorb a member state of the United Nations, even if that state's treaty commitments are tantamount to protectorate status. Moreover, Bhutan has gradually succeeded in persuading India to relax its tight rein. The kingdom

These representatives were given full ambassadorial status in April, 1971. Bhutan had referred to its Mission as an embassy from the outset.

Ibid., 140.

Bhutan had accepted an Indian Advisor in 1963 as a ". . . consultant to the Prime Minister on political matters and as a channel of communication between the two governments," but a successor was not appointed in 1966 because the advisor had been accused of interference in Bhutanese affairs. Similarly, an Indian suggestion to appoint an officer of the External Affairs Ministry to Bhutan on a full-time basis raised suspicions in Bhutan and led instead to the exchange of special officials.

Rose, *Pacific Affairs*, (1974), 201.

³⁵" . . . it furnishes proof of Bhutan's sovereignty. . . "

Nagendra Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

³⁶The leader of the Bhutanese delegation to the United Nations, Prince Namgyal Wangchuck, saw membership as the culmination of Bhutan's quest for full international status.

United Nations Document, (XXVI) A/PV/1934, p. 21 September, 1971, pp. 67-68.

³⁷Rose, *Pacific Affairs*, *op. cit.*, 202.

³⁸The Bhutanese were not alone in regarding United Nations membership as relevant to the kingdom's status. The French ambassador to the United Nations observed that membership allowed Bhutan ". . . to improve its independence, . . . maintain its originality and . . . achieve its legitimate aspirations."

United Nations Document, (XXVI) S/PV 1566, 10 October, 1971, 16-18.

now enjoys direct relations with Bangladesh. It joined the Conference of the Non-Aligned. And, more significantly, it was allowed to negotiate directly with China on the settlement of outstanding border issues.³⁹ This does not mean that the legitimacy of Bhutan's statehood is fully established. Bhutan remains a ward of India, "a regional unit within India's defense perimeter."⁴⁰ Bhutan's aspirations for its international personality have to be considered within the context of India's traditional claims of guardianship. For micro-states whose identity is forged from sufferance, such claims may prove, in more critical times, to be the more persuasive for being the more historically justified.

In some cases the sufferance of the larger and dangerous neighbouring state may depend on the extent to which that state is concerned for its own prestige and international image. Venezuela's threat to Guyana is "clear and present," as the failure to renew the Port of Spain Protocol demonstrates.⁴¹ And, during the Falklands Crisis in 1982 Guyana protested Venezuelan frontier violations to the Security Council.⁴² Though Venezuela had

³⁹The first set of negotiations was held in Thimphu in April 1984. Both sides have repeatedly stated their commitment to a "peaceful friendly border."

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1986), 34175; (1987), 35384; (1990), 37356.

Bhutan joined the F.A.O., the I.D.A., the I.M.F. and the World Bank in 1981 and U.N.E.S.C.O. in 1982. In 1983 the Kingdom was one of the founding members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. This gives Bhutan direct relations, through cross-creditation, in New Delhi, with Pakistan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka in addition to the exchange of missions with Bangladesh and more recently Kuwait.

See also S. D. Munt, "Bhutan Steps Out," *The World Today* XL (December, 1984), 514-520.

⁴⁰Karan, *op. cit.*, 212.

⁴¹The Protocol between Venezuela, Guyana and the United Kingdom was signed in Port-of-Spain on June 17, 1970. It was to replace an earlier 1966 agreement between Venezuela and the United Kingdom which had left the resolution of the dispute to a mixed commission. The work of that commission was frustrated by regular Guyanese complaints of Venezuelan border incursions. The Port-of-Spain Protocol imposed a 12 year moratorium on the issue, with each side agreeing not to press any territorial claims on the other during this period. It allowed for either an automatic 12 year extension, a negotiated five-to-12 year extension, or unilateral termination with six months notice. In protest against Guyana's intransigence and her determination to proceed with a hydro-electric project in the disputed Essequibo region, Venezuela announced that she would not renew the Protocol. In response Guyana launched a major diplomatic campaign for support, particularly in Brazil and Colombia.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1970), 24286; (1981), 31066.

⁴²*The Times* (London), 29 April, 1982, 6; 3 May, 1982, 3; 13 May, 1982, 6.

adopted a hard line on the territorial dispute, she has also been anxious to cultivate relations within the immediate region, including those Commonwealth Caribbean micro-states which would be most outraged by any Venezuelan decision to realise her long-standing claim to three eighths of Guyana.⁴³ To some extent the dispute has already proven to be an embarrassing obstacle in Venezuela's attempts to assume a larger role in the international system. The forced withdrawal of her application to join the Non-Aligned movement is dramatic evidence of the cost of her policy towards Guyana.⁴⁴ Even Guatemala, in the absence of the British Harrier force, might hesitate to endure the opprobrium which the annexation of Belize would risk.

However, there is little comfort in this kind of calculation. It is still existence on sufferance and it is never certain, even with prestige-conscious states like Venezuela, that domestic considerations will not finally force the resolution of a long-standing irritant. Argentina's campaign for liberation of the 'Malvinas' is a sobering example for micro-states living on the good will or self-restraint of powerful neighbours.

The New York Times 9 May, 1982, 18.

Guyana made it clear that it was ready to accept aid from any friendly state in the event of a Venezuelan invasion. In October, 1982 Brazil granted Guyana a \$50 million credit for the purchase of aircraft, armoured vehicles and munitions.

The Times (London), 2 October, 1982, 6.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1984), 32966.

⁴³John D. Martz, "Venezuelan Foreign Policy Towards Latin America," in Robert D. Bond (ed.) *Contemporary Venezuela and its Role in International Affairs* (New York: New York University Press, 1977), pp. 175-178.

Cedric L. Joseph, "The Venezuela-Guyana Boundary Arbitration of 1899: An Appraisal, Part One" *Caribbean Studies* X (No. 2, July 1970), 56-89; Part Two, (No. 4, January 1971), 35-75.

⁴⁴Venezuela applied to join the Non-Aligned Movement in mid-1982. However, in the face of Guyana's objections, Caracas withdrew its application in February 1983 but maintained its observer status.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1983), 32350-32351.

Though the issue remains unresolved, relations between the two countries have improved considerably since 1985. Various economic co-operation agreements have been signed during these years. In February, 1990 both sides agreed to the appointment of a United Nations mediator.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1985), 33978; (1986), 34478; (1987), 34935; (1988), 36209; (1990), 37492.

In some cases, the larger state, while holding acquisitive designs, might have concluded that separate independence would not preclude union eventually. In the case of The Gambia, for instance, Senegal had every reason to believe in the eventual union of the two countries and the creation of Senegambia. The British were reluctant to accept the notion of separate independence for their tiny enclave.⁴⁵ The territory was considered "too small to carry the burden of sovereignty"⁴⁶ and British efforts were directed to encouraging integration with Senegal.⁴⁷ The Gambians themselves did not accept the likelihood of independence until the criteria of size and economic viability became demonstrably less formidable.⁴⁸ A United Nations mission⁴⁹ established to explore the opportunities for as-

⁴⁵Following the river Gambia for 92 miles, the country sticks ". . .into Senegal like a crooked forefinger." *Africa*, May, 1977, 61.

Only 15 miles in width for most of its length, The Gambia's borders do not extend even to the natural limits of the river basin on either side. At certain points the frontier is so unnatural that only a rock is placed to mark its supposed existence. The border also interrupts traditional patterns of settlement. In some cases farmers lived in Gambian villages but tended their crops in Senegal.

R. Harrington, "Gambia—Africa's Smallest Country," *Canadian Geographical Journal* LXXVI (January 1968), 34-39.

Africa, October, 1974, 38.

Africa, March, 1976, 51.

⁴⁶Sir Hilary Blood, *The Smaller Territories: Problems and Future* (London: Conservative Political Centre, C.P.C. No. 183, Commonwealth Series No. 4, 1958), p. 11.

Sir Edwin Windley, former Governor of The Gambia, said: "The Accident of history created Gambia too small and too ill-endowed to develop economically in isolation." quoted in: Berkeley Rice, *Enter Gambia—The Birth of an Improbable Nation* (London: Angus and Robertson, 1968), p. 292.

⁴⁷The British had attempted to sell the colony to France in 1875 in exchange for territory elsewhere, particularly the Ivory Coast and Gabon. It was agreed that The Gambia was a useless expense to maintain and that the original reasons for its separation from Senegal were no longer relevant. However, disagreement over the terms of an exchange and determined resistance in The Gambia meant that the proposals came to naught.

⁴⁸Though the British had not foreseen independence for The Gambia, the example of Sierra Leone and other small countries encouraged expectations of independence in the colony. The United Party exploited these precedents to refute arguments that The Gambia was too small to be a viable state in its own right.

"The question whether the Gambia can be viable is not relevant since she should be able to manage independence on her own as other small countries are doing."

United Party statement quoted in Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Unlikely Gambia," *Africa Report X* (February, 1965), 7.

sociation with Senegal outlined three alternatives: the incorporation of The Gambia as the eighth province of Senegal; the establishment of a Senegambian federation, the alternative most favoured by the Mission; or a Senegambian "entente" encouraging ventures which would lead to federation. The report regarded this alternative only as "a means to an end."⁵⁰ However, the Gambians' sense of their own separateness was more formidable than any party had anticipated. A separate colonial history had produced different educational, legal, political and economic institutions.⁵¹

The Gambian prime minister, D. K. Jawara, procrastinated, offering proposals based on the United Nations Mission's third alternative.⁵² The Senegalese, however, were totally committed to the logic of integration. Jawara's "confederation" offered only the veneer of integration. In light of the ill-fated Mali Federation, such experiments seemed unworkable. If there was to be union at all, it had to be substantial.⁵³ Moreover, President Senghor wanted a federation which would reflect the reality of the size discrepancy. The Gambia could not expect an exaggeration of Gambian representation in order to create the

⁴⁹United Nations, *Report on the Alternatives of Association between the Gambia and Senegal* (New York: The United Nations, 1964).

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹Three hundred years of British colonial rule, albeit in benign neglect, had left, nevertheless, a sense of separate interest and distinctive identity. Though many of the people in the interior would not speak English, the Anglicized leadership was jealous of the British educational, political, and legal institutions and the open-door economy which distinguished life in The Gambia from Senegal. Indeed, the differences of colonial history were all the more pronounced for the particularly emphatic French way of life in Senegal. The Gambia was the most peaceful of British colonies. There was no need for a military force to uphold the colonial authority. Its excessive Britishness led Queen Victoria to call it "that dear, loyal little place."
Rice, *op. cit.*, p. 2. See also p. 317

⁵²Jawara sought a confederation which would integrate foreign policy, overseas representation, and defence in a seven-person "Council of the Alliance." In all other spheres each government would retain exclusive jurisdiction. Even The Gambia's membership in the Commonwealth would not be affected. J. H. Proctor, "The Gambia's Relations with Senegal: The Search for Partnership," *Journal of Commonwealth Studies* V (No. 2, July, 1967), 151.

⁵³"The Gambia Goes It Alone: Part Four," *West Africa*, 6 February, 1965, 145.

appearance of an equal partnership. Finally, the responsibility of the federal government in the crucial areas assigned to it had to be clearly established beyond doubt.

From Dakar, The Gambia was clearly seen as an artifice; its eventual union with Senegal was inevitable. For Senghor, history possessed its own common sense. The Gambia and Senegal were "one country and one people."⁵⁴ Given such assumptions, Senegal was not willing to countenance anything other than organic union. Were they to agree to a superficial arrangement they might only delay the inevitability of complete union. Senegal could afford to wait: ". . . the Gambians can taste independence if they want to, but sooner or later they will realize the advantages of a wider grouping."⁵⁵ Though this uncompromising and patronising posture was to reinforce independence sentiments in The Gambia, the Senegalese were assured that the very shock treatment of independence would soon turn the Gambians to Senegal. Indeed, if the illusions of separate independence were shattered early by the realities of experience, the issue was unlikely to surface again.

Given the certainty of his convictions, Senghor finally did accept the separate independence of The Gambia, with agreements for co-operation in foreign affairs, including Senegalese representation of The Gambia's interests abroad where directed, and in matters of "external security and defence against any form of threat;"⁵⁶ and development of the Gambia river basin.⁵⁷ Further co-operation towards Senegambia was established in a series

⁵⁴Leopold Senghor quoted in W. A. E. Skurnik, *The Foreign Policy of Senegal* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 145.

⁵⁵*West Africa, op. cit.*

⁵⁶*West Africa*, 11 July, 1964.

⁵⁷The Convention for the Establishment and Organization of an Inter-State Committee for the Integrated Development of the Gambia River Basin, 18 February, 1965.

This convention was in accord with the recommendations of an earlier F.A.O. report.

Food and Agriculture Organization, Integrated Agricultural Development in the Gambia River Basin: A Report to the Governments of Gambia and Senegal (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1964).

of agreements including the Senegalo-Gambia Interstate Ministerial Committee to oversee the process of cooperation.⁵⁸ Jawara, however, was anxious to resist "the logic of integration" and to salvage as much international personality for The Gambia as possible. This was often difficult and compromising given Senegal's commitment to the inevitability of union. For Senegal The Gambia's existence has been described as "an arrow pointing at our heart"⁵⁹ and "a knife plunging into Senegal's side."⁶⁰ The extent of the Gambia's vulnerability and the justification for Senegal's confidence was clearly demonstrated in the events following the attempted coup in The Gambia in July, 1981. Jawara, who was in London at the time, was compelled to invoke the Security Agreement requesting Senegal to send troops into The Gambia to deal with the rebels. Senegalese intervention and the restoration of Jawara to the presidency immediately forced a serious and determined effort to move toward the logic of Senegambia.⁶¹ Protocol agreements establishing the union of

⁵⁸The Committee was to meet annually, alternately in Dakar and Banjul (formerly Bathurst). The Committee was to be assisted by a Permanent Secretariat based in Banjul but with a Senegalese Executive Secretary nominated by both governments.

The Treaty of Association, 19 April, 1967. United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 640, no. 9156, 101-109.

Subsequent agreements were reached on the recognition of equal fishing and shipping rights within Senegambian waters, the construction of Senegambian schools and cultural centers in both countries, the exchange of sports and cultural events and the rationalisation of transportation.

Peter Schwab, "Melanges— The Gambia's Relationship to the Senegambia Association," *Geneve Afrique IX* (No. 2, 1970), 101-103.

⁵⁹*Le Monde*, 7 July, 1976.

⁶⁰Rice, *op. cit.*, 3.

The Gambia cuts off the southern province of Casamance from the rest of the country. Recurring secessionist sentiments in Casamance only reinforces the fear in Dakar that The Gambia could be used as a base of subversion. Moreover, the extensive and uncontrollable practice of smuggling and The Gambia's role as a virtual free port within Senegal, have proven to be costly irritants.

Skurnik, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-47.

Peter Robson, "The Problems of Senegambia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* III (No. 3, October, 1965), 398.

⁶¹Arnold Hughes, "The attempted Gambian coup d'etat of 30 July 1981," in Arnold Hughes (ed.) *The Gambia: Studies in Society and Politics* (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1991), pp. 92-106.

the two countries as Senegambia were signed by both presidents in December 1981 and the Confederation came into effect on February 1, 1982. Though the protocols provided that "... each of the Confederal States shall maintain its independence and sovereignty,"⁶² and thus for the time being its separate status in international law, it established Senegambian institutions much more advanced than anything Jawara had previously considered. The central institutions of the new Confederation were a Confederal Council of Ministers headed by a President and Vice-President (the presidents of Senegal and The Gambia respectively), and a Confederal Parliament nominated by members of the two national legislatures. With these institutions in place the two countries committed themselves to policy co-ordination and joint policy formulation. Yet this logic of integration, which for a time seriously threatened the continued separate international personality of The Gambia, finally gave way to inertia, self-interest and those forces rooted in different colonial experiences which justified separate independence in the first place. Even more important was the fact that the experiment in Confederation failed to meet the very different expectations of both parties and was ultimately unable to reconcile the consequences of such profound disparities between the two partners.⁶³ Though the Confederation was dissolved quickly in 1989, both states continue to recognise the need for co-operation and closer economic ties, for the immediate future at least. The Gambia may have emerged from this coaxed marriage with greater confidence.

The Gambia in its early period of independence was an extreme case of micro-state vulnerability. Had President Senghor been more determined in the period prior to independence, and less confident in the ultimate historical outcome, it is possible that separate

⁶²*Official Gazette of the Senegambia Confederation*

⁶³Arnold Hughes, "The Collapse of the Senegambian Confederation," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* (XXX, No. 2, July, 1992), 216-217.

independence would not have been an alternative at all for The Gambia.⁶⁴ The very small size of The Gambia and its fragmentary geographical character are mutually-reinforcing problems which undermine the case for separate independence.

The problems of micro-state legitimacy are particularly evident in continental micro-states. They are more exposed to the larger interests of their neighbours, whether those be territorial completeness, security and defence or economic rationalisation. Stanley de Smith has argued that an island, being a more "visibly separate geographic area"⁶⁵ is, therefore, more legitimate as a separate state than a comparable mainland entity. Geographical isolation establishes a clear sense of separate identity which supports the legitimacy of the claim for separate independence.⁶⁶ In taking issue with de Smith, John Ostheimer cites the international acceptance of independence for The Gambia and Equatorial Guinea to support his contention that diminutive continental entities possess the same credentials for separate statehood as small islands.⁶⁷ The sense of separate identity can be as compelling for continental communities as for island peoples. Of this there is ample evidence, though a distinction must be made between a sense of separate identity and the recognition of a distinctive interest sufficient to win acceptance for a separate destiny.

⁶⁴The Gambians have been the first to acknowledge their precarious status. Note the following statement in a Government publication:

"Considering that a total merger with her bigger neighbour has always been on the cards actively encouraged by both Britain and France and untiringly advocated by Senegal to the point of coercion, it is surprising that The Gambia still survives as a sovereign independent nation."

The Gambia Forges Ahead (Banjul: Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1977), p. 6.

⁶⁵Stanley A. de Smith, *Microstates and Micronesia* (New York: New York University Press, 1970), p. 57.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*

⁶⁷John M. Ostheimer, "Are Islanders Different? A survey of Theoretical Ideas," in John M. Ostheimer (ed.) *The Politics of the Western Indian Ocean Islands* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 13-27

As we have argued already, The Gambia's "acceptance" is not without qualification. Moreover, Equatorial Guinea too has faced claims from larger states.⁶⁸ At the 1962 meeting of the U.D.E.A.C.⁶⁹ it was suggested that Fernando Po be transferred to Cameroun⁷⁰ and Rio Muni attached to Gabon.⁷¹ After Spain granted internal autonomy to the colony in 1963, its progress towards separate independence was supported by the states of the region.⁷² However, the continued independence of Equatorial Guinea has been questioned since, particularly in Nigeria, where trade unions demanded the annexation of Equatorial Guinea in light of the maltreatment of Nigerian migrant workers during the brutal regime of Macias Nguema.⁷³

⁶⁸These claims have been related to the traditional ties among the Fang of Cameroun, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. In the 1930's, Fang nationalists aspired to a single Fang state in the region. The French regarded Fang nationalism as a threat to the security of their own frontiers in the area.

Brian Weinstein, *Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogooue* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 58-62.

President Ahidjo of Cameroun justified his acceptance of refugees from Equatorial Guinea on the grounds that ". . . the people of that territory who have sought refuge are of the same parentage as our people."

Jeune Afrique, 2 January, 1976 quoted in: Suzanne Cronjé, *Equatorial Guinea: The Forgotten Dictatorship* (London: Anti-Slavery Society, 1976), p. 26.

⁶⁹Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale

⁷⁰Paul Soppo Prison, former president of the Cameroun legislature, argued in 1962 that the creation of micro-states which were unviable and susceptible to neo-colonialism was a senseless course. Since parts of Cameroun had been given to Gabon, Qubangi-Chiari, Congo and Chad, the leaders of those states could recognise at least Cameroun's claim to Equatorial Guinea since it is ". . . the natural and ethnic prolongation of Cameroun, the continuation of the southern zone of the Fang Ntoumou people of the low region of Amban, a zone which, by the way, used to include Wdeu-Ntem, a former Camerounese region today included in the national territory of Gabon."

Paul Soppo Prison, "Face a l'harmonisation de l'Afrique: le Cameroun et la Guinee Espagnole," *Communauté France-Eurafrique* (September, 1962), 7, quoted in: Weinstein, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

⁷¹The Fang in Gabon wanted Equatorial Guinea annexed to Gabon in order to increase the Fang percentage of the population.

Ibid., p. 231.

⁷²Support was particularly forthcoming from Gabon. However, relations deteriorated in 1972 when Gabon occupied the islands of Mbanie and Cocotiers which, though they had been part of Equatorial Guinea, were claimed when Gabon extended its territorial waters.

Cronjé, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 10, 26.

⁷³*The Guardian* (Manchester and London), 27 January, 1976, 4.

Ostheimer's examples, then, do not necessarily refute de Smith's argument that the legitimacy of diminutive states is more readily realised in island states. Territorial contiguity has posed difficult problems for most mainland micro-states, while geographical isolation has favoured island states with axiomatic independence. The alternatives to separate statehood are also more difficult to effect with island peoples because "the maritime nature of their separation" can so exacerbate separateness as to encourage the fragmentation of island groupings.⁷⁴ Given these problems the decolonisation of small islands is often independence by default. However, this is not to say that geographical self-containment itself ensures long-term security. Some island micro-states have also faced explicit irredentist pressures.⁷⁵ And, for others, the durability of continued separate independence may depend on the willingness of donor states to continue the budgetary support which makes sovereignty even on a minimal subsistence basis possible.

The issue of legitimacy is inseparable from that of security. The prospects for expendability are greater if the reserve of international acceptance remains limited and qualified. Nor is this necessarily relevant only for the newest micro-states. What is San Mar-

West Africa, 6 February, 1965, 155.
Africa, March, 1976, 57.

⁷⁴Separatist movements in Anguilla, Nevis, Barbuda, Addu, Aruba, Tobago, Bougainville, Tuvalu and Mayotte are cases in point. In spite of constitutional provisions for reunion with Guinea-Bissau, the "temporary" independence of Cape Verde proved to be more rooted in sentiments of separateness than P.A.I.G.C. ambitions would have suggested.

⁷⁵We have already mentioned the case of Bahrain.

In 1957 Prime Minister R. D. Bandaranaike suggested a Ceylonese claim to the Maldivé Islands, arguing that the archipelago had once been a dependency of Ceylon.

The Times (London), 25 March, 1957.

Though that claim was not pursued, the proximity to Sri Lanka and the exclusivity of the relationship has resulted in sufficient apprehension in the Maldives to encourage a diversification of its external relations.

Dilip Mukerjee, "Maldives Diversifies Contacts with Big Neighbours," *Pacific Community* VI (No. 4, July, 1975), 602-603.

M. Adeney and W. K. Carr, "The Maldives Republic," in Ostheimer, *op. cit.*, p.158.

ino's reserve of international acceptance, should Italy ever decide to complete its "territorial integrity?" While this seems unthinkable, particularly given the long-established understanding between the two countries, San Marino has, nonetheless, exploited every opportunity to assert its separate independence and to confirm the recognition of its status in the international system. Faced with the responsibility of proving themselves as states to be respected and defended, micro-states, in the tradition of small state diplomacy, stress the primacy of international norms to secure the permanence of their sovereignty. Even the most controversial micro-state can argue that its own survival is crucial to the credibility of the fundamental principles of international law. The process of legitimisation is itself a foreign policy objective. And prospects for the smallest and weakest states are more propitious than for their counterparts in earlier international systems. The norms and institutions of contemporary international relations have increasingly been those most relevant to the security of small states and particularly micro-states. The inviolability of colonial frontiers as the basis for national self-determination allowed for their separate independence in the first place.

However, this only underscores the argument that security is first an issue of juridical survival and this, in turn, means participating in the organised relations of the international system. This participation is crucial to meeting whatever problems of status they face. Status is rooted and legitimacy is enhanced by exploiting the formal network of inter-state relations. With time the commitments of international diplomacy become pledge cards against future neglect or complacency. For some micro-states, an international profile may be the only basis for security. However, this is often a daunting and impossible task. While it is important to register their presence and to project their statehood in foreign capitals and international organisations, the human and economic resources are often beyond reach. We examine this aspect of the micro-state problem in the next section of this essay.

In summary, we have argued that micro-states are particularly vulnerable to what we have called questions of legitimacy. The issue of legitimacy is not directly relevant in the case of every micro-state, but it is always relevant in any discussion of very small size and sovereign statehood. Very small size imposes particular burdens while it exacerbates familiar problems. Lingering doubts about capacity are often reinforced by misgivings about rights to self-determination. While the problems of status vary with particular conditions, legitimacy as a dimension of international personality is a familiar concomitant of micro-statehood.

The concept of legitimacy embraces both the legal and political dimensions of status. We have noted that in spite of the recognition of micro-states' sovereignty in international law, there may yet be serious misgivings about their political status. These reservations may compromise and finally erode even the legal status which they now possess. Conversely, the prerogatives which accompany the legal status of micro-states as equal members of the international system can be exploited to enhance their political status. An adroit use of the formalities of the international system can allow even the most improbable and dubious state to root its statehood eventually in the diplomatic commitments of other states and inter-state organisations. The concept of legitimacy allows us, then, to bridge the difficult terrain between the legal provisions of sovereignty and the political expectations of independence. International status can be viewed from both perspectives and it is this grey area which has always been the recurring theme in the international relations of micro-states.

CHAPTER FIVE

Sovereignty and the Challenge of Diplomacy The Relevance of Size in the External Relations of Micro-States

If there are doubts about the reality of micro-state sovereignty, it is because such states appear incapable of external relations. International relations may be seen as the *raison d'être* of statehood¹ and the capacity to protect and project national interests the essential mark of sovereignty.

We have already discussed the importance of diplomacy for those micro-states whose claims for separate independence are in question. The ability to cope with controversies of status depends on exploiting the legal norms and institutions of the global system and this, in turn, requires some degree of international presence. This may be a minimal foreign policy of sovereignty-maintenance, but it is fundamental to the long term security of the state.

But even for micro-states where status is not in question, the issue of diplomatic capability is still urgent. Most micro-states are developing economies, competing for foreign capital and development assistance. Even the smallest and weakest micro-states, by virtue of their sovereign status, have direct access to foreign governments and international agencies. The extent to which they can take advantage of these opportunities is dependent on the diplomatic capabilities which they can muster to promote their interests. There are few micro-states, then, whose international presence could be confidently left to philatelic commissions.

In this section of the discussion we explore that question which seems most central to the issue of viability: How do these tiny states manage their external relations? We

¹F. S. Northedge, *The International Political System* (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), p. 177.

begin in this chapter by reviewing those conclusions about very small states which are commonly assumed in theoretical studies in foreign policy. We also consider the principal methodological approaches to empirical research in the relationship of size and foreign policy behaviour, namely events data analysis and diplomatic exchange studies. We conclude this section by reviewing the scale of micro-state bilateral and multilateral relations, using diplomatic exchange data as our basis for analysis. In the following several sections of this chapter, we examine both the intensity and the direction of micro-state participation in the international system. Our principal interest is the assessment of delineations between the very small and the small. Throughout this section, and in the following chapters on the international economic relations of micro-states, we draw upon comparative data for micro-states and other small states: those countries with populations between one and six million. We begin now with the general question of micro-states as actors in international politics.

Micro-states and the Study of Foreign Policy:

Theoretical Assumptions and Methodological Problems.

Scepticism about the capacity of micro-states to engage in the international system is common enough. This reflects the influence of "political realism" and the preponderance of Western models based on high politics. In this view, the external relations of micro-states may be described as "ceremonial" or "administrative"² but they do not constitute foreign policy and foreign policy is the activity of a normal state in international relations.

Foreign policy is widely understood as initiative and output. Modelski, for example, views foreign policy as that activity by which states influence and alter

²R. P. Barston (ed.), *The Other Powers-Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1973), pp. 21-22.

conditions in their external environment. Though he allows for foreign policy as reaction, whereby states "adjust their own activities to the external environment,"³ he emphasises the generative nature of foreign policy as an activity "for changing the behavior of other states."⁴ This is finally a question of power. "All measures directed to the outside world and aimed at changing the foreign policies of other states involve power"⁵ and, for Modelski, the "power-assets" which make foreign policy possible are directly related to the size of the state.⁶

Like Modelski, Rosenau accepts that foreign policy can be adaptive behaviour– the state's accommodation with its environment. However, he too stresses that this adaptation is essentially purposeful and directed to effecting change or preservation in the environment of the state:

By foreign policy is meant the authoritative actions which governments take- or are committed to take- in order either to preserve the desirable aspects of the international environment or to alter its undesirable effects . . . In other words, some image of how the environment should be structured necessarily underlies every external activity undertaken by governments, and it is in this sense that foreign policy is a distinctive form of adaptive behaviour.⁷

³George Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 6-7.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁷James N. Rosenau, "Comparing Foreign Policies: Why, What, How," in James N. Rosenau (ed.) *Comparing Foreign Policies* (New York: Sage Publications, Halsted Press Division, 1974), pp. 3-22. Some students of the subject have attempted to move away from the active-centered model. Frankel's definition, for example, is broad and perhaps vague: "Foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others."

Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1. For Frankel foreign policy is essentially reactive:

The notion that foreign policy is a projection of a state's image of the external environment was particularly emphasised in Holsti's analysis of national role perceptions. Holsti suggested that states with credible foreign policies are those which play a "role" in the international system. Foreign policy is seen as "national role performance" derived from the policy makers' role conception or their "image of the appropriate orientation or functions of their state toward, or in the external environment."⁸ In his typology of national role perceptions Holsti structured a continuum of activity/passivity. He allows for four passive roles: independent, internal development, protectee and isolate.⁹ Yet, even these passive categories involve such notions as self-reliance and self-determination. The role perception which encourages aloofness is a choice for all of that; an image of the state as primarily self-absorbed. Beyond this however, Holsti suggests a degree of passivity lacking even the clear self-view of the isolate:

" . . . foreign policy is generally pursued without any clear purpose. Most policies are reactive, following real or imagined stimuli from the environment; active foreign policy which positively pursues objectives based upon firmly held values, is much rarer."

Joseph Frankel, *National Interest* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 26.

⁸K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* XIV (No. 3, September, 1970), 246.

⁹Independent: ". . . the government will make policy decisions according to the state's own interests rather than in support of the objectives of other states. The themes in the role conception of the independent all emphasise this element of policy self-determination; otherwise they do not imply any particular continuing task or function in the system."

Ibid., 268.

Internal Development: "This concept has little reference to any particular task or function within the international system. The emphasis, on the contrary, is that most efforts of the government should be directed towards problems of internal development."

Ibid., 269.8

Isolate: "The national role of the isolate demands . . . a minimum of external contacts of whatever variety."

Ibid., 2708

Protectee: "Some governments allude to the responsibility of other states to defend them but otherwise do not indicate any particular orientation, tasks or functions toward the external environment."

Ibid.

(There are states which) . . . have no real foreign policy if by that term we mean a coherent set of objectives guiding day to day diplomatic actions, expectations about how changes in the external environment could influence the state in question, or a well thought out image of a desirable future state for the external environment. These states appear to be objects, but not actors, in international relationships. Except for commercial matters, they do not try to change external conditions in their favour, and they see no continuing external tasks for themselves.¹⁰

If the projection of self-image is seen as the essence of foreign policy, then micro-states might appear to lack the confidence of role perception as surely as they lack the means of role performance.¹¹ These assumptions are axiomatic and pervasive in both general analyses of foreign policy and in small state studies, particularly during the early years of decolonisation, when any future international role for micro-states seemed unlikely.¹² Though the issue of micro-state diplomacy may have appeared too obvious to pursue, there was a growing effort to assess the impact of size, among other variables, on the behaviour of states in the international system. James Rosenau's early model for analysing the influence of size, modernisation and political accountability¹³ has spawned

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 281.

¹¹Holsti's own samplings excluded many micro-states simply because his sources of role-perception, newspapers and journals of the Western world, carried few references to these states. It may be tempting to conclude that lack of information is itself evidence of lack of role.

¹²The excesses of decolonisation, noted one student, have resulted in ". . . the birth of new small states which . . . do not seem to reach the minimum size below which no meaningful, constructive part in international affairs is possible."

Jean Luc Vellut, "Smaller States and the Problems of War and Peace: Some Consequences of the Emergence of Smaller States in Africa," *Journal of Peace Research* III (1966), 266.

¹³Using these three basic variables, Rosenau developed a typology of "eight genotypic national societies."

further research to test the relationship of these variables to differing patterns of foreign policy behaviour. Subsequent efforts were centred on the following aspects of the foreign policy process: a) the degree of international participation¹⁴; b) the focus of international involvement;¹⁵ and c) the degrees of conflictual and co-operative behaviour.¹⁶

Most of this literature is classification analysis. How do these states differ in terms of the frequency, scope and nature of their interactions in the international system? The findings in this body of work suggest that size is the most salient variable in any differentiation of foreign policy behaviour.¹⁷ There are two hypotheses concerning the impact of size which are of concern to us in this section. They may be summarised as follows:

James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 48.

In a further elaboration Roseanu and Hoggard added three 'external' or 'systemic' variables to complement the three national or subsystemic variables of the original model.

James N. Roseanu and Gary D. Hoggard, "Foreign Policy Behavior in Dyadic Relationships: Testing a Pre-Theoretical Extension," in Rosenau (ed.), *Comparing Foreign Policies*, *op. cit.*, 117-150.

¹⁴R. J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and their Behavior," *World Politics* XXI (January, 1969), 226-241.

Maurice A. East and Charles F. Hermann, "Do Nation-Types Account for Foreign Policy Behavior?," in Rosenau (ed.), *Comparing Foreign Policies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-302.

¹⁵James G. Kean and Patrick J. McGowan, "National Attributes and Foreign Policy Participation; a PATH Analysis," *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies* I (1973), 219-251.

¹⁶Stephen A. Slamore and Charles F. Hermann, "The Effects of Size, Development and Accountability on Foreign Policy," *Peace Research Society (International) Papers* XIV (Ann Arbor Conference, 1969), 15-30.

James H. Harf, "Inter-Nation Conflict Resolution and National Attributes," in Rosenau (ed.), *Comparing Foreign Policies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-328.

Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," *World Politics* XXV (July, 1973), 556-576.

¹⁷Patrick A. McGowan and H. B. Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy* (London: Sage Publications, 1973).

Kean and McGowan, *op. cit.*

a) Size is the major national attribute determining the extent of a state's international involvement. The smaller the state, the fewer external reactions it will have.¹⁸

b) As size determines the degree and frequency of international involvement, so it also delimits its geographical and functional scope. A small state is likely to be limited to regional and local levels of interaction. Global involvement will be primarily through inter-governmental organisations.¹⁹

Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: Problems of Data Compilation

What empirical research supports these conclusions? Thus far, empirical studies have centred on two bases of information: events-data analysis and diplomatic exchange data. Events-data research²⁰ analyses the volume of a state's international interactions; the patterns of its bilateral and multilateral relations; its response to particular issues and its degree of conflictual or co-operative behaviour. An event is defined as "an occasion when one actor directs an action toward one or more others" and is regarded as "the basic unit through which the pattern of international relations can be discerned, contrasted and

¹⁸East and Hermann, *op. cit.*, 291.
East, *op. cit.*, 564.
Kean and McGowan, *op. cit.*, 221.
Salmore and Hermann, *op. cit.*, 23.

¹⁹Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 3.
George L. Reid, *The Impact of Very Small Size on the International Behavior of Micro-States* (London: Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, No. 402-027, Sage Publications, Inc., 1974), pp. 30-31.

²⁰Edward A. Azar, "The Analysis of International Events," *Peace Research Reviews* IV (No. 1, 1970), 1-10.

assessed."²¹ The basis of the research is the computation and analysis of a state's events as recorded in major newspapers, global chronologies and regional sources.²²

There are certain problems which arise when using events-data research in the analysis of micro-state behaviour. The first is that of newsworthiness.²³ The major sources for events-data collection are likely to provide only occasional mention of micro-states. This reflects, in part, the conviction that these tiny states are as ineffectual and unimportant from the domestic perspective of the source as they are to the international system as a whole. Moreover, with a few notable exceptions, these states are not liable to engage in the kind of dramatic conflictual behaviour which would draw attention to their international relations.²⁴ The neglect of micro-state events on the basis of the peripheral and passive characteristics of micro-state international relations has meant that micro-states have not been included in events-data studies. In their analysis of the W.E.I.S. data, for example, Salmore and Hermann excluded all states for which there had been less than 15 events computed in a two-year period.²⁵ This problem could have been met, in part, by adding regional and local sources to the major Western newspapers and global

²¹James N. Rosenau and George H. Ramsey, Jr., "External and Internal Typologies of Foreign Policy Behavior: Testing the Stability of an Intriguing Set of Findings," *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies* III (1975), 245-262.

²²The W.E.I.S. (World Event/Interaction System: Charles McClelland) used The New York Times Index. The C.R.E.O.N. (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) Project used Deadline Data on World Affairs. Events data sources are compared in Robert Burrowes, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . A Comparison of Event Data Sources," in Rosenau (ed.), *Comparing Foreign Policies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 383-406

²³J. Galtung and M. Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News," *Journal of Peace Research* II (1965), 64-91.
Gary Hoggard, "Differential Source Coverage in Foreign Policy Analysis," in Rosenau (ed.), *Comparing Foreign Policies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 353-377.

²⁴ And when these tiny jurisdictions do make the evening news, as in Grenada, Kuwait or the Falklands, it is as objects or targets of larger state strategy rather than as actors in their own right.

²⁵Salmore and Hermann, *op. cit.*, 19.

compilations. However, there is the difficulty of differential coverage which could leave some states overlooked in areas where compilations are not available or where micro-states are judged as peripheral even within their own regions.

An even greater limitation is the fact that some micro-states have no daily newspaper at all. A weekly or bi-weekly government bulletin may be the only source of information. Regular access to these sources could be as frustrating for the regional chronologer as for the individual researcher.

This is not to rule out the value of events-data research for the future study of micro-state international relations. It is possible that news-gathering agencies and data-base centres will become more attentive to micro-state interests. Technological advances in information collection suggest some support for this view. So too do the ever-expanding concerns of the United Nations system, which draw even the most peripheral states into a network of international information.

There are, however, other measures of external behaviour which are more readily accessible with less risk of neglect at the source: indicators of diplomatic exchange; representation and voting behaviour in international organisations and international conferences; patterns of trade exchange, aid and investment; and treaties, conventions, and military alignments. All of these can serve as reliable indicators of a state's involvement in the international system. Ideally, exhaustive data from these sources could be correlated with that of events-data compilation to present a comprehensive and thorough picture of micro-states in international politics.

Diplomatic exchange data can be useful in at least four respects. In the first place it is an index of the extent of a state's participation in the international system. States interact in international society in widely varying degrees of range and intensity. The number of capitals with which a state enjoys some form of accreditation, the number of inter-governmental organisations to which it subscribes, and the size of those

commitments provide reliable indicators of the level of that state's involvement in the international system.

Second, diplomatic exchange data provides an important indication of a state's orientation in international politics. Since the establishment of a mission abroad is a significant commitment of scarce resources, the decision is a reflection of those relationships judged as crucial to the state's interests. Even the near-universal commitments of the Great Powers reveal differentials of accreditation and thus a hierarchy of relationships. For small and weak states with limited resources, these commitments are particularly indicative of that state's most important associations. What are the ideological and geographical boundaries of a state's international relations? To what extent is it involved in system-wide issues?

Third, just as diplomatic exchange data indicates those relationships considered important to the sending state, so it attests to the standing of a state in the international system.²⁶ Since the decision to establish accreditation is one of cost on the part of the sending state it can only reflect the importance of the host state in the judgement of the sender. The status of a state in the international system is indicated both by the number of missions received and by the identity of those missions. The commitment of "key legitimizers"²⁷— the Great Powers or regional leaders—enhances the status of the receiving state. The analysis of status as reflected in the accreditation which a state receives allows us to understand the extent to which a state— or a class of states— can be viewed on a

²⁶J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition And Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940," *World Politics* XVIII (January, 1966), 237-242
Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816-1970; An Extension and Refinement of the Indicator," *World Politics* XXV (July, 1973), 580-583.

²⁷Singer and Small, *op. cit.*, 245-246.

central/peripheral continuum.²⁸ We will explore this aspect of micro-state international relations later in this chapter.

Unfortunately, micro-states have rarely been included in these studies and we have little sense of the distinctions between the small and the very small. In their excellent study, Singer and Small used a population limit of 500,000, League or United Nations membership and/or recognition by France or Britain as "key legitimizers" so as to exclude "the ephemeral and politically insignificant principalities."²⁹ The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators includes all United Nations members but only those other independent states with populations over one million, which would exclude a dozen micro-states.³⁰ Only five micro-states were included in the Alger and Brams study.³¹ Even Plishke's survey of micro-states excludes the old European states.³²

²⁸Dominguez identified centrality with international influence: "The center includes the major powers-France, the People's Republic of China, the U.S.S.R., The United Kingdom and the United States- those countries whose behavior and power influence all other countries in the international system . . . also . . . those countries whose behavior must be taken into account by the major powers in their key policy decisions.

The peripheral state is one which may be penetrated regularly by the center but is only intermittently capable itself of center penetration.

A country in the peripheries of the international system is one whose behavior and power are marginal to the center of the international system and to all other countries in the peripheries- except when policies for the subsystem to which that peripheral country belongs are formulated."

Jorge I. Dominguez, "Mice that Do Not Roar: Some Aspects of International Politics in the World's Peripheries," *International Organization XXV* (Spring, 1971), 175-176.

²⁹Singer and Small, *op. cit.*, 245.

Small and Singer, *op. cit.*, 590-591.

³⁰Bruce Russett, Hayward R. Alker, Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

That approach would exclude Tonga, Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu. At the time it would have excluded Western Samoa, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra.

³¹Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Inter-Governmental Organizations," *World Politics XIX* (July, 1967), 646-663.

Russett, and Singer and Small attempted to include even the European micro-states by setting their population limit at 10, 000, which at the same time ". . . avoided the impossible task of identifying the scores of island kingdoms and chieftains. . . as well as a number of politically esoteric enclaves." However, even by this criterion, Nauru, independent in 1968, would have been excluded. Since then Tuvalu achieved sovereignty and there are other such diminutive territories where independence might be expected in the foreseeable future.

In these earlier studies the problems of using this kind of data for micro-states were formidable. Most micro-states had achieved independence only recently. Their foreign ministries were small and not yet well-established, with diplomatic lists unavailable in some cases. Moreover, micro-states often rely on consular levels of exchange which are not included in international compilations. These problems have not been entirely overcome. Nonetheless, diplomatic exchange data still provides the most reliable index of micro-state international relations, particularly in comparison to other small states.

A comparative assessment of diplomatic-exchange data reveals two patterns which micro-states share to some extent with other small states. First, micro-states are indeed "local powers," in the sense that they have few ongoing bilateral relationships. Formal accreditation, particularly an exchange of permanent missions, is limited to a very small community of states. The most important of these are patron states, which may be the former metropole, a neighbouring state or both. The micro-state's regular "diplomatic community" is modest even in comparison to the weakest and poorest states in the next population class. Even when micro-states do aspire to a larger network of bilateral contacts, the limitations of very small size impose an early ceiling on formal diplomatic exchange, including non-resident forms of accreditation. We explore this aspect of micro-state diplomacy in detail in the next section of this chapter.

Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer, Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List," *American Political Science Review* LXII (September, 1968), 933.

³²Elmer Plishke, *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 12.

Yet the modest scale of micro-state diplomacy does not suggest that these very small states are indifferent to issues beyond local and pragmatic concern.³³ In keeping with widely held assumptions about the international orientation of small states in general, micro-states give priority to multilateral diplomacy at both the regional and international levels. Typically, micro-states will direct most of their limited diplomatic resources to these commitments. Even the handful of micro-states which are not members of the United Nations participate in those U.N. functional bodies which are most relevant to their interests. For *all* small states the virtues of multilateral diplomacy are as symbolic as they are practical. Critics argue that multilateral forums, particularly the international conference, are very long on rhetoric and short on substance.³⁴ Yet even the declaratory diplomacy of multilateralism is supportive and satisfying for small and weak states. Small states value multilateral diplomacy for the same reasons that they promoted The Hague Conferences a century ago. The exercise itself constantly reaffirms the dignity and the legal equality of all participants at the table.

³³It is not an uncommon assumption that the dimensions of national interest are determined by the size of the state. Hence, small states would be expected to have fewer interests and thus less need for extensive international involvement.

Frankel, *National Interest, op. cit.*, pp. 62-72.

East and Hermann, *op. cit.*, 275.

However, the number of interests may be less important than the character of interests. All states can be said to share the same core interests relating to their international identity, their security and their economic well-being. The important distinctions between small states and large states relate more to their respective abilities to promote their national interests. Thus, the distinction between interests and objectives or between "operational interests" and "aspirational interests" is more appropriate to the issue of the impact of size on the international involvement of states.

Modelski, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119.

Frankel, *ibid.*, pp. 31-38.

³⁴A. Leroy Bennett, *International Organizations- Principles and Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 4th ed., 1988), p. 343.

This is not to understate the importance of international and regional bodies in addressing the central interests of micro-states. Clearly, there are issues, such as nuclear-testing in the South Pacific, for example, which must be pursued in a multilateral context in both regional and global bodies. The material benefits of international regulation, co-ordination of regional policies, access to development assistance programmes, and the potential for dependence relief through diversification justify the priority which micro-states give to multilateralism and inter-governmental organisations. In some cases, particularly regional bodies, an inter-governmental organisation may serve as the primary focus of bilateral diplomacy mitigating the need for an exchange of missions. Moreover, the cultivation of particular expertise and a concentration of resources and effort can allow a micro-state to have significant influence in the determination of multilateral policies. Malta's contribution in the Law of the Sea Conferences can be seen as an example of effective micro-state diplomacy beyond immediate and parochial interests.

Though the proliferation of inter-governmental organisations has extended the resources and policy options of most small states, effective participation remains a formidable challenge given the limitations of small budgets and over-extended staff. Once again the gap between ambition and capability distinguishes micro-states from other small states. The disabilities of very small size are evident in the comparative participation of micro-states and other small states in inter-governmental organisations.³⁵ These

³⁵Table III at the end of this chapter lists small-state and micro-state membership in regional and global inter-governmental organisations. Micro-states belong to an average of 26 organisations; small states in the next population class subscribe to an average of 46 organisations. These differences are confirmed in Table IV and Table V, which outline the participation of both groups of states in the full range of the United Nations system.

differences would not support the notion that very small states have only "bare minimum" interests in the international system. It is true that within this class there are states whose self-view and external regard place them on the peripheries of the international system. But there are others whose security and economic interests would justify a greater diplomatic presence than their resources allow. We now examine the diplomatic practices of micro-states in light of the constraints of very small size. We consider too the extent to which these constraints are mitigated by economic advantages, geopolitical assets and leadership styles.

Patterns of Diplomatic Relations for Micro-states and Other Small States

Whatever the frustrations, all micro-states participate in regional and global multilateral diplomacy. Very small size usually means that their participation pales in comparison even to that of other small states. Still, multilateralism offers a relatively profitable return on investment. Apart from symbolic and material advantages, it hugely supplements their modest efforts to maintain normal practices of bilateral diplomatic representation. It is this level of international involvement which most clearly reflects the limitations of very small size. Even for relatively prosperous micro-states, it is difficult to establish regular channels of diplomatic exchange with more than a handful of partners. In these prerogatives of sovereignty, micro-states are disadvantaged among small states.

We begin with a comparative review of micro-state and small state representation in foreign capitals.³⁶ Particular attention is given to avenues other than the overseas mission: non-resident accreditation, joint representation, and the use of consuls. The second section considers micro-states and small states as recipients of diplomatic attention

³⁶The permanent mission to the United Nations is also included since it often serves to represent a state's interests in the United States and Canada.

from other states, particularly major powers. For states with modest services of their own, the resident diplomatic corps can provide welcome supplemental links to the outside world.

The Overseas Mission in Micro-state Diplomacy

The size and scope of a state's diplomatic service is a reflection of both its capacity as an international actor and the hierarchy of its external interests. By analysing the particulars of micro-state diplomatic representation we soon appreciate the burdens of very small size and the essentially recipient nature of micro-state relations with the outside world. Only 14 micro-states have established more than ten missions abroad. In contrast, all but 12 of the small states in the next population class (Bhutan, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and the newly independent states of Armenia, Eritrea, Georgia, Kyrgystan, Macedonia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) send more than ten missions. Three micro-states have only one overseas mission; two others have none at all. The average number of resident overseas missions for micro-states is only eight compared with 27 for the next population class of small states.³⁷ Clearly, micro-state diplomatic representation is the lowest of any class of states.

There is a correlation between the size of the economy and the scale of diplomatic representation. Of the 24 micro-states with fewer than seven overseas missions, all but one (the Bahamas) have a Gross National Product of less than \$500 million.

Gabon and Qatar, both O.P.E.C. members, stand apart from other micro-states. Both countries were able to establish a relatively large diplomatic service in the early days of independence. Gabon's enviable resource base and comparatively high per capita income levels have allowed a scale of international representation far beyond that of most

³⁷ If we do not include Eritrea and the 13 former Soviet and Yugoslav republics which are just beginning to establish a diplomatic service, the average number of resident overseas missions for small states is 31.

African states. Gabon maintains more missions abroad than all but two of the sub-Saharan African states in this study. It remains an anomaly, even among other rich micro-states.

Qatar, with a population of 110,000, became independent in 1970. By 1975 the shaikhdom had established 26 missions abroad, accredited to a further 21 states. Similarly, Brunei achieved sovereignty in 1984 and is already represented in 18 capitals. This was the pattern for all the oil-rich micro-states with very small populations at the time of independence. Though there were problems of staffing, given a small pool of skilled personnel, capital costs were relatively insignificant. But wealth was not the only factor in explaining the large scale of Gulf state diplomacy. These are feudal regimes in a highly volatile region which benefit from the legitimacy insurance of high profile diplomacy.

The correlation of diplomatic representation with levels of per capita income is less consistent. Some of the states with the most skeletal diplomatic services are among the world's most prosperous societies. But, since micro-states have such limited total resources, absolute costs tend to be more decisive than questions of allocation. Even if a particularly ambitious micro-state should assign a grossly disproportionate share of its budget to overseas representation, the still-small size of its total wherewithal would preclude the kind of representation undertaken by larger states, however poorer the living standards.

The length of time that a state has been independent might seem to be as important as its economic resources. States expand their services with experience and with the development of bilateral relations.³⁸ Most of the larger small states in this study are long-established members of the international community. The newest among them, Papua-New Guinea, independent in 1975, and Namibia, independent in 1990, Eritrea and, of

³⁸A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "Diplomacy and Diplomats: The Formation of the Foreign Service Cadres in Black Africa," in K. Ingham (ed.) *Foreign Relations of African States*, Proceedings of the 25th Symposium of the Colston Research Society, University of Bristol, 4-7 April, 1973, (London: The Colston Papers, Colston Research Society, Butterworths, 1974), esp. pp. 288-289.

course, most of the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics, are among the lowest-ranked states in this class. These considerations are less relevant for micro-states because of the early ceiling in the potential expansion of a micro-state's diplomatic service. Of the 31 micro-states which send fewer than ten missions, nine had achieved sovereignty prior to 1970.³⁹ This longer period of sovereignty has not resulted in a marked expansion of the diplomatic service in these states comparable to that of states in the next population group during a similar period. For the newest micro-states there is little reason to expect that time will allow any significant change in the pattern of their diplomatic practice. These are the most diminutive states in the international system. The very recency of their decolonisation is the result of long-held reservations about their prospects for independence. Short of an oil bonanza, these newest and smallest micro-states seem destined to pursue their international relations through means other than the overseas mission.

Except for Gabon and Qatar, the most active micro-states maintain a scale of overseas representation comparable to the poorest and weakest states in the next population class: that is between ten and 20 missions. These few "active" micro-states rank similarly in other indices of international involvement, such as membership in inter-governmental organisations. Four of them (Cyprus, Iceland, Luxembourg and Malta) participate in the multiple linkages of the Western European state system. Indeed, Cyprus and Malta have both applied for membership in the European Union.⁴⁰ The uncertain future of a united Cypriot state would justify the most high profile diplomacy possible from the Greek Cypriot government in Nicosia. And, similarly, Guyana's commitment to an active and prominent foreign policy reflects an abiding concern for unresolved disputes

³⁹ Though an ancient principality, Andorra's international status was not clear until 1993.

⁴⁰ *The Economist*, 21-27 July, 1990, 50-51.

which threaten her territorial integrity and perhaps her international personality. Moreover, Guyana has pursued an significant role within her own region and a vigorous identification with a broader alignment of Third World states. Bahrain's relatively high rank within the micro-state class (12 missions) may obscure the fact that the shaikhdom has the smallest diplomatic service in the Arab world. Bahrain's level of diplomatic representation, confined largely to Arab capitals, is truly modest in comparison with other small but oil-rich Gulf states.

Of all the channels for international participation open to micro-states, the establishment of the overseas mission is obviously the most difficult. It is certainly the most expensive: the cost of the embassy space itself; accommodation for the ambassador and staff; the recruitment of secretarial and clerical personnel; local transportation and leave expenses; cypher links and telex connections; and entertainment costs. All of these are prohibitively expensive for very small states. It is particularly difficult when, like all states, they are sensitive to maintaining minimal standards appropriate to the dignity of the state. Costs are particularly high in the most important centres: New York, London, Brussels, Paris and Washington. Tonga's High Commission in London accounts for 70% of the foreign relations budget.⁴¹ It is not surprising that it is the kingdom's only overseas mission.

How do most micro-states allocate these scarce resources? The United Nations mission in New York is certainly a major priority. As we have stressed in earlier chapters, the flag in the plaza and the seat in the General Assembly are acknowledgements of the very small state's international personality. This may be "woolly minded"⁴² and for

⁴¹*Commonwealth Report on Diplomatic Services* (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 1970).

⁴²Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), pp. 114-115.

Alan James properly insists that participation in the international system has no bearing on the rights and prerogatives of statehood: "International activity is not a condition of sovereignty. What sovereignty

confident and long-established states like Switzerland it is irrelevant. But for fledgling states seeking reassurance and self-esteem, participation in the life of the United Nations is an acknowledgement and reinforcement of their sovereignty. More important, permanent representation in New York gives access to most states in the international community, often at a very high level. The mission in New York is plugged into the day-to-day agenda of the global town meeting, often impossible to reach from a remote micro-state capital. Vast sources of information in every policy area are available to micro-state representatives while their colleagues at home base rely largely on periodic and intermittent press reports. Moreover, the United Nations mission is often a bilateral posting in that it may be accredited to the United States, Canada and other Western Hemispheric states.

Though the New York mission is important and resourceful, it is still beyond the means of some micro-states. The Gambia and the Maldives joined the United Nations at independence, but they did not establish permanent missions until much later. Western Samoa delayed her own membership for 14 years largely because of the projected costs. For the Solomon Islands the permanent delegation to the United Nations is its only overseas mission. Even then, it is housed in offices shared with Western Samoa. At one time, the respective ambassadors of the two countries were husband and wife.⁴³ Four other South Pacific micro-states have still not applied for membership.⁴⁴

does is to give a state an international capacity, to make it eligible for international life. It is not necessary that that capacity should be used, that a state should take advantage of its eligibility." Sovereignty then, relates neither to a guarantee of international participation (United Nations membership, for instance) nor the necessity for active diplomacy.
Ibid., pp. 25-26.

⁴³An unusual but happy situation discussed by both ambassadors with the author on a visit to the United Nations in 1985.

⁴⁴Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru

Typically the micro-state mission in New York is a bare-bones operation. Only six micro-states have more than five officers.⁴⁵ Most are staffed by two or three people. In these conditions it is impossible for the mission to cover the full range of issues and meetings in New York. In their frenetic schedules, micro-state delegates must choose those committees which seem most central to the country's interests. This often means relying on advice from a trusted neighbour or patron state in difficult and unfamiliar issue areas.

Such a friend is usually a major regional power or, more discreetly, the former metropole. With few exceptions the latter constitutes the principal overseas mission. Most micro-states still depend on the former colonial power as a trading partner, aid donor, and a source of investment. Typically, the former metropole is the preferred choice for higher education. In many cases there are large communities of emigrés resident there. Moreover, the European capitals are themselves major centres of diplomatic activity. They are important too as access points to E.U. institutions.

There are also important regional capitals which require the presence of a permanent mission. And, as noted, in some cases, the role of the former metropole has been eclipsed by regional powers: the United States and Canada in the Commonwealth Caribbean, for instance; and Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific. Apart from allocations for these "great neighbours," regional diplomacy is active and intense, but conducted from home base. Typically, the ambassadors to neighbouring states of similar circumstance will be senior officers resident in the foreign ministry.

Some micro-states reach beyond the contacts established in New York, the former metropole capital and the major regional power. These are the micro-states which come closest to the pattern of diplomatic representation characteristic of the next group of small

⁴⁵See Table VIII

states. The most active establish missions in other capitals of the First World, some presence in the former Second World, and thereafter an extensive network of missions in their own region or their own ideological community.

Multiple Accreditation

There are alternatives to the overseas mission which allow tiny and poor states to extend their international contacts. One of the most familiar expedients is the practice of multiple accreditation, whereby an envoy in one capital is simultaneously accredited to one or more others. Home-based officers are also accredited as ambassadors to various capitals. Of course, many states are content to conduct their relations with most other states without formal channels of accreditation. For the more ambitious state, however, multiple accreditation allows for an international profile otherwise beyond its means.

Non-resident accreditation is primarily a gesture of particular regard, a commitment beyond the minimal courtesies in the exchange of diplomatic relations. Non-resident envoys are responsible for assuming the same functions in representing their state's interests as if they were stationed there permanently. Whether they can meet these extra responsibilities in practice is usually doubtful. At best, non-resident envoys' visits to their other postings can only be periodic and the receiving state's access accordingly limited. This seems even more likely where there is no apparent geographic rationale to the distribution of assignments. Iceland's ambassador to Denmark, for example, is also ambassador to Turkey and Japan.

However wanting in practice, multiple accreditation is a necessary expedient in an international system of 192 states. Not even the most powerful states establish missions in every other state. The value of non-resident accreditation will depend as much on the intensity of relations between the states concerned as on the abilities and resources of the base mission. There are many relationships which are neither consistent enough nor

significant enough to require the outlay of a permanent mission but which warrant the courtesy of accreditation and the attention of part-time responsibility. Diplomatic relations at this level may be adequate enough to meet the mutual needs of the two states. Unhappily for many micro-states, non-resident accreditation must suffice even when interests would be better served by more permanent representation.

Multiple accreditation accounts for a more significant proportion of "targets" in the diplomatic practice of other small states than it does for the micro-states. All but four of these small states accredit half again as many non-resident targets as resident. Though multiple accreditation is practised by all but six of the least active micro-states, there is much less consistency in its use than with small states in the next population group. More than half of all micro-states have more non-resident targets than resident, but this includes five states with fewer than five established missions. With so few missions, any use at all of multiple accreditation is bound to result in a higher proportion of non-resident missions. For these states, multiple accreditation can not markedly improve the range of diplomatic contacts. There is an early limit to the potential extensibility of two or three missions. For the few oil rich micro-states multiple accreditation is less significant because they can afford to establish resident missions in most of the states with which they have diplomatic relations.

It is among those micro-states where foreign policy aspirations are frustrated by limitations of size that multiple accreditation is practiced so extensively: Cyprus, Iceland, Guyana, Luxembourg and Malta. Within their population class these states rank consistently high in other indices of international involvement. Multiple accreditation allows them to raise their total diplomatic network to levels comparable to that of other small states, achieving an international presence in keeping with their own aspirations. Even some of the micro-states with ten or fewer missions have supplemented their diplomatic network with non-resident posts. Mauritius, The Gambia, Swaziland, Fiji, and

Barbados all pursue more active international roles than their few missions would suggest.

All have more than doubled their targets by means of multiple accreditation.

THE USE OF MULTIPLE ACCREDITATION
THE CASE OF ICELAND

	RESIDENT MISSIONS	ALSO ACCREDITED TO:
1	COPENHAGEN	Italy, Turkey, Israel, Lithuania, Japan, the Vatican
2	OSLO	Poland, Croatia, Cyprus, Slovakia, Macedonia, Republic of Korea
3	STOCKHOLM	Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Albania, Namibia
4	LONDON	Ireland, Greece, Netherlands, India, Nigeria
5	PARIS	Spain, Portugal, Cape Verde, UNESCO, Council of Europe, OECD
6	MOSCOW	Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Romania, Bulgaria
7	BONN	Austria, Switzerland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Serbia-Montenegro, OSCE
8	BRUSSELS	Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, EU, NATO, WEU
9	WASHINGTON	Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela
10	GENEVA (UN)	Egypt, EFTA, GATT, WHO, ILO and all other UN specialised agencies
11	NEW YORK (UN)	
12	REYKJAVIK	China

Co-operation with Another State

The disabilities of size may encourage some form of co-operation with another state to ensure a more extensive representation of interests. This may involve a treaty with a larger state whereby the latter undertakes representation of the smaller state's interests either wholly or supplementary to the small state's own diplomatic service. It can also mean arrangements for establishing joint missions with neighbouring states of similar circumstances. Co-operation with a larger power is more common, even if it presents greater potential problems.

Luxembourg has diplomatic relations with 108 states but maintains only ten missions abroad which are accredited to a further 23 capitals. However, by agreement with her Benelux partners, Luxembourg's commercial and economic interests are tended by Belgium and her political and diplomatic interests represented by the Netherlands in those many states where there is no direct Luxembourg accreditation.⁴⁶ Liechtenstein now has missions in New York, Brussels and Vienna in addition to its embassy in Berne. Elsewhere, its limited and periodic overseas interests are represented by Switzerland. This does not imply an abandonment of Liechtenstein's right of legation or treaty power. It is, as the Swiss have insisted, an arrangement of convenience for Liechtenstein with Switzerland acting in response to instructions from the government in Vaduz.⁴⁷

For new states, however, these arrangements are less attractive. Luxembourg's relations with Belgium and the Netherlands are intimate and confident. Similarly, Liechtenstein has enjoyed a secure relationship with its much larger neighbour characterised by Switzerland's sensitivity to the principality's sovereignty and its role as

⁴⁶*Guide du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et du Commerce Extérieur* (Luxembourg, December, 1977).

⁴⁷The Agreement of 24 October, 1919.

Pierre Raton, *Liechtenstein: History and Institutions of the Principality* (Vaduz: Liechtenstein-Verlag, 1970), pp. 72-76.

principal advocate whenever Liechtenstein's credentials were open to question. But for new states, where a confident self-view is lacking, independent diplomacy is the badge of newly-won sovereignty and essential to a sense of dignity.⁴⁸ The projection of a distinctive international image is indispensable in the process of nation-building and it is particularly well-served by the formalities of diplomacy. It is not surprising that new states are reluctant to risk confusing their international identity by relinquishing exclusive responsibility for a prerogative so invested with symbolic significance.

Yet some micro-states have concluded agreements with larger neighbours to supplement their own meagre representation.⁴⁹ Western Samoa's agreement with New Zealand is similar to Liechtenstein's arrangement with Switzerland. New Zealand represents Western Samoa's interests whenever necessary and as directed by the government in Apia.⁵⁰ The Gambia's accord with Senegal allows Gambian interests to be represented by Senegalese envoys and for Senegalese missions to serve Gambians abroad in those states where The Gambia is not represented.⁵¹ The case of The Gambia is particularly interesting. After the abortive *coup d'état* attempt on 5 July, 1981, which forced President Jawara to rely on Senegalese troops to restore order, there was a renewed commitment on both sides to extend and supplement existing agreements to a further stage of co-operation. When the Senegambian Confederation came into effect on

⁴⁸Wilson Carey McWilliams, "Political Development," in R. Butwell (ed.), *Foreign Policy and the Developing Nations* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 19.

⁴⁹India's representation of Bhutan's overseas interests is not just a question of administrative convenience. As noted earlier, Bhutan has sought to expand its international relations within the context of the 1949 treaty with India. The development of a Bhutanese diplomatic service will depend as much on Indian sensibilities as on Bhutanese resources. Though Bhutan enjoys diplomatic relations with many states, she maintains only three embassies abroad; New Delhi, Dacca and Kuwait.

⁵⁰*The Treaty of Friendship between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Western Samoa*, Apia. 1 August, 1962; Western Samoa, Prime Minister's Department, Treaty Series, No. 1, 1967.

⁵¹The Agreement of Co-operation in Foreign Policy, 11 July, 1964.

February 1, 1982 it included, *inter alia*, a new protocol calling for "co-ordination of foreign policies" and the appointment of two foreign ministers in the Confederation Council of Ministers.⁵² As with many of the other protocols of the Confederation, it did not substantially change The Gambia's diplomatic status. The terms of the Confederation recognised the sovereignty and the independence of each state. The Gambia continued to pursue an active diplomacy and now maintains nine missions abroad accredited to a further 26 states. This has been augmented by active summit and conference diplomacy to forge an independent image for The Gambia in the world.⁵³ This suggests that the provisions of the Senegambian treaties for Senegalese representation of Gambian interests abroad may have been more to serve the spirit of a necessary but precarious relationship than to supplement The Gambia's own diplomacy.

Even in Samoa, which long spurned the temptations of international politics, the same trend is apparent. The Samoan-New Zealand relationship has been noted frequently as a model for micro-states in coping with the burdens of diplomatic representation. Eventually, however, the Samoans moved slowly out from under the patronage of New Zealand. This was particularly demonstrated in their decision to reverse their isolation from the United Nations and to establish a permanent mission in New York. The Government has also modified its initial policy of discouraging foreign representation in Apia. Once content to receive accreditation through Wellington, Western Samoa signalled

⁵²*The New York Times*, 1 February, 1982.7
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1982), 31548, 31834.

⁵³In the early years of independence The Gambia embarked on a policy which extended its links to Libya and the Arab world, China, and the more radical governments in Africa. Often this was a stance at variance with President Senghor's own policies.
The Times (London), 12 February, 1975, 16.

its new sense of international confidence in 1976 when China opened an embassy in Apia.⁵⁴

There are also instances where no explicit agreement exists but where the micro-state's diplomatic resources are so limited and its relationship with a mentor power so intimate that international representation on behalf of the micro-state by the mentor could be expected as the situation demanded. In the early years of independence the former metropole can act as a vital link for the new micro-state to the international community. While such an understanding is valuable, it must of necessity be discreet. Even among those states determined to maintain close ties with the former metropole, it is still important to cultivate at least the appearance of independence and a distinctive diplomatic image.

If co-operative diplomatic arrangements with a larger power hold the danger of compromising self-respect and obscuring national identity, what of joint representation with other micro-states? This has been often advocated as an acceptable solution to the micro-state dilemma of inadequate representation.⁵⁵ Many micro-states are located in cluster areas with a common colonial experience and similar interests.

Micro-states have been no less sensitive in their dealings with neighbouring micro-states than with larger states. Acute sensibilities of independence, emphasised by constitutional and ideological differences and daunting problems of communication, have resulted in a weaker sense of commonality than might be expected. Closer examination usually reveals deeply-rooted differences to account for intense feelings of separate identity. Among island micro-states, particularly, maritime separateness has perpetuated

⁵⁴R. A. Herr, "A Minor Ornament: The Diplomatic Decisions of Western Samoa at Independence," P. J. Boyce, *Foreign Affairs for New States* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), p. 247.

⁵⁵Elmer Plishke, *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options* (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp. 53-54.

traditional rivalries and mutual suspicion.⁵⁶ Moreover, though neighbouring micro-states may benefit economically from diplomatic collaboration in the long run, in the short run they are competitors better served by separate representatives in those capitals crucial as markets and as sources of aid and investment.

Even among micro-states the issue of relative size is not unimportant. Fiji, for example, with 715,375 people, stands alone as a "giant" among South Pacific states. Fiji has acted on behalf of the other South Pacific states at certain international forums and at the United Nations.⁵⁷ But this did not develop into a shared South Pacific diplomatic service based in Suva. The other states prefer to entrust their representation to their own envoys in those capitals of most importance to them; Canberra, Wellington, London, Tokyo.

Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde established joint missions in Algeria. Since both states were ruled by the same party and pledged to eventual unification, it was not a surprising arrangement. What may be more significant, however, is the fact that separate missions account for most of the overseas representation of both states.

Only among the Commonwealth micro-states of the Eastern Caribbean is joint representation an accepted arrangement. Even among these states it is a variable practice. Dominica, for example, shares office space at the United Nations with St. Lucia and is represented jointly with four other Eastern Caribbean states in Ottawa. But it maintains separate missions in London and Washington. Similarly, Antigua and Barbuda is represented in Ottawa by the High Commissioner for the Eastern Caribbean; shares

⁵⁶John M. Ostheimer, "Are Islanders Different? A Survey of Theoretical Ideas," in John M. Ostheimer (ed.) *The Politics of the Western Indian Ocean Islands* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 13-27.

⁵⁷In his address to the general Assembly in 1970, the Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, emphasised the importance of a Pacific voice at the United Nations: "As far as we are authorised by our friends and neighbours, and we do not arrogate to ourselves any role of leadership, we would hope to act as representative and interpreter of that voice."

Parliament of Fiji, *Report on Foreign Affairs*, Parliamentary Paper No. 1 of 1974, Appendix III (a).

offices, though not the same High Commissioner, in London with Belize; and maintains separate missions in Washington and at the United Nations.

The representation of a state's interests and the projection of its identity before the world are the very core of sovereign privileges. The decision to co-operate with other states requires not only a realistic assessment of needs and confidence that co-operation will best serve the state's interests without compromising its sovereignty. It also means some measure of indifference to the allurements of international protocol. What may appear as sensible to sympathetic students of micro-states is usually fraught with controversy in practice.

The Use of Consular Representatives

Consular representation can be an expedient means of extending a micro-state's international relations in lieu of a costly diplomatic service. However, the extent to which consuls can substitute for diplomats is limited. There are important distinctions of accreditation and function and therefore of privileges and immunities. The diplomatic representative is the official spokesman of his state, accredited to the Head of state, and authorised to enter secret negotiations on behalf of his state.⁵⁸ The consul's functions have been confined traditionally to *actes de gestion*; the protection of commercial interests and the promotion of trade, the provision of advice and assistance for resident nationals and a panoply of administrative and notarial responsibilities.⁵⁹

⁵⁸*The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, 1961, Article 3 (1).

⁵⁹B. Sen, *A Diplomat's Handbook of International Law and Practice* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 202-203.

Luke T. Lee, *Consular Law and Practice* (London: Institute of World Affairs, Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1961), pp. 59-62

Accordingly, his privileges and immunities are limited, particularly as he remains subject to local jurisdiction.

These distinctions of function between diplomatic and consular representatives are subject to some degree of overlap and the variable practice of states.⁶⁰ Most states have amalgamated their consular and diplomatic services with a resultant increase in the number of dual appointments. It is convenient to have diplomatic officers empowered to perform consular functions.⁶¹ Moreover, it is often difficult to separate the purely commercial interests of a state from political or even strategic considerations.⁶² The consul's responsibility for promoting friendly relations between the peoples of the two states through various cultural activities also bears certain political implications since the consul is acting as spokesman and interpreter for his state's point of view.⁶³ These political and diplomatic dimensions of consular representation can be all the more important if there is no resident diplomatic mission and the consul is the lone representative for his state.⁶⁴ In some cases, this larger responsibility has been recognised and consuls with the rank of consul-general are allowed to be established in the capital itself and accepted as ministers for purposes of precedence.⁶⁵

For the European micro-states consular representation is vested with diplomatic significance. Some micro-states rely almost entirely on consular representation for their links to the outside world. In most cases, the micro-state consulate is that country's only

⁶⁰*The Yearbook of the International Law Commission* (1959, I), pp. 170-178.

⁶¹Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-22.
Sen, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-220.

⁶²As Luke Lee noted, "A generally accepted rule of international law illustrates this point tellingly: a state (political) may be injured through the injury of its citizens (economic or otherwise)."
Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

⁶³Sen, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 228.
Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-189

⁶⁵Sen, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-225.

representative and as such he bears the sole responsibility for promoting friendly relations, interpreting his country's point of view and making any and all representations as necessary. The importance of the micro-state consul can not be exaggerated. The consular service gives visibility to the international identity of micro-states which would be lacking otherwise. Often that may be the only function, since the European micro-states would not have many resident nationals or significant commercial interests in many of the more esoteric capitals where their consular missions are established.⁶⁶ The consulate, then, is a confirmation of the micro-state's sovereignty and international identity.⁶⁷

Micro-state consular relations are based wholly on the services of the non-professional or honorary consul. The practice of appointing honorary consuls is well-established among Western European and Latin American states.⁶⁸ It was not accepted among Communist states and it is practised variably elsewhere.⁶⁹ The United States, for example, appoints only career consuls or consular agents but accepts honorary consuls

⁶⁶For instance, Monaco has consulates in Haiti, Paraguay, and Costa Rica.

⁶⁷This is a principal argument for those defending the sovereignty of the smallest European micro-states. C. D'Olivier Farran, "The Position of Diminutive States in International Law," in Erik Bruel et. al. (eds.) *Internationalrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen: Festschrift für Walter Schagel zu seinem 70 Geburtstag* (Dusseldorf: Hermes, 1960), pp. 131-147.

Having said that, it is possible for consulates to be established without the recognition of sovereignty attendant upon the establishment of a diplomatic mission. A state may have consular missions in dependent territories or a state may allow the establishment of a consular mission but refuse to interpret that acceptance as recognition of the sender as a sovereign state. For example, the then United Arab Republic did not regard the establishment of an East German consul in Cairo to imply recognition of the German Democratic Republic. However, the issuance of an exequatur, the commission from the receiving state which authorises the status and the duties of the consul, does constitute recognition of the sending state. Moreover, the request for an exequatur is regarded as an act of recognition by the sending state of the receiving state. Farran's case is based on the exchanges of exequatur.

Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35

Sen, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136.

⁶⁸Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 15-20.

Sen, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218.

from other states.⁷⁰ Unlike career consuls, honorary consuls are appointed locally and need not be citizens of the state which they represent. Their postings are not dependent on special training or examination and they usually receive little or no remuneration. Most important, honorary consuls can engage in private professional or commercial activities. Since they are often citizens of the host state and employed privately there, they are usually accorded fewer immunities.⁷¹

It is also likely that the honorary consul's functions will be more restricted than those of the career consul, though this depends on the established practice of the sending state. For micro-states these possible distinctions of function are less relevant when the consular service is constituted wholly of honorary consuls. In spite of these differences, honorary consuls can hold any consular rank within the functions assigned by the state which they represent and those accepted by the receiving state.⁷²

Without specific training or fixed remuneration there is always the risk that honorary consuls will benefit more from the arrangement than the state which they represent. The prestige afforded by consular designation can be an advantage in private business. And, it is possible that the honorary consul will be too preoccupied with his or her own activities to devote much attention to consular functions. On the other hand, honorary consuls are often "good friends" of the state which they represent and noted for their long and conscientious service. With little or no capital expenditure, the honorary consul system is an economical means of achieving representation on a scale otherwise unlikely. It is also a resourceful arrangement, for it brings to the service of the state those whose familiarity with local conditions and personalities can be invaluable.

⁷⁰Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁷²Precedence is established by rank rather than class. Thus, an honorary consul who heads a post takes precedence over a career consul who does not.
Sen, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

For the European micro-states,⁷³ the honorary-consul system constitutes the major share of their overseas representation. It has allowed these states to have a direct presence throughout the world. Only the Communist states were inaccessible.

State	No. of Diplomatic Missions	No. of Consular Missions
Monaco	7	43
Iceland	13	50
Cyprus	20	56
Luxembourg	20	35
San Marino	8	47
Malta	15	82

Consular missions also constitute whatever representation is resident in or accredited to Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Monaco. Liechtenstein has not established any consular missions itself but all 25 of the states accredited to the Principality are represented at the consular level. Three states have honorary consuls resident in Liechtenstein. Of the 32 states accredited to San Marino, 30 are consular missions resident in Italy. There are 38 consulates resident in Monaco.

The honorary consular system would seem to be ideally suited to the requirements of many new micro-states. Apart from the advantage of having some kind of visible official presence in important capitals, the honorary consul could prove to be a

⁷³Though until 1993 Andorra was not a party to the normal channels of diplomacy, it established "delegations" in a number of states. The delegate was usually an Andorran citizen engaged in private business in the host state or a local citizen with some ties to Andorra. In that sense, the "delegation" is similar to the honorary consul. The primary function of these offices was to promote tourism in Andorra since they were official representatives of the *Sindicat D'Iniciative de Le Valls D'Andorra*. Now Andorra is in the process of establishing regular diplomatic missions, at the United Nations, the Council of Europe, Paris, and Madrid and the Holy See.

A number of states have accredited consuls to Andorra. They are based in nearby French or Spanish centres. The British Consul-General in Barcelona is accredited to Andorra. However, as his *exequatur* was granted by the two co-princes and not by the Council of the Valleys, it did not necessarily constitute recognition of Andorra's sovereignty since one of the co-princes, the President of the French Republic, claimed that Andorra's relations with other states were the responsibility of France. There are now French and Spanish embassies in Andorra la Vella

valuable link to much-needed services and sources of investment in the industrialised states. Yet, these very needs also account for the infrequent use of the honorary consul system among micro-states outside of Europe. Those most in need are the smallest and the most remote states with the least developed economies. The international contacts and associations of these states are limited. Discovering locals who have some interest or connection with the micro-state would be difficult in many cases. Successful emigrés tend to settle in the former metropole where the micro-state is likely to be represented already. Only a few new micro-states have been able to overcome these difficulties.⁷⁴

The Resident Diplomatic Corps in Micro-State Capitals

The representation which micro-states receive is as important to their participation in international relations as that which they are able to send. The diplomatic attention accorded to micro-states is significant not only as a reflection of international status but as a further dimension of their capacity to function in the international system. For some micro-states the resident diplomatic corps is the principal contact with the outside world. For almost all of them it is an important supplement to their own limited diplomatic services.

A comparative ranking of micro-states with other small states according to the number of diplomatic missions received confirms the patterns evident in our analysis thus far. Only four micro-states (Gabon, Cyprus, Qatar and Luxembourg) receive more than 20 missions, while only 24 of the 56 larger small states receive less than 20. This includes 16 Soviet and Yugoslav republics. Twenty-seven micro-states receive fewer than ten

⁷⁴The following micro-states use non-diplomatic missions. They include not only consuls but commercial and trade representatives and government offices.

Swaziland 6; Barbados 1; Tonga 2; Nauru 7; Guyana 7; Cape Verde 5; Bahrain 2.

Nauru has consulates in Australia, Fiji, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand, the Marianas, Hawaii and two in the continental United States. There is also a Government Office in London.

missions along with two recent graduates from the micro-state class: Bhutan and Lesotho. The average number of missions received is 28 for the small states and nine for the micro-states.⁷⁵ Those states which rank high as senders and as participants in international organisations also rank high in their diplomatic importance as measured by the size of the resident diplomatic corps.

Are such factors as tenure of independence, geopolitical location and the size of the economy relevant in explaining differences in the diplomatic commitments which micro-states and small states receive from other members of the international system?

Duration of independence might seem to be important. States of very recent independence can be expected to interest other states in resident representation only as the development of bilateral relations warrants. For some micro-states (Guyana and Malta, for instance) a comparatively longer period of independence and the gradual development of a more prominent international role have met with an increase in the number of states willing to establish resident missions in their capitals. This is also evident in a few post-1970 micro-states: Guinea-Bissau, Fiji, Suriname. For most micro-states, however, the length of independence has made very little difference. Western Samoa (1962), the Maldives (1965), Tonga (1970) and Swaziland (1968) are still among those states with a resident diplomatic corps of six or less. For the new and smallest micro-states (and, most certainly for those smallest of dependencies yet to achieve sovereignty) the prospects for even six resident missions are remote. Ten of these micro-states have only one or two resident missions.

There is some regional differentiation in levels of resident accreditation. European, Middle Eastern and Western Hemispheric states are primary centres of diplomatic attention. Until recently, sub-Saharan African capitals ranked low in international indices of diplomatic exchange. In the Singer/Small study no sub-Saharan African state was

⁷⁵ Once again this figure rises (to 33) if we exclude the new states of Eritrea and post-Communist Eurasia.

among those 27 states which received more than 75 missions.⁷⁶ To some extent these regional differences are reflected in the diplomatic importance accorded to states in this study. Of the 24 small states in the next population class which receive fewer than 20 resident missions, ten are in sub-Saharan Africa.⁷⁷ However, levels of resident diplomatic accreditation are rising in most African states. This is not just the result of other states giving more attention to the continent. There has also been a significant expansion of regional diplomatic exchange. This is evident in both groups of states. Though African micro-states command little attention in comparison with larger states, they rank relatively high within their respective population groups.

The most notable regional difference is the South Pacific, where resident accreditation for most states is minimal. The South Pacific is primarily a region of island micro-states. They are small in the extreme and of little economic importance. Of course, the diplomatic attention given these states could change dramatically if the region became a principal area of strategic competition.

The influence of remoteness is evident with land-locked states as much as far-flung islands. Resident accreditation is lower in land-locked states than in coastal states of similar population size and economic advantage. Of the 16 land-locked small states in this study, 13 receive fewer than 20 missions. The others rank only marginally higher: Paraguay, Slovakia, Laos with 27, 25 and 24 resident missions respectively. Land-locked states are dependent on the port facilities and transit routes of neighbouring coastal

⁷⁶Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816-1970: An Extension and Refinement of the Indicator," *World Politics* XXV (July, 1973), 77.
Note also David H. Johns, "Diplomatic Activity, Power and Integration in Africa," *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies* (1975), 85-105.

⁷⁷ Most of the others are the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics.

states.⁷⁸ Often they are not easily accessible and it is more convenient for other states to manage their hinterland interests from missions in coastal capitals.⁷⁹

Apart from the disabilities of very small size, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are particularly affected as land-locked states.⁸⁰ Their access to the international system depends on transportation and communications links with the Republic of South Africa. Though it is the largest of the three states, and once the largest micro-state in Africa, Lesotho is especially vulnerable. It maintains diplomatic relations with 44 states and it has established missions in ten capitals accredited to another 26 states. Yet only eight states along with the EU have established missions in Maseru. Diplomats move to and from their posting on the sufferance of the South African authorities which, of course, at one time could be difficult. The case of Botswana is less extreme. It was one of the five front-line states that faced South Africa, but it attracted fewer missions than the smaller coastal states of Guinea-Bissau and Djibouti. Initially, most of the accreditation which the former High Commission territories received was based in Pretoria. With new links to Zambia and the independence of Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique there was some scope for relieving their physical and political isolation in the days of the apartheid regime.⁸¹

⁷⁸Robert McKinnell, "Land-locked countries and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development," in Zdenek Cervenka (ed.) *Land-Locked Countries of Africa* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1973), pp. 300-315.

⁷⁹Much of the accreditation to the land-locked states of North-eastern Africa is based in Dakar.

⁸⁰Willie Henderson, "Independent Botswana: A Reappraisal of Foreign Policy Options," *African Affairs* LXXIII (No. 290, January, 1974), 37-44.

T. T. Thane, "Lesotho, the Realities of Land-lockedness," in Cervenka, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-249.

Zdenek Cervenka, "Swailand's Links with the Outside World," in Cervenka, *Ibid*, pp. 263-272.

⁸¹The independence of the former Portuguese colonies and improved transportation links made these states much more accessible to the rest of Africa. The change in the centres of non-resident accreditation also reflected international co-operation in reducing as much as possible the visible features of their dependence on South Africa.

When remoteness is combined with very small size and paucity of resources, it places the state truly on the periphery of international political and economic relations. Among the lowest ranking micro-states in our table of resident accreditation are isolated and tiny states such as these; the Maldives, the Comoros, Tonga, Kiribati, Western Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe. Yet, while geographic isolation compounds the peripheral nature of the very small state, it is still size which is most directly related to the extent and diversity of interests held by other states. Some of the island states of the Eastern Caribbean, for instance, have no resident diplomatic corps at all. They are not remote and isolated. Central location actually discourages resident accreditation. They are all extremely small and the interests which other states do have can be conveniently managed from missions in larger states nearby.

Isolation may be as much a self-imposed condition for ideological reasons as it is a question of geography. A policy of introversion and withdrawal from international relations may be seen as crucial to the consolidation of a government's domestic power base. During the period of the Maçias Nguema regime in Equatorial Guinea, for example, that country's links to the outside world were extremely limited, confined to those states which were regarded as ideologically congenial or politically unavoidable. Even United Nations access was restricted. After the 1979 coup the new government began to restore links with the outside world. By 1985 Equatorial Guinea had established ten missions abroad compared to six in 1975. More significant, the number of states with resident missions in Malabo rose from four in 1975 to 12 in 1992.

There is some correlation between economic importance as measured by the size of the economy and the diplomatic attention which states receive. With the exception of Ireland and New Zealand, the larger small states with a Gross National Product over \$15 billion all host resident missions from more than 35 states. At the lower end of the small

state table, 20 of the 24 states with fewer than 20 resident missions are also among those small states with the lowest G.N.P. (under \$1.5 billion).

The correlation is also evident in the micro-state group. With three exceptions (Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, and Guyana), micro-states which receive over ten missions are the largest economies in their class with Gross National Products over \$1 billion. In spite of their small economies, Guyana and Guinea-Bissau were relatively successful in winning commitments of resident accreditation, particularly from leftist governments which were prepared to acknowledge a deliberately active policy of non-alignment. The correlation between the size of the economy and the level of diplomatic attention is even more consistent at the lowest ends of the tables. Problems of geopolitical isolation and economic weakness are often concomitant with very small size and together they will restrict the potential interest which a micro-state may hope to draw. The varying influence of these factors is evident when analysing the differences within the micro-state group. Luxembourg, Guyana, Iceland, and Malta attract a respectable amount of attention in comparison to that accorded São Tomé and Príncipe, the Maldives or Tonga. What is more striking, however, is the comparison of these more prominent micro-states with small states of the next population group.

These high-scoring micro-states have attracted resident representation only to the same extent as the least advantaged states of the small state group. Compared to these states, the most solicited micro-states are favoured in levels of economic development, centrality of location, political stability and leadership reputation. Often they pursue a more active foreign policy than the poorest states of the the next population group. Yet, in spite of these comparative advantages, micro-states do not attract a correspondingly higher level of international attention than the poorest and most peripheral of the small states.

Small states are commonly viewed as "consumers" in the global system.⁸² In terms of diplomatic exchange data they may be seen as "net receivers," accepting more commitments than they are able to give themselves.⁸³ Yet for micro-states this question is not as important as it may at first appear. Many micro-states send so few missions abroad that even minimal resident accreditation of two or three states will mean they are "net receivers." Kiribati with three resident missions and the Solomon Islands with seven have established no missions themselves in other capitals, though the Solomon Islands does maintain a permanent mission at the United Nations in New York

Among the "net receivers" are micro-states which serve as monitoring posts for interests other than those in the micro-state itself. Fiji is the centre of the South Pacific regional state system. Whatever accreditation other island states receive is usually based in Suva. It is the major stop-over between North America, Japan and Australasia. And Suva's role as an entrepôt has boosted Fiji's function as a re-exporter in the Pacific region. Similarly, Bahrain's relatively large resident diplomatic corps reflects the extent to which the shaikhdom has replaced Lebanon as a service centre in the region. Djibouti is a curious example of this pattern. It is a very small state totally lacking in resources except for its geothermal areas. It is unlikely that it will ever have a diplomatic service of its own comparable to the attention which it receives. But, because of its strategic location and its importance as a port and rail centre, Djibouti has attracted the interest of the major powers and the dominant states of the region. Within a year of its independence there were 12 missions resident in Djibouti and today there are 14.

⁸²David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 17-20.

⁸³In their study, Alger and Brams found no correlation between small size and a state's "world interest balance", that is the difference between the number of missions sent and received. Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations," *World Politics* XIX (July, 1967), 654.

States which are "net receivers" may also be the beneficiaries of generous policies of resident accreditation from those powers anxious to raise their international profile wherever possible; for example, status-conscious states such as Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and even Israel. Taiwan and Israel account for two of the five missions resident in Swaziland. At one time Eastern bloc governments and other "progressive" states were also prepared to reward an assertive policy of non-alignment, even in the smallest states. The Seychelles is an interesting example. The 1977 coup which brought France Albert René to power occasioned a dramatic shift in foreign policy from a comfortable identification with the West to a vigorous policy of non-alignment. Much of this new activism had to be conducted through summit and conference diplomacy. The meagre resources of the Seychelles had not permitted any increase in the number of its permanent missions beyond those in London and New York. However, the posture of the new government encouraged a number of friendly states to establish missions in Victoria: Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, North Korea and Libya.

There is a further consideration in this section of the discussion. To what extent do the major powers rely on non-resident accreditation to meet their commitments in micro-state capitals? The near-universal diplomatic commitments of the United States are limited only among the smallest micro-states. Though the United States maintains resident missions in 29 micro-state capitals, it relies on non-resident accreditation to represent American interests in most others. Britain maintains resident missions in 23 micro-states, most of them Commonwealth members. China is represented in 22 micro-state capitals, France in 21 and Russia in 15. There are nine micro-states with no major power representation at all at the ministerial level though consulates may be resident in these smallest micro-states. The extent to which the major powers rely on non-resident accreditation to manage their interests in micro-states is one of the most distinctive features of micro-state international relations.

Major Power Representation in Micro States

Five:	Cyprus, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Qatar, Seychelles
Four:	Barbados, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Guyana, Suriname
Three:	Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei, Comoros, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Vanuatu
Two:	Belize, Grenada, St. Lucia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Western Samoa
One:	Andorra, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu,
None:	Dominica, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Nauru, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino

Conclusions

Micro-state participation in the international system is characterised by limited representational capacity and minimal diplomatic importance. Their modest involvement in the diplomatic life of the international community sets them apart even from other disadvantaged small states. The limitations of very small size are most evident in the establishment of overseas missions and permanent delegations to international organisations.

The prohibitive costs of permanent representation are not the only constraint for micro-states. Even occasional forays in conference diplomacy and the hosting of visitations from other states can stand out as major commitments. Infrastructural costs such as communications and information-gathering services are similarly disproportionately heavy for micro-states. Not only is information costly but it is random and limited. Typically, a micro-state's world view is based entirely on sources from the mentor. These problems are compounded by the lack of expertise necessary to the formulation and representation of foreign policy objectives. Even for those micro-states which are less

constrained by financial considerations, the recruitment of committed and qualified personnel is difficult in such small societies. To be sure, as David Vital emphasised, these are the most disturbing problems for small states in general.⁸⁴ But for micro-states they are experienced in the extreme.

At first glance such skeletal diplomatic services would seem to confirm the notion that micro-states are "non-actors" incapable of conducting independent foreign relations in any meaningful sense. But bare-bones diplomacy does not mean that micro-states can not promote their interests in the international system. Clearly few micro-states have stakes in the full panoply of issues which constitute the global agenda. It is not important whether micro-states can address every international issue satisfactorily. It only matters that they can represent their interests in those issue areas which are of direct concern for their own welfare. South Pacific micro-states, for example, have little vested interest in the burning issues of South Africa and Palestine which have dominated much of the international conference agenda. A sympathetic declaratory policy can win some gratitude in those quarters where these issues are crucial and thus may translate into favourable lines of credit and aid, or even reciprocal support in issues of direct concern such as nuclear testing in the South Pacific. But this is the kind of diplomacy which can be done on a shoestring.

This is not to suggest that micro-state diplomacy can be or need be confined to single-resource commercial relations, local co-operative development projects, and modest pragmatic day to day administrative concerns. For most micro-states, many of the central issues of international politics, particularly those relating to development— the terms of trade, aid, and technical assistance, debt management— are of direct concern to their own welfare. Others face controversies of status and the predatory designs of covetous

⁸⁴Vital, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-38.

neighbours. Promoting these interests requires access to major centres: at least one major power, the United Nations, and principal regional states and organisations.

Clearly micro-states can not engage in bilateral diplomatic exchanges on a scale comparable to other states. But there is scope for the imaginative use of even these limited links. Micro-states must allocate their very scarce resources to target those centres where representation will be most effective. This usually means that the most able individuals will be stationed in the principal delegation in the former metropole. For most micro-states this office will also be the principal link to the European Union. In some instances micro-states have even been prepared to delay a permanent mission in New York in order to establish an effective mission in the former metropole. Choosing priorities may also mean that some normally important capitals are not stationed and certain conferences and organisations are neglected to permit a larger travelling budget for direct periodic representations from a government figure or a senior diplomat as roving ambassador. And, typically, given the absolute costs of international representation, the resources of the external affairs bureaucracy at home will have lower priority.

Most micro-states can rely on advice and even representational support from larger states. While there are always sensitivities about state dignity in these situations, most micro-states do enjoy friendly relations with the former metropole or a trustworthy neighbour which allows them to conduct a satisfactory foreign policy. This may be diplomacy by proxy but if there is trust on one side and sufficient sensitivity on the other it can serve to meet many of the micro-state's interests in the international system.

Micro-states benefit too from the resources of regional organisations. Regional co-operation is unlikely to extend to collaborative diplomatic representation. But in such micro-state communities as the South Pacific and the Eastern Caribbean, the services of regional bodies have substantially supplemented micro-states' links to the outside world.

Most micro-states are members of the Commonwealth. Given the number of micro-states in its membership, this post-imperial association could be described as a micro-state organisation. Much of its efforts in technical assistance and in research in development studies is directed to the special problems of very small states.

However, it is the United Nations system, and particularly the regional commissions, which best support micro-state relations with the outside world. Not only does the United Nations provide access to other members of the international system on both an incidental and a regular basis, it also provides a vast range of information services crucial to the formulation of foreign policy objectives, particularly those relating to issues of economic development. It is fitting that the United Nations, which often played a critical role in the independence and international acceptance of micro-states, should provide the context and support for their continuing relations with the international community.

Micro-state diplomacy may be limited and still largely dependent on external supports. But micro-states are not without interests in the global community. Nor are they totally incapable of representing those interests. Smallness, isolation and the very limited capabilities of micro-states would have surely once confined them to the margins of international life. But, in the contemporary international system with its universal institutions and egalitarian values, even the smallest state has access to the opportunities which this global network provides.

APPENDIX

TABLE I
NUMBER OF MISSIONS ESTABLISHED ABROAD¹

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
Finland	80	Gabon	33
Denmark	77	Qatar	30
Norway	65	Cyprus	20
Israel	64	Luxembourg	20
Slovakia	60	Brunei	18
Libya	58	Malta	16
Lebanon	55	Iceland	13
Uruguay	50	Bahrain	12
Costa Rica	47	Guinea-Bissau	12
Panama	45	Guyana	12
Kuwait	41	Djibouti	12
Nicaragua	41	Equatorial Guinea	11
Jordan	39	Mauritius	11
Somalia	39	Cape Verde	10
New Zealand	37	The Gambia	9
Senegal	37	San Marino	8
Ireland	34	Barbados	7
Honduras	32	Fiji	7
Oman	32	Grenada	7
United Arab Emirates	32	Monaco	7
El Salvador	29	Suriname	7
Albania	28	Belize	6
Mongolia	28	São Tomé and Príncipe	5
Mauritania	27	Swaziland	5
Haiti	26	Western Samoa	5
Paraguay	26	Seychelles	5
Croatia	24	Marshall Islands	4
Singapore	23	Andorra	4

¹ This list includes only separately established permanent missions at the legation or embassy level. It does not include missions, like some in Brussels which are also accredited to the European Union, unless there is a completely different staff.

The World Directory of Diplomatic Representation
(London: Europa Publications, 1993)

TABLE I**NUMBER OF MISSIONS ESTABLISHED ABROAD**

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
Congo	21	Antigua and Barbuda	4
Chad	20	Bahamas	4
Burundi	20	Dominica ²	4
Central African Republic	18	Micronesia	4
Laos	18	St. Kitts and Nevis ³	4
Benin	17	St. Lucia ³	4
Lithuania	16	Liechtenstein	4
Slovenia	16	Maldives	3
Jamaica	16	St. Vincent and the Grenadines ³	3
Latvia	14	Comoros	2
Estonia	14	Vanuatu	2
Sierra Leone	14	Palau	2
Togo	14	Solomon Islands	1
Trinidad and Tobago	13	Tonga	1
Bosnia-Herzegovina	12	Tuvalu	1
Papua New Guinea	11	Kiribati	0
Namibia	10	Nauru	0
Turkmenistan	10		
Armenia	10		
Macedonia	10		
Lesotho	10		
Kyrgyzstan	9		
Eritrea	8		
Botswana	8		
Georgia	7		
Moldova	7		
Bhutan	5		
Tajikistan	5		

² This includes one joint O.E.C.S. mission in Ottawa.

³ This includes two joint O.E.C.S. missions in London and Ottawa.

TABLE II

MISSIONS RESIDENT IN SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES¹

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
Libya	67	Gabon	40
Kuwait	66	Cyprus	30
Denmark	62	Qatar	28
Lebanon	61	Luxembourg	21
Senegal	59	Bahrain	18
Ireland	55	Guinea-Bissau	17
Israel	55	Guyana	17
United Arab Emirates	51	Malta	17
Jordan	48	Suriname	15
Uruguay	46	Barbados	14
Finland	44	Brunei	14
Norway	43	Djibouti	14
Singapore	42	Fiji	14
Nicaragua	41	Belize	12
Panama	39	Equatorial Guinea	12
Costa Rica	38	Iceland	11
Namibia	38	Mauritius	11
Oman	36	Seychelles	10
Honduras	33	Cape Verde	9
Somalia	33	Gambia	8
Jamaica	32	São Tomé and Príncipe	8
New Zealand	31	Solomon Islands	7
Honduras	27	Comoros	7
Paraguay	27	Swaziland	6
El Salvador	26	Vanuatu	6
Slovakia	25	Grenada	5
Laos	24	Tonga	5
Congo	24	Micronesia	5

¹ This table includes only resident embassies and legations. For consular representation see Table IV.

The World Directory of Diplomatic Representation (London: Europa Publications, 1993)

Europa World Yearbook, 1993 Volumes i, ii. (London, Europa Publications, 1993)

TABLE II**MISSIONS RESIDENT IN SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES**

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
Croatia	23	Western Samoa	5
Haiti	21	Bahamas	4
Trinidad and Tobago	20	St. Lucia	4
Latvia	20	Antigua and Barbuda	4
Lithuania	20	Marshall Islands	3
Central African Republic	19	Kiribati	3
Benin	19	Maldives	3
Albania	18	Andorra	2
Mauritania	18	Dominica	2
Togo	18	Nauru	2
Slovenia	18	St. Kitts and Nevis	2
Mongolia	17	St. Vincent and Grenadines	2
Sierra Leone	17	San Marino	2
Botswana	15	Liechtenstein	1
Estonia	15	Tuvalu	1
Burundi	14	Palau	1
Chad	14	Monaco	1
Papua New Guinea	14		
Georgia	12		
Macedonia	11		
Moldova	10		
Armenia	9		
Eritrea	9		
Kyrgystan	9		
Lesotho	8		
Tajikistan	7		
Bosnia-Herzegovina	6		
Turkmenistan	6		
Bhutan	2		

TABLE III**SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE MEMBERSHIPS IN
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS¹**

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
Denmark	91	Gabon	59
Finland	89	Iceland	55
Norway	89	Luxembourg	55
Libya	63	Qatar	48
Mauritania	63	Cyprus	45
Benin	56	Gambia	44
Togo	55	Mauritius	39
Congo	53	Bahrain	38
Jordan	53	Guinea-Bissau	35
Slovakia	53	Guyana	34
Chad	51	Swaziland	34
United Arab Emirates	51	Barbados	33
Kuwait	50	Djibouti	33
Ireland	48	Equatorial Guinea	31
Sierra Leone	48	Grenada	28
Lebanon	47	Malta	28
Libya	47	St. Lucia	27
Central African Republic	46	Belize	26
Costa Rica	46	Comoros	26
Nicaragua	46	Fiji	26
Panama	45	Dominica	25
Lithuania	45	Bahamas	24
Slovenia	44	Monaco	24
Uruguay	44	St. Vincent and Grenadines	23
Oman	43	São Tomé and Príncipe	23
Trinidad and Tobago	41	Cape Verde	22
Jamaica	40	Suriname	22
New Zealand	40	Maldives	21
Honduras	39		
Burundi	38		

¹ Union of International Associations (ed.) *Yearbook of International Organizations, 1992/1993* Volume 2, 10th ed. (München, New York, London, Paris: K. G. Saur, 1992), esp. Table III, pp. 1612-1614.

TABLE III**SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE MEMBERSHIPS IN
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS**

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
El Salvador	37	Seychelles	21
Israel	37	Brunei	19
Namibia	37	St. Kitts and Nevis	18
Latvia	36	San Marino	16
Macedonia	36	Solomon Islands	16
Haiti	35	Vanuatu	16
Paraguay	35	Tonga	15
Tajikistan	34	Western Samoa	13
Lesotho	32	Liechtenstein	12
Singapore	32	Andorra	11
Armenia	31	Kiribati	9
Turkmenistan	31	Palau	8
Estonia	30	Nauru	7
Botswana	30	Marshall Islands	6
Papua New Guinea	30	Antigua and Barbuda	5
Moldova	29	Micronesia	5
Georgia	26	Tuvalu	5
Croatia	25		
Kyrgystan	23		
Bosnia-Herzegovina	21		
Eritrea	21		
Mongolia	21		
Albania	19		
Laos	18		
Bhutan	12		

TABLE IV

MAJOR IGO MEMBERSHIPS FOR MICRO-STATES

MICRO-STATES	MEMBERSHIPS
Andorra	UN, Council of Europe
Antigua and Barbuda	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Bahamas	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Bahrain	UN, Arab League, OPEC, OIC, OAPEC, GCC
Barbados	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Belize	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Brunei	UN, Commonwealth, ASEAN, OIC
Cape Verde	UN, OAU, ECOWAS
Comoros	UN, OAU, OIC
Cyprus	UN, Commonwealth, OSCE, Council of Europe
Djibouti	UN, OAU, Arab League, OIC
Dominica	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Equatorial Guinea	UN, OAU
Fiji	UN, South Pacific Forum, CP
Gabon	UN, OAU, OPEC, OIC
Gambia	UN, Commonwealth, OAU, ECOWAS, OIC
Grenada	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Guinea-Bissau	UN, OAU, ECOWAS, OIC
Guyana	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Iceland	UN, NATO, EFTA, Council of Europe, OSCE, OECD, NC
Kiribati	Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum

TABLE IV**MAJOR IGO MEMBERSHIPS FOR MICRO-STATES**

MICRO-STATES	MEMBERSHIPS
Liechtenstein	UN, EFTA, Council of Europe, OSCE
Luxembourg	UN, EC, NATO, WEU, OECD, Council of Europe, OSCE
Maldives	UN, Commonwealth, SAAEC, CP
Malta	UN, Commonwealth, OSCE, Council of Europe
Marshall Islands	UN, South Pacific Forum
Mauritius	UN, Commonwealth, OAU
Micronesia	UN, South Pacific Forum
Monaco	UN, OSCE
Nauru	Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum
Palau	UN, South Pacific Forum
Qatar	UN, Arab League, OPEC, GCC, OIC, OAPEC
St. Kitts and Nevis	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
St. Lucia	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
St. Vincent and Grenadines	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
San Marino	UN, OSCE, Council of Europe
São Tomé and Príncipe	UN, OAU
Seychelles	UN, Commonwealth, OAU
Solomon Islands	UN, Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum
Suriname	UN, OAS, CARICOM
Swaziland	UN, Commonwealth, OAU, SADCC
Tonga	Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum
Tuvalu	Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum
Vanuatu	UN, Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum
Western Samoa	UN, Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum

TABLE V***MAJOR IGO MEMBERSHIPS FOR SMALL STATES**

SMALL STATES	MEMBERSHIPS
Albania	UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, P/P
Armenia	UN, BSCE, CIS, Council of Europe, OSCE, P/P
Benin	UN, OAU, ECOWAS, OIC
Bhutan	UN, SAAEC, CP
Bosnia-Herzegovina	UN, Council of Europe, OSCE
Botswana	UN, Commonwealth, OAU, SADCC
Burundi	UN, OAU,
Central African Republic	UN, OAU
Chad	UN, OAU
Congo	UN, OAU
Costa Rica	UN, OAS, CACM, ALADI
Croatia	UN, Council of Europe, OSCE
Denmark	UN, EU, NATO, Council of Europe, OSCE, OECD, WEU, NC
El Salvador	UN, OAS, CACM
Eritrea	UN, OAU
Estonia	UN, Council of Europe, CBSS, OSCE, WEU* P/P, NC
Finland	UN, EU, OSCE, OECD, Council of Europe, P/P
Georgia	UN, BSEC, CIS, OSCE, Council of Europe, P/P
Haiti	UN, OAS, CARICOM
Honduras	UN, OAS, CACM, ALADI
Ireland	UN, EC, Council of Europe, OECD, WEU* OSCE

TABLE V**MAJOR IGO MEMBERSHIPS FOR SMALL STATES**

SMALL STATES	MEMBERSHIPS
Israel	UN
Jamaica	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Jordan	UN, Arab League, OIC
Kuwait	UN, Arab League, OPEC, GCC, OIC, OAPEC
Kyrgyzstan	UN, CIS, OIC, OSCE, P/P, ECO
Laos	UN, CP, ASEAN*
Latvia	UN, CBSS, Council of Europe, OSCE, WEU, P/P, NC*
Lebanon	UN, Arab League, OIC
Lesotho	UN, Commonwealth, OAU, SADCC
Liberia	UN, OAU, ECOWAS
Libya	UN, Arab League, OAU, OPEC, OIC, OAPEC
Lithuania	UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, WEU, P/P, NC*
Macedonia	UN, OSCE, Council of Europe
Mauritania	UN, OAU, Arab League, ECOWAS, OIC
Moldova	UN, OSCE, BSEC, Council of Europe, P/P, CIS
Mongolia	UN
Namibia	UN, Commonwealth, OAU, SADCC
New Zealand	UN, Commonwealth, ANZUS, OECD, South Pacific Forum
Nicaragua	UN, OAS, CACM, ALADI
Norway	UN, NATO, EFTA, OSCE, OECD, Council of Europe, NC
Oman	UN, Arab League, GCC, OIC
Panama	UN, OAS, ALADI

TABLE V**MAJOR IGO MEMBERSHIPS FOR SMALL STATES**

SMALL STATES	MEMBERSHIPS
Papua New Guinea	UN, Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum, CP
Paraguay	UN, OAS, Merosur
Sierra Leone	UN, Commonwealth, OAU, ECOWAS, OIC
Singapore	UN, Commonwealth, ASEAN, CP
Slovenia	UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, P/P
Slovakia	UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, P/P
Somalia	UN, OAU, Arab League, OIC
Tajikistan	UN, CIS, ECO, P/P, OSCE
Togo	UN, OAU, ECOWAS
Trinidad and Tobago	UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Turkmenistan	UN, CIS, ECO, P/P, OSCE
United Arab Emirates	UN, Arab League, OPEC, GCC, OAPEC
Uruguay	UN, OAS, Merosur

*Key: ALADI: Latin American Integration Association; ASEAN: Association of South-East Asian nations; BSEC: Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone; CACM: Central American Common Market; CARICOM: Caribbean Community and Common Market; CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States; Commonwealth of Nations; CP: Colombo Plan; CBSS: Council of Baltic Sea States; Council of Europe; ECO: Economic Cooperation Organization; ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States; EFTA: European Free-Trade Association; EU: European Union; GCC: Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf; Merosur; NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization; NC: Nordic Council; OAPEC: Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries; OAS: Organization of American States; OAU: Organization of African Unity; OECD: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development; OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; OSCE: Organization For Security and Cooperation in Europe; SAAEC: South Asian Association for Economic Cooperation; SADCC: South African Development Coordination Conference; South Pacific Forum; States of the Gulf; UN: United Nations.

* Associate status

TABLE VI

MICRO-STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM¹

	IAEA	IBRD	IDA	IFC	IMF	FAO	IFAO	GATT	IMO	ICAO	ILO
Andorra											
Antigua and Barbuda		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bahamas*		X		X	X	X			X	X	X
Bahrain*		X			X	X			X	X	X
Barbados		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Belize		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Brunei*									X	X	
Cape Verde*		X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Comoros		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
Cyprus	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Djibouti		X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Dominica*		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Equatorial Guinea*		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
Fiji*		X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Gabon	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Gambia		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Grenada*		X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Guinea-Bissau*		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Guyana		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Iceland	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Kiribati*		X	X	X	X					X	

¹Europa World Year Book, 1993, Volume I (London: Europa Publications, 1993), pp. 50-52.

* "Countries to whose territories GATT has been applied, and which now, as independent states, maintain a *de facto* application of the GATT pending final decisions as to their future commercial policy." *Ibid.*

TABLE VI

MICRO-STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

	IAEA	IBRD	IDA	IFC	IMF	FAO	IFAO	GATT	IMO	ICAO	ILO
Liechtenstein	X										
Luxembourg	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Maldives		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Malta		X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Marshall Islands		X	X		X					X	
Mauritius	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Micronesia										X	
Monaco	X								X	X	
Nauru										X	
Palau											
Qatar*	X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X
San Marino										X	
São Tomé and Príncipe*		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
St. Kitts and Nevis*		X	X		X	X	X				
St. Lucia*		X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X
St. Vincent and Grenadines*					X	X	X		X	X	
Seychelles*		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Solomon Islands*		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Suriname		X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Swaziland*		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Tonga*		X		X	X	X				X	
Tuvalu*											
Vanuatu				X	X	X			X	X	
Western Samoa		X	X	X	X	X	X				

TABLE VI

MICRO-STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

	ITU	UNESCO	UNIDO	UPU	WHO	WMO	WIPO	UN
Andorra	X	X					X	X
Antigua and Barbuda	X	X	X		X	X		X
Bahamas	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bahrain	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Barbados	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Belize	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Brunei	X			X	X	X		X
Cape Verde	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Comoros	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Cyprus	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Djibouti	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Dominica		X	X	X		X		X
Equatorial Guinea	X	X	X	X	X			X
Fiji	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Gabon	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Gambia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Grenada	X	X	X	X	X			X
Guinea-Bissau	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Guyana	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Iceland	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Kiribati	X	X		X	X			

TABLE VI

MICRO-STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

	ITU	UNESCO	UNIDO	UPU	WHO	WMO	WIPO	UN
Liechtenstein	X			X				X
Luxembourg	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Maldives	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Malta	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Marshall Islands					X			X
Mauritius	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Micronesia					X			X
Monaco	X	X		X	X		X	X
Nauru	X			X	X			
Palau								X
Qatar	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
San Marino	X	X		X	X			X
São Tomé and Príncipe	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
St. Kitts and Nevis		X	X	X	X			X
St. Lucia		X	X	X	X	X		X
St. Vincent and Grenadines	X	X	X	X	X			X
Seychelles		X	X	X	X	X		X
Solomon Islands	X			X	X	X		X
Suriname	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Swaziland	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Tonga	X	X	X	X	X			
Tuvalu		X		X				
Vanuatu	X		X	X	X	X		X
Western Samoa	X	X		X	X			X

TABLE VII

SMALL STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM¹

	IAEA	IBRD	IDA	IFC	IMF	FAO	IFAD	GATT	IMO	ICAO	ILO
Albania	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			x	x
Armenia	x	x	x		x	x	x			x	x
Bhutan		x	x		x	x	x				
Benin		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Bosnia-Hercegovina						x	x		x	x	x
Botswana		x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
Burundi		x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
Central African Republic		x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
Chad		x	x		x	x	x	x		x	x
Costa Rica	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
Congo		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Croatia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
Denmark	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
El Salvador	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Eritrea		x	x		x	x	x		x	x	x
Estonia	x	x		x	x	x			x	x	x
Finland	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Georgia		x	x						x	x	x
Haiti	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Honduras		x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
Ireland	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Israel	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Jamaica	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Jordan	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x

¹ *The Europa Yearbook 1993, Volume I* (London: Europa Publications, 1993), pp. 50-52.

* "Countries to whose territories GATT has been applied, and which now, as independent states, maintain a *de facto* application of the GATT pending final decisions as to their future commercial policy." *Ibid.*

TABLE VII

SMALL STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

	IAEA	IBRD	IDA	IFC	IMF	FAO	IFAD	GATT	IMO	ICAO	ILO
Kuwait	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kyrgystan		X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Laos		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
Latvia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Lebanon	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Lesotho		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Liberia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Libya	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Lithuania	X	X		X	X	X				X	X
Macedonia		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Mauritania		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Moldova		X	X							X	X
Mongolia	X	X	X	X	X	X					X
Namibia*		X		X	X			X	X	X	X
New Zealand	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Nicaragua	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Norway	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Oman		X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X
Panama	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Papua New Guinea*		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Paraguay	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Sierra Leone	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Singapore	X	X		X	X			X	X	X	X
Slovenia	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X
Slovakia	X	X	X	X	X			X	X		X
Tajikistan		X		X		X	X			X	X
Togo		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Trinidad and Tobago		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Turkmenistan		X			X				X	X	
United Arab Emirates*	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Uruguay	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

TABLE VII

SMALL STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

	ITU	UNESCO	UNIDO	UPU	WHO	WMO	WIPO	UN
Albania	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Armenia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bhutan	X	X	X	X	X			X
Benin	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bosnia-Herzegovina	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Botswana	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Burundi	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Central African Republic	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Chad	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Costa Rica	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Congo	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Croatia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Denmark	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
El Salvador	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Eritrea	X	X		X	X	X		X
Estonia	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Finland	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Georgia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Haiti	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Honduras	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ireland	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Israel	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Jamaica	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Jordan	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kuwait	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Kyrgystan		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Laos	X	X	X	X	X	X		X

TABLE VII

SMALL STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

	ITU	UNESCO	UNIDO	UPU	WHO	WMO	WIPO	UN
Latvia	X	X		X	X		X	X
Lebanon	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lesotho	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Liberia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Libya	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lithuania	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Macedonia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mauritania	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Moldova	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Mongolia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Namibia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
New Zealand	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Nicaragua	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Norway	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Oman	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Panama	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Papua New Guinea	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Paraguay	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sierra Leone	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Singapore	X			X	X	X	X	X
Slovakia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Slovenia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Tajikistan		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Togo	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Trinidad and Tobago	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Turkmenistan	X	X		X	X	X		X
United Arab Emirates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Uruguay	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

TABLE VIII**THE SIZE OF SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE MISSIONS TO
THE UNITED NATIONS (New York)¹**

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
Costa Rica	17	Cyprus	11
Israel	17	Gabon	9
Jamaica	13	Brunei	8
New Zealand	13	Antigua and Barbuda	7
Norway	12	Cape Verde	6
Finland	11	Gambia	6
Denmark	10	Guyana	6
Honduras	10	Swaziland	6
Libya	10	Malta	5
El Salvador	9	Suriname	5
Ireland	9	Bahamas	4
Nicaragua	9	Bahrain	4
Haiti	8	Barbados	4
Jordan	8	Fiji	4
Kuwait	8	Qatar	4
Oman	8	St. Lucia	4
Uruguay	8	San Marino	4
Benin	7	Andorra	3
Namibia	7	Maldives	3
Panama	7	Mauritius	3
Togo	7	Guinea-Bissau	3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	6	Djibouti	3
Botswana	6	Dominica	3
Estonia	6	Iceland	3
Latvia	6	Luxembourg	3
Liberia	6	Micronesia	3
Mauritania	6	St. Kitts and Nevis	3
Slovakia	6	Solomon Islands	3
Slovenia	6	Belize	2
Bhutan	5		

¹ *Permanent Missions to the United Nations, No. 274* (New York: United Nations, August, 1994).

TABLE VIII**THE SIZE OF SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE MISSIONS TO
THE UNITED NATIONS (New York)**

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
Croatia	5	Comoros	2
Georgia	5	Equatorial Guinea	2
Lesotho	5	Grenada	2
Lithuania	5	Marshall Islands	2
Papua New Guinea	5	Monaco	2
Paraguay	5	St. Vincent and Grenadines	2
Sierra Leone	5	São Tomé and Príncipe	2
Singapore	5	Seychelles	2
Trinidad and Tobago	5	Western Samoa	2
Albania	4	Liechtenstein	2
Armenia	4	Palau	1
Chad	4	Vanuatu	1
Laos	4		
Mongolia	4		
United Arab Emirates	4		
Central African Republic	3		
Congo	3		
Eritrea	3		
Kyrgystan	3		
Lebanon	3		
Macedonia	3		
Burundi	2		
Somalia	2		
Moldova	1		
Tajikistan	1		
Turkmenistan	1		

TABLE IX

**MEMBERSHIP OF SELECTED MICRO-DEPENDENCIES IN
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS**

Montserrat	11
Netherlands Antilles	7
Anguilla	6
Cook Islands	6
Aruba	5
Bermuda	5
Greenland	3
Gibraltar	3
Faroe Islands	2
Åland Islands	1
Guernsey	1
Jersey	1
Western Sahara	1
Isle of Man	0
East Timor	0

TABLE X**MICRO-STATE AND SMALL STATE MEMBERSHIPS IN
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS¹**

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
Denmark	2389	Luxembourg	982
Finland	2143	Iceland	861
Norway	2130	Cyprus	558
Ireland	1507	Malta	433
Israel	1412	Mauritius	385
New Zealand	1178	Barbados	312
Slovakia	1132	Andorra	286
Croatia	1075	Fiji	284
Slovenia	1025	Guyana	274
Uruguay	795	Monaco	260
Estonia	789	Bahamas	251
Singapore	783	Gabon	248
Lithuania	744	Bahrain	225
Costa Rica	658	Gambia	213
Latvia	619	Swaziland	197
Panama	557	Liechtenstein	188
Namibia	508	Suriname	186
Lebanon	504	Belize	163
Jamaica	462	Seychelles	160
Jordan	458	Qatar	158
Paraguay	450	St. Lucia	156
Kuwait	445	Antigua and Barbuda	141
Trinidad and Tobago	420	Grenada	139
Honduras	383	Brunei	134
El Salvador	378	Dominica	133

¹ *Yearbook of International Organizations, 1992-93, Volume II, 10th ed.* (München, New York, London, Paris: K. G. Saur, 1992), esp. Table III, pp. 1612-1614.

TABLE X**MICRO-STATE AND SMALL STATE MEMBERSHIPS IN
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS**

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
Nicaragua	364	Western Samoa	127
Georgia	362	Solomon Islands	119
Papua New Guinea	348	St. Vincent and Grenadines	118
Sierra Leone	328	Djibouti	112
Togo	311	San Marino	104
Libya	292	Vanuatu	99
Benin	291	Tonga	97
Congo	279	St. Kitts and Nevis	94
United Arab Emirates	277	Guinea-Bissau	81
Liberia	276	Cape Verde	74
Haiti	274	Comoros	72
Botswana	270	Equatorial Guinea	69
Moldova	265	Kiribati	66
Bosnia-Herzegovina	243	Maldives	48
Lesotho	234	Palau	45
Armenia	219	Tuvalu	44
Macedonia	213	São Tomé and Príncipe	41
Benin	194	Nauru	34
Mauritania	192	Marshall Islands	27
Central African Republic	180	Micronesia	19
Oman	133		
Chad	145		
Kyrgyzstan	122		
Turkmenistan	112		
Mongolia	107		

TABLE X

**MICRO-STATE AND SMALL STATE MEMBERSHIPS IN
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS**

SMALL STATES		MICRO-STATES	
Tajikistan	98		
Albania	88		
Eritrea	64		
Laos	61		
Bhutan	48		

TABLE XI
PATTERNS OF MICRO-STATE DIPLOMACY

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Andorra	France Holy See Spain United Nations	France Spain		
Antigua and Barbuda	United Kingdom United States United Nations	China United Kingdom United States Venezuela	Canada Germany (2, Hon.) United States	Denmark Germany
Bahamas	Canada United Kingdom United States United Nations	France United Kingdom United States European Union	United States (2)	Austria (Hon.) Canada (Hon.) Denmark Germany (Hon.) Iceland Jamaica (Hon.) Sweden Switzerland (Hon.)

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Bahrain	Egypt France Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Saudi-Arabia Tunisia United States United Nations United Nations, Geneva	Algeria Bangladesh Egypt France Germany India Iran Iraq Japan Jordan Korea, Republic of Kuwait Oman Pakistan Saudi-Arabia Tunisia United Kingdom United States	United States	Belgium Denmark New Zealand Norway Sweden Switzerland
Barbados	Belgium Canada Trinidad and Tobago United Kingdom United States Venezuela United Nations	Argentina Brazil Canada China Colombia Costa Rica France Holy See	Australia (2) Canada Germany (2) United States (2)	Austria (Hon.) Belgium Cyprus Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Finland Germany (Hon.)

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Barbados cont.		Korea, Republic of United Kingdom United States Venezuela European Union		Haiti Israel Italy Jamaica (Hon.) Mexico Netherlands Norway Peru Sweden
Belize	Canada Mexico United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States United Nations	Belgium China (Taiwan) Costa Rica Honduras Jordan Mexico Panama Sweden United Kingdom United States Venezuela European Union	Canada Germany (Hon.) Sweden (Hon.) United States (7, 6 Hon.)	Denmark Germany (Hon.) Jamaica

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Brunei	Australia Egypt France Germany India Indonesia Japan Korea, Republic of Malaysia New Zealand Oman Phillipines Saudi-Arabia Singapore Thailand United Kingdom United States United Nations United Nations, Geneva	Australia France Germany Indonesia Japan Korea, Republic of Malaysia Oman Pakistan Phillipines Singapore Thailand United Kingdom United States		Austria Belgium (Hon.) New Zealand Netherlands (Hon.) Sweden
Cape Verde	Angola Cuba Germany Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Portugal	Brazil China Cuba France Portugal Russia	Germany (4, Hon.) Netherlands United States	Denmark Germany Sweden

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Cape Verde cont.	Russia Senegal United States United Nations	Senegal United States European Union		
Comoros	France United Nations	China France Mauritius Seychelles Sweden United States European Union	Germany (Hon.)	Belgium Italy South Africa
Cyprus	Australia Belgium China Egypt France Germany Greece India Italy Kenya Libya Mexico Russia	Australia Bulgaria China Cuba Czech Republic Egypt France Germany Greece Holy See Hungary India Iran	Austria (Hon.) Barbados Denmark (Hon.) Dominican Republic (H) Ecuador (Hon.) Finland (Hon.) France (3, Hon.) Germany (5, 3 Hon.) Greece India (Hon.) Italy (5, 4 Hon.) Kuwait (Hon.) Lebanon (2, Hon.)	Austria (Hon.) Belgium (2, Hon.) Brazil (2, Hon.) Burundi (Hon.) Canada (Hon.) Chile (Hon.) Colombia (Hon.) Cost Rica (Hon.) Denmark (Hon.) Ecuador (Hon.) Finland Guyana (Hon.) Iceland

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Cyprus, cont.	Syria	Israel	Malta (Hon.)	Ireland (Hon.)
	United Kingdom	Italy	Norway (Hon.)	Japan (Hon.)
	United States	Lebanon	Panama	Jordan (Hon.)
	Yugoslavia	Libya	Papua New Guinea (H.)	Liberia (Hon.)
	United Nations	Romania	Peru (Hon.)	Luxembourg (Hon.)
	United Nations (Geneva)	Russia	Philippines (Hon.)	Mali (Hon.)
		Slovakia	Portugal (Hon.)	Malta (Hon.)
		Syria	Spain (Hon.)	Mexico (Hon.)
		United Kingdom	Sweden (Hon.)	Netherlands (Hon.)
		United States	Switzerland (2, Hon.)	Norway (2, Hon.)
		Yemen	United Kingdom (5, Hon.)	Oman (Hon.)
		Yugoslavia	United States (15, 14 H.)	Panama (Hon.)
		European Union	Uruguay (Hon.)	Peru (Hon.)
		FAO		Philippines (Hon.)
		UNDP		Portugal (Hon.)
		UNFICYP		Rwanda (Hon.)
		PLO		San Marino (Hon.)
				Sierra Leone (Hon.)
				Spain (Hon.)
				Sri Lanka (Hon.)
				Sweden
				Switzerland
				Thailand (Hon.)

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Djibouti	Belgium Egypt Ethiopia France Iraq Japan Kenya Saudi-Arabia Somalia Tunisia United States United Nations	China Egypt Ethiopia France Iraq Libya Oman Russia Saudi-Arabia Somalia Sudan United States Yemen European Union	Germany (Hon.) Luxembourg	Belgium Denmark Germany (Hon.) Sweden United Kingdom (Hon.)
Dominica	Belgium Canada (joint OECS) India United Kingdom United Nations	China (Taiwan) Venezuela	United States	Sweden
Equatorial Guinea	Cameroun China Ethiopia France	Cameroun China Cuba France		United Kingdom

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Equatorial Guinea, cont.	Gabon Morocco Nigeria Poland Russia Spain United Nations	Gabon Korea, D.P.R. Nigeria Russia Spain Sweden United States European Union		
Fiji	Australia Belgium Japan New Zealand United Kingdom United States United Nations	Australia China France Japan Korea, Republic of Malaysia Marshall Islands Micronesia New Zealand Papua New Guinea Tuvalu United Kingdom United States European Union	Australia Canada United States	Canada Denmark Finland Nauru Norway Sweden

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Gabon	Algeria Angola Argentina Belgium Cameroun Canada Central African Republic China Congo Egypt Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia France Germany Iran Italy Ivory Coast Japan Kenya Korea, P.D.R. Korea, Republic of Kuwait Mauritania Morocco Nigeria Russia Saudi-Arabia	Algeria Angola Argentina Belgium Brazil Cameroun Canada Central African Republic China Congo Egypt Equatorial Guinea France Germany Guinea Iran Italy Ivory Coast Japan Korea, P.D.R. Korea, Republic of Lebanon Mauritania Morocco Nigeria Philippines Russia	Australia (Hon.) Austria (Hon.) Germany (3, 2 Hon.) Japan	Denmark France (2)

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Gabon, cont.	Senegal Spain Togo United Kingdom United States Venezuela Yugoslavia Zaire United Nations United Nations (Geneva) European Union	São Tome and Príncipe Senegal Spain Sweden Togo Tunisia United States Uruguay Venezuela Yugoslavia Zaire Zimbabwe European Union		
The Gambia	Belgium Nigeria Saudi-Arabia Senegal Sierra Leone United Kingdom United States United Nations European Union	China Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Sweden United Kingdom United States European Union	Austria (Hon.) Denmark Germany (3, Hon.) United States	Denmark

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Grenada	Belgium Canada Cuba United States Venezuela United Nations European Union	China (Taiwan) United Kingdom United States Venezuela European Union	Canada Germany (Hon.) United States	France Guyana (Hon.) Netherlands (Hon.) Sweden
Guinea-Bissau	Algeria Belgium China (Taiwan) Cuba Egypt Guinea Portugal Russia Senegal Sweden United States United Nations European Union	Algeria Brazil Cape Verde China (Taiwan) Cuba Egypt France Germany Korea, P.D.R. Libya Portugal Russia Senegal Sweden United States European Union	Germany (Hon.) United States	United Kingdom (Hon.)

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Guyana	Belgium Brazil Canada China Cuba India Russia United Kingdom United States Venezuela United Nations European Union	Brazil Canada China Colombia Cuba Germany India Jamaica Korea, D.P.R. Libya Russia Suriname United Kingdom United States Venezuela European Union	Cyprus (Hon.) United States (4, 3 Hon.)	Denmark Finland Germany Jamaica (Hon.) Sweden
Iceland	Belgium China Denmark France Germany Norway Russia Sweden United Kingdom	China Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Norway Russia Sweden	Argentina Australia (3) Austria (2, Hon.) Bangladesh Brazil (2) Canada (9) Chile Colombia Cuba	Australia (Hon.) Canada (Hon.) Cyprus (Hon.) Denmark (6) Finland (5, Hon.) Germany (6, Hon.) Sweden (4) United Kingdom (Hon.)

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Iceland, cont.	United States United Nations United Nations (Geneva)	United Kingdom United States	Cyprus Denmark (15, Hon.) Egypt Finland (7) France (6) Germany (11, Hon.) Greece India (3) Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy (7) Japan (Hon.) Kenya Korea, Rep. of (Hon.) Lebanon Luxembourg Malaysia Malta Mexico Netherlands (3) New Zealand (Hon.) Nigeria Norway (10) Pakistan (2) Panama	

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Iceland, cont.			Philippines Portugal (2) Singapore South Africa Spain (6) Sri Lanka Sweden (8) Switzerland (3, Hon.) Tunisia Turkey (2) United Kingdom (14) United States (21) Uruguay Venezuela Yugoslavia	
Kiribati		Australia New Zealand United Kingdom	Australia (Hon.) Germany (Hon.) New Zealand (Hon.) United Kingdom United States (Hon.)	
Liechtenstein	Austria Belgium	Holy See		34 non-resident consulates

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Liechtenstein, cont.	Switzerland United Nations			
Luxembourg	Austria Belgium China Denmark France Germany Holy See Italy Japan Netherlands Portugal Russia Spain Switzerland United Kingdom United States United Nations United Nations (Geneva) European Union NATO	Austria Belgium Bulgaria China Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Portugal Russia Spain Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States Zaire European Union	Australia (Hon.) Austria (3, 2 Hon.) Cyprus (Hon.) Denmark (Hon.) Germany (11, Hon.) Malta (Hon.) United States (16, 15 H.)	Burkina Faso (Hon.) Canada (Hon.) Djibouti Finland Iceland Mali Malta Monaco Sweden Togo

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Maldives	India Sri Lanka United Nations	India Pakistan Sri Lanka		Denmark France Sweden
Malta	Algeria Australia Belgium China Egypt France Germany Iraq Italy Libya Philippines Russia United Kingdom United States Uruguay United Nations	Australia China Czech Republic Egypt France Germany Holy See Italy Korea, D.P.R. Libya Russia Slovakia Spain Tunisia United Kingdom United States European Union PLO	Australia (5, 3 Hon.) Austria (3, Hon.) Brazil (2, Hon.) Cameroun (Hon.) Canada (2, Hon.) Cyprus (Hon.) Denmark (2, Hon.) Finland (Hon.) France (Hon.) Greece (Hon.) Germany (7, Hon.) Greece (Hon.) India, (2, Hon.) Iraq Ireland (Hon.) Israel (2, Hon.) Italy (15, Hon.) Japan (2, Hon.) Jordan (Hon.) Korea, Rep. of (Hon.) Lebanon (2, Hon.)	Austria (Hon.) Belgium (Hon.) Canada (Hon.) Colombia (Hon.) Cyprus (Hon.) Denmark Finland Honduras (Hon.) Iceland Japan (Hon.) Liberia (Hon.) Luxembourg (Hon.) Mexico (Hon.) Monaco (Hon.) Netherlands (Hon.) Norway (Hon.) Pakistan (Hon.) Philippines (Hon.) Poland (Hon.) Portugal (Hon.) San Marino (Hon.)

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Malta, cont.			Luxembourg Mexico (Hon.) New Zealand (2, Hon.) Norway (Hon.) Pakistan (Hon.) Philippines (Hon.) Portugal (Hon.) Singapore (Hon.) Spain (Hon.) Sweden (3, Hon.) Switzerland (4, Hon.) Syria (Hon.) Turkey (Hon.) United Kingdom (Hon.) United States (9, 8 Hon.) Venezuela (Hon.)	Senegal (Hon.) Sweden Switzerland (Hon.) Thailand (Hon.) Turkey (Hon.) Yugoslavia (Hon.)
Marshall Islands	China Fiji United States United Nations	Australia China United States	United States	
Mauritius	Australia Belgium Comoros	Australia China	Australia (3, Hon.) Germany (2, Hon.)	Austria (Hon.) Belgium

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Mauritius, cont.	Egypt France India Kenya Pakistan United Kingdom United States United Nations	France India Korea, Republic of Madagascar Pakistan Russia United Kingdom United States European Union	Italy (Hon.) New Zealand (Hon.) United States (Hon.)	Denmark Finland Germany (Hon.) New Zealand (Hon.) South Africa (Trade Of.) Spain (Hon.) Switzerland (Hon.)
Micronesia	Fiji Japan United States United Nations	Australia Japan Korea, Republic of Philippines United States	United States (2)	
Monaco	Belgium France Germany Holy See Italy Switzerland United Nations	France	Australia (2, Hon.) Austria (Hon.) Belgium (3) Denmark (Hon.) France (8) Germany (5, Hon.) Luxembourg Malta (Hon.) Netherlands (3)	Austria (Hon.) Canada Denmark Finland France Germany (Hon.) Ireland (Hon.) Mexico (Hon.) San Marino

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Monaco, cont.			Switzerland (5) United States (12, Hon.)	Sweden
Nauru		Australia China (Taiwan)	Australia (2, 1 Hon.) China (Taiwan) Fiji India New Zealand	
Palau	Japan United Nations	United States	Philippines United Kingdom	
Qatar	Algeria Austria Bangladesh Belgium China Egypt France Germany India Iran Iraq Japan Jordan	Algeria Bangladesh China Egypt France Germany India Iran Iraq Japan Jordan Korea, Republic of Kuwait		

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Qatar, cont.	Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Pakistan Russia Saudi-Arabia Somalia Spain Sudan Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States United Nations United Nations (Geneva)	Lebanon Mauritania Morocco Oman Pakistan Russia Saudi-Arabia Somalia Sudan Syria Tunisia Turkey United Kingdom United States Yemen		
St. Christopher & Nevis	Canada (Joint OECS) United Kingdom (OECS) United States United Nations	China (Taiwan) Venezuela	United States (2, Hon.)	Denmark

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
St. Lucia	Canada (Joint OECS) United Kingdom (OECS) United States United Nations	China (Taiwan) France United Kingdom Venezuela	Germany (Hon.)	Denmark Germany (Hon.) Jamaica (Hon.)
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Canada (Joint OECS) United Kingdom (OECS) United Nations	China (Taiwan) Venezuela	Japan (Hon.)	Denmark Germany (Hon.)
San Marino	Austria Belgium France Holy See Italy Switzerland United Nations United Nations (Geneva)	Holy See Italy	Argentina Australia (Hon.) Austria (Hon.) Belgium (Hon.) Brazil Canada (2, Hon.) Cyprus (Hon.) Finland France (5) Greece India Israel Italy (13) Japan Malta (Hon.)	

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
San Marino, cont.			Mexico Monaco Panama Spain Sweden Switzerland (3) Turkey United Kingdom United States (3) Venezuela Yugoslavia	
São Tomé and Príncipe	Angola Belgium Gabon Portugal United Nations	Angola China Cuba Gabon Korea, D.P.R. Portugal Russia European Union	United Kingdom (Hon.) United States (Hon.)	Sweden United Kingdom (Hon.)
Seychelles	Comoros Cuba France United Kingdom	China Cuba France	Australia (2, Hon.) Denmark (Hon.) France (Hon.)	Belgium Denmark Finland

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Seychelles, cont.	United Nations	India Netherlands Russia Sweden United Kingdom United States European Union	Germany (Hon.)	Germany
Solomon Islands	United Nations	Australia China (Taiwan) Japan New Zealand United Kingdom United States European Union	Australia (2, 1 Hon.) United Kingdom	Germany (Hon.) Sweden
Suriname	Belgium Brazil Mexico Netherlands United States Venezuela United Nations	Belgium Brazil China France Guyana India Indonesia Japan	Germany (Hon.) United States (2, 1 Hon.)	Denmark Finland Germany (Hon.) Sweden United Kingdom (Hon.)

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Suriname, cont.		Korea, Republic of Libya Netherlands Russia United States Venezuela European Union		
Swaziland	Belgium Denmark United Kingdom United States United Nations	China (Taiwan) Israel Mozambique United Kingdom United States European Union	Denmark (Hon.) Germany (Hon.) South Africa (Trade Of.)	Austria (Hon.) Denmark South Africa (Trade Of.) Zaire
Tonga	United Kingdom	Australia China (Taiwan) New Zealand United Kingdom European Union	Australia (Hon.) Germany (2, Hon.) New Zealand United States	Germany (Hon.)
Tuvalu	Fiji	United Kingdom	Australia (Hon.) Germany (Hon.)	

State	Missions Sent	Missions Received	Consulates Sent	Consulates Received
Tuvalu, cont.			New Zealand (Hon.)	
Vanuatu	Cuba United Nations	Australia China France New Zealand United Kingdom European Union		Sweden
Western Samoa	Australia Belgium New Zealand United States United Nations	Australia China New Zealand United States European Union	Germany (Hon.) United States (Hon.)	Germany (Hon.) Sweden (Hon.) United Kingdom (Hon.)

CHAPTER SIX

Economic Dependence in the International Relations of Micro-States: The Structure of the Small Economy

Thus far, we have examined the position of micro-states in the international system in terms of legal status and diplomatic activity. Questions about the credibility of sovereignty and the legitimacy of claims for separate independence characterise micro-state international relations. And the limitations of very small size clearly set micro-states apart from the normal diplomatic practices of other small states. Are these initial impressions of weakness borne out in the international economic relations of micro-states? To what extent does the very small size of the micro-state economy necessitate conditions of extreme dependence?

The issue of dependence is a central and recurring theme in small state studies. In this last section of our discussion we examine the structural elements of dependence in the international economic relations of micro-states. In particular, we focus on the relationship between very small size and economic dependence as reflected in the commodity composition and geographical direction of trade, and in patterns of capital investment and budgetary support.

We begin in this chapter by briefly reviewing various approaches to the definition and usage of dependence. Particular attention is given to the distinctions between functional and structural dimensions of dependence. Very small economies reflect both elements. In the concluding pages of the chapter we outline the most familiar constraints facing micro-states in any attempt to reduce their dependence in the international system; those problems which arise from the highly skewed structure of their very small economies.

The Concept of Dependence

What do we mean by dependence? It has been defined simply as "a subordinate relation to the outside world."¹ This first suggests passivity: The dependent state moves in an external environment which is determined primarily by other actors. It cannot contribute to the shape and direction of events beyond its borders, however much they may affect its own interests. The dependent state is "system-ineffectual." Its foreign policy is "adjustment to reality, not rearrangement of it."²

However, dependence not only limits the opportunities for a state to condition its own external environment. The dependent state is itself vulnerable to external pressures which determine the scope and direction of its behaviour. As dependence deepens, so the state's capacity to qualify and adapt external influence is weakened. The dependent state can lose control even over its internal affairs as these become increasingly managed within the terms of external interests.

Economists as well as political scientists have stressed the importance of vulnerability as the critical element of dependence. Michael Michaely, for example, argues that "An agent is 'dependent' on some phenomenon (or position, or act), if it is vulnerable to its complete disappearance or to disturbances in it; and the more severe the vulnerability, the heavier the dependence."³ Michaely's concerns centred on the economic

¹Gabriele Winai Ström, *Development and Dependence in Lesotho-the Enclave of South Africa* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978), p. 14.

²Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputian Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," *International Organization* XXIII (Spring, 1969, No. 2), 296.
See also: Vaughan A. Lewis and A. W. Singham, "Integration, Domination and the Small-State System: The Caribbean," in S. Lewis and T. G. Matthews (eds.) *Caribbean Integration* (Puerto Rico: Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico, 1967), p. 128.

³Michaely understands this vulnerability to consist of two components: ". . . the *extent of the damage* that would occur should the disruption of the phenomenon on which the agent is dependent take place; the other is the *likelihood* of such an event, that is, of the disruption actually occurring. Dependence is thus a product of a multiplicand and multiplier. The larger either of the two components is- given the other- the larger is the vulnerability and the higher the degree of dependence. . . "

vulnerabilities of states in terms of foreign trade, foreign capital and income, foreign labour and labour income, transfers of technology and macroeconomic influences and events.⁴

It is this second aspect of dependence, that is the issue of vulnerability, which is most critical to the question of a state's viability. The survival of a state may be determined finally, as Vital argues, by its capacity to withstand stress.⁵ Important here is the concept of "penetration," with its emphasis on the linkages between the internal processes of decision-making and the external sources of influence.

The notion that the contemporary state is increasingly permeable and porous is familiar enough.⁶ But, for James Rosenau, there are cases where the impact of the external environment will have been so profound as to produce "a new type of political system that will account for phenomena which not even a less rigid use of the national-international distinction renders comprehensible."⁷ Rosenau identifies this as "the penetrated political system" and describes it as follows:

A penetrated political system is one in which non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly

Michael Michaely, *Trade, Income Levels and Dependence* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1984), pp. 7-8.

⁴ Michaely focuses particularly on trade dependence. Both trade and foreign capital will be examined in an analysis of micro-state dependence in the next chapter.

⁵ David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 4, 87, 120.

⁶ John H. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," *World Politics* IX (July, 1957), 473-493.

Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft* (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 156-176.

⁷ James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.) *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 65.

with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals.⁸

Rosenau's interest is in distinguishing those political systems where external actors are directly involved from those where they are merely "influential non-participants."⁹ The involvement of non-members is the consequence of a "shortage of capabilities,"¹⁰ which is recognised in the penetrated state and exploited from the outside. States which are "thoroughgoing" penetrated systems are those, such as Cuba or the formerly independent state in South Vietnam, where external participation in domestic politics is pervasive and extends over a broad range of issue-areas.¹¹

Rosenau emphasises the importance of consent in his definition. The penetrated system is distinguished by the legitimacy accorded to the role of non-members in the allocation of values and the attainment of goals.¹² Occupied France, for example, is not considered a penetrated system in Rosenau's view because German attempts to allocate their own values and to mobilise the country in support of their goals met with resistance.¹³ This emphasis on the legitimacy of external participation presents problems in differentiating levels of consent. Rosenau interprets legitimacy to be that which is considered "binding, irrespective of whether . . . (it is) . . . accepted regretfully or

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 68

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹²As Rosenau puts it:

"Most important, the participation of non-members of the society in value-allocative and goal-attainment processes is accepted by both its officialdom and its citizenry, so that the decisions to which non-members contribute are no less authoritative and legitimate than those in which they do not participate."
Ibid., p. 64.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 66.

willingly."¹⁴ This could imply that consent may be given sullenly; an unhappy but realistic assessment of ill-fated national interests.¹⁵ In this situation domestic decision-makers are not so much persuaded as intimidated. This further suggests, (though the thrust of Rosenau's argument is towards collaboration), that the relationship between the penetrated state and external actors could be one of constant tension and hostility.

The implications of Rosenau's emphasis on consent have been taken up in later studies of dependence. The truly dependent society may be viewed as one in which the values and priorities of external interests are seen by decision makers (and perhaps by the masses) to be their own. This raises the question of the extent to which Rosenau's stress on "face-to-face interaction"¹⁶ is necessary. Decision-makers may be sensitive to external pressures, both private and governmental, without those pressures being personal and immediate. If external interests constitute the terms of reference within which policy is made, compliance will be unprompted and even intuitive.

Rosenau's approach to the subject confirms the asymmetry of the dependent state's relations with the outside world. On the one hand, it is unable to influence those events and conditions which determine its external environment. On the other, it is itself susceptible to external penetration in the determination of its values and goals. Simply put, the dependent state is characterised by one-way sensitivity to the outside world.

In practice, it is difficult to identify the threshold of dependence. Rosenau himself readily acknowledged the problems of classifying systems as penetrated: "What one observer treats as direct participation another may regard as indirect influence."¹⁷ The

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁵Rosenau cites Finland's reluctant acceptance of Soviet participation in Finnish affairs as just such an example.
Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 66.

decision is finally arbitrary. The concepts of independence, inter-dependence and dependence can only be relative and contextual descriptions. Bernard Schaffer's observation that dependence is not a category but a "score of asymmetry"¹⁸ is a sensible acknowledgement that dependence is neither necessarily static nor comprehensive.

A state's "score" is determined by the "spread" of its dependence, which can be distributed unevenly over the range of a state's interests, as Rosenau acknowledged in his distinction between "thoroughgoing" and "less thoroughgoing" penetrated systems.¹⁹ A state may be largely dependent in its trading relationships but retain substantial autonomy in its defence policy and/or its diplomatic commitments. Guyana is just such an example. For much of the post-independence period, the United States accounted for one fifth of Guyana's total trade. It was also consistently a principal source of development assistance.²⁰ Yet, Guyana was still able to pursue a radical and independent policy in the region and even in the larger context of East-West relations as her 1977 application for formal association with Comecon clearly illustrated.²¹ Moreover, Guyana's security can

¹⁸Bernard Schaffer, "The Politics of Dependence," in Percy Selwyn, (ed.) *Development Policy in Small Countries* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 29.

¹⁹Rosenau, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

²⁰While the United States is neither Guyana's principal market nor its main source of imports, it does account for the largest percentage of total trade. In 1981, the United States was Guyana's second most important market after the United Kingdom. Nearly 24 per cent of Guyana's exports went to the United States. In the same year, the United States was the source of nearly 21 per cent of Guyana's imports, second only to Trinidad and Tobago.

United Nations, *International Trade Statistics Yearbook* Volume I (New York: United Nations, 1987). The United States has consistently been among the three principal sources of bilateral aid to Guyana. Note Appendix II, Chapter Seven, Table X.

²¹At the time, Guyana's trade with Comecon states was less than one per cent in either direction. The Manley government in Jamaica also sought to develop trade relations with Comecon in order "to complete (our) policy of non-alignment."

Keesings Contemporary Archives (1977) 28219, 29367

"Guyana-Delicate Balance," *Africa* (February, 1978), 58-67.

Jean-Pierre Clerc, "Guyana, The Co-operative Republic: Socialist for Development Purposes," (translated from *Le Monde*), *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 2, 1978, 13.

hardly be said to depend on the United States, given American commitments to Venezuela, the likely source of any military threat. There is, then, no necessary spillover from dependence in one sector to that of another.

The distribution of a state's dependence is not only measured by the range of issues affected but also by the concentration of relationships. The scope for alleviating dependence is finally determined by the diversity of a state's dependent relationships. It is not just a question of "subordination to the outside world;" it is the direction of subordination which determines the "score" of a state's dependence.

Important also is the extent to which a state's dependence is perceived as permanent. Is dependence rooted in conditions which are intrinsic to the state itself or is it contingent on factors which are liable to change? Alister McIntyre refers to this distinction as that of "structural dependence" and "functional dependence". Structural dependence is "the dependence that arises because of the size and structure of the economy and cannot be helped."²² Functional dependence is "the dependence which arises as a result of particular policies chosen and therefore can be avoided if alternative policies are chosen."²³

Functional dependence can be seen as primarily self-imposed; the adoption of policies which are counter-productive and self-defeating when measured against objectives for greater autonomy. Dependence in these circumstances is largely a political-psychological handicap. The more acute the decision-makers' perceptions of their own weakness, the greater their inhibition in undertaking alternatives.²⁴

²²Alister McIntyre, "Some Issues of Trade Policy in the West Indies," in N. Girvan and P. Jefferson (eds.) *Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean* (Mona, Jamaica: New World Group, 1971), pp. 165-183.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴Percy Selwyn, "Room for Manoeuvre?," in Selwyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

The experience of dependence can be so debilitating that it engenders an overwhelming sense of impotence. For nationalist critics in Canada, for example, particularly in the 1970's, it is this aspect of dependence which is finally so pernicious and compromising:

Canada has become so deeply penetrated by the American metropolis, so dependent on it— economically, militarily, culturally and psychologically— that we are overcome by our own sense of powerlessness. The possibility of independence seems doubtful and the cost of it stupendous.²⁵

Defeatism may induce policies of reluctant acquiescence, or it may lead to policies of active and enthusiastic collaboration. In the latter instance, the institutional elements of dependence are sustained largely because external penetration of the state has advanced to the point that domestic values and interests, particularly those of the elites, coincide with the priorities of dominant external interests. This analysis of dependence, as we have noted, is apparent already in Rosenau's notion of 'the penetrated society.' And it is this domestic collusion which is seen as the basis of the neo-colonial relationship.

For radical strategists, dependence on alien interests can only be overcome as national values are recovered and genuinely bold and independent policies are adopted. Using a Marxist framework of analysis, dependency theorists view dependence as underdevelopment resulting from penetration by the international capitalist economy. Development in the dependent state is limited and confined to the priorities and prevailing interests centered in the metropolitan economies.

²⁵C. W. Gonick, "Foreign Ownership and Political Decay," in Ian Lumsden (ed.) *Close to the 49th Parallel etc.: The Americanization of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 44. This excellent collection of essays perhaps best represents the nationalist anxieties of the early Trudeau years, and in some cases, the application of dependency theory models to the American-Canadian relationship.

The Brazilian sociologist, Theotonio dos Santos, describes dependence as follows:

By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between those and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-starting, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.²⁶

There are, of course, important areas of dispute among dependency theorists in emphasis and approach, particularly in relation to the primacy of class or nation in the framework of analysis.²⁷ However, there are general propositions which are common to the literature of dependency theory:²⁸

(a) *Third-World economies proceed from undevelopment to underdevelopment*
Underdeveloped economies do not reflect conditions of pre-capitalist economies. The historical process was one of undevelopment to underdevelopment, since both development and underdevelopment are the consequences of the expansion of

²⁶Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," in K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (eds.) *Readings in U.S. Imperialism* (Boston: Porter and Sargent, 1971), p. 226.

²⁷Henry Veltmeyer, "Dependency and Underdevelopment: Some Questions and Answers," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* II (No. 2, Spring-Summer, 1978), 55

²⁸For a review of that literature see:
Ronald H. Chilcote, "Dependency: A Critical Synthesis of the Literature," *Latin American Perspectives* (No. 1, Spring, 1974), 4-29.

international capitalism. Thus, the historical process of capitalism in the Third World may be seen as "the development of underdevelopment."²⁹

(b) *The dualistic model of the underdeveloped economy is rejected as a basis for development strategy.* The persistence of dualism is not the consequence of the resilience of feudal structures and subsistence activities resistant to the modernised sector, but a response to capitalist penetration in which the rural and traditional sectors of the economy stagnate to further the process of capital accumulation. Thus, the unequal patterns of development inherent in the capitalist division of labour are duplicated in the domestic structure of the underdeveloped economy.³⁰

(c) *The underdeveloped state has little hope of becoming developed in the international capitalist economy.* Since the growth in the capitalist centre is dependent on the continued extraction of surplus value from the underdeveloped economy, the dependent state's own prospects for development are limited, particularly in relation to the growth of the internal market. The transfer of profits precludes the development of a capital and intermediate goods sector sufficient to sustain an integrated industrial economy.³¹

(d) *Dependence is sustained by the collaboration of local clientele classes, whose interests and consumption patterns are those of the capitalist centre.*³² The role of the clientele classes emphasises the importance of dependency as penetration and the essential

²⁹Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," *Monthly Review*, XVIII (No. 4, September, 1966), 17-31.

³⁰Theotonio dos Santos, "The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin America," in Henry Bernstein (ed.) *Underdevelopment and Development* (London: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 57-80.
Keith Griffin, *Underdevelopment in Spanish America* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 19-30.

³¹dos Santos, in Fann and Hodges, *op. cit.*

³²Celso Furtado, "The Concept of External Dependence in the Study of Underdevelopment," in Charles K. Wilber (ed.) *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 118-123.

functional character of dependency from a Marxist perspective. For Susanne Bodenheimer, "the existence of . . . clientele classes . . . is the kingpin and *sine qua non* of dependency."³³

Dependency theory is a useful analytical framework for understanding the manifold and often subtle patterns of domination and dependence in the "post-imperial" age. The insistence that dependence is a function of economic penetration beyond the political and military dimensions of power allows for a greater appreciation of the complexity of the dependent condition. And the use of class analysis provides a basis for understanding the functional dimension of dependence and for appreciating the extent to which it can facilitate and reinforce structural elements.

However, dependency theorists underestimate factors which are crucial to the pattern and extent of dependence; social and cultural composition, demographic structure, location, and, most important, the size of the state. These factors may in themselves be the primary determinants of dependence and may preclude any opportunity for self-generating development, even if all linkages to the metropolitan economies were severed. A state's dependent condition may be seen, then, as a mosaic of overlapping structural elements. Moreover, the structural and functional elements of dependence themselves interact. Structural dependence may induce patterns of functional dependence but the reverse is also true. Timid or self-defeating policies may exaggerate and deepen structural disabilities in the dependent state. There is no question that dependency theory provides insight into the patterns of dependence in underdeveloped economies arising from the historical process of capitalist expansion. But, it is less certain that dependency theory offers a framework for strategies of development in those states where the potential for

³³Susanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," in Fann and Hodges, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

actual independence and a self-generating economy is checked finally by the sheer limitations of small size.

We return to an assessment of these options for micro-states in the concluding chapter.

Defining the Small State Economy

In considering the economic consequences of smallness, we begin with the problems of defining a small state for the purposes of economic analysis. Can we assume that the small state is necessarily a small economy? Some economists have been content to use a simple definition based on population size. Both Simon Kuznets³⁴ and Michael Michaely³⁵ accept the I.M.F. definition of a small state as one of less than ten million people. Robinson³⁶ also based his definition on population but argued that the ceiling figure should be fifteen million so that "moderately small" economies like Belgium and the Netherlands could be included. Kuznets noted that the economic consequences of small size are progressively more evident the smaller the state in question.³⁷ Similarly, William Demas preferred a lower figure of five million and added a geographic qualification of 10,000-20,000 square miles of arable land.³⁸

³⁴Simon Kuznets, "The Economic Growth of Small Nations," in E. A. G. Robinson, *The Economic Consequences of the Sizes of Nations* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 14.

³⁵Michael Michaely, *Concentration in International Trade* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1962).

³⁶E. A. G. Robinson, "Introduction," in Robinson (ed.), *op. cit.*

³⁷Kuznets in Robinson, *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

³⁸William G. Demas, *The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965), p. 22.

For others,³⁹ the size of the economy is a question of national income. It is the size of the market which is important and this may not always relate to population size. Many of the greatly populated Third World states are small countries for the purposes of economic analysis, particularly in comparison to the "small" but advanced economies of Western Europe:

1992	<i>Population</i>	<i>G.D.P.</i> <i>(Per Capita Income)</i>	<i>G.D.P.</i> <i>(millions \$ U.S.)</i>
PAKISTAN	102.5 million	\$350.00	\$31,650
SWEDEN	8.4 million	\$28,291.00	\$244,774 ⁴⁰

Some economists, then, have chosen to allow for the importance of population, geography and income in a composite definition of the small economy.⁴¹ Michael Ward, for example, has argued that "an economy (or region) is small when it is unable to devise techniques of organisation, production or marketing free from reliance on foreign or metropolitan institutions."⁴² Thus, we have come full circle. It is the degree of dependence which determines the definition of small size: The small economy is the dependent economy.

³⁹Peter J. Lloyd, *International Trade Problems of Small Nations* (Durham, N.C. Duke University Press, 1968), p. 11.

Sidney Dell, *Trade Blocs and Common Markets* (London: Constable and Co., Ltd, 1963), p. 166.

⁴⁰ 1987 data. The World Bank *World Development Report 1989* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

⁴¹G. Leduc and J. Weiller, "The Size of the Economy and its Relation to Stability and Steady Progress: II," in Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

G. Marcy, "How Far Can Foreign Trade Confer Upon Small Nations the Advantages of Large Nations," in Robinson, *Ibid.*, p. 266.

⁴²Michael Ward, "Dependent Development— Problems of Economic Planning in Small Developing Countries," in Selwyn, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

For our purposes, however, the use of population size does conform to other measurements of the small economy. The 43 small states in our list are small by every agreed standard. We have used a ceiling of six million, clearly below the I.M.F. figure and approximating the classifications used by Demas and Reynolds.⁴³

Moreover, less than half of these states have a 1992 G.N.P. of over \$4 billion which Barend de Vries regarded in 1967 as the market definition of a small economy.⁴⁴ Finally, our central focus, after all, is the micro-state. Our selected small states are included only for comparative purposes. States with a population of less than one million are also unquestionably small in economic terms. Only six micro-states exceed de Vries' ceiling G.N.P. figure of \$4 billion, while most have a G.N.P. of far less than \$1 billion.

The Skewed Structure of the Small Economy

The economic disabilities of small size are most obvious in the highly skewed structure of the small state economy. The small state is typically concentrated in its economic activity. The explanation for this tendency is two-fold: The small state suffers first from problems of resource deficiency and, second, from limitations derived from diseconomies of scale.

Small Size and Resource Deficiency

Resource deficiency first suggests material poverty; a state which possesses little of marketable value. But, it also refers to the lack of diversity in a state's resource base,

⁴³David Reynolds identified "small protean economies" as those states with populations under six million. David R. Reynolds, *Rapid Development in Small Economies; The Example of El Salvador* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 102.

⁴⁴This figure was "a convenient dividing point," in de Vries' 1967 World Bank paper on the export performance of developing countries. He continued to employ this classification in later studies. Barend A. de Vries, "Development Aid to Small Countries," in Selwyn, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

which can apply to rich and poor states alike. The notion that the small state commands a limited range of resources is based on the assumption that a state small in population is also likely to be small in territory.⁴⁵ This in turn implies a limited distribution of mineral resources and less variety in topographical, soil and climatic conditions necessary for a broad range of agricultural production.

However, the initial assumption that there is a correlation between demographic and geographic size is not entirely justified with the small states in this study. Most of these states are more than 100,000 square miles in area. This is about the size of West Germany or the former Yugoslavia, comparatively large territories. Among micro-states, however, the correlation is justified. Only Gabon has a territory of more than 100,000 square miles in area. Most are less than 10,000 square miles and half are less than 1,000 square miles. There is little doubt, then, that the micro-state is as diminutive in area as it is in population size.

The second assumption that a small territory is likely to provide only a narrow resource base must also be qualified. An expansive territory does not necessarily mean that a country will enjoy a diversity of natural resources. Some of the largest small states are vast barren tracts. In some cases, the sparse population of these territories is itself a reflection of their material deficiencies. Similarly, a small territory does not mean that the potential for resource development is confined to a few products. Swaziland, though only 6,700 square miles in area, benefits from profitable deposits of iron ore, asbestos, and coal in addition to a comparatively diverse range of agricultural products: sugar, citrus fruit, rice, maize and sorghum. Livestock, timber and cotton production are also important. Moreover, many small coastal and island states are looking increasingly to the sea to

⁴⁵George L. Reid, *A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policies of Very Small States with Special Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean* (University of Southampton, Ph.D. dissertation, 1971), p. 234.

augment their resource base. The maritime dimension of a state's territory can significantly extend its effective geographic size.⁴⁶

Yet, even if a state does possess a variety of resources, its impact on the structure of the state's economy will depend ultimately on the volume and value of those resources and, most importantly, on the ease with which they can be exploited. Peter Lloyd has argued that the resource base of a state should be understood to include factors other than mineral and agricultural products.⁴⁷ The location of the state, transportation, and communications advantages and the skills of its people are not necessarily correlated with geographic size.

To what extent, then, is the narrow resource base argument useful in explaining the skewed structure of small state and micro-state economies? Allowing for obvious exceptions, it is reasonable to assume that the likelihood of a diverse mineral and agricultural resource base will be greater the larger the territory. This is particularly true of micro-states. A few micro-states enjoy a comparatively diverse range of mineral and agricultural resources and these are the larger territories in the micro-state group: Guyana, Surinam and particularly Gabon. But, even these states still have few resources in terms of any significant impact on the structure of the state's economy. A resource base sufficiently rich and varied to allow diversification of economic activity would have to be much more extensive than is the case with any of the micro-states and most of the small states included here.

The micro-state is typically a developing economy based on the export of a few primary commodities. The extent of this resource deficiency and the consequent skewness of the economy is reflected in the commodity concentration levels of their

⁴⁶John Connell, *Sovereignty and Survival: Island Microstates in the Third World* (Sydney: University of Sydney, Department of Geography, Research Monograph No. 3, 1988), pp. 46-50.

⁴⁷Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

exports. Only for the oil producers is the impact of a narrow resource base potentially less restrictive, since their huge revenues can be used to develop alternative sectors of the economy. For most micro-states, their products are highly vulnerable to demand elasticity and price fluctuation and their problems of development and eventual diversification are much more formidable.

Moreover, the extremes of resource deficiency are particularly evident among micro-states. In the Maldivian Islands, for example, the economy is based solely on dried fish; in The Gambia, groundnuts; in Lesotho, mohair; in a number of South Pacific states, copra. In these cases, resource deficiency is pathetic and the prospects for real development are bleak.

Extreme smallness exacerbates the effects of other geographical liabilities to limit the potential for resource development. Kiribati, Tuvalu and other low-lying atolls, for example, are too small to allow any of the geological and topographical variations of the larger islands. With unpredictable patterns of precipitation and an early susceptibility to saline infiltration, there is little potential for any crop other than copra.⁴⁸ Moreover, these economies have no resilience in the face of natural disaster. With so little space and a single product there is no margin for retreat or an alternative course. The whole economy could be devastated.⁴⁹

For some micro-states the only exploitable resource is their location. Djibouti has no natural resources whatsoever and its economy is based primarily on its importance as a rail centre and port for Ethiopia and the ancillary services which that entails. Djibouti's location also gives it strategic importance. The French naval base has been a major prop

⁴⁸R. G. Ward, "The Consequences of Smallness in Polynesia," in Burton Benedict (ed.) *Problems of Small Territories* (London: University of London: The Institute of Commonwealth Studies, The Athlone Press, 1967), pp. 82-83.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 83.

of the country's economy and is responsible for the comparatively high level of its social services.⁵⁰ Other micro-states, Malta and Iceland, also profited from their strategic value to the major powers, though in the case of Iceland this was always a marginal contribution to the island's post-war prosperity. Moreover, this form of economic support is increasingly unacceptable. The very smallness of the micro-state makes it difficult to absorb a large foreign presence without social and cultural dislocation. The disproportionately huge American population in Iceland resulted for a time in widespread Icelandic opposition to the Keflavik base.⁵¹

Moreover, when the primary resource is the strategic value of the state itself, the economy becomes dependent on the defence policies of other powers, which are liable to change. The declining British interest in the Mediterranean and the accompanying cuts in the defence budget imposed serious problems of recession and unemployment and the need to restructure the Maltese economy, which had been based primarily on the defence sector.⁵² Many micro-states are in a position to exploit the strategic interests of major powers and some, like the Maldives, are desperately in need of the income which a foreign base could bring.⁵³ Though this has been a principal concern in the subject of micro-state

⁵⁰James Buxton, "Independence on a Wing and a Prayer—Djibouti Comes of Age," *The Financial Times*, 24 June, 1977.

Anthony Hughes, "Djibouti- France: the Reluctant Colonialist?," *Africa Report* (Nov.-Dec., 1975), 10-14.

⁵¹As one observer noted, the American force of 3,000-4,000 troops is "the equivalent of stationing some four million alien soldiers and their families in the United States."

Thraninn Eggertsson, "Determinants of Icelandic Foreign Relations," *Co-operation and Conflict X* (No. 2, 1975), 94.

⁵²John Dowdall, "The Political Economy of Malta," *The Round Table* (No. 248, October, 1972), 465-473.

"Malta—Financial Times Report," *The Financial Times*, 6 February, 1975.

⁵³When the British withdrew from Gan in 1976 a number of states expressed interest in the base. Maldivian President Ibrahim Nasir announced that he had turned down a Soviet offer of \$1,000,000 to lease Gan— a courageous decision, given the Maldives' limited opportunities for income.

Liz Colton, "The Strategic Isles on the Oil Routes," *Gemini News Service*, No G66432, 1978.

decolonisation, notably in the Indian Ocean,⁵⁴ it has not proven an attractive option. In most cases, the presence of a foreign power seems too flagrant a compromise of national dignity and newly-won independence.⁵⁵

There are, however, other ways in which a state can exploit its location to compensate for a deficiency of material resources, particularly if there is potential for tourism. The most promising resource for many of the micro-states in this study may seem to be their place in the sun. With few exceptions, development policies encourage expansion in the tourist industry. For some island micro-states in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the Pacific, tourism is by far the most important component of gross domestic product.⁵⁶ Moreover, the potential for tourism is increasingly true even for remote and exotic locations in the fog and wind belt of the far North.⁵⁷ Yet tourism does not necessarily ensure economic security and the promise of significant diversification. Demand patterns are fickle and highly sensitive to economic conditions in industrialised countries. Moreover, the long term multiplier effects of tourism are doubtful, at least in developing economies, since the major beneficiaries tend to be foreign-owned hotel

⁵⁴Robert G. Irani and William O. Staudenmaier, "Microstates and the Balance of Power in the Contemporary International System," *Naval War College Review* XXXI (No. 1, Sequence 268, Summer, 1978), 76-96.

⁵⁵ Of course, some micro-states, like Bahrain and Qatar, have willingly offered their territory for military purposes. In these cases, however, the incentive has little to do with possible benefits to their economies. Both states are sufficiently prosperous to ignore the blandishments of Great Powers. These decisions are simply rooted in national and regional security.

⁵⁶This is particularly the case for the Commonwealth Caribbean micro-states. Connell, *op. cit.*, p. 62. Inaccessibility leaves some micro-states (São Tomé and Príncipe, the Comoros, and the most remote Pacific islands) far behind in the competition for tourist dollars.

⁵⁷ Consider, for example, the growth of adventure tourism and convention tourism in Iceland. Pony treks and camping expeditions appeal to a growing German market particularly. New Years fireworks, dinner parties on a glacier are enticements in Iceland's appeal in the back pages of *The New Yorker* urging public and private organisations to hold their conventions at the top of the world.

chains, airlines and shipping companies, travel firms and overseas producers of goods for the tourist sector.

There is some short term benefit for the construction industry (though accompanied by an inflation in land values) and a longer term benefit to those engaged in local transportation and the production of certain foods for the tourist sector.⁵⁸

However, the distribution of benefits is not to the long term benefit of the domestic population. 'Leakage' could be so high that the returns may not justify the social costs.⁵⁹ The more prestigious and financially rewarding positions in the industry tend to be held by expatriates, thus risking the possibility that in a highly tourist-dependent economy, the indigenous populations will become a nation of bus boys and parlour maids. For some critics the tourist sector offers little more than "a replication of the plantation economy."⁶⁰

The "demonstration effect" of a large influx of tourists, who import lifestyles and consumption patterns beyond the reach but not the expectations of the local population, can have lasting consequences for the stability of the country, particularly if the resulting sense of relative deprivation is associated with class and racial differences. There is concern too for the cultural costs of tourism if the local culture is reduced to that of "a human zoo . . . (where) . . . local people (are) encouraged to be 'interesting natives' and go through traditional movements for the benefit of goggling strangers."⁶¹ These problems are particularly evident in very small economies where the density of tourism is so high.

⁵⁸S. G. Britton, "The Political Economy of Tourism in the Third World," *Annals of Tourism Research* IX (1982), 331-358.

⁵⁹John M. Bryden, *Tourism and Development* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1973), pp. 71-96.

⁶⁰H. C. Brookfield, *Colonialism, Development and Independence: The Case of the Melanesian Islands in the South Pacific* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1972), p. 134.
M. Salter, "The Economy of the South Pacific," *Pacific Viewpoint* XI (No. 1, May, 1970), 13.

⁶¹Bryden, *op. cit.*

Moreover, tourism may deepen existing patterns of dependence. For most states with significant tourist industries, there are high indices of geographical concentration in the sources of the tourist population. The external base of the tourist industry is typically the principal trading partner and the primary source of aid and investment.⁶²

There are also "invisible" factors of dependence; the inhibitions derived from the necessity of maintaining a good image. It is important that the host country pursue policies which reflect conditions of stability and which ensure attitudes of confidence and favour in the tourists' home countries. Tourism, then, may offer some measure of diversification for countries with a limited range of resources. But it may not offer much opportunity to reach beyond existing patterns of dependent relationships, unless there are vigorous and determined efforts to market their destination outside these familiar patterns.⁶³ And that is difficult, given the enormous costs, particularly for very small economies, of embarking on marketing initiatives in expensive new markets against tough and much better endowed competition.

All that being said, tourism is still the world's largest industry, and a growth industry at that. If it is pursued in tandem with other strategic diversification initiatives it has and can continue to offer very small economies some measure of optimism in moving towards self-reliance or at least a more flexible regime of dependence management. For those very small jurisdictions, long dependent on a single primary resource, the Faröes, for example on a diminishing cod fishery, tourism offers hope for relief from the utter despair of a society bankrupt for its monoculture.⁶⁴

⁶²Brookfield, *op. cit.*

⁶³Ban It Chiu quoted in Bryden, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁶⁴*The Iceland Reporter*, XXII (Number 241, March, 1996), 1, 15.

Some micro-states with limited resources also exploit the economic advantages of their separate international identity in other areas of the service economy. The "resource potential" of legal status is an increasingly attractive option for micro-states. They serve as off-shore financial centres and tax havens, free ports, and flags-of-convenience: Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Malta, the Bahamas, Bahrain and Vanuatu and Nauru in the South Pacific.⁶⁵ Others trade on their distinctive international identity in philatelic and numismatic markets. This has long been a lucrative practice for Tonga. In Tuvalu philately is the principal source of non-grant income and the second most important employer in the country.

In many cases service activities which exploit location and legal status are so important that the structure of the economy is as skewed as for those states dependent on particular commodities.⁶⁶

All micro-states, then, are resource deficient if we understand resource sufficiency to mean a material endowment diverse enough to support a wide variety of economic activities. Though resource deficiency partially explains the narrow base of economic activity in micro-states, it is the manufacturing sector which is most relevant to the question of economic diversification. Here the limitations of very small size are evident in the early imposition of diseconomies of scale. It is to this aspect of the problem that we turn now.

Small Size and Economies of Scale

The potential for economic diversification in the small state is ultimately limited by the problems of achieving economies of scale. A reduction of costs sufficient to allow

⁶⁵Caroline Doggart, *Tax Havens and Their Uses* (London: The Economist Publications, Special Report No. 1191, 1990).

⁶⁶Connell, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

maximum efficiency and competitiveness means production at optimum size. But for the small state, indivisibilities of plant and productive processes in many industries are such that optimum size would require a level of demand far beyond that of the domestic market alone. Robinson estimated that a high-income market of fifty million people was necessary in order to achieve economies of scale in the major areas of industrial production,⁶⁷ while Demas believes that for populations of under three million economies of scale are unlikely even in public administration.⁶⁸ The constraints and risks of a small market preclude many of the activities possible in larger economies: They cannot be supported in states as small as those in this study.

Diseconomies of scale operate to constrict the scope for diversification in small economies at all stages of development. But, as market size is subject to national income, the small industrialised state will permit economies of scale to be achieved more readily than in a developing economy of similar size. Consequently, the structure of the economy will be more diversified the higher the state of development.

Yet, differences in the degree of diversification are even more pronounced between large and small industrialised economies than between small economies at different levels of development.⁶⁹ Since the structure of demand does not become less diverse as its volume is reduced, the material requirements of the small economy exceed domestic capabilities. Aggregate limits to total productive capacity in the small economy will restrict the range of activities possible.⁷⁰ And, in spite of high income, diseconomies of scale still act to prevent production of a wide range of goods required for the home

⁶⁷Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. xviii.

⁶⁸Demas, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁶⁹Michaely, *Concentration in International Trade, op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁷⁰Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

market. The diversity of demand, then, is met through imports and this means that domestic production must be channelled into particular areas for export.

The small industrialised economies developed specialised areas of production where they had a comparative advantage either in geographical position (Belgium), natural resources (Sweden),⁷¹ or in the efficiency and skills of the workforce (Switzerland).⁷² In some cases, the domestic market served as a springboard for the expansion of the industry through exports. In the case of Switzerland, however, where 95% of the output in the four major areas of production is exported, the importance of the domestic market as a basis for development is less certain.⁷³

Earlier explorations into the comparative success of the small industrialised economies in overcoming the problems of scale suggested that these cases did not serve as encouraging models for the development strategies of Third World states. Contemporary conditions are more unfavourable, it was argued, than they were when the European states embarked on industrialisation. As Demas pointed out, those small states were able to benefit from a greater elasticity of higher-income demand for manufactured goods and more labour intensive processes in smaller units of production, which made economies of scale less significant than now. Most important, however, these small states were able to exploit more liberalised conditions of trade and thus escape the limitations of the domestic market.⁷⁴

For all but a few of the states in this study the problems of small size are exacerbated by the familiar conditions of economic underdevelopment. Deficiencies of

⁷¹I. Sventnilson, "The Concept of the Nation and its Relevance to Economic Analysis," in Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

⁷²W. A. Johr and F. Kneschaurek, "Study of the Efficiency of a Small Nation," *Ibid.*, pp. 54-77.

⁷³*Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

⁷⁴Demas, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

internal transportation and communications separate large sections of the population from the centres of economic activity.⁷⁵ There may be a significant subsistence sector. And cultural and ethnic divisions can be reflected in demand patterns to fragment an already small market even further.⁷⁶

The gloomy prospects derived from arguments of scale can, on the other hand, be exaggerated. Though large-scale heavy industry is not feasible for most small states, there are still opportunities in other areas of production: textiles, footwear, beverages and food processing.⁷⁷ There may be prospects for agro-industrial projects or secondary processing established around an export staple. Depending on other development indicators, particularly the skills and potential adaptability of the work-force, there are opportunities even in areas of high technology. The development of the electronics industry in Singapore is an encouraging example.

Clearly, the impact of scale depends on the industry in question. The scope for industrial production may be greater than it first appears, for optimum size does not always determine feasibility. As Sidney Dell noted, minimum plant size can be as much as one-fifth of the largest efficient size.⁷⁸ A comparison of five industries in the United States and Trinidad and Tobago indicated that comparative diseconomies of scale in Trinidad were only marginal.⁷⁹ Moreover, many activities are best established in the domestic market, however small. This includes local transportation and communications systems, a

⁷⁵Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁷⁶Ward in Selwyn, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁷⁷Dell, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁷⁹A. D. Knox, "Some Economic Problems of Small Countries," in Burton Benedict (ed.) *Problems of Smaller Territories* (London: University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, The Athlone Press, 1967), pp. 43-44.

variety of other direct services and the construction and building materials industries, where considerations of transport costs allow domestic production to be practical even in a small market.⁸⁰ These opportunities are particularly important for the island micro-states. Often construction, cement production and local services constitute the whole of the non-agricultural sector of the economy.

Still, even in these areas of potential development, small size can be an inhibiting and disabling factor. Cost-efficiency is weakened by the probability that industries in a small economy will function as monopolies.⁸¹ Moreover, aggregate size limits the intellectual resources necessary for product development, particularly in areas of more advanced technology.⁸² Without the support of adequate research there is always risk to the industry's continuing competitiveness. These conditions are exacerbated if the small state is cut off from the mainstream of the industrialised world with only limited and irregular channels of communication and information. For all but a few well placed micro-states these particular consequences of small scale will be serious obstacles to development in more sophisticated areas of production.

The most important consequence of small size, however, is the early ceiling imposed on the development of an intermediate and capital goods sector. The domestic market in these states is simply too small to support the range of products necessary for the inter-industrial linkages and interdependence essential to a rounded structure of

⁸⁰Kuznets in Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

⁸¹Demas, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

Donald B. Keesing, "Small Population as a Political Handicap to National Development," *Political Science Quarterly* LXXXIV (No. 1, March, 1969), 52.

⁸²David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 44.

Demas, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

Kuznets in Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

production. For most of the developing states these linkages are first established around a particular growth industry centred on an agricultural or mineral resource.

But, as H. C. Brookfield has observed, the opportunities for establishing linkages even on this basis are limited both in range and volume.⁸³ "Backward linkages" such as international transportation systems tend to be confined to the points of export. "Forward linkages" are limited to early stages of processing since more advanced stages are not feasible because of diseconomies of scale. The scope for "demand linkages," where consumer goods are produced for the export sector, are reduced for the same reasons.⁸⁴

Demas has emphasised that it is this aspect of the problem of scale which is most discouraging for the development prospects of small states. Diseconomies of scale hit the small developing economy at its most vulnerable point; the growth of the manufacturing sector.⁸⁵ For Demas, then, "small size" is the critical factor in limiting the small developing state's potential for achieving structural transformation of its economy. It might succeed in developing an important and profitable manufacturing centre based on particular export industries, but diseconomies of scale will preclude the establishment of the wide range of activities necessary for a balanced economy and self-sustained growth. As the small economy cannot be diverse and well-rounded so it cannot be independent and self-generating.⁸⁶

This does not mean that diseconomies of scale are an insurmountable obstacle to prosperity in small states and micro-states. A state which is able to exploit a valuable

⁸³H. C. Brookfield, "Multum in Parvo: questions about diversity and diversification in small developing countries," in Selwyn, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

⁸⁵Demas, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁸⁶Demas was soon criticised by scholars in his own region for his pessimism and defeatism. Lloyd Best, "Size and Survival," *New World Quarterly* II (No. 3, 1966), 58-63.

resource or which commands large earnings from invisible exports can enjoy enviable living standards. Moreover, the problems of scale are not confined to small states and micro-states. Small market size is a characteristic feature of economic underdevelopment and diseconomies of scale also operate to produce a skewed economic structure in many larger developing states. However, for these states there is greater potential for economic diversification. As suggested, the resource base of the larger state is likely to be more varied. Resource development may be more a problem of investment and technology than of scarcity. More important, however, the potential size of the market in the large developing state is sufficient to support eventually a diversified and balanced structure of production.

The major limitation for the small state is the inevitable early ceiling on market potential. Small size limits the extent to which the economy can be diversified. And, it is the question of diversification which is crucial in the analysis of small state and micro-state dependence.

In summary, the limited range of activities possible in the small economy is due first to the correlation between small size and a narrow and thus deficient resource base and, second, to the early intervention of diseconomies of scale. The small economy is characteristically unbalanced, the highly skewed structure of production being unequal to the diversity of domestic demand. We turn now to the two most oft-cited dimensions of dependence in the international relations of small states and micro-states; vulnerability in patterns of trade and external capital flows.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Patterns of Trade and Capital Flows in the International Economic Relations of Micro-States

If small economies are typically viewed as structurally dependent with very little "room to manoeuvre,"¹ it is largely because of their perceived vulnerability to external markets and outside sources of capital. They exist in an increasingly competitive international economy with limited options and few instruments to shape their economic milieu. Micro-states, even the most prosperous among them, are bit players in the international economy to be sure. Yet, some of the direst prognoses are based as much on intuition as on evidence. Until recently, much of the statistical data of micro-state international economic relations was not available, even to United Nations agencies. Now, however, there is sufficient data to draw a profile of micro-states and other small states in the international economy.

In this chapter we examine two areas of micro-state international economic relations which are central to any discussion of dependence; trade and capital formation. Of course, there are many other areas which can frustrate efforts to diversify and to achieve some measure of self-reliance. Still, it is the apparent vulnerability of micro-states and small states in general in their trade and in their sources of capital which are glaring and recurring themes in the literature. We begin with the trading patterns of these small economies.

¹ Percy Selwyn, "Room to Manoeuvre," in Percy Selwyn (ed.), *Development Policy in Small Countries* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), pp. 8-24.

Micro-State Trade in the International Economy

Thus far we have discussed the structure of the small economy as typically confined to a limited range of domestic production. Because of this imbalance it is highly dependent on external trade. As the wide range of domestic needs can only be met through imports, domestic production is geared primarily to the export sector. And, to exploit comparative advantage in world markets, the small economy must specialise. At the same time, only through external demand will economies of scale in the specialised sectors be achieved. Thus, the small state's greater dependence on trade is both "the consequence and complement"² of the skewed structure of its economy.

Continuing with our use of small states between one and six million for comparative reference, we examine in this chapter micro-states as dependent economies in the international trading system.³

The first section of this chapter focuses on the most important indices of trade dependence; the levels of commodity concentration in export trade and the correlation

²S. Kuznets, "Economic Growth of Small Nations," in Austin Robinson (ed.), *The Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations* (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 21.

³The selected cases in this chapter do not include certain European micro-states: Andorra, whose status was not resolved until 1993 and Monaco and San Marino for which separate data is not available. Nor do these tables include those states which reached independence following the collection and compilation of this data: the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau in the micro state group, and Eritrea and the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics in the larger small state group. International trade statistics are notoriously behind the year of publication of most statistical volumes. This is particularly true of developing states, especially those in the micro-state class. Indeed, the most recent data is in some cases earlier than the 1986 base which is used in these tables. The intention of these tables in this chapter is not to give a definitive profile of every country's trading patterns for every year since independence. That would be an enormous undertaking for some 80 states and far beyond the scope of this portion of what is, after all, a larger consideration of micro-state relations. By using 1975 and 1986 bench mark figures, particularly in the critical indices of commodity and geographic concentration of trade, we are able to paint a picture of small state and micro-state patterns of trade during a decade of independence in so far as that picture relates to issues of dependence and dependence management in these states.

between small size and high levels of concentration in the direction of trade. We begin by assessing the comparative importance of trade in the economies of micro-states and small states in the next population class.

Small Size and Dependence on Trade

The extent to which small economies are dependent on trade can be illustrated most simply by calculating the ratio of exports and imports to gross national product. In an early study of weak states in international politics Marshall Singer estimated that a high degree of trade dependence was evident if trade exceeded more than 20 percent of gross national product.⁴ However, Singer conceded that this was the case for two-thirds of the states in the international system and that only the continental economies of the United States and the U.S.S.R. had trade ratios which at that time fell below ten percent.⁵

Yet, among small states and micro-states the extent of trade dependence is particularly extreme. No state in either class falls below 20%. Even 30% is a low trade ratio for states of this size. No micro-state and only five of the small states listed have a ratio to G.N.P. of less than 30 percent. On the other hand, all but five micro-states and more than half the small states in the next population class exceed 50 percent.⁶ The average trade ratio for the small state groups is 62.3%; for micro-states it is 85.5%.

The level of trade dependence is not related to the size of the G.N.P. itself. If we

⁴Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers* (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 238.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Note Table II in Appendix I to this chapter.

divide the states into three groups according to the size of the G.N.P., we see that there is a wide distribution in the ratios in each group.

G.N.P.	Below \$1b.	\$1b. - \$5b.	Over \$5b.
Lowest Ratio	37.0	22.7	23.9
Highest Ratio	212.0	259.6	263.7

And these wide variations hold if we divide these groups further according to our population classification, though the variations are much greater among micro-states. except in the over \$5 billion group which includes only Luxembourg.

G.N.P.		Below \$1b.	\$1b. - \$3b.	Over \$5b.
Micro States:	Lowest	37.2	50.3	13.0
	Highest	212.0	259.6	32.2
Other Small States:	Lowest	37.0	22.7	23.9
	Highest	158.4	143.1	263.7

However, the extent of trade dependence among small states *is* related to the level of per capita income. The average ratio of total trade to G.N.P. for the poorest states (with a per capita income of less than \$480 per annum) is 48.5 in the small state group and 68 for micro-states. But at the highest income level (a per capita income over \$6000 per annum) the average ratios are 82.7 and 101.3 respectively.

Average Ratios of Trade to G.N.P. by Income Levels⁷

	<u>Lower</u> \$480 or less	<u>Middle</u> \$480 - \$1940 \$1940 - \$6000	<u>Higher</u> over \$6,000
Micro-states	(9) 68.0	(15) 92.0 (7) 76.2	(8) 101.3
Small states	(14) 48.5	(13) 72.5 (5) 53.9	(8) 82.7

For the industrialised high income state, a greater trade dependence is the consequence of every manufactured export having a high import content. As manufactured products' share of exports increases, the greater the need for imported intermediate and capital goods. In a newly industrialised economy like Singapore, for example, the overall trade ratio is 263.7. The ratio of exports to G.N.P. is itself high (123.5) but the ratio of imports to G.N.P. is 140.2. Ironically, then, the small economy's dependence on trade increases the more developed it becomes.

Moreover, as income levels rise, domestic demand for consumer goods expands. The greater variety of goods required can only be met through additional imports. And since it is the growth of consumer demand which is important, the emphasis here is on levels of income rather than development. Higher trade ratios, then, can be evident in economies, like the oil states, where wealth is not related to extensive industrialisation.

⁷*The World Bank Atlas 1988* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1988)

By 1994 there had been no significant changes. Micro-states fell into the same income groups that they had in 1986, though the monetary definitions of those groups had changed.

The World Bank Atlas 1996 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996).

A high trade ratio can also reflect the importance of tourism in the economy, even for lower income states. Tourists bring with them the demand patterns of advanced economies and the host state must import a wide range of goods to meet the needs of the tourist sector. For some states, the annual tourist influx is many times their own population size.⁸ Thus, micro-states such as the Seychelles, Mauritius and the islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean, which rely heavily on tourism, reflect very high indices of trade dependence. As this suggests, trade dependence for most small states and micro-states is primarily a problem of import consumption.⁹ The average ratio of imports to G.N.P. for all 80 states is 45.9 compared to the average total trade ratio of 73.6.

A further examination of import ratios will reveal the marked differences between micro-states and other small states in the extent to which they are dependent on imports. Micro-states are clearly unable to provide even the most fundamental needs from their own resources. The average ratio of imports to G.N.P. is 36.7 for the small states listed but 55.1 for micro-states and this greater dependence of micro-states on imports is evident at every level of per capita income.

⁸In 1993, St. Lucia, for example, with a population of 120,300 received 342,400 tourists which accounted for one half of the country's foreign exchange earnings.

The Europa World Yearbook 1994 (London, Europa Publications, 1994), pp. 2534-2539.

Malta is an even more dramatic example. In the same year Malta received 1,063,000 visitors which earned the country \$653 million.

⁹Note Table III in Appendix I to this chapter.

Average Ratios of Import Trade to G.N.P. by Annual Per Capita Income Levels

	Lower \$480 or less	Middle \$480-\$1940 \$1940-\$6000	Higher Over \$6000
Micro-states	(9) 47.0	(15) 61.3	(8) 54.1
		(7) 53.3	
Small states	(14) 32.8	(13) 44.0	(8) 40.0
		(5) 30.3	

Only six micro-states, as compared to 24 other small states, have import ratios of less than 30. This group includes poor and remote states with a large subsistence sector but it also includes wealthy oil exporting nations whose import bills are still large but small only in relation to a G.N.P. swollen because of huge export earnings.

Moreover, 20 micro-states as compared to only eight of the other small states have import ratios of more than 50. These include those states with a large re-export trade (Bahrain, the Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda); tourist havens (the Seychelles, most of the Commonwealth Caribbean states) and some lower income states whose own resource deficiency is such that practically all goods have to be imported (for example, the Maldives).

The difference between micro-states and other small states is also evident in the figures relating to export trade, though it is less pronounced.¹⁰ The average ratio of

¹⁰ See Table IV in Appendix I to this chapter.

exports to G.N.P. is 25.6 for the small states and 36.8 for micro-states. Among high income states the discrepancies between micro-states and other small states is marked. In this group the average export ratio for small states is 42.6 but 71.1 for micro-states. However, in other income groups, the differences between the two size groups are not dramatic.

Average Ratios of Export Trade to G.N.P. by Annual Per Capita Income Levels

	Lower \$480 or less	Middle \$480 - \$1940 \$1940 - \$6000	Higher Over \$6000
Micro-states	(9) 20.9	(15) 34.5 (7) 22.8	(8) 71.1
Small states	(14) 15.6	(13) 28.5 (5) 23.7	(8) 42.6

A low export ratio is a reflection of a state's peripheral situation and its paucity of exportable resources. Most of the states with an export ratio of less than 20 are either acutely resource deficient and/or landlocked and situated on the periphery of the international trading system with particular problems of accessibility. In some cases the export ratio is lower than might be expected because of civil war or the idiosyncratic and despotic policies of an isolationist regime which interrupt the normal patterns of export trade. For example, both factors help to explain the extraordinarily low 1975 export ratios for Guinea-Bissau (3.4), and the Comoros (5.7). There are, however, a few higher income

states in this group (the Seychelles, Djibouti, Uruguay, Panama and Cyprus), whose lower export ratio is related to the importance of non-commodity activities and invisible export earnings. This confirms the importance of other factors which contribute to the extent of a small state's trade dependence; the relative importance of commodity earnings; the security of established trading relationships; the specific policies of governments and, most important, the proximity of the state to major centres.

For over half the micro-states, however, (particularly those in the higher income groups) the export ratio is markedly higher than that of other small states. This includes the oil producers whose vast earnings are bound to constitute an enormous share of their G.N.P. and a few states (Bahrain, the Bahamas) whose extraordinary export performances are due primarily to the capacity of their transshipment terminals and refineries and their role as re-exporters of oil and petroleum products. Re-exports of oil account for 91 percent of the Bahamas' staggering export total of \$2.5 billion, nearly four times the size of the tiny state's gross domestic product. But this group also includes other primary producers whose economies are based on the export sector. Here size does seem to be important. Micro-states in this group are much more dependent on their export trade than other small states.

Serious trade dependence is a feature of nearly all small economies with populations of six million or less. But the extent of trade dependence for micro-states is even greater than that of other small states. The average total trade ratio for the small states listed is 62.3, more than twice that of Singer's dependence figure. But for micro-states the average ratio of total trade to G.N.P. is 85.5. Nineteen micro-states, as

compared to only five larger small states, have total trade ratios over 85. Similarly, more than half the small states (27) fall below a ratio of 60 while only 11 micro-states are so low. Moreover, the average ratio of total trade to G.N.P. is higher at every level of income. Even allowing for the inflated figures of a few exceptional micro-states, there is a clear pattern of greater dependence for micro-states in both export and import trade. The importance of trade for the typical micro-state economy, then, is extreme. However, it is the commodity composition and geographical direction of that trade which is most significant in assessing the structure of dependence in the micro-state economy.

Commodity Concentration in Export Trade

The structure of trade in the small economy is believed to be typically one of export specialisation and import diversification.¹¹ The smaller the economy, the greater is the range of basic commodities which must be imported. Thus, very small states can be expected to have proportionately lower commodity concentration indices of imports than larger states. However, differences in import indices due to size have proven to be less dramatic than might be expected. All states import a wide variety of commodities and Michaely found that variations in commodity concentration levels between large and small states were not as significant for imports as for exports.¹² Consequently, we have not attempted to calculate commodity indices of import trade. Given the vast number of

¹¹Peter J. Lloyd, *International Trade Problems of Small Nations* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968), p. 23.

¹²Michael Michaely, *Concentration in International Trade* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1962), p. 12.

separate commodities listed, the task of computing indices for 80 states would be enormous. As the evidence already available suggests the probability of only marginal variations, this task hardly seemed justified.

What is important is to indicate the extent to which micro-states and other small states must depend on a narrow range of exports in order to pay for the imports required. To do this, we have calculated the degree of export specialisation by using the Hirschmann index of commodity concentration.¹³ In all but a few cases, the index was based on commodities of the three digit S.I.T.C. grouping. While the three digit classification allows for clear distinctions, it is least likely to risk replication which could exaggerate the diversity of a state's export trade.¹⁴

¹³The index was first used by Hirschmann to measure the geographic concentration of a state's trade but it also can be applied as a measure of commodity concentration.
See Michaely, *op. cit.*;
Lloyd, *op. cit.*

$$100 \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_{ij})^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_j)^2}}$$

\sum

I=1 (X_j)

Albert O. Hirschmann, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California, 1945), Appendix A.

The total value of a state's (J) export trade is X_j and the value of its specific commodity exports is X_{ij}

¹⁴Nevertheless, the 3-digit classification is still fraught with potential distortions. As Michaely noted, some commodities are classified separately though they really are closely related. This tends to reduce a state's index favourably. Moreover, an index of the commodity concentration of exports is not a wholly accurate reflection of the degree of concentration of economic activity for a given state since other important sectors such as services are not included.
Michaely, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

It has been argued that states with a high ratio of total trade to gross domestic product are also inclined to a narrow commodity concentration in their export trade. Peter Lloyd has objected to this argument on the grounds that there are far too many exceptions. And, for Lloyd, the fact that any correlation can be so easily disproved "alone destroys the foundation of the general theory of small nation trading."¹⁵

With the larger small states Lloyd's objections seem justified. Of the 22 small states which have a particularly high trade ratio, that is over 50% of G.N.P., there are five with comparatively low indices (under .350) of commodity concentration in their export trade: Denmark (.093), Ireland (.172), Lebanon (.219), Singapore (.229) and Norway (.306). The most notable exceptions are clearly the highly developed small economies. Conversely, of the 19 small states with a high index of commodity concentration (over .500) in their export trade, nine have comparatively low ratios of total trade to G.N.P. (less than 50%): Paraguay (22.7), Haiti (24.1), Burundi (29.8), Somalia (32.5), Benin (33.6), Chad (37), Laos (39.8), El Salvador (41.7), and Trinidad and Tobago (44.7). These exceptions, unlike those in the micro-state class, are not high income economies. Moreover, the 1986 calculations were particularly low for these states. They do not really counter Michael's argument that small economies with a high ratio of total trade to G.N.P. are also likely to evidence high indices of commodity concentration in their export trade. Similarly, only seven micro-states of the 28 with indices of over .600 have a total trade ratio of less than 60 percent. As with other states, the most notable exceptions in

¹⁵Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p.30.

Lloyd's criticism of previous studies is that such conclusions were based on groupings of states which were too general to allow for the impact of other variables.

this group are the poorest states: Cape Verde, the Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe.¹⁶

Lloyd's findings suggest that the correlation between small size, a high trade ratio, and a high degree of commodity concentration of exports is not very convincing. Our review of small state trade would generally seem to support this except for micro-states. Here there is a clear and consistent correlation. Micro-states demonstrate both a high ratio of trade to gross national product and a high commodity correlation of exports.

As with comparisons of total trade dependence, it is clear that there are a number of factors which influence the extent to which a state's export trade is concentrated. As suggested already, the level of development in the economy is clearly relevant. We have noticed that high income economies tend to have a greater overall trade dependence. But, within the high income group there are important structural variations which account for the marked differences in the commodity composition of export trade. As would be expected, the wealthy primary producers evidence a high degree of export specialisation while in the more developed states of the high income group, those with an important manufacturing sector, export trade is much more diversified. The composition of exports, then, is a reflection of the structure of the economy rather than its standard of prosperity.

The development factor is even more pronounced than that of size. The large economy based on primary production will be more specialised in its exports than the small economy with an industrialised sector which holds the most important share of the national product. For these economies, comparative advantage is determined by the

¹⁶ Note Table V in Appendix I to this chapter.

availability of factors (such as capital or skilled labour) which are not confined to a very narrow range of goods, and, therefore, they may be expected to be as diversified in their export as in their import trade.¹⁷

The table below indicates differences accountable to both the development and size factors. The average index is reduced the higher the level of per capita income. For the larger small states the trend is particularly apparent.

Average Small State Commodity

Concentration Indices by Income Group

Lower	Middle	Higher
\$480 or less	\$ 480 - \$1940 \$1940 - \$6000	Over \$6000
(14) .589	(13) .566 (5) .449	(8) .360

There is some deviation in the highest income group due to the inclusion of the United Arab Emirates, most of whose exports consist of crude oil. Without the exceptional UAE index (.892), the average for small states with per capita income levels of over \$6000 is .284 rather than .360. Furthermore, the most industrialised small economies have the lowest commodity concentration indices: Singapore, Denmark and Finland.

¹⁷Kuznets, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-23.

Assessing the impact of economic development on the export structure of micro-states is more difficult. Though many micro-states enjoy high levels of per capita income, only a few have significant manufacturing sectors. Apart from Cyprus, the indices of commodity concentration of export trade for these micro-states (which include Iceland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg) are notably higher than those of other small European economies. A few middle-income micro-states with comparatively significant industrial sectors (Malta) do have indices marginally lower than that of most other states of their size. But the differences in degrees of commodity concentration indices between income levels among micro-states are not significant. Like the United Arab Emirates in the small state group, Qatar's nearly exclusive (.971) oil export trade somewhat distorts the average index for high income micro-states. Without Qatar the average index for these states is .518 rather than .649.

Average Micro-State Commodity Concentration Indices by Income Group

Lower	Middle	Higher
\$480 or less	\$ 480 - \$1940	Over \$6000
	\$1940 - \$6000	
(9) .734	(15) .531	(8) .649
	(7) .517	

As indicated in our earlier discussion of resource endowment, the location of the state is important to its potential for export development. As transport costs are reduced, and accessibility to markets is improved, so capital is easier to attract for export industries

which could be ignored otherwise. The states with the highest levels of commodity concentration in their export trade are not only small and less developed but peripheral in the international trading system. However, the impact of location appears to be much more evident among the larger small states than micro-states.

Average Indices of Commodity Concentration of Export Trade by Region

	Small States	Micro-states
Asia and Oceania	.417	.615
Sub-Saharan Africa	.638	.683
Middle East and North Africa	.543	.794
Caribbean and Latin America	.473	.549
Europe	.238	.417

Clearly, all micro-states at all income levels and in every region demonstrate a high degree of commodity concentration in their export trade. The micro-state average is high in every income group with 28 of the 38 micro-states listed having commodity concentration indices of over .500 for their export trade. For some, such extremes of export specialisation might seem to support initial assumptions that the formal provisions of micro-state sovereignty belie the realities of severe dependence. This seems all the more persuasive since for most micro-states their share of the world market is miniscule and the value of their few products is erratic and often disappointing.

Consider the example of Fiji. Compared to many other micro-states Fiji's position in terms of size, location, and even resource base is enviable. In addition to sugar, Fiji's

timber, fish and mineral (gold) resources give the islands some natural advantages over other South Pacific micro-states. Fiji has a significant and relatively diverse manufacturing sector, a well-developed tourist industry and, perhaps most important, a role as entrepôt re-exporting goods and services in the region.

Yet Fiji's export trade is still primarily dependent on sugar. Cane sugar and sugar products accounted for 32.6% of total export earnings in 1993.¹⁸ Given Fiji's tiny share of world sugar production (0.5%) she has little bargaining power in determining price. Price fluctuations in sugar have been savage in their consequences. In 1965, for example, world prices fell to 1/4 of the 1963 level, precipitating recession and sabotaging development planning targets. Fiji's second crop, copra, is also vulnerable to extreme price instability.

Nonetheless, though micro-states are relatively more dependent on a very narrow base of export goods than larger states, the general trend in the trading patterns of both small states and micro-states is one of export diversification. Eighteen micro-states have dramatically lower (more than .100) commodity concentration indices in their export trade than they had in 1975. In only four cases is the index higher. This trend to diversification is evident at every income level and in every region. In some cases it is the result of modest development in secondary areas of primary production: rice in Suriname, fish products in Guinea-Bissau, vegetables in Western Samoa. In Kiribati the now exhausted phosphate reserves, once the nearly exclusive source of export revenue, have been replaced by an expanding fishery. In others the successful establishment of industries based on the processing of primary products accounts for the lower index. In most cases,

¹⁸*Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 1994* (Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1994), pp. 127-129.

particularly in the Caribbean, a skilled labour force and a local culture of entrepreneurship have allowed for the growth of a significant manufacturing sector in textiles, machinery and electrical goods. Trade dependence as measured by a narrow base of export revenue is still a characteristic feature of small state and micro-state vulnerability in the international economy though it by no means suggests hopelessness and despair for the future.

The Geographic Concentration of Trade

It is serious enough that the small state is so heavily dependent on its export sector and that its export earnings are confined to a few commodities, often of limited and fluctuating value and typically constituting only a tiny fraction of world production. Even more disturbing is the extent to which these small states must rely on one or two trading partners. When a state is dependent on the same partner in both its import and export trade it may be seen as a satellitic economy,¹⁹ particularly if those patterns are evident in other areas such as capital flows or tourist markets.

There is a correlation between these two aspects of trade dependence. Both Hirschmann and Michaely found that states which demonstrated a high level of commodity concentration in their export trade were also likely to evidence a high index of geographic

¹⁹A. D. Knox, "Some Economic Problems of Small Countries," in Burton Benedict (ed.) *Problems of Smaller Territories* (London: University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, The Athlone Press, 1967), p. 37.

Apparently the term 'satellite economy' was coined by Bert Hoselitz, "Patterns of Economic Growth," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* XXI (1955), 420-421, quoted in William G. Demas, *The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965), p. 32.

concentration. Hirschmann said that he would have expected otherwise, that a country with only a few commodities to export would be able to spread them over a large market. That this does not seem to be the case is due in part to the fact that world demand (and thus a diverse market) is not always possible for many products. Nor can it be assumed that the confidence and security which might be derived from a single trading partner will offer an advantage in a wide range of goods. The potential for diversification is not necessarily related to long-established access to a market, particularly if there is a considerable discrepancy in the size and/or economic wealth of the two partners. This is certainly the case for most small states and micro-states and in both groups, Hirschmann's and Michaely's earlier findings of a correlation between high indices of commodity concentration and geographic concentration are borne out. If we examine the 19 small states with commodity concentration indices of over .500 in their export trade, nearly half (nine) are similarly high (over .500) in their indices of geographic concentration. Among micro-states the correlation is similarly evident. Fifteen of the 28 micro-states with commodity concentration indices of over .500 have geographic indices of over .500. In total there are twenty-two micro-states which are over .500 in the geographic concentration of export trade. The exceptions are those states whose limited exports are highly valued in the world market (the oil producers) and the European micro-states. This last point indicates that the extent of geographic diversification of exports is also a matter of how the market is defined. For many states the index of concentration would change dramatically if E.U. members were treated as a single market rather than separately.

Hirschmann also argued that export trade was more geographically concentrated than that of imports and that this was especially true of states where geographic concentration indices were high. For Michaely, however, this tendency did not seem particularly strong. Nearly half the states in his sample (19 of 43) evidenced a higher index of geographic concentration in their import trade than for their exports. Using a ratio of imports to exports, Michaely's average in the sample was 1.03, suggesting that geographic concentration was only marginally more evident in export trade.²⁰ But in our study Hirschmann's original contention seems to be corroborated. Among the 43 selected small states only 14 (31%) had a higher level of geographic concentration in their import trade, thus demonstrating ratios of below 1.00. The average ratio for the group was 1.22. The same tendency is even more pronounced among micro-states. Only nine of the 38 micro-states for which both export and import indices were calculable had higher levels of concentration in their import trade and thus ratios below 1.00. The average ratio for the micro-state group was 1.34.

A high level of concentration in the direction of a state's import trade is a reflection of geographical proximity and in many cases the enduring importance of former colonial ties. Those states which are particularly import dependent in the direction of their trade are the Caribbean and South Pacific islands, where the United States and Australia serve as the obvious primary sources of supply. The perpetuation of neo-mercantilist trading relations between France and her former colonies in Africa is reflected in the extent to

²⁰Michaely, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

See also, Michael Michaely, *Trade, Income Levels and Dependence* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1994), p. 77.

which these states have such high indices in the direction of their import trade. Contrast, for example, Gabon (.674) with the Gambia (.304) whose open door policy was well established in the period of British rule.

Only a few states, then, in both groups are more concentrated in the direction of their import trade than in their exports. Moreover, the average levels of geographic concentration are lower for imports than for exports. The average index for the micro-state group is .538 for export trade but only .438 for imports. The average figures for the small state group are .462 and .381 respectively.

As this indicates, micro-states are significantly less diversified in their import trade than other small states. Nearly half (18 of 38) of the micro-states had indices of over .400 in the direction of their imports. This figure is a very high index for exports. But for imports, it indicates extreme levels of concentration. In contrast, only 13 of the 45 small states demonstrated indices of over .400. This discrepancy seems to be evident at all income levels.

Among middle income states the micro-state index is actually lower than that of other small states. Most of the states in both groups at this income level are Western Hemispheric countries. However, unlike the small Latin American republics whose trading relations have been confined almost exclusively to the United States, the micro-states in the region enjoy long-standing Commonwealth ties with both Britain and Canada, which serve to reduce the impact of the United States as the primary source of supply and the major market in the area.

There is a slight tendency to geographic diversification of imports as income levels rise. This is more consistent in the small state group. It is only offset at the highest income level because of Ireland (.503), reflecting that country's special economic relationship with Britain. In the micro-state group, however, prosperity does not necessarily encourage diversification. Some of the most extreme examples of geographic concentration of imports are among higher income micro-states, indicating the importance of location (Luxembourg), of former colonial relationships (Gabon) or both (Nauru).

Micro-states are clearly more concentrated in the geographic direction of their import trade than other small states. However, a high level of geographic concentration is far less critical in its implications for a state's score of dependence if it is a question of supply rather than markets. This is not to suggest that there are not grave implications if most goods and services are derived from a single country. Such a relationship with minimal competition can certainly mean higher domestic costs. And, because such domination is usually that of a large, industrialised metropolitan power in a small, developing economy, it can also mean control of local marketing systems and financial institutions. In most cases this extent of import dependence is a function of a similar export dependence. Reciprocity is the price paid for established and secure markets for the weaker country's exports.

Nonetheless, the potential for diversification is greater on the import side than for exports, particularly if as a primary producer a state's major export commodities are not those which are subject to inelasticity of demand and consistently high prices. The most

serious aspect of trade dependence then is that of the direction of a state's exports. And this is particularly acute for micro-states.

Michaely has suggested that an index of over .400 can be regarded as a high level of geographic concentration of export trade.²¹ More than half of the larger small states in our study fall into this category. The average index for the small state group is .462. Among micro-states this measure of dependence is far more pronounced. The average index for micro-states is .538 and 28 of 39 micro-states exceed .400 in the geographic concentration of their export trade. Similarly, it might seem reasonable to assume that a state is extremely dependent if more than 30 percent of its exports are directed to a single market. Such is the case for 30 of 36 micro-states for which trade direction statistics are available. Most greatly exceed the 30 percent figure and only the oil producing shaikhdom of Qatar falls below 20 percent in the principal market's share of total export trade.

Michaely's findings indicate that a tendency to geographic concentration of exports is characteristic of small-state trading at all levels of development. But the extent of economic development is, nevertheless, a principal factor in determining the degree to which a state is dependent on particular markets. Economic development implies commodity diversification in export trade and as suggested earlier there is a correlation between levels of commodity and geographic concentration in trade. This is especially evident in the group of larger small states where the highest levels of concentration are in the lowest income groups. All but three of the 17 small states at the lowest income levels

²¹ Michaely, *Concentration in International Trade*, *op. cit.*

have indices of over .400 in the direction of their export trade. These poorest states with little to offer will have few opportunities for market diversification.

Among micro-states, however, the impact of economic development is not clear. There are only a few micro-state economies which are based primarily on manufacturing. In the case of Luxembourg the direction of export trade is highly concentrated. For those micro-states with secondary but still significant manufacturing sectors the evidence is inconsistent. Malta and Cyprus have comparatively low indices of geographic concentration. But Trinidad and Tobago and St. Kitts-Nevis, both more industrialised than other Commonwealth Caribbean economies, nevertheless, demonstrate the same high levels of concentration in the direction of their exports.

Simple levels of income as measurements of prosperity rather than the structure of development do indicate marginal variations among micro-states, with the more affluent micro-states enjoying greater diversification of markets than those at the lowest income levels. This only reflects the world demand for whatever primary product is the basis of the micro-state economy, be it oil or groundnuts. For micro-states the impact of location and colonial affiliation are more significant in accounting for differences of geographic concentration of export trade.

The identity of the principal market is as important in assessing the question of dependence as the extent of its percentage share. No government can be comfortable if over 30 percent of exports are purchased by a single customer. But the implications for further dependence are not as great if the relationship does not also have other dimensions. Though Tonga relies on the Dutch market for a critical share of its copra

exports, the Netherlands has neither the established interests nor the ambitions for penetration which could compromise the policies of this tiny kingdom in other issue areas. Nor would the Seychelles have to be anxious about the potential for economic and political domination from Pakistan, which accounts for 56 percent of their visible export trade. For most micro-states, however, the high degree of concentration in the direction of their export trade is a reflection of larger and continuing dependent relationships.

This is immediately evident in those micro-states which conform to Knox's definition of a satellitic economy. Nineteen micro-states rely on a single dominant trading partner as both the principal market and the major source of supply. In four others comparable data was not available (Monaco, Liechtenstein, San Marino and Bhutan in the small state group), but clearly trade is almost entirely confined to the larger neighbouring states. In some micro-states dependence approximates Knox's definition, with the principal market serving as the second major source of supply. In others the reverse pattern holds, with the principal source of supply serving as the second most important market. Such dual trade dependence, in Barbados and Guyana for example, is typical of the Commonwealth Caribbean micro-states, where the United Kingdom and the United States account for most visible trade between them. The greater total trade dependence from the import side is particularly dramatic in the case of Botswana. South Africa is Botswana's second most important market (23.5%) after the United Kingdom (47.3%), but its overwhelming importance as the major source of supply (79.7%) gives South Africa a preponderant share (51.6%) of Botswana's total trade.

For most of the states in this study the question of trade dependence is one of persisting colonial ties. With few exceptions, export markets are primarily those of the former metropole: Britain in the Caribbean, the South Pacific and Anglophone Africa; France, in her former African colonies and the United States in Latin America. Metropolitan penetration of the colonial economy was so thorough and comprehensive that formal independence alone could not alter the exclusivity of economic relations which tied the colony to its distant metropole. The primary sector of colonial production and local financial and marketing systems were channels of the metropolitan economy.

The intensity of the colonial bond is more salient among micro-states than other small states. In part, this is due to the relative amiability which has characterised the new micro-states' relations with the colonial power. In most cases independence was not achieved as a result of a long nationalist struggle. As we have already noted, in some instances it was even resisted initially and accepted finally only because of the colonial power's determination to withdraw. Local elites approached independence with a determination to retain the economic relationship intact. Yet, even in those states where there was conflict— in Guinea-Bissau for example— economic ties to the metropole have endured. In Equatorial Guinea, where diplomatic relations with Spain were broken, the international economic relations of the country, to the extent that they still existed, were channelled almost wholly through Madrid in the early years of independence. Admittedly, that pattern has changed with the development of strong links to France.

In those areas where there is a dominant industrialised regional power, micro-state trading relationships reflect a dualistic basis of economic dependence. Though Britain is

still the most important market for the smallest micro-states of the Commonwealth Caribbean, it is nearly equalled by the importance of the dominant regional power. The United States (and Canada) play a significant role in the economies of the Commonwealth Caribbean, principally in tourism, but also in banking, shipping and industrial development. And, these closer ties are also increasingly evident in the American and Canadian share of visible trade. Similarly, Australian domination of Pacific shipping and her position as the major industrial economy in the region has meant that Australia accounts for a significant share of island trade even in those economies still tied principally to the European metropole.

This reorientation may be seen as a process of decolonisation or it may be regarded simply as exchanging one form of domination, for another. For the former High Commission territories in southern Africa, however, during the difficult years of the apartheid regime next door, continuing economic ties to the former colonial power actually offset the pull towards further domination from Pretoria.

As the last group of dependent territories to achieve sovereignty, micro-states have had little time to develop alternative trading patterns. And, for some of the poorest and smallest among them, the prospects for diversification are not encouraging. For some time they may be as dependent on the metropolitan market as they were in the colonial period. For most very small economies with little of value to sell, the perceived security of existing markets is an inhibiting factor to developing alternative strategies, particularly when, as is often the case, exports to the metropolitan power are actually a form of foreign aid. Nor is it easy to abandon established marketing arrangements (and even

familiar personnel) or to separate trade from the wider network of relations involving shipping, banking, aid and private investment.

Regional trade may eventually offer some potential for diversification. But, the problems of encouraging more than a lip-service commitment to intra-regional trade are well-known and thoroughly analysed in the literature of regionalism: the still small size of the regional market in most developing areas; the common production of principal export staples; the risks of export displacement in certain economies with the development of secondary industries in others; the suspicions of the smaller and peripheral areas towards the 'unfair' advantages of regional growth poles matched by the resentment of the larger and central countries towards 'unreasonable' demands for equalisation of investment and production opportunities.

Still, the picture is not as bleak as it may first appear. Some 26 micro-states have actually increased the geographic diversification of their export trade in the years since independence. Some of these are modest and statistically insignificant, to be sure. But for 14 micro-states the pattern of diversification is dramatic, that is it represents a factor of more than .100 since 1975. This parallels similar patterns of commodity diversification in export trade. The evidence is most striking in the Commonwealth Caribbean where, as suggested, the former colonial power has gradually been displaced by the United States and Canada. Some might argue that this is simply a matter of replacing one hegemonic relationship with another. But a closer examination will indicate that there is also a significant increase in regional trade where regionalism is more advanced than in many parts of the world as well as with European and Asian partners. In other cases, (Malta,

Mauritius, Cape Verde, and Fiji), micro-states have been able to overcome historically powerful mentor relationships as well as difficult problems of location to diversify their export markets dramatically.

In summary, while the international economic relations of micro-states are characterised by high levels of dependence in trade, higher levels than in larger small states, there is no overwhelming evidence that these states are doomed as permanent wards of the international system with no opportunities to reduce their dependence through diversification. They are, after all, as a group, much more recently sovereign states than is the case for the other small states in this comparative exercise. Some have already used instruments available to sovereign governments to encourage patterns of diversification. But like other small states, and indeed some much larger states, their international economic relations, particularly in the context of trade, are largely a matter of dependence management. And in that context, they are clearly not without opportunities.

Foreign Aid and Capital Investment Flows

No discussion of the dependence of very small economies can avoid the issue of aid disbursements and external capital flows. Much of the early literature on small states emphasised the importance and the dangers of aid, both in terms of the percentage of GNP accounted for by aid and, perhaps more ominously, by the geographic concentration of aid sources. There were similar concerns for the likely long-term dependence of so many new states on capital flows from the First World, particularly from multinational corporations that could dominate the enclave sector of a small developing economy.

Inevitably one is drawn to the question of whether the independence of so many new and small states is mortally compromised because of the excessive dependence on external sources of capital, either through aid or through the investment of particular private corporations and financial institutions. Once again we return to themes of scepticism about micro-state sovereignty addressed in the earlier chapters of this study. It may be useful to consider in all of this the plight of many of these new micro-states, some of them clearly vulnerable in the extreme, in the context of the cycle of dependency in some non-sovereign jurisdictions which, nonetheless enjoy considerable levels of constitutional autonomy. The issue of aid, or transfer payments, is the central and recurring question in any discussion of potential self-reliance for so many of these jurisdictions. In 1993 transfer payments from *one* source, Ottawa, accounted for 42.6% of provincial revenue in Prince Edward Island and 47% in Newfoundland and Labrador.²² This is a huge subsidy of separate jurisdictional status. It is no wonder, that in an increasingly threatening milieu of downsizing and fiscal devolution, these governments worry as much about the reality of their autonomy as they do about the stark options which face them over the next decade. But this, sadly, is not an untypical situation for many sub-national jurisdictions across the developed world. Similar pressures are felt in Greenland and the Farøe Islands in respect to the benign but nonetheless finally

²²*Province of Prince Edward Island, 20th Annual Statistical Review 1993* (Charlottetown: Department of the Provincial Treasury, 1994), p. 78.

Historical Statistics of Newfoundland and Labrador (St. John's: Newfoundland Statistics Agency, Executive Council, Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1994), p. 81.

determining role of Copenhagen in allowing these very small jurisdictions to enjoy both constitutional autonomy and relatively comparable living standards to those in Denmark.²³

Are there parallels between dependent very small states and their counterparts within larger jurisdictions? Has sovereignty made a difference or have many of these states simply persisted in a familiar imperial relationship with cosmetic changes; the former Governor now being the High Commissioner or Ambassador? Are they, in the ceremonies of their new-found status, simply replacing one set of transfer payment arrangements for another, the realities of dependence unchanged and perhaps even deepening?²⁴

The anxieties of both Western and non-Western scholars concerning the dangers of both Official Development Assistance and First World private investment in the new states were evident in the literature from the earliest days of decolonisation. Nearly all aid was seen to be political and compromising.²⁵ Marshall Singer was typical in expressing these concerns:

²³H. Schmid, "The Future of the Farøe Islands: Adaptation, Innovation or Stagnation?," in Sámal Tróndur Finnson Johansen (ed.) *Nordiske fiskersamfund ifremtiden, vol.2: Små samfund under europæisk integration* (København: Tema Nord 1995:586, Nordiske Ministerråd, 1995), pp. 71-87.

Danish transfers account for over 50% of government expenditure in Greenland.

Tønnes O. K. Berthelsen, "Greenland Home Rule," *Indigenous Affairs* (No. 1, Jan./Feb./March, 1995), esp. 19-20.

Block grants from Copenhagen, which the Home Rule government can use as it sees fit, have more than trebled since 1980.

Greenland 1994- Statistical Yearbook (Nuuk: Greenland Bureau of Statistics, 1994), p. 18.

²⁴The parallels and potential contrasts between autonomous sub-national micro-jurisdictions and their sovereign counterparts speaks to the very heart of the issue. Some of the French overseas departments and territories, for example, benefit enormously compared to their sovereign neighbours because of immense aid disbursements from Paris. It is not surprising that in many of these territories, even Tahiti in the wake of nuclear testing, independence movements are still embryonic.

²⁵George L. Reid, *A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policies of Very Small States with Special Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean* (University of Southampton, Ph.D. dissertation, 1971), p. 278.

a) Aid tends to support the regime in power and the status quo. And, this in turn, can encourage a conservative emphasis on projecting "the right image;"²⁶

b) Aid deepens the dependence linkage between the donor and the recipient, particularly through such donor self-serving practices as an insistence on expenditures of donor funds within the donor state,²⁷ a practice generally presented as being consistent with the interests of both the incumbent administration and the principal donor state;

c) There is a "spillover " of aid relationships into other sectors through a panoply of concomitant relationships:

. . . there is a mutually reinforcing quality to the ties between donor and recipient. The more economic aid is extended by one country to another, the more foreign trade there is likely to be. The more foreign aid and trade exists, the more economically dependent the weaker state may become on the more powerful, and the more likely it is to support the political interests of the more powerful (other things being equal). The more it tends to support the political interests of the more powerful state, the more likely it will receive more foreign aid. And so it goes.²⁸

These anxieties became a mantra throughout much of the literature, though there was at the same time a recognition of the value of aid and external investment as a kick-

²⁶Demas, *op cit.*, p. 64.

²⁷Singer, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-256.

²⁸*Ibid.*

start for small economies towards some degree of diversification and some measure of dependence-management, if not an ideal state of self-reliant development.

Was size a factor at all in these early debates? Certain disadvantages of small size were widely acknowledged. Many of the small states, and certainly most of the new micro-states, would be less attractive to both public and private investment because of diseconomies within the institutional and infrastructural arrangements in place. In many cases, this would simply mean higher costs.²⁹ Private sector investors would not be inclined to view a small or very small jurisdiction as a separate unit. It was far more likely that decisions taken regarding operations in such small places would be within the vertical hierarchy of the firm's interests, at least on a regional basis.³⁰ Indeed, large corporations could shut down their operations in very small states without much attention or consequence. There was also a recognition that in small states more desirable aid from multilateral sources was not easily forthcoming simply because the scale of many of the ambitious and high-profile operations which these agencies support were not feasible in the scaled-down economies of micro-states and even in many of the small states in the next class.³¹ And, in too many cases, foreign aid was a means of budget support, or even "sovereignty maintenance," rather than as a source of investment in new areas of economic

²⁹Michael Ward, "Dependent Development— Problems of Economic Planning in Small Developing Countries," in Percy Selwyn, *Development Policy in Small Countries* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 123.

³⁰Percy Selwyn, "Industrial Development in Peripheral Small Countries," in Selwyn, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

³¹Reid, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

activity.³² Moreover, small economies were more likely to have a very low savings ratio since domestic capital is typically invested abroad.³³ Expatriate banks and external financial institutions, usually very conservative in terms of local investment risks, are typically the principal agents of capital formation in small and very small economies.³⁴ And, even in those situations where governments seek joint ventures through industrial corporations, more often than not, management has to be imported because the local governments simply lack the experience and the expertise to man their side of these arrangements.³⁵ Finally there is the problem of infrastructure. Many of the very small developing states simply lack the infrastructural requirements to attract foreign investment in projects that could significantly alter the structure of the economy.³⁶ All of these concerns are particularly evident in a small economy dominated by a single enclave sector. This is a familiar litany of anxieties which dominated the literature in the early years of independence.

Yet the prospects for very small economies were not as bleak as these general propositions might suggest. Micro-states are not without their own advantages in this

³²Jean-Luc Vellut, "Smaller States and the Problem of War and Peace: Some Consequences of the Emergence of Smaller States in Africa," *Journal of Peace Research* III (1966), 266-267.

Moreover, as Brookfield noted, aid is often used to finance welfare, thus raising levels of demand and exacerbating the need for foreign exchange.

H. C. Brookfield, "Multum in Parvo: Questions About Diversity and Diversification in Small Countries," in Selwyn, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

³³Demas, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

³⁴H. C. Brookfield, *Colonialism, Development and Independence: The Case of the Melanesian Islands in the South Pacific* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1972), p. 14.

³⁵Selwyn, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

³⁶Reid, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

very competitive search for capital, both from public sources and the huge global private sector. Certainly, diversification of external capital sources is of the most urgent priority in virtually all of these very small jurisdictions. Widening the Official Development Assistance portfolio, away from bilateral arrangements, however understanding, informed and sensitive traditional donors may be, to a variety of sources, particularly multilateral agencies, will alter both the material basis of dependence and the equally important psychological constraints to further self-reliance. For some donor states, very small jurisdictions may seem to be more compliant with the donor's agenda. This may be a good card to play as long as the micro-state is able to call upon other patrons in a diverse portfolio of external assistance and investment. Moreover, a very small jurisdiction can be attractive for many donors simply because a small amount of money can go a very long way.³⁷ Similar contributions can be lost with larger states, but they can make a substantial difference in very small economies. And, if the donors have political priorities, there is an added incentive to consider those cases where there is a relatively high visibility pay-off with relatively low commitments.³⁸ This may be particularly persuasive if a micro-state has its own constituency of support within the lobbying and legislative structures of the donor state. When one begins to compare sources of aid with expenditures of diplomatic representation, the correlation between the two is clear. Equatorial Guinea, for example, has drifted from a residual Spanish affiliation into a new francophone Equatorial Africa.

³⁷ Demas, *op. cit.*, 80.

³⁸ Selwyn, "Room to Manoeuvre?," in Selwyn, *op. cit.*, 16.

This is reflected by almost every measure of linkages between this very poor little state and Europe.

As he did with trade, Marshall Singer set very formidable standards for new states in the context of foreign aid and dependence on foreign capital. He argued that any state which relied upon 20% or more of its GNP on external financial supports was truly a dependent society.³⁹ When we look across the list of micro-states we find some very disturbingly high levels of capital dependence on the outside world. In some cases, obviously Tuvalu, sovereignty maintenance is being supported entirely by external funds which allow this tiny country to function. In too many others, the figures of capital flows as a percentage of GNP,⁴⁰ reflect inordinately high levels of dependence on external financial sources. Twenty one of these micro-states depended on or called upon external capital flows to the extent of more than ten percent of their Gross National Product in 1986. A close examination of those figures over several years will reveal an ongoing pattern among those capital dependent states, though some times with huge variations; Antigua and Barbuda for example. The most outstanding examples of a high dependence on foreign capital are, as might be expected, the poorest states in Africa and the South Pacific with very low levels of export income. Indeed, these states are typically monocultural economies dependent on resources (copra, groundnuts) which are hardly

³⁹Singer, *op. cit.*, 262.

⁴⁰Table I, Appendix II.

lucrative sources of export earnings. In cases such as these, when we examine net capital flows as a percentage of total exports, the figure can be as high 664 percent.⁴¹

Of course, the very small size of many of these economies would mean that comparatively modest grants and investments would account for an unusually high percentage of Gross National Product as indicated in Table I-A of Appendix II. This is evident when we compare these statistics to those of much larger states in Table I-B. Only six of the larger small states in the next population group demonstrated percentages above Singer's threshold of 20%. Again most of these states are African countries which are among the poorest in the world. Among this group of states Panama stands apart since 99.5% of external capital flows in 1987 were from the private sector. Among the highly dependent African states official development assistance accounts for nearly the whole of their external funds.⁴²

As with the issue of trade dependence, the question of a concentration of sources is surely the most central concern. To what extent have these states been able to diversify their sources of capital during the years since they achieved sovereignty?

Perhaps the most illuminating patterns are those to be found in the changing directions of bilateral aid to micro-states. If we look at only the major donors, that is the first three sources in any given year, we see that all micro-states can claim some diversity of portfolio. Over the four years cited as a representative sample in Table X (Appendix II), no micro-state, not even little Tuvalu, is totally dependent on one source of external

⁴¹Table II, Appendix II.

⁴²Table IX, Appendix II

support. Indeed, efforts to diversify capital sources are surprisingly impressive. All of these developing micro-states call upon three to six major sources for bilateral aid.

In some cases, notably the former French colonies, the major partner is the former metropole. In the Comoros, Gabon and Vanuatu the French are by far the major players in those states' portfolios. And the experience of these states would surely support the scepticism of those who view the sovereignty of many of these micro-states as a residual form of colonialism. In other cases, however, the colonial power seems to have vanished from the scene. Portugal and Spain are not major contributors of official development assistance in their former territories within this group of states. In Equatorial Guinea, for instance, France accounts for over 50% of official development assistance. France is similarly present in states where there is no recent colonial link but where there is a cultural residue: the Seychelles, Mauritius. Perhaps France has simply agreed to perform a neo-colonialist role for which the former metropolises no longer have any interest.

Old colonial ties are being overtaken by major regional centres in the South Pacific and the Caribbean. Great Britain, particularly, and Canada, secondarily, are being overtaken by both the United States and Japan in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Grenada. Great Britain appears to be withdrawing from many of its own former colonies. The British are still important in some of the more disadvantaged parts of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Dominica, St. Kitts and St. Vincent, as they are in the most peripheral states of the South Pacific, Kiribati and Tuvalu. But the sovereignty option offers new opportunities. These very small states are now in a position to visit a number of bankers and lending institutions and prospective investors. And the evidence suggests

that they have done just that. In Tonga, for example, Australia has replaced Great Britain as the major source of capital. Australia is the major donor in the Solomon Islands. In Western Samoa and Nauru there is increasing dependence on Japan. And there is the welcome relief of the Scandinavians, the Germans, the Dutch, Belgians and Italians in so many of these situations. In some micro-states with enviably diversified capital portfolios, these smaller players add a welcome balance: The Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, the Seychelles, Swaziland.

In short, there are very few sources of capital to chase: the United States, the former colonial power, the major regional powers, a few major external powers such as Japan. Most states in both groups rely on either the United States or European Union members. There are really no credible alternative sources. The CMEA no longer exists and when it did, it provided sparse pickings for both groups of states cited in this study. Arab support was clearly directed to Arab League states and to selected Muslim states beyond the Arab world. There is limited opportunity for diversification when faced with these few doors of opportunity. There is fierce competition from over 100 developing states for grants and investments from a very small coterie of donors. The competition is all the more difficult now given the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the new international priority assigned to the former Soviet and the former Communist states in Eastern Europe.

The patterns of aid and investment discussed thus far and outlined in the tables in Appendix B indicate that micro-states are not distinguished from other small states in terms of sources of external capital. The larger small states also depend on a portfolio of

four to six donors with the same patterns of metropolitan and regional participation evident among micro-states.

Given that there are few sources of support and very limited opportunities for diversification, how do micro-states stand in this competition? It is certainly clear that almost all of them enjoy a more diversified portfolio of external funding than they could possibly have entertained as ongoing dependencies of European powers. They now have the status to present themselves before international agencies. While multilateral assistance is clearly less compromising than bilateral aid, it remains a small percentage of the assistance package for most developing states in both population groups. Still, the evidence suggests that micro-states have been as successful as larger states in the queue in tapping these limited funds and in diversifying their assistance sources. As sovereign states they have the means now to approach other donors, in sometimes historically unconnected capitals, Stockholm, Copenhagen and Bonn, to diversify their revenue even further. In some cases they have been able to reach a regional partner, the United States, or an extra-regional partner, Japan, to offset traditional colonial relationships. And, as we have suggested with the "mission to civilize" mandate in French foreign policy, some Latin-rooted micro-states outside the immediate francophone embrace, may with compelling evidence of cultural aspiration, be able to draw upon the generous resources of Paris to diversify their own requests from the outside world.

In the first years of their independence then, micro-states were able to reach beyond their colonial largesse, such as it was. Once wholly dependent on funds from the metropolitan centre, they are now able to tap a wide range of sources, some of them

astonishing in their reach. Indeed, in some cases, the new financial partners are rather surprising. Who would have thought that Sweden would have an interest in Guinea-Bissau? But successive Swedish governments have committed significant amounts of support to this former Portuguese territory as they have in what may appear to be eccentric choices across sub-tropical Africa.

There are concerns, to be sure. A growing Japanese presence in the economic and budgetary strategies of South Pacific island states will be unsettling in many quarters. The American embrace of the Commonwealth Caribbean states after the invasion of Grenada will surely arouse similar concerns. On the whole, however, micro-states *have* discovered some measure of diversification through sovereignty. They are no longer dependent on one Home Office for whatever budgetary assistance they may need, much less funds for exploiting new areas of development. They are in a position to win access to otherwise closed boardrooms. They are parties to be considered in the allocation of funds both from international bodies and from various national overseas development ministries. They can speak to their own case. And this is a huge advantage. It is an advantage which is reflected in the statistics of diversification cited in Table X.

How then might we review the fortune of these very small economies in an increasingly pressing global system? There is no question that the evidence brought to bear in this chapter powerfully suggests vulnerability and ongoing dependence. That vulnerability is particularly evident in the volatile growth rates of Gross Domestic Product set out in Appendix III. In some cases the swings are huge. In Equatorial Guinea, for example, GDP grew by 7.3% in 1985 only to fall by 3.8% the following year and up again

by 7.5% in 1987. In a few others there are several years of protracted decline, particularly among oil states in the mid-1980's, when world prices fell. What is more striking, however, is that most micro-states have demonstrated rather hopeful patterns of continued growth. Some are still woefully poor, to be sure. But even among these seemingly most desolate micro-states there is hard evidence of growth and diversification. The Maldivian Islands is just such a case. They have not had to earn their way by selling their strategic location or the former base at Gan to potential global or, more likely regional powers. It is a very poor society with income levels less than \$1000 per annum. But the Gross Domestic Product of the Maldives has grown from year to year by 6.3% to 16.2%. Population growth in so many of these poorer micro-states inhibits the effect of such astonishing rates of growth. But it seems to be clear that even among these very weak micro-states sovereignty has not ushered in the doom and gloom that many predicted and first generation indigenous leaders feared.

In middle income micro-states the patterns of economic development over the years of independence are also encouraging. Malta, for example, has sustained enviable levels of annual growth by OECD standards, and certainly in comparison to other European states. Admittedly, Malta and Cyprus remain far behind their prospective European partners in all measures of economic development save those of consistent advance. Standards of living have more than doubled in the last decade as the economy has steadily grown in all sectors at rates comparable to the Asian tigers. This is hardly a country with any special advantage. As an off-shore island in the Mediterranean it must confront problems of access and expensive transportation costs. There are precious few

resources on Malta, apart from the unparalleled pre-historic archaeological sites and other tourism attractions. Even fresh water is in short supply. It is not surprising that even Dom Mintoff, the irascible and fiercely independent Labour leader, would have considered Home Rule status, much like the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands, at one time as a secure alternative to independence.⁴³ Indeed, independence *was* an unnerving prospect given the importance of the British base to the island economy in the early post-war years. Between 1960 and 1964, the base accounted for 15.1% of GDP and 16.2% of total employment. By 1975-1979 this percentage had fallen to 2.3% and 2.1% respectively. They were to disappear altogether in the 1980's.⁴⁴ Yet in the thirty-two years of independence, received as reluctantly as it was celebrated, Malta has managed to adjust within the parameters of sovereignty. It has not always been comfortable given the shock of the British withdrawal in the sixties, the world energy crisis and inflation in the seventies and worldwide recession in the eighties. But perhaps the development of the manufacturing sector is the most dramatic achievement. Manufacturing, mostly textiles, footwear and machinery, contributed 16.6% to GDP in the early sixties. That share was doubled by 1975-1979. Moreover, employment in manufacturing rose from 18.2% of

⁴³Dom Mintoff, "Malta's Road to Independence," a paper delivered at the international conference, "An Island Living," Prince Edward Island, September, 1992 and to be included in Barry Bartmann and T. N. St. John Bates (eds.), *The Road to Self-Government: Patterns of Autonomy Among North Atlantic Islands* (Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, forthcoming 1996).

⁴⁴Lino Briguglio, "The Maltese Economy," a paper presented at an international conference on Small Islands and Small States, sponsored by the Foundation for International Studies, University of Malta, Valletta, 23-25 May, 1991.

total employment in 1960-1964 to 32.7% in 1975-1979. These figures have dropped only marginally in recent years.⁴⁵

Tourism and construction have both contributed significantly to Malta's ongoing prosperity. Tourism grew by 21% to 30% in the late eighties. It is a major factor in compensating for recurring deficits in merchandise trade. And it accounts for 5% of total employment.⁴⁶ Market services account for some 34% of GDP.

Over the last decade Malta has experienced annual growth rates of between 3.9% and 8.4%, well above the European average.⁴⁷ And now Malta is poised to join the European Union with credentials for Maastricht convergence on monetary union that only Luxembourg now consistently meets.⁴⁸ The relative success of Malta speaks dramatically to so many of the assumptions outlined in the early pages of this study. It is an extremely small place geographically, even to the point that the major runway at its busy international airport seems to stretch half way across the major island in satellite photographs. It is arid and import dependent. And the Maltese themselves would be a relatively small or middle-sized city in other European states. Yet, this once most loyal

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶Market Services Co. Ltd., *The E.C.- Malta at the Crossroads*. Floriana: Federation of Industries, 1988, pp. 39, 47.

⁴⁷These figures are similar to Europe's other Mediterranean micro-state, Cyprus, which has had the further difficulty of coping with a seemingly intractable division of the island. Note Appendix III to this chapter.

⁴⁸Indeed, astonishingly, Malta is one of the few countries in Europe which could now meet the Maastricht standards for convergence. Its growth rate in 1995 was 6%, more than twice the E.U. average of 2.5%. And its public debt stands at 36% of GDP, lower than any other state in the Union except for Luxembourg!
The Economist, March 9, 1996, 56.

colony of Great Britain, which petitioned for an ongoing imperial relationship, is now negotiating to join the European Union from an enviable position of strength.

The experience of Malta and Cyprus, both once considered under-developed economies, is not repeated everywhere. But it is testament that very small economies can manage and prosper as sovereign states and against formidable odds. Malta particularly is pursuing a course of liberalisation in its efforts to meet all EU expectations.⁴⁹ Far from the timidity which characterised much of Maltese attitudes in the late fifties and early sixties, this very small national community is embracing the challenge of membership with confidence and enthusiasm.

In short, sovereignty has not been a panacea to rescue very small economies from the vulnerabilities and structural disabilities which they face because of their size. On the other hand, it has not presented an impossible set of challenges sufficient to support early notions that these tiny jurisdictions would be either unviable in the end or so chronically dependent as to render hollow the international personality which they won for themselves. For most micro-states, their international economic relations are still characterised by tasks of dependence-management. But within those more modest parameters, they have done unexpectedly well.

⁴⁹Edward Scicluna, *The Restructuring of the Maltese Economy* (Floriana: Malta Federation of Industry, 1993).

APPENDIX

TABLE I**TRADE STATISTICS FOR SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES**

(\$US Million, 1986 Current Dollars)

RANKED ACCORDING TO GNP, 1986

(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)

COUNTRY	GNP	EXPORTS	IMPORTS
1 Denmark	78888	20558.4	22725.6
2 Finland	69375	16325.2	15324.5
3 Norway	68548	18229.7	20298.2
4 Israel	28140	7135.2	9481.1
5 New Zealand	26668	3143.3	3235.9
6 Kuwait	24580	7511.9	5934.0
7 Ireland	21962	12603.7	11563.7
8 United Arab Emirates	21400	15837.1	6422.0
9 Libya	20030	5680.0	4440.4
10 Singapore	18160	22427.9	25461.4
11 Oman	8540	290.4	2384.1
12 Trinidad and Tobago	6170	1385.7	1369.8
13 Uruguay	6120	1082.1	870.0
14 LUXEMBOURG	5830	3720.5	4020.2
15 Panama	4820	326.8	1275.3
16 Jordan	4420	714.3	2412.7
17 Costa Rica	4110	1025.5	1130.1
18 QATAR	3880	1827.8	1098.9
19 El Salvador	3830	713.0	884.9
20 ICELAND	3713	1095.8	1115.3
21 BAHRAIN	3670	2343.6	2426.6
22 Mongolia	3620	675.0	1732.0
23 BRUNEI	3570	2156.0	1114.2
24 Honduras	3570	854.3	875.0
25 Paraguay	3570	232.5	578.1
26 CYPRUS	3120	306.4	1263.4
27 GABON	3010	1074.2	924.0

TABLE I**TRADE STATISTICS FOR SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES**

(\$US Million, 1986 Current Dollars)

RANKED ACCORDING TO GNP, 1986

(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)

COUNTRY	GNP	EXPORTS	IMPORTS
28 Albania	2800	428.0	363.0
29 Nicaragua	2470	247.2	770.1
30 Papua New Guinea	2,400	1,048.80	931.30
31 BAHAMAS	2310	2702.2	3293.5
32 Haiti	2230	170.2	367.2
33 Jamaica	2150	587.5	971.6
34 Lebanon	a,e 1800	302.9	2273.1
35 Congo	1,620	718	629
36 Somalia	1,560	105	402
37 MAURITIUS	1,400	674.5	675.4
38 MALTA	1,380	497	879.7
39 Benin	1,380	93.9	370
40 BARBADOS	1,300	277.4	593.2
41 FIJI	1,250	264.3	422.2
42 Burundi	1,250	169.3	203.4
43 Sierra Leone	1,240	144.9	276.5
44 Liberia	1,010	408.4	259
45 Botswana	990	861.3	707.1
46 SURINAME	980	336.6	317
47 Togo	950	235	350
48 Central African Republic	940	131.3	251.8
49 Yemen, P.D.R.	910	29	483
50 Chad	c 810	138	162
51 Mauritania	780	349.4	221
52 Laos	660	58	205
53 Lesotho	540	24.3	425
54 SWAZILAND	460	265.5	344.4

TABLE I**TRADE STATISTICS FOR SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES**

(\$US Million, 1986 Current Dollars)

RANKED ACCORDING TO GNP, 1986

(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)

COUNTRY		GNP	EXPORTS	IMPORTS
55	LIECHTENSTEIN	450	688.8	265.4
56	DJIBOUTI	b 430	13.4	188.4
57	GUYANA	390	231.2	225.6
58	BELIZE	200	90.9	107.5
59	SAINT LUCIA	190	82.9	154.8
60	ANTIGUA and BARBUDA	190	24.7	199.5
61	SEYCHELLES	190	18.4	105.5
62	GAMBIA	170	68.4	113.3
63	BHUTAN	170	25.6	89.1
64	NAURU	160	54.8	10.7
65	CAPE VERDE	c 160	49.7	41.8
66	COMOROS	160	20.3	39.3
67	VANUATU	160	17.3	57.1
68	GUINEA-BISSAU	160	9.6	71.6
69	SOLOMON ISLANDS	120	66.8	63.5
70	GRENADA	120	28.8	83.5
71	SAINT VINCENT and GRENADINES	110	63.9	87.3
72	DOMINICA	110	42.3	55.7
73	WESTERN SAMOA	110	11.5	48.3
74	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	a,c 107	23.5	25.1
75	SAINT KITTS-NEVIS	80	27.5	63.4
76	TONGA	70	5.8	39.8
77	MALDIVES	60	27.3	11.6
78	SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE	d 40	9.9	11
79	KIRIBATI	30	1.8	14
80	TUVALU	4	0.015	2.7
81	MONACO	n/a	n/a	n/a
82	SAN MARINO	n/a	n/a	n/a

TABLE I

NOTES:

- a GDP, not GNP
- b exports 1985
- c exports, imports 1984
- d imports 1984
- e GDP, exports 1985; imports 1984

SOURCES FOR GNP:

DEVELOPING NATIONS

Main Source:

United Nations Statistical Yearbook
New York: United Nations, 1985-86.

Supplementary Source:

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.

LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.

Albania 1982, 1985-86; EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1981, 1983-86; Lebanon 1983-84; Mongolia 1985-86;
Lebanon 1983-84; Mongolia 1985-86; NAURU 1984-86; TUVALU 1981, 1984-86;
WESTERN SAMOA 1981, 1985-86.

WESTERN NATIONS

WORLD TABLES, BALTIMORE: THE WORLD BANK, JOHN HOPKINS

UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1989. (in Domestic currency)

Conversion Rates: UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK.

NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, 1985-86.

TABLE I

SOURCES FOR EXPORTS:

Main Source:

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK.

NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1, 1987.

Table 3: "Trade by Principal Countries of Provenance and Destination", supplemented by:

Table 1: "Historical Series, General Trade", where value of exports in domestic currency is converted into \$US millions by using the conversion factors supplied in the Table.

Supplementary Sources:

i) HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS.

GENEVA: UNCTAD, 1988. (Micro-states only)

GABON 1986; GAMBIA 1984-86; GUINEA-BISSAU 1983-86; KIRIBATI 1985-86;

MALDIVES 1983-86; SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE 1981-85; ST. KITTS-NEVIS 1984;

ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES 1983-84; SURINAME 1981-86; SWAZILAND 1981-86.

ii) STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, BANGKOK: UNEASCAP, 1988.

Bhutan 1981-86; BRUNEI 1986; Laos 1981-86; NAURU 1981-84; TUVALU 1984.

iii) UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK. NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, 1985/86.

Chad 1981-84; EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1981-82, 1984; Lebanon 1983-85; Paraguay 1984-85;

United Arab Emirates 1983-86; Yemen, P.D.R. 1981-86.

iv) WORLD TABLES, BALTIMORE: THE WORLD BANK, JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1989.

Benin 1984-86; Congo 1986; Lesotho 1986; Libya 1985-86; NAURU 1986;

New Zealand 1981-86; Somalia 1986; Togo 1986; TUVALU 1985.

vi) ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.

LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.

Albania 1982, 1985-86; LIECHTENSTEIN 1982-86; LUXEMBOURG 1982-86; Mongolia 1985-86;

Paraguay 1986; QATAR 1986; TUVALU 1986.

TABLE I

SOURCES FOR IMPORTS:

Main Source:

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK.

NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1, 1987.

Table 3: "Trade by Principal Countries of Provenance and Destination", supplemented by:

Table 1: "Historical Series, General Trade", where value of imports in domestic currency is converted into \$US millions by using the conversion factors supplied in the Table.

Supplementary Sources:

- i) **STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. BANGKOK: UNEASCAP, 1988.**
Bhutan 1981-86; BRUNEI 1986; KIRIBATI 1985-86; Laos 1981-86; MALDIVES 1983-86;
NAURU 1981-84; TUVALU 1984.
- ii) **UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK. NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, 1985/86.**
Chad 1981-84; EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1981-82, 1984; Lebanon 1982, 1984; Paraguay 1984-85;
ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES 1984; SURINAME 1981-82, 1984-85;
United Arab Emirates 1984-85; Yemen, P.D.R. 1981-86.
- iii) **WORLD TABLES, BALTIMORE: THE WORLD BANK, JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1989.**
Benin 1984-86; Congo 1986; GABON 1986; GAMBIA 1984-86; GUINEA-BISSAU 1983-86;
GUYANA 1986; Haiti 1986; Kuwait 1985-86; Lesotho 1986; Libya 1983-86; NAURU 1986;
New Zealand 1981-86; Somalia 1986; SWAZILAND 1984; Togo 1986;
United Arab Emirates 1986.
- iv) **THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK: LONDON: EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, 1987.**
Botswana 1984-86; Lesotho 1981-85; Paraguay 1981-83; SWAZILAND 1983, 1985-86.
- v) **ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.**
LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.
Albania 1982, 1985-86; DJIBOUTI 1986; Lebanon 1983; LIECHTENSTEIN 1981-86;
LUXEMBOURG 1981, 1983-86; Mongolia 1985-86; Paraguay 1986;
SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE 1984; SURINAME 1986; SWAZILAND 1982, TUVALU 1985-86

TABLE II

SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED			
ACCORDING TO RATIOS OF TOTAL TRADE (X+M) TO GNP (1986)			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY	1986	1985	1984
1 Singapore	263.7	267.7	275.5
2 BAHAMAS	259.6	268.8	486.4
3 LIECHTENSTEIN	f 212	149	130.9
4 Botswana	158.4	148	156.6
5 Lebanon	acde 143.1	143.1	177.7
6 MALDIVES	142.2	146.8	178.9
7 ST. VINCENT and THE GRENADINES	137.4	129.5	130.2
8 LUXEMBOURG	132.8	116.9	111.2
9 SWAZILAND	132.6	130.1	120
10 BAHRAIN	130	161.5	167.5
11 ST. LUCIA	125.1	104.1	110.9
12 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA	118	107.9	93.4
13 GUYANA	117.1	128.2	121.7
14 ST. KITTS-NEVIS	g 113.6	107.7	104.8
15 Ireland	110	125.5	121.4
16 SOLOMON ISLANDS	108.6	106.7	105.3
17 GAMBIA	106.9	112.9	94.4
18 United Arab Emirates	104	81.3	79.8
19 MALTA	99.8	104.7	100.4
20 BELIZE	99.2	121.3	115.3
21 MAURITIUS	96.4	93.1	84.5
22 GRENADA	93.6	83.3	74.2
23 BRUNEI	91.6	96	99.4
24 DOMINICA	89.1	83.8	92.7
25 Lesotho	83.2	79.1	76.4
26 Congo	83.1	86.4	86
27 Papua New Guinea	82.5	84.8	81.2
28 QATAR	75.4	95.1	100.4
29 Mauritania	73.1	90.7	79.9
30 Jamaica	72.5	96.1	93.4

TABLE II

SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED				
ACCORDING TO RATIOS OF TOTAL TRADE (X+M) TO GNP (1986)				
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)				
COUNTRY		1986	1985	1984
31	Jordan	70.7	87.4	93.6
32	TUVALU	67.9	74.8	93.6
33	Bhutan	67.5	61.2	50.7
34	BARBADOS	67	77.7	90.4
35	SURINAME	66.7	69.5	78.2
36	Mongolia	66.5	105.5	n/a
37	GABON	66.4	95.5	88.3
38	Liberia	66.1	69.9	82.9
39	SEYCHELLES	65.2	79.5	70.6
40	TONGA	65.2	77.8	71.8
41	Togo	61.6	55.6	55.7
42	ICELAND	59.6	62.4	60.6
43	Israel	59	61.9	56.4
44	CAPE VERDE	bc	57.1	70.3
45	Yemen, P.D.R.	56.3	70.4	74.4
46	Norway	56.2	57.5	60.8
47	FIJI	54.9	59.8	59.7
48	Denmark	54.9	61.8	61.3
49	Kuwait	54.7	63.1	71.9
50	WESTERN SAMOA	f	54.4	60.3
51	KIRIBATI	52.7	65.3	106.7
52	Costa Rica	52.4	58.1	62.9
53	SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE	c	52.3	45.3
54	GUINEA-BISSAU	50.7	49.7	57.5
55	Libya	50.5	67.7	74.8
56	CYPRUS	50.3	70.1	86.7
57	Honduras	48.4	47.7	51.1
58	DJIBOUTI	d	46.9	51.7
59	VANUATU	46.5	68	65.3
60	Finland	45.6	50.2	51.4

TABLE II

SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED				
ACCORDING TO RATIOS OF TOTAL TRADE (X+M) TO GNP (1986)				
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)				
COUNTRY		1986	1985	1984
61 EQUATORIAL GUINEA	abc	45.5	54.1	71.5
62 Trinidad and Tobago		44.7	51.4	53.8
63 El Salvador		41.7	43.5	49.2
64 Nicaragua		41.2	45.7	46.8
65 NAURU	h	40.9	46.7	46.7
66 Central African Republic		40.8	28.6	26.5
67 Laos		39.8	41.2	39.1
68 COMOROS		37.2	47.6	45.5
69 Chad	bc	37	45.5	58.8
70 Sierra Leone		34	19.3	29.3
71 Benin		33.6	45.5	45.9
72 Panama		33.2	36.9	38.9
73 Somalia		32.5	15.7	8.8
74 Uruguay		31.9	32.1	34.8
75 Oman		31.3	39.6	39.9
76 Burundi		29.8	27.1	29.5
77 Albania		28.3	18.8	n/a
78 Haiti		24.1	30.9	36.2
79 New Zealand		23.9	28.4	32.1
80 Paraguay		22.7	26.7	29.3
81 SAN MARINO		n/a	n/a	n/a
82 MONACO		n/a	n/a	n/a
NOTES:				
GDP, not GNP				
a 1984 most recent export data, used for 1984-86				
b 1984 most recent import data, used for 1984-86				
c 1985 most recent export data, used for 1985-86				
d 1985 most recent GNP data, used for 1985-86				
e 1984 GNP missing, used 1981				
f 1984 imports missing, used 1983				
g 1985 exports, imports missing, used 1984 both years				
Source: SEE NOTES TO TABLE I				

TABLE III

SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE			
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986)			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY	1986	1985	1984
1 BAHAMAS	142.6	142.5	266.1
2 Singapore	140.2	143.2	149.8
3 Lebanon	abc 126.3	126.3	152.4
4 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA	105.0	92.9	82.4
5 MALDIVES	96.7	95.8	121.2
6 ST. LUCIA	81.5	73.5	79.0
7 ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES	79.4	72.0	76.6
8 ST. KITTS-NEVIS	e 79.3	76.6	74.2
9 Lesotho	78.7	75.0	72.4
10 SWAZILAND	74.9	84.5	74.7
11 Botswana	71.4	65.1	80.6
12 GRENADA	69.6	63.0	56.0
13 LUXEMBOURG	69.0	59.9	58.2
14 TUVALU	67.5	72.0	86.8
15 GAMBIA	66.6	70.0	50.1
16 BAHRAIN	66.1	83.5	87.2
17 MALTA	63.7	68.3	64.6
18 LIECHTENSTEIN	d 59.0	39.9	38.1
19 GUYANA	57.8	70.8	66.4
20 TONGA	56.9	68.8	58.7
21 SEYCHELLES	55.5	62.1	54.5
22 Jordan	54.6	67.2	73.1
23 BELIZE	53.8	71.2	72.3
24 Yemen, P.D.R.	53.1	66.5	72.0
25 SOLOMON ISLANDS	52.9	53.1	43.7
26 Ireland	52.7	61.7	60.8
27 Bhutan	52.4	47.3	40.6
28 DOMINICA	50.6	55.3	64.2
29 MAURITIUS	48.2	50.9	47.2
30 Mongolia	47.8	75.8	n/a

TABLE III

SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE			
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986)			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY	1986	1985	1984
31 KIRIBATI	46.7	50.0	68.6
32 BARBADOS	45.6	50.6	58.9
33 Jamaica	45.2	64.6	56.6
34 GUINEA-BISSAU	44.8	42.0	44.2
35 WESTERN SAMOA	d 43.9	46.5	39.7
36 DJIBOUTI	43.8	48.5	56.4
37 CYPRUS	40.5	50.6	60.8
38 Congo	38.8	30.1	28.9
39 Papua New Guinea	38.8	43.4	42.3
40 Togo	36.8	33.5	32.7
41 VANUATU	35.7	47.5	42.0
42 FIJI	33.8	40.1	39.0
43 Israel	33.7	35.1	33.2
44 SURINAME	32.3	34.9	40.0
45 BRUNEI	31.2	16.4	16.2
46 Nicaragua	31.2	34.2	31.9
47 Laos	31.1	32.2	30.6
48 GABON	30.7	31.6	27.0
49 ICELAND	30.0	32.8	32.2
50 United Arab Emirates	30.0	27.7	26.9
51 Norway	29.6	25.2	25.7
52 Denmark	28.8	32.3	31.6
53 Mauritania	28.3	34.9	36.2
54 QATAR	28.3	23.2	20.6
55 Oman	27.9	35.6	35.2
56 SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE	b 27.5	27.5	36.7
57 Costa Rica	27.5	30.6	33.5
58 Benin	26.8	30.6	30.3
59 Central African Republic	26.8	15.8	13.4
60 Panama	26.5	30.3	32.9

TABLE III

SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE				
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986)				
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)				
COUNTRY		1986	1985	1984
61 CAPE VERDE	b	26.1	32.1	32.1
62 Somalia		25.8	8.7	6.2
63 Liberia		25.6	27.6	37.1
64 COMOROS		24.5	33.4	39.1
65 Honduras		24.5	26.5	27.4
66 Kuwait		24.1	21.4	25.9
67 EQUATORIAL GUINEA	ab	23.5	27.9	36.9
68 El Salvador		23.1	25.5	33.5
69 Sierra Leone		22.3	11.6	15.6
70 Trinidad and Tobago		22.2	21.3	25.3
71 Libya		22.2	24.1	32.3
72 Finland		22.1	24.7	24.6
73 Chad	b	20.0	24.5	31.8
74 Haiti		16.5	22.2	26.2
75 Burundi		16.3	17.3	19.3
76 Paraguay		16.2	14.0	16.7
77 Uruguay		14.2	14.6	15.9
78 Albania		13.0	9.8	n/a
79 New Zealand		12.1	14.5	16.8
80 NAÛRU		6.7	5.3	5.3
81 MONACO		n/a	n/a	n/a
82 SAN MARINO		n/a	n/a	n/a

NOTES:
a GDP, not GNP
b 1984 most recent imports, used 1984-86
c 1985 most recent GNP, used 1985-86
d 1984 GNP is 1981
e 1984 imports missing, used 1983

Source: SEE NOTES TO TABLE I

TABLE IV

SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE				
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986)				
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)				
COUNTRY		1986	1985	1984
1	LIECHTENSTEIN	e 153.1	109.2	92.9
2	Singapore	123.5	124.5	125.7
3	BAHAMAS	117.0	126.3	220.3
4	Botswana	87.0	82.9	76.1
5	United Arab Emirates	74.0	53.6	52.9
6	BAHRAIN	63.9	78.0	80.3
7	LUXEMBOURG	63.8	57.0	53.0
8	BRUNEI	60.4	79.7	83.2
9	GUYANA	59.3	57.4	55.3
10	ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES	58.1	57.5	53.6
11	SWAZILAND	57.7	45.6	45.3
12	Ireland	57.4	63.8	60.6
13	SOLOMON ISLANDS	55.7	53.7	61.6
14	MAURITIUS	48.2	42.2	37.3
15	QATAR	47.1	72.0	79.9
16	MALDIVES	45.5	51.0	57.8
17	BELIZE	45.5	50.1	43.0
18	Mauritania	44.8	55.9	43.7
19	Congo	44.3	56.3	57.1
20	Papua New Guinea	43.7	41.4	38.9
21	ST. LUCIA	43.6	30.6	31.9
22	Liberia	40.4	42.3	45.8
23	GAMBIA	40.2	42.9	44.3
24	DOMINICA	38.5	28.4	28.5
25	MALTA	36.0	36.4	35.8
26	GABON	35.7	63.9	61.3
27	ST. KITTS-NEVIS	f 34.4	31.1	30.6
28	SURINAME	34.3	34.6	38.2
29	NAURU	34.3	41.4	41.4

TABLE IV

SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE					
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986)					
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)					
COUNTRY		1986	1985	1984	
30	CAPE VERDE	b	31.0	38.2	38.2
31	Kuwait		30.6	41.7	46.0
32	ICELAND		29.5	29.6	28.4
33	Libya		28.4	43.7	42.5
34	Jamaica		27.3	31.5	36.8
35	Norway		26.6	32.3	35.1
36	Denmark		26.1	29.6	29.6
37	Israel		25.4	26.8	23.2
38	Costa Rica		25.0	27.5	29.4
39	SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE		24.8	17.8	40.7
40	Togo		24.7	22.1	23.1
41	GRENADA		24.0	20.3	18.2
42	Honduras		23.9	21.2	23.7
43	Finland		23.5	25.4	26.7
44	Trinidad and Tobago		22.5	30.1	28.6
45	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	ab	22.0	26.2	34.6
46	BARBADOS		21.3	27.1	31.5
47	FIJI		21.1	19.8	20.6
48	Mongolia		18.6	29.8	n/a
49	El Salvador		18.6	18.0	15.7
50	Uruguay		17.7	17.5	18.9
51	Chad	b	17.0	20.9	27.1
52	Lebanon	acd	16.8	16.8	25.3
53	Jordan		16.2	20.2	20.5
54	Albania		15.3	9.0	n/a
55	Bhutan		15.1	13.9	10.1
56	Central African Republic		14.0	12.8	13.1
57	Burundi		13.5	9.8	10.2
58	ANTIGUA and BARBUDA		13.0	14.9	11.0

TABLE IV

SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE			
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986)			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY	1986	1985	1984
59 COMOROS	12.7	14.3	6.4
60 New Zealand	11.8	13.8	15.3
61 Sierra Leone	11.7	7.8	13.7
62 VANUATU	10.8	20.5	23.3
63 WESTERN SAMOA	e 10.5	13.8	15.4
64 Nicaragua	10.0	11.6	14.9
65 CYPRUS	9.8	19.5	25.9
66 SEYCHELLES	9.7	17.4	16.0
67 Laos	8.8	9.0	8.5
68 TONGA	8.3	9.1	13.1
69 Haiti	7.6	8.8	9.9
70 Benin	6.8	14.9	15.6
71 Panama	6.8	6.6	6.0
72 Somalia	6.7	7.0	2.7
73 Paraguay	6.5	12.8	12.6
74 KIRIBATI	6.0	15.3	38.1
75 GUINEA-BISSAU	6.0	7.7	13.4
76 Lesotho	4.5	4.1	4.0
77 Oman	3.4	3.9	4.7
78 Yemen, P.D.R.	3.2	3.9	2.4
79 DJIBOUTI	c 3.1	3.3	3.3
80 TUVALU	0.4	2.8	6.9
81 MONACO	n/a	n/a	n/a
82 SAN MARINO	n/a	n/a	n/a

NOTES:
a GDP, not GNP
b 1984 most recent export, used for 1984-1986
c 1985 most recent export, used for 1985-1986
d 1985 most recent GNP, used for 1985-1986
e 1984 GNP missing, used 1981
f 1984 imports missing, used 1983

Source: SEE NOTES TO TABLE I

TABLE V

SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING			
TO THE			
<u>HIRSHMANN INDEX OF COMMODITY CONCENTRATION</u>			
OF			
<u>EXPORT TRADE (1986)</u>			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY+		1986*	1975
1	Libya	0.958	(0.982)
2	QATAR	0.915	(0.971)
3	MAURITIUS	0.913	(0.856)
4	Chad	0.911	(0.630)
5	Congo	0.901	(0.693)
6	United Arab Emirates	0.892	(0.939)
7	Burundi	0.884	(0.873)
8	CAPE VERDE	0.865	(0.684)
9	TUVALU	0.864	n/a
10	SEYCHELLES	0.825	(0.676)
11	SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE	0.814	(0.780)
12	GABON	0.808	(0.563)
13	MALDIVES	0.791	(0.976)
14	COMOROS	0.784	(0.514)
15	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	0.755	(0.725)
16	Botswana	0.749	(0.507)
17	KIRIBATI	0.732	(0.964)
18	Yemen, P.D.R.	0.720	(0.744)
19	Mauritania	0.719	(0.625)
20	BAHAMAS	0.715	(0.698)
21	BRUNEI	0.691	(0.797)
22	ST. LUCIA	0.678	(0.666)
23	BAHRAIN	0.673	(0.747)
24	Liberia	0.646	(0.656)
25	GUINEA-BISSAU	0.632	(0.763)
26	Laos	0.606	(0.945)
27	Kuwait	0.602	(0.812)
28	Somalia	0.601	(0.586)

TABLE V

<u>SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING</u>			
TO THE			
<u>HIRSHMANN INDEX OF COMMODITY CONCENTRATION</u>			
OF			
<u>EXPORT TRADE (1986)</u>			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY+		1986*	1975
29	ST. KITTS-NEVIS	0.591	(0.699)
30	Jamaica	0.590	(0.549)
31	Mongolia	0.587	(0.506)
32	ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES	0.586	(0.567)
33	El Salvador	0.586	(0.378)
34	Paraguay	0.576	(0.224)
35	DOMINICA	0.570	(0.743)
36	SURINAME	0.568	(0.766)
37	Haiti	0.564	(0.336)
38	SOLOMON ISLANDS	0.561	(0.507)
39	GUYANA	0.560	(0.562)
40	LIECHTENSTEIN	0.557	n/a
41	VANUATU	0.541	n/a
42	GRENADA	0.539	(0.582)
43	LUXEMBOURG	0.535	(0.686)
44	FIJI	0.528	(0.833)
45	Trinidad and Tobago	0.512	(0.623)
46	Benin	0.512	(0.333)
47	ANTIGUA and BARBUDA	0.502	(0.849)
48	Honduras	0.480	(0.283)
49	Nicaragua	0.478	(0.354)
50	Papua New Guinea	0.460	(0.618)
51	ICELAND	0.459	(0.669)
52	Lesotho	0.448	(0.556)
53	Central African Republic	0.447	(0.386)
54	Togo	0.431	(0.757)
55	BARBADOS	0.409	(0.526)
56	Costa Rica	0.406	(0.331)

TABLE V

<u>SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING</u>			
TO THE			
<u>HIRSHMANN INDEX OF COMMODITY CONCENTRATION</u>			
OF			
<u>EXPORT TRADE (1986)</u>			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY+		1986*	1975
57	Jordan	0.401	(0.495)
58	WESTERN SAMOA	0.400	(0.537)
59	Bhutan	0.389	n/a
60	SWAZILAND	0.387	(0.496)
61	Albania	0.381	n/a
62	GAMBIA	0.374	(0.657)
63	Sierra Leone	0.362	(0.617)
64	DJIBOUTI	0.360	n/a
65	MALTA	0.355	(0.529)
66	BELIZE	0.329	n/a
67	Panama	0.318	(0.547)
68	Norway	0.306	(0.176)
69	TONGA	0.297	(0.733)
70	Israel	0.289	(0.327)
71	Oman	0.265	(0.997)
72	Finland	0.242	(0.277)
73	New Zealand	0.233	(0.348)
74	Singapore	0.229	(0.313)
75	Uruguay	0.228	(0.563)
76	Lebanon	0.219	(0.104)
77	Ireland	0.172	(0.128)
78	CYPRUS	0.152	(0.284)
79	Denmark	0.093	(0.093)
80	MONACO	n/a	n/a
81	NAURU	n/a	n/a
82	SAN MARINO	n/a	n/a

TABLE V

- Indicates 2-digit SITC, not 3-digit.

* Indicates 1986 or most recent year available, as indicated below:

1985: BAHAMAS, BELIZE, BRUNEI, Congo, DOMINICA, GABON, GUYANA, MALDIVES, Paraguay, QATAR, SEYCHELLES, Sierra Leone, SURINAME, United Arab Emirates.

1984: ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, Benin, CAPE VERDE, El Salvador, Kuwait, Lebanon, ST. KITTS-NEVIS, SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE, Somalia

1983: Chad, DJIBOUTI, GRENADA.

1982: BAHRAIN, Central African Republic.

1981: EQUATORIAL GUINEA, Lesotho.

SOURCES:

Main Source:

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK.

NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1, 1987.

ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, BAHAMAS, BAHRAIN, BARBADOS, BELIZE, BRUNEI, Burundi, CAPE VERDE, Congo, CYPRUS, Denmark, DOMINICA, El Salvador, Finland, ICELAND, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, MALTA, Norway, Oman, SEYCHELLES, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay.

Supplementary Sources:

i) **THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK: LONDON: EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, 1988.**

Bhutan, Botswana, Chad, Costa Rica, DJIBOUTI, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, FIJI, GRENADA, GUINEA-BISSAU, JAMAICA, KIRIBATI, MAURITIUS, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Solomon Islands.

ii) **ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.**

LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.

Remaining countries.

TABLE VI

<u>SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING</u>			
TO THE			
<u>HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION</u>			
OF			
<u>EXPORT TRADE (1986)</u>			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY+		1986*	1975
1	Bhutan	~ 0.991	n/a
2	Chad	0.925	(0.684)
3	BAHAMAS	0.879	(0.792)
4	Botswana	0.836	(0.572)
5	Somalia	0.788	(0.600)
6	MALDIVES	0.721	(0.641)
7	ST. LUCIA	0.715	(0.622)
8	COMOROS	0.691	(0.637)
9	Panama	0.683	(0.613)
10	NAURU	0.655	(0.645)
11	Laos	0.638	(0.743)
12	Lesotho	0.631	n/a
13	Trinidad and Tobago	0.630	(0.695)
14	Congo	0.629	(0.411)
15	TUVALU	0.621	n/a
16	ST. KITTS-NEVIS	0.578	(0.658)
17	BRUNEI	0.575	(0.785)
18	QATAR	0.575	(0.356)
19	Burundi	0.566	(0.513)
20	LIECHTENSTEIN	0.564	(0.506)
21	Haiti	0.560	(0.749)
22	BELIZE	0.556	n/a
23	ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES	0.542	(0.642)
24	Honduras	0.535	(0.540)
25	TONGA	0.531	(0.586)
26	DOMINICA	0.528	(0.784)
27	SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE	0.526	(0.617)
28	Papua New Guinea	0.526	(0.452)

TABLE VI

<u>SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING</u>			
TO THE			
<u>HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION</u>			
OF			
<u>EXPORT TRADE (1986)</u>			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY+		1986*	1975
29	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	0.520	(0.580)
30	DJIBOUTI	0.519	(0.663)
31	Central African Republic	~ 0.509	(0.456)
32	United Arab Emirates	0.507	(0.372)
33	GUINEA-BISSAU	0.506	(0.570)
34	KIRIBATI	0.505	(0.598)
35	MAURITIUS	0.499	(0.784)
36	SEYCHELLES	0.491	(0.586)
37	SOLOMON ISLANDS	0.475	(0.364)
38	VANUATU	0.469	n/a
39	BARBADOS	0.461	(0.418)
40	Costa Rica	0.457	(0.454)
41	El Salvador	0.455	(0.371)
42	WESTERN SAMOA	0.450	(0.542)
43	GRENADA	0.441	(0.708)
44	Jamaica	0.435	(0.469)
45	ANTIGUA and BARBUDA	0.423	(0.600)
46	Liberia	0.421	(0.371)
47	Oman	0.418	(0.453)
48	Mauritania	0.417	(0.349)
49	FIJI	0.415	(0.606)
50	CAPE VERDE	0.412	(0.648)
51	Yemen, P.D.R.	0.410	(0.695)
52	GABON	0.392	(0.491)
53	Ireland	0.386	(0.558)
54	Benin	0.384	(0.317)
55	SWAZILAND	0.378	(0.363)
56	LUXEMBOURG	0.377	(0.379)

TABLE VI

SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING			
TO THE			
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION			
OF			
EXPORT TRADE (1986)			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY+		1986*	1975
57	MALTA	0.374	(0.389)
58	Sierra Leone	0.372	(0.655)
59	GUYANA	0.363	(0.391)
60	Norway	0.360	(0.326)
61	Israel	0.347	(0.229)
62	Nicaragua	0.328	(0.354)
63	Libya	0.323	(0.380)
64	ICELAND	0.322	(0.364)
65	Uruguay	0.319	(0.224)
66	SURINAME	0.316	(0.473)
67	Paraguay	0.314	(0.363)
68	Lebanon	0.309	(0.230)
69	GAMBIA	0.299	(0.479)
70	Singapore	0.299	(0.229)
71	Finland	0.291	(0.329)
72	New Zealand	0.289	(0.296)
73	CYPRUS	0.266	(0.379)
74	Jordan	0.262	(0.152)
75	Denmark	0.256	(0.287)
76	BAHRAIN	0.252	(0.318)
77	Albania	0.219	n/a
78	Kuwait	0.200	(0.307)
79	Togo	0.198	(0.524)
80	MONACO	n/a	n/a
81	Mongolia	n/a	n/a
82	SAN MARINO	n/a	n/a

TABLE VI

- Indicates 2-digit SITC, not 3-digit.

* Indicates 1986 or most recent year available, as indicated below:

1985: BAHAMAS, BAHRAIN, BELIZE, Benin, COMOROS, Congo, DOMINICA, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, GABON, GUINEA-BISSAU, GUYANA, Liberia, Paraguay, QATAR, SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE, Sierra Leone.

1984: ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, CAPE VERDE, DJIBOUTI, El Salvador, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Nicaragua, SEYCHELLES, Somalia, United Arab Emirates.

1983: Chad, ST. KITTS-NEVIS.

1982: Central African Republic, TUVALU.

1981: Lesotho.

1977: NAURU.

SOURCES:

Main Source:

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK.

NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1, 1987.

ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, BAHAMAS, BARBADOS, BELIZE, Central African Republic, Congo, CYPRUS, Denmark, DOMINICA, El Salvador, Finland, ICELAND, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, MÁLDIVES, MALTA, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Singapore, ST. KITTS-NEVIS, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay.

Supplementary Sources:

i) **THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK: LONDON: EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, 1988.**

Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, CAPE VERDE, Chad, COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, Jamaica, MAURITIUS, NAURU, New Zealand.

ii) **STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. BANGKOK: UNEASCAP, 1988.**

BRUNEI, FIJI, Laos, Papua New Guinea, SOLOMON ISLANDS, TONGA, WESTERN SAMOA.

iii) **ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.**

LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.

Remaining Countries.

TABLE VII

<u>SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING</u>			
TO THE			
<u>HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION</u>			
OF			
<u>IMPORT TRADE (1986)</u>			
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)			
COUNTRY+	1986*	1975	
1 Lesotho	0.971	n/a	
2 SWAZILAND	0.902	n/a	
3 Bhutan	0.872	n/a	
4 Botswana	0.784	(0.808)	
5 MALDIVES	0.550	(0.290)	
6 Central African Republic	0.545	(0.584)	
7 Laos	0.528	(0.535)	
8 BAHRAIN	0.517	(0.531)	
9 Jamaica	0.512	(0.431)	
10 BELIZE	0.511	n/a	
11 LUXEMBOURG	0.504	(0.524)	
12 Papua New Guinea	0.503	(0.529)	
13 TONGA	0.498	(0.444)	
14 Haiti	0.487	(0.559)	
15 BRUNEI	0.487	(0.383)	
16 DJIBOUTI	0.480	(0.407)	
17 COMOROS	0.479	(0.541)	
18 GABON	0.476	(0.674)	
19 Congo	0.472	(0.515)	
20 KIRIBATI	0.467	(0.620)	
21 SOLOMON ISLANDS	0.461	(0.422)	
22 Albania	0.460	n/a	
23 Ireland	0.458	(0.503)	
24 Trinidad and Tobago	0.453	(0.393)	
25 SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE	0.451	(0.628)	
26 BAHAMAS	0.450	(0.456)	
27 ST. KITTS-NEVIS	0.450	(0.385)	
28 FIJI	0.429	(0.388)	

TABLE VII

SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
IMPORT TRADE (1986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)

COUNTRY+	1986*	1975
29 BARBADOS	0.428	(0.341)
30 TUVALU	0.427	n/a
31 Paraguay	0.424	(0.351)
32 EQUATORIAL GUINEA	0.415	(0.456)
33 VANUATU	0.408	n/a
34 WESTERN SAMOA	0.403	(0.396)
35 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA	0.403	(0.360)
36 ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES	0.402	(0.366)
37 Honduras	0.401	(0.467)
38 SURINAME	0.399	(0.420)
39 El Salvador	0.399	(0.369)
40 ST. LUCIA	0.392	(0.377)
41 GUYANA	0.388	(0.416)
42 Costa Rica	0.385	(0.387)
43 Panama	0.382	(0.360)
44 Somalia	0.381	(0.386)
45 Nicaragua	0.367	(0.381)
46 MALTA	0.356	(0.354)
47 GRENADA	0.351	(0.482)
48 DOMINICA	0.346	(0.327)
49 CAPE VERDE	0.345	(0.587)
50 New Zealand	0.338	(0.333)
51 Togo	0.328	(0.397)
52 Oman	0.319	(0.323)
53 Uruguay	0.313	(0.274)
54 Libya	0.308	(0.327)
55 Liberia	0.306	(0.381)
56 Israel	0.290	(0.310)

TABLE VII

SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
IMPORT TRADE (1986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)

COUNTRY+	1986*	1975
57 Singapore	0.290	(0.292)
58 Denmark	0.286	(0.293)
59 GUINEA-BISSAU	0.284	(0.475)
60 Finland	0.279	(0.302)
61 Burundi	0.277	(0.313)
62 Norway	0.277	(0.299)
63 Mauritania	0.269	(0.423)
64 Kuwait	0.269	(0.299)
65 QATAR	0.268	(0.318)
66 Benin	0.265	(0.352)
67 United Arab Emirates	0.256	(0.302)
68 ICELAND	0.236	(0.279)
69 CYPRUS	0.235	(0.283)
70 Sierra Leone	0.233	(0.293)
71 SEYCHELLES	0.227	(0.368)
72 Lebanon	0.222	(0.248)
73 Chad	0.217	(0.503)
74 GAMBIA	0.206	(0.304)
75 Yemen, P.D.R.	0.204	(0.303)
76 MAURITIUS	0.204	(0.273)
77 Jordan	0.187	(0.242)
78 NAURU	n/a	(0.656)
79 LIECHTENSTEIN	n/a	n/a
80 MONACO	n/a	n/a
81 Mongolia	n/a	n/a
82 SAN MARINO	n/a	n/a

TABLE VII

- Indicates 2-digit SITC, not 3-digit.

* Indicates 1988 or most recent year available, as indicated below:

1985: BAHAMAS, BAHRAIN, BELIZE, Benin, COMOROS, Congo, DOMINICA, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, GABON, GUINEA-BISSAU, GUYANA, Liberia, Paraguay, SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE, SEYCHELLES.

1984: ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, CAPE VERDE, DJIBOUTI, El Salvador, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Somalia, United Arab Emirates.

1983: Chad, ST. KITTS-NEVIS.

1982: Albania, Central African Republic, TUVALU.

1981: Lesotho.

SOURCES:

Main Source:

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK.

NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1, 1987.

ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, BAHAMAS, BARBADOS, BELIZE, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, CYPRUS, Denmark, DOMINICA, El Salvador, Finland, ICELAND, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, MALDIVES, MALTA, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, SEYCHELLES, Sierra Leone, Singapore, ST. KITTS-NEVIS, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay.

Supplementary Sources:

i) **THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK: LONDON: EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, 1988.**

Bhutan, Botswana, CAPE VERDE, COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, Jamaica, New Zealand.
Jamaica, New Zealand.

ii) **STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. BANGKOK: UNEASCAP, 1988.**

BRUNEI, FIJI, Laos, Papua New Guinea, SOLOMON ISLANDS, TONGA, WESTERN SAMOA.

iii) **ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.**

LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.

Remaining countries.

TABLE VIII

<u>RATIO OF INDICES OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION</u>		
OF		
<u>TRADE (X/M) FOR SELECTED SMALL STATES (1986)</u>		
COUNTRY	1986*	1975
<i>(GREATER CONCENTRATION OF EXPORTS)</i>		
1 Chad	4.26	(1.35)
2 Somalia	2.07	(1.55)
3 Burundi	2.04	(1.63)
4 Yemen, P.D.R.	2.01	(2.29)
5 United Arab Emirates	1.98	(1.23)
6 Panama	1.79	(1.70)
7 Sierra Leone	1.60	(2.23)
8 Mauritania	1.55	(0.82)
9 Benin	1.45	(0.90)
10 Jordan	1.40	(1.03)
11 Lebanon	1.39	(1.04)
12 Trinidad and Tobago	1.39	(1.76)
13 Liberia	1.38	(0.97)
14 Honduras	1.33	(1.15)
15 Congo	1.33	(0.79)
16 Oman	1.31	(1.40)
17 Norway	1.30	(1.09)
18 Laos	1.21	(1.38)
19 Israel	1.20	(0.81)
20 Costa Rica	1.19	(1.17)
21 Haiti	1.15	(1.33)
22 El Salvador	1.14	(1.00)
23 Bhutan	1.14	n/a
24 Botswana	1.07	(0.70)
25 Libya	1.05	(1.16)
26 Papua New Guinea	1.05	(0.85)
27 Finland	1.04	(1.08)
28 Singapore	1.03	(0.91)
29 Uruguay	1.02	(0.93)

TABLE VIII

<u>RATIO OF INDICES OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION</u>		
OF		
<u>TRADE (X/M) FOR SELECTED SMALL STATES (1986)</u>		
COUNTRY	1986*	1975
<i>(GREATER CONCENTRATION OF IMPORTS)</i>		
30 Central African Republic	0.93	(0.78)
31 Denmark	0.90	(0.99)
32 Nicaragua	0.89	(0.92)
33 New Zealand	0.86	(0.89)
34 Jamaica	0.85	(1.08)
35 Ireland	0.84	(1.10)
36 Paraguay	0.74	(1.03)
37 Kuwait	0.74	(1.02)
38 Lesotho	0.65	n/a
39 Togo	0.60	(1.31)
40 Albania	0.48	n/a
41 Mongolia	n/a	n/a
AVERAGE RATIO:	1.28	54.55

* 1986 or most recent year available.

TABLE IX

<u>RATIO OF INDICES OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION</u>		
OF		
<u>TRADE (X/M) FOR SELECTED MICRO-STATES (1986)</u>		
COUNTRY	1986*	1975
<i>(GREATER CONCENTRATION OF EXPORTS)</i>		
1 MAURITIUS	2.45	(2.87)
2 SEYCHELLES	2.16	(1.59)
3 QATAR	2.15	(1.11)
4 BAHAMAS	1.95	(1.73)
5 ST. LUCIA	1.82	(1.64)
6 GUINEA-BISSAU	1.78	(1.20)
7 DOMINICA	1.53	(2.39)
8 TUVALU	1.45	n/a
9 GAMBIA	1.45	(1.57)
10 COMOROS	1.44	(1.17)
11 ICELAND	1.36	(1.30)
12 ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES	1.35	(1.75)
13 MALDIVES	1.31	(2.21)
14 ST. KITTS-NEVIS	1.28	(1.70)
15 GRENADA	1.26	(1.46)
16 EQUATORIAL GUINEA	1.25	(1.27)
17 CAPE VERDE	1.19	(1.10)
18 BRUNEI	1.18	(2.05)
19 SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE	1.17	(0.98)
20 VANUATU	1.15	n/a
21 CYPRUS	1.13	(1.33)
22 WESTERN SAMOA	1.12	(1.36)
23 BELIZE	1.09	n/a
24 KIRIBATI	1.08	(0.96)
25 DJIBOUTI	1.08	(1.62)
26 BARBADOS	1.08	(1.22)
27 TONGA	1.07	(1.31)
28 MALTA	1.05	(1.09)
29 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA	1.05	(1.66)
30 SOLOMON ISLANDS	1.03	(0.86)

TABLE IX

RATIO OF INDICES OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
TRADE (X/M) FOR SELECTED MICRO-STATES (1986)

COUNTRY	1986*	1975
<i>(GREATER CONCENTRATION OF IMPORTS)</i>		
31 FIJI	0.97	(1.56)
32 GUYANA	0.94	(0.93)
33 GABON	0.82	(0.72)
34 SURINAME	0.77	(1.12)
35 LUXEMBOURG	0.75	(0.72)
36 BAHRAIN	0.49	(0.59)
37 SWAZILAND	0.42	n/a
38 LIECHTENSTEIN	n/a	n/a
39 MONACO	n/a	n/a
40 NAURU	n/a	(0.98)
41 SAN MARINO	n/a	n/a
AVERAGE RATIO:	1.26	59.47

* 1986 or most recent year available.

APPENDIX II

TABLE I-A

NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES AS % OF GNP

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Antigua and Barbuda	1210.0%	490.0%	280.0%	-240.0%	* 1260.0%	23.9%
Bahamas	22.1	19.4	58.9	-6.7	* 24.1	37.8
Bahrain	5.6	15.9	12.1	8.2	8.1	3.3
Barbados	4.0	4.9	3.3	-0.2	* 2.4	2.8
Belize	6.6	8.3	12.2	14.7	16.2	9.6
Brunei	-0.7	* 0.6	0.2	-0.1	* -0.1	* -0.1
Cape Verde	42.3	48.1	49.3	49.7	54.3	70.3
Comoros	48.7	34.5	35.9	38.9	46.2	29.4
Cyprus	5.9	1.9	2.0	1.0	7.3	5.7
Djibouti	19.7	16.9	17.7	32.7	25.2	18.3
Dominica	30.4	29.1	12.9	32.2	35.9	35.9
Equatorial Guinea	8.2	n/a	20.2	27.3	19.7	29.3
Fiji	7.0	6.5	5.9	2.8	2.0	3.7
Gabon	2.6	5.3	8.4	1.8	6.6	10.3
Gambia	37.6	21.3	19.1	24.2	32.6	58.8
Grenada	9.4	-2.4	* 23.1	30.7	30.5	23.6
Guinea-Bissau	44.7	41.3	41.5	47.4	42.2	44.9
Guyana	16.9	13.2	8.1	6.2	9.8	6.9
Kiribati	77.0	50.7	55.7	38.0	40.0	46.0
Maldives	72.7	22.5	22.5	13.8	19.6	27.0
Malta	8.1	29.3	5.0	1.0	1.9	1.4
Mauritius	8.6	7.2	4.2	6.0	2.9	3.9
Nauru	n/a	n/a	* n/a	* -0.1	* 1.4	28.6
São Tomé and Príncipe	20.3	33.0	29.0	37.7	31.3	31.0
Seychelles	21.3	21.1	14.5	15.4	17.5	17.7
Solomon Islands	25.1	21.9	25.8	17.0	16.9	24.9
St. Kitts-Nevis	7.0	5.7	5.3	-3.7	* 6.7	6.6
St. Lucia	10.4	7.5	5.9	3.6	4.2	6.2
St. Vincent and Grenadines	13.1	9.8	5.7	4.2	7.1	11.4
Suriname	9.4	9.6	0.1	0.2	1.5	8.6
Swaziland	8.8	8.9	9.1	9.5	8.4	9.1
Tonga	30.0	24.9	22.4	22.4	22.7	21.6
Tuvalu	108.0	n/a	n/a	137.5	82.5	110.0
Vanuatu	26.8	25.5	25.4	32.4	25.7	-17.8
Western Samoa	19.4	n/a	n/a	n/a	18.5	20.8

* Indicates a negative net receipt, that is, a net capital outflow from the microstate to all external sources of bilateral and multilateral aid, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE I-A**NET CAPITAL FLOWS (\$US Millions)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	14.5	6.4	3.7	-3.9	22.7	45.4	10.9
Bahamas	244.8	250.7	830.3	-103.1	521.1	872.9	1031.1
Bahrain	196.5	575.4	469.5	326.8	301.6	119.9	-22.9
Barbados	38	48.6	34	-1.7	28	37	12.2
Belize	11.9	13.3	20.7	26.5	29.1	19.1	23.6
Brunei	-30.3	23.8	7.5	-2.5	-3.5	-4.2	2.4
Cape Verde	50.7	62.5	64.1	64.6	70.6	112.4	86.4
Comoros	53.6	37.9	39.5	42.8	50.8	47.1	53.1
Cyprus	120.9	39.4	42.1	23.2	178.4	177.1	95.5
Djibouti	66.9	59.2	67.1	130.8	103.2	78.9	87.8
Dominica	21.3	20.4	10.3	29	35.9	39.5	16.4
Equatorial Guinea	11.5	9.1	12.1	17.8	17.7	31.4	45.9
Fiji	85.9	75.6	65.3	31.9	22.5	46.7	21.6
Gabon	93	175.4	272.9	60.7	203.3	309.3	427.4
Gambia	86.5	42.5	38.1	48.3	48.9	100	105.2
Grenada	6.6	-1.7	18.5	30.7	33.6	28.3	23.1
Guinea-Bissau	67.1	66	66.4	61.6	63.3	71.9	99.6
Guyana	86	56.9	34.1	23.4	35.3	27.1	37.9
Kiribati	23.1	15.2	16.7	11.4	12	13.8	18.3
Maldives	21.8	9	9	5.5	9.8	16.2	24.1
Malta	100	366.5	57.7	11.3	20.8	19.3	27.9
Mauritius	94.7	74.4	44.1	60	30.2	54.9	93.7
Nauru	2.7	-4.3	-8	-0.2	2.3	45.7	0.8
São Tomé and Príncipe	6.1	9.9	11.6	11.3	12.5	12.4	18.2
Seychelles	32	31.6	21.8	24.6	28	33.7	24.5
Soloman Islands	30.1	28.5	30.9	25.5	22	29.9	70.3
St. Kitts-Nevis	4.2	3.4	3.2	-2.6	4.7	5.3	10.9
St. Lucia	13.5	9.7	8.3	5.4	7.1	11.8	15.3
St. Vincent and Grenadines	9.2	7.8	5.1	4.2	7.8	12.5	13.5
Suriname	95.6	101.3	1.1	1.9	14.4	83.8	-32
Swaziland	57.1	48.2	53	48.2	31.8	41.8	37.7
Tonga	18	17.4	17.9	15.7	13.6	15.1	36.7
Tuvalu	5.4	5.9	4.2	5.5	3.3	4.4	25.7
Vanuatu	29.5	33.1	35.6	45.3	38.5	-28.4	35.2
Western Samoa	24.6	22.6	31	13.6	20.4	22.9	35.4

TABLE I-A**GNP AT CURRENT PRICES (\$US Millions)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	120	130	130	160	180	190	210
Bahamas	1110	1290	1410	1540	2160	2310	2550
Bahrain	3510	3620	3880	3990	3720	3670	
Barbados	950	990	1040	1130	1190	1300	1350
Belize	180	160	170	180	180	200	
Brunel	4330	4250	3820	3840	3730	3570	
Cape Verde	120	130	130	130	130	160	170
Comoros	110	110	110	110	110	160	200
Cyprus	2050	2100	2080	2220	2440	3120	3740
Djibouti	340	350	380	400	410	430	
Dominica	70	70	80	90	100	110	120
Equatorial Guinea	140		60	65.2	90	107	
Fiji	1230	1160	1100	1150	1100	1250	1120
Gabon	3530	3340	3240	3290	3090	3010	3060
Gambia	230	200	200	200	150	170	210
Grenada	70	70	80	100	110	120	130
Guinea-Bissau	150	160	160	130	150	160	120
Guyana	510	430	420	380	360	390	250
Kiribati	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Maldives	30	40	40	40	50	60	50
Malta	1240	1250	1150	1100	1100	1380	1670
Mauritius	1100	1030	1050	1000	1030	1400	1720
Nauru				160	160	160	160
São Tomé and Príncipe	30	30	40	30	40	40	20
Seychelles	150	150	150	160	160	190	220
Soloman Islands	120	130	120	150	130	120	110
St. Kitts-Nevis	60	60	60	70	70	80	80
St. Lucia	130	130	140	150	170	190	210
St. Vincent and Grenadines	70	80	90	100	110	110	120
Suriname	1020	1050	1020	980	970	980	1090
Swaziland	650	540	580	510	380	460	590
Tonga	60	70	80	70	60	70	80
Tuvalu	5			4	4	4	
Vanuatu	110	130	140	140	150	160	
Western Samoa	127				110	110	

TABLE I-B

NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES AS % OF GNP

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Benin	11.50%	18.80%	9.50%	11.70%	9.60%	7.00%
Bhutan	8.20%	7.50%	7.60%	9.90%	15.10%	23.60%
Botswana	13.8	17.2	15.9	20.9	17.8	15.8
Burundi	14.1	15.7	16.7	16.2	14.1	14.9
Chad	8.7	11.1	17	21.9	27.3	20.1
Congo	11.7	23.3	15.5	5.5	3.2	20.7
Costa Rica	4.3	5.1	9.6	9	11.1	8.1
El Salvador	5.6	6.6	8.8	7.5	10	8.6
Haiti	8	8.9	7.9	7.5	7.3	7.8
Honduras	8.7	6.9	8.7	12.7	11.4	8.3
Israel	5.4	7.7	10	8	10.9	8.2
Jamaica	9	12.8	10.1	17.5	12.6	3.3
Jordan	42.2	29.3	21.5	23.3	8.5	14.7
Laos	7.8	7.9	6	6.6	10.7	7.3
Lebanon	13.2	7.9	2.3	6.4	3.2	n/a
Lesotho	14.6	13.5	13.6	13.9	23.9	17.1
Liberia	61.3	45.7	-13.3	* -24.9	* -27.9	* -25.4
Mauritania	33.1	35.7	32	27.5	35.1	26.6
Nicaragua	13.4	6.8	7.3	6.2	4.5	7
Oman	2.8	1.2	3	3.4	2.1	3.4
Panama	36.6	42.5	19.3	28.7	36.6	37.2
Papua New Guinea	13.4	26.3	25.7	22.6	15.4	8.4
Paraguay	2.5	5.2	5.4	4.9	2.6	3.3
Sierra Leone	5.8	6.5	4.5	6.8	4.2	7
Singapore	10.4	6.2	1.1	6.9	-1.5	* -0.6
Somalia	34.5	51.1	30.1	21.1	28.7	38.5
Togo	5.6	12.6	16.3	14.1	11.4	14.1
Trinidad and Tobago	0.7	0.6	0.9	1.9	-4.4	* 0.2
Uruguay	0.5	2.2	8	5.6	-2.5	* 1
Yemen, P.D.R.	9.9	18.5	7.7	8.7	11.6	6

* Indicates a negative net receipt; that is, a net capital outflow from the small state to all external sources of bilateral and multilateral aid, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received.

Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE I-B

NET CAPITAL FLOWS (\$US Millions)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	119.6	192.2	90.9	110.2	98.1	96.3	86.2
Bhutan	9.8	11.3	13	17.9	24.1	40.1	42
Botswana	110.7	118.6	130	182.2	158.8	156.6	215.2
Burundi	136.8	157.1	175.7	156.9	157.4	185.9	189
Chad	53.9	63	93.7	111.7	180.5	162.7	198.4
Congo	215.8	466.2	298.7	113.1	60.8	335.9	254.2
Costa Rica	99.7	110.6	288.5	291.2	397.1	331.7	242.6
El Salvador	188.4	221.9	313.3	293.7	375.2	330.8	422.3
Haiti	116.3	131.5	126.4	135.1	145	173	211.7
Honduras	216.9	179.8	242.3	376.7	376.3	297.9	246.7
Israel	1060.5	1551	2168.3	1985.3	2548.5	2296.8	2082.2
Jamaica	233.2	355.6	311.2	354	219.3	70.7	243.8
Jordan	1502.3	1104.4	833.1	855.9	327.3	648.5	881.8
Laos	35	38.1	30.1	35.2	64.1	48.4	59
Lebanon	515.3	198.4	113.6	95.2	58.3	124.6	76.8
Lesotho	106.3	97.4	109.8	96.2	119.3	92.1	102.4
Liberia	656.2	479.7	-128.9	-243.6	-287.5	-256.7	-274.3
Mauritania	238.6	249.7	236.5	186.7	235.2	207.6	183.4
Nicaragua	307.8	155.2	171.9	180.7	116.5	171.9	177.1
Oman	185.3	79.4	207.7	262.4	182.9	291.3	38
Panama	1341.2	1681.6	796.9	1230.9	1668.6	1790.8	2314.6
Papua New Guinea	323.8	600.6	574.8	521	331.8	202	305
Paraguay	124	221.4	175.1	150.3	83.2	117.1	104.5
Sierra Leone	67.8	84.9	66.4	73	57.1	88.9	93.7
Singapore	1384.6	914.3	191.9	1314.1	-267.3	-109.4	726.8
Somalia	368.8	618.9	345.9	361.6	370	600.9	604.8
Togo	50.8	97.2	111.1	116.9	98.2	133.6	101.9
Trinidad and Tobago	48.9	45.6	66.5	146.3	-317.8	9.4	40.7
Uruguay	60.2	202	405.6	273	-123.9	62.8	252.4
Yemen, P.D.R.	90.4	175.9	82.6	98.7	121.6	54.7	98.3

TABLE I-B**GNP AT CURRENT PRICES (\$US Millions)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	1040	1020	960	940	1020	1380	1650
Bhutan	120	150	170	180	160	170	200
Botswana	800	690	820	870	890	990	1090
Burundi	970	1000	1050	970	1120	1250	1190
Chad	620	570	550	510	660	810	960
Congo	1840	2000	1930	2070	1930	1620	1890
Costa Rica	2330	2180	2810	3240	3590	4110	4090
El Salvador	3370	3370	3570	3920	3770	3830	4630
Haiti	1460	1470	1610	1800	1990	2230	2230
Honduras	2490	2590	2790	2970	3300	3570	3800
Israel	19680	20060	21770	24970	23310	28140	33450
Jamaica	2580	2770	3070	2020	1740	2150	2530
Jordan	3560	3770	3870	3680	3880	4420	4670
Laos	450	480	500	530	600	660	680
Lebanon	3894	2520	5000	1492	1800		
Lesotho	730	720	810	690	500	540	640
Liberia	1070	1050	970	980	1030	1010	1060
Mauritania	720	700	740	680	670	780	870
Nicaragua	2290	2270	2360	2590	2610	2470	2960
Oman	6570	6900	7040	7810	8850	8540	7160
Panama	3660	3960	4120	4290	4580	4820	5130
Papua New Guinea	2410	2280	2240	2310	2150	2400	2760
Paraguay	4960	4280	3220	3070	3160	3570	4470
Sierra Leone	1160	1300	1460	1070	1350	1240	900
Singapore	13320	14820	16940	19130	18330	18160	20550
Somalia	1070	1210	1150	1710	1290	1560	
Togo	910	770	680	830	860	950	1150
Trinidad and Tobago	6870	7950	7590	7600	7190	6170	
Uruguay	11240	9070	5070	4890	4860	6120	7220
Yemen, P.D.R.	910	950	1070	1140	1050	910	940

TABLE II-A

NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES AS % OF TOTAL EXPORTS

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Antigua and Barbuda	4240.00%	30.10%	18.70%	-22.20%	* 84.40%	183.80%
Bahamas	4	5.5	20.9	-3	* 19.1	32.3
Bahrain	65.2	16.1	15.1	10.2	10.4	5.1
Barbados	19.5	18.9	9.4	-0.5	* 8.7	13.3
Belize	10	14.6	26.6	34.3	32.3	21
Brunei	-0.7	* 0.6	0.2	-0.1	* -0.1	* -0.2
Cape Verde	1748.3	1602.6	1834.6	130.1	n/a	n/a
Comoros	326.8	193.6	202.9	607.1	323.8	232.2
Cyprus	21.8	7.1	8.5	4	37.5	57.8
Djibouti	764.7	470.6	622	993.2	771.9	n/a
Dominica	111.1	83.4	37.5	113.1	126.3	93.4
Equatorial Guinea	91.3	52.2	n/a	75.6	n/a	n/a
Fiji	28.9	28.1	29.3	13.4	10.3	17.7
Gabon	5.5	11.2	18.5	3	10.3	28.8
Gambia	317.2	96.5	78.6	54.5	75.9	146.2
Grenada	34.7	-9.2	* 96.4	168.8	150.5	98.3
Guinea-Bissau	428.6	555.6	772.1	354	545.7	749
Guyana	24.8	23.6	18	11.1	17.1	11.7
Kiribati	568.7	633.3	458.4	99.7	260.9	766.7
Maldives	252	102.3	45.5	23.8	38.4	59.3
Malta	22.3	89.2	15.9	2.9	5.2	3.9
Mauritius	29.2	20.3	12	16.1	6.9	8.1
Nauru	3.1	-3.2	* -8.5	* -0.3	* n/a	83.4
São Tomé and Príncipe	84.7	112.5	133.3	92.6	176.1	125.3
Seychelles	616.7	115.8	59.2	95.9	100.4	182.7
Solomon Islands	45.9	49.3	50.7	27.6	31.5	44.8
St. Kitts-Nevis	18.7	19.7	18.3	-12.1	* 21.6	19.3
St. Lucia	32.7	23.3	17.5	11.3	13.6	14.2
St. Vincent and Grenadines	37.7	24.1	12.4	7.8	12.3	19.6
Suriname	20.2	23.7	0.3	0.5	4.3	24.9
Swaziland	14.7	14.9	17.4	20.9	18.3	15.7
Tonga	202	400.8	314.1	171	249.3	259.5
Tuvalu	12857.1	15945.9	6000	2037	3000	29333.3
Vanuatu	183.7	309.6	198.9	139	125.1	-163.8
Western Samoa	220.1	169.6	166.5	69.7	134.1	198.4

* Indicates a negative net receipt; that is, a net capital outflow from the microstate to all external sources of bilateral and multilateral aid, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries
Paris Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE II-A

TOTAL EXPORTS F.O.B. (\$US Millions)							
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	34.2	21.3	19.7	17.6	26.9	24.7	
Bahamas	b 6189.2	4534.4	3970.3	3392.7	2727.9	2702.2	2737
Bahrain	301.2	3582.8	3119.4	3204	2901.1	2343.6	2050.5
Barbados	194.4	257.3	360.8	356.3	322.2	277.4	156
Belize	119	91	77.7	77.3	90.1	90.9	99.4
Brunei	4066.4	3808.4	3385.7	3196.8	2972	2156	
Cape Verde	2.9	3.9	3.5	49.7			
Comoros	b 16.4	19.6	19.5	7.1	15.7	20.3	11.6
Cyprus	555.7	554.7	494.2	575	476.3	306.4	621.2
Djibouti	8.7	12.6	10.8	13.2	13.4		
Dominica	b 19.2	24.4	27.5	25.6	28.4	42.3	46.5
Equatorial Guinea	12.6	17.4		23.5			
Fiji	297.7	269.3	223.2	237.4	217.4	264.3	307.1
Gabon	c 1699.9	1565.5	1475.4	2018.2	1974.5	1074.2	1286.3
Gambia	e 27.3	44	48.5	88.6	64.4	68.4	68.2
Grenada	19	18.6	19.2	18.2	22.3	28.8	31.5
Guinea-Bissau	d 15.7	11.9	8.6	17.4	11.6	9.6	15
Guyana	346.3	241.3	189.2	210.1	206.7	231.2	
Kiribati	c 4.1	2.4	3.6	11.4	4.6	1.8	
Maldives	d 8.7	8.8	19.8	23.1	25.5	27.3	35.3
Malta	447.5	410.8	362.7	394	400.4	497	603.2
Mauritius	b 324	366.8	368.3	373	434.6	674.5	898.3
Nauru	88.3	133.5	93.7	66.2		54.8	
São Tomé and Príncipe	a 7.2	8.8	8.7	12.2	7.1	9.9	
Seychelles	5.2	27.3	36.8	25.7	27.9	18.5	
Solomon Islands	65.6	57.8	60.9	92.4	69.8	66.8	
St. Kitts-Nevis	f 22.4	17.2	17.4	21.4	21.8	27.5	
St. Lucia	41.2	41.6	47.5	47.8	52	82.9	
St. Vincent and Grenadines	g 24.4	32.4	41.1	53.6	63.3	63.9	
Suriname	a 473.8	427.6	367.3	374.5	335.6	336.6	337.6
Swaziland	a 388.3	324	303.8	230.8	173.3	265.5	363.1
Tonga	b 8.9	4.3	5.7	9.2	5.5	5.8	5.8
Tuvalu	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.3	0.1	0	
Vanuatu	16.1	10.7	17.9	32.6	30.8	17.3	17.7
Western Samoa	11.2	13.3	18.6	19.5	15.2	11.5	12

TABLE II-B

NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES AS % OF TOTAL EXPORTS

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Benin	353.4%	450.9%	136.7%	75.1%	64.5%	102.6%
Bhutan	49.4	66.9	81.8	98.5	108.7	156.6
Botswana	n/a	n/a	n/a	27.5	21.5	18.2
Burundi	191.7	179.4	219.5	158.7	143.7	109.8
Chad	64.9	108.6	126.6	80.9	n/a	n/a
Congo	26.6	47.0	46.7	9.6	5.6	46.8
Costa Rica	9.9	12.6	31.0	30.6	40.2	32.3
El Salvador	38.4	54.4	42.3	47.8	55.3	46.4
Haiti	75.9	80.9	82.2	75.6	83.2	101.7
Honduras	30.4	27.4	36.7	53.5	53.8	34.9
Israel	19.9	31.1	42.4	34.2	40.7	32.2
Jamaica	23.7	48.1	42.5	47.6	40.0	12.0
Jordan	205.3	146.7	149.6	113.4	41.9	90.8
Laos	152.2	95.3	73.4	78.2	118.7	83.4
Lebanon	58.2	n/a	19.1	25.2	19.2	n/a
Lesotho	215.4	270.0	368.6	349.7	586.2	379.0
Liberia	125.3	101.5	-30.5	* -54.2	* -66.0	* -62.9
Mauritania	91.4	107.0	77.6	62.8	62.8	59.4
Nicaragua	64.7	39.7	40.1	41.6	38.6	69.5
Oman	39.5	18.0	59.4	71.6	52.5	100.3
Panama	419.9	542.1	263.3	477.8	554.1	548.0
Papua New Guinea	37.5	75.9	70.7	58.0	37.3	19.3
Paraguay	42.0	59.0	79.0	38.9	20.6	50.4
Sierra Leone	44.2	97.2	73.2	49.6	54.4	60.0
Singapore	6.6	4.4	0.9	5.5	-1.2	* -0.5
Somalia	242.6	310.5	336.9	785.7	408.5	572.3
Togo	24.5	54.9	68.4	61.1	51.7	56.9
Trinidad and Tobago	1.3	1.5	2.8	6.7	-14.7	* 0.7
Uruguay	5.0	19.7	40.2	29.5	-14.5	* 5.8
Yemen, P.D.R.	410.9	732.9	284.8	365.6	296.6	188.6

Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.

TABLE II-B**TOTAL EXPORTS F.O.B. (\$US Millions)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	33.84	42.62	66.52	146.70	152.00	93.90	
Bhutan	19.85	16.89	15.89	18.18	22.17	25.6	
Botswana				661.66	737.63	861.27	
Burundi	71.37	87.59	80.03	98.87	109.57	169.28	84.34
Chad	83.00	58.00	74.00	138.00			
Congo	811.07	992.15	639.85	1182.63	1087.22	718.00	
Costa Rica	1010.53	876.83	866.13	951.26	988.90	1025.50	
El Salvador	490.83	407.55	741.30	615.03	678.96	712.98	
Haiti	153.30	162.54	153.71	178.63	174.24	170.18	
Honduras	712.53	655.68	660.06	703.65	699.42	854.25	
Israel	5328.90	4990.60	5111.62	5803.48	6256.39	7135.25	8474.77
Jamaica	985.34	739.19	732.28	743.05	548.50	587.54	656.52
Jordan	731.62	752.69	557.03	754.64	780.82	714.29	1468.86
Laos	23.00	40.00	41.00	45.00	54.00	58.00	
Lebanon	885.97		595.01	378.13	302.92		600.60
Lesotho	49.34	36.08	29.79	27.51	20.35	24.30	
Liberia	523.63	472.57	422.58	449.07	435.60	408.40	
Mauritania	261.18	233.27	304.70	297.33	374.30	349.42	427.85
Nicaragua	475.91	390.72	428.79	386.65	301.50	247.17	
Oman	469.57	442.07	349.5	366.59	348.11	290.43	322.29
Panama	319.42	310.21	302.63	257.61	301.16	326.80	334.90
Papua New Guinea	863.56	791.11	812.51	898.98	890.56	1048.80	1171.42
Paraguay	295.54	375.06	221.51	386	403	232.5	
Sierra Leone	153.50	87.31	90.74	147.07	104.93	144.87	132.02
Singapore	20967.3	20788.1	21832.6	24055.0	22815.3	22427.9	28592.4
Somalia	152.00	199.29	102.66	46.02	90.57	105.00	
Togo	206.45	177.02	162.48	191.33	190.06	235.00	
Trinidad and Tobago	3763.99	3071.86	2352.66	2173.42	2160.91	1385.68	1462.40
Uruguay	1215.40	1022.90	1008.43	924.94	852.66	1082.12	1191.10
Yemen, P.D.R.	22.00	24.00	29.00	27.00	41.00	29.00	

Main Source: United Nations International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Vol. 1, 1987.

Source: "Trade by Principal Countries of Provenance and Destination", supplemented by:
1984-1987 data from UNCTAD; 1984 data from UNCTAD; 1983-1984 data from UNCTAD

TABLE III-A

NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES AS % OF TOTAL IMPORTS

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Antigua and Barbuda	13.10%	4.60%	3.40%	-3.00%	* 13.60%	22.80%
Bahamas	3.4	3.9	18	-2.5	* 16.9	26.5
Bahrain	12	15.9	14.4	9.4	9.7	4.9
Barbados	6.6	8.8	5.6	-0.3	* 4.7	6.2
Belize	7.3	10.4	18.5	20.4	22.7	17.8
Brunei	-5.1	* 3.3	1	-0.4	* -0.6	* -0.4
Cape Verde	71.4	87.4	133.6	154.7	n/a	n/a
Comoros	165.7	116.1	114.9	99.6	138.5	119.9
Cyprus	10.4	3.2	3.5	1.7	14.5	14
Djibouti	32.6	26.2	30.4	58	51.9	41.9
Dominica	42.9	43	22.8	50.2	64.9	70.9
Equatorial Guinea	26.6	18.5	n/a	70.9	n/a	n/a
Fiji	13.6	14.7	13.5	7.1	5.1	11.1
Gabon	11.1	22	39.8	6.8	20.8	33.5
Gambia	70.7	43.9	32.9	48.2	46.6	88.3
Grenada	12.1	-3	* 32.3	54.9	48.5	33.9
Guinea-Bissau	130	133.1	120.9	107.3	100.5	100.4
Guyana	19.7	20.3	14.8	9.3	13.9	12
Kiribati	100.9	65.4	93.6	55.4	80	98.6
Maldives	78.2	30	17.4	11.3	20.5	27.9
Malta	11.7	46.5	7.9	1.6	2.8	2.2
Mauritius	17.1	16	10	12.7	5.8	8.1
Nauru	15.7	-32.3	* -61.8	* -2.3	* n/a	427.1
São Tomé and Príncipe	n/a	n/a	n/a	102.7	n/a	n/a
Seychelles	34.2	32.2	24.8	28.2	28.2	31.9
Solomon Islands	39.7	48	50.4	38.9	31.9	47.1
St. Kitts-Nevis	8.8	7.7	6.2	n/a	* 8.8	8.4
St. Lucia	10.4	8.2	9.8	4.6	5.7	7.6
St. Vincent and Grenadines	15.8	12.8	n/a	5.5	9.8	14.3
Suriname	18.9	19.6	n/a	0.5	4.3	26.4
Swaziland	n/a	9.3	9.7	12.7	9.9	12.1
Tonga	44.7	41.8	47.6	38.2	33	37.9
Tuvalu	181.3	200.7	157.2	158.5	114.6	163
Vanuatu	67.1	69.4	69.6	77	54.1	-49.7
Western Samoa	36	45.4	59	27	39.9	47.4

* Indicates a negative net receipt; that is, a net capital outflow from the microstate to all external sources of bilateral and multilateral aid, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received.

Source: "Historical Series, General Trade", where value of imports in domestic currency is converted into \$US millions by using the conversion factors supplied in the Table.

TABLE III-A

TOTAL IMPORTS (C.I.F.)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	110.86	138.9	108.91	131.86	167.3	199.5	
Bahamas	7284.5	6348.73	4616.09	4097.74	3077.86	3293.46	
Bahrain	1637.06	3615.36	3261.73	3479.38	3106.72	2426.62	2419.11
Barbados	572.33	550.65	605.22	665.19	601.93	593.22	515.03
Belize	161.97	128	111.79	130.15	128.13	107.5	142.95
Brunel	596.24	731.69	725.65	621.83	610.46	1114.2	
Cape Verde	71	71.5	47.98	41.76			
Comoros	32.35	32.64	34.37	42.98	36.69	39.27	
Cyprus	1165.24	1215.38	1207.8	1350.79	1233.55	1263.43	1463.33
Djibouti	205.47	226.31	220.98	225.45	198.75	188.36	
Dominica	49.67	47.48	45.08	57.82	55.32	55.7	
Equatorial Guinea	43.2	49.3		25.11			
Fiji	631.08	513.7	483.16	448.77	440.62	422.24	378.96
Gabon	834.45	798.5	685.56	888.02	975.88	924	
Gambia	122.38	96.91	115.65	100.2	105	113.3	
Grenada	54.34	56.46	57.22	55.96	69.26	83.52	88.37
Guinea-Bissau	51.63	49.6	54.9	57.4	63	71.6	
Guyana	436.3	280.37	230.5	252.31	254.82	225.6	
Kiribati	22.89	23.23	17.84	20.57	15	14	
Maldives	27.86	30	51.72	48.48	47.89	58	
Malta	854.99	788.84	727.3	710.8	750.95	879.73	1137.67
Mauritius	554	464.2	441.65	472.44	523.83	675.39	
Nauru	17.15	13.3	12.95	8.54		10.7	
São Tomé and Príncipe				11			
Seychelles	93.44	98.02	87.78	87.27	99.29	105.48	
Solomon Islands	75.75	59.39	61.26	65.53	68.99	63.46	
St. Kitts-Nevis	47.69	44.35	51.94		53.6	63.4	
St. Lucia	129.24	118.04	84.59	118.52	125	154.78	
St. Vincent and Grenadines	58.19	60.93		76.6	79.19	87.3	
Suriname	507	516.07		391.6	338.2	317	
Swaziland		520.3	545.21	381	321.15	344.39	
Tonga	40.23	41.62	37.57	41.09	41.25	39.8	
Tuvalu	2.98	2.94	2.67	3.47	2.88	2.7	
Vanuatu	43.99	47.68	51.18	58.82	71.22	57.13	69.57
Western Samoa	68.33	49.78	52.57	50.44	51.13	48.31	62.21

Main Source: United Nations International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Vol. 1, 1987.

Source: "Trade by Principal Countries of Provenance and Destination", supplemented by:
1984-1987 data from UNCTAD; 1984 data from UNCTAD; 1983-1984 data from UNCTAD

TABLE III-B

NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES AS % OF TOTAL IMPORTS

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Benin	22.10%	40.40%	30.90%	38.70%	31.40%	26.00%
Bhutan	14.5	16.5	18	24.5	31.8	45
Botswana	n/a	n/a	n/a	26	27.4	22.1
Burundi	84.9	73.3	95.8	83.9	81.4	91.4
Chad	49.9	57.8	80.1	69	n/a	n/a
Congo	22.4	62.6	47.5	18.9	10.5	53.4
Costa Rica	7.8	11.7	27	26.8	36.2	29.4
El Salvador	18	23.5	35.1	22.4	39	37.4
Haiti	31	34.8	28.7	28.6	32.8	47.1
Honduras	23	26.1	29.4	46.3	43.1	34
Israel	13.5	19.5	25.5	24	31.1	24.2
Jamaica	15.7	25.9	20.3	30.9	19.5	7.3
Jordan	47.7	34.1	27.6	31.8	12.6	26.9
Laos	31.8	28.9	20.2	21.7	33.2	23.6
Lebanon	14.3	6.3	3.1	4.2	n/a	n/a
Lesotho	20.8	18.6	19.3	19.2	31.8	21.7
Liberia	137.4	112	-31.3	* -67.1	* -101.1	* -99.1
Mauritania	90	91.5	104.2	75.9	100.7	93.9
Nicaragua	31	20	21.3	19.5	13.1	22.3
Oman	8.1	3	8.3	9.5	5.8	12.2
Panama	85.9	107.3	56.4	87.2	120.6	140.4
Papua New Guinea	29.1	58.4	59	53.3	35.6	21.7
Paraguay	21.3	35.1	36.6	29.3	18.8	20.3
Sierra Leone	21.8	35.4	40.1	43.9	36.6	31.4
Singapore	5	3.2	0.7	4.6	-1	* -0.4
Somalia	71.9	187.5	192.7	343.8	330.2	149.5
Togo	11.6	24.9	39.2	43.1	34.1	38.2
Trinidad and Tobago	1.6	1.2	2.6	7.6	-20.7	* 0.7
Uruguay	3.7	18.2	51.5	35.2	-17.5	* 7.2
Yemen, P.D.R.	12.9	23.2	10.9	12	17.4	11.3

* Indicates a negative net receipt; that is, a net capital outflow from the small state to all external sources of bilateral and multilateral aid, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received.

Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Imports: See Notes to Trade Table I

TABLE III-B

TOTAL IMPORTS C.I.F. (\$US Millions)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	542.06	475.54	293.97	285	312	370	
Bhutan	67.72	68.48	72.28	73.11	75.72	89.14	
Botswana				700.94	579.15	707.07	
Burundi	161.21	214.22	183.33	186.94	193.43	203.37	211.5
Chad	108	109	117	162			
Congo	965.41	744.32	628.99	598.57	580.23	629	
Costa Rica	1274.16	945.22	993	1086.25	1098.2	1130.1	
El Salvador	1044.51	944.84	891.5	1314.01	961.36	884.88	
Haiti	375.68	378	440.3	472.08	441.56	367.2	
Honduras	944.93	689.87	823.03	813.44	873.66	875.05	
Israel	7847	7960.4	8500.01	8288.53	8184.01	9481.13	11751.9
Jamaica	1486.97	1373.27	1530.23	1144.26	1123.7	971.6	1207.53
Jordan	3149.08	3241.2	3016.3	2688.67	2593.17	2412.71	5464.79
Laos	110	132	149	162	193	205	
Lebanon	3614.6	3169.7	3661.2	2273.08			1929.7
Lesotho	511.36	523.41	568.53	499.84	374.92	425	
Liberia	477.43	428.38	411.62	363.21	284.4	259	
Mauritania	265.09	273	227	246	233.53	220.97	381.9
Nicaragua	994.22	774.88	806.91	825.88	891.93	770.06	
Oman	2288.07	2682.39	2492.33	2748.17	3152.67	2384.07	1822.3
Panama	1561.85	1567.77	1412.5	1411.82	1383.34	1275.3	
Papua New Guinea	1111.68	1028.26	973.93	977.27	932.81	931.32	
Paraguay	581.47	631.38	478.26	513	442	578.1	
Sierra Leone	311.54	240.16	165.7	166.39	155.94	276.47	137.06
Singapore	27607.4	28167.7	28158.4	28655.7	26249.9	25461.4	32480.2
Somalia	512.93	330.09	179.5	105.17	112.07	402	
Togo	435.77	390.58	283.76	271.16	288.06	350	
Trinidad and Tobago	3109.19	3699.36	2581.97	1919.13	1533	1369.83	1218.74
Uruguay	1641.1	1110	787.45	775.72	707.76	869.98	1141.89
Yemen, P.D.R.	703	757	756	821	698	483	

NOTES TO TABLE 3:

1. The sources for the imports data are as follows:

Main: United Nations International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Vol. 1, 1987:

- Table 3: "Trade by Principal Countries of Provenance and Destination", supplemented by:
- Table 1: "Historical Series, General Trade", where value of imports in domestic currency is converted into \$US millions by using the conversion factors supplied in the Table.

TABLE IV-A

BILATERAL RECEIPTS AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	80.00%	51.60%	32.40%	156.40% *	95.20%	98.50%	92.70%
Bahamas	98.3	97.1	99.6	103.2 *	100	98.4	99.7
Bahrain	98.4	99.5	99.7	96.8	100.4	101	94.8 *
Barbados	41.8	46.9	44.7	935.3 *	67.5	78.1	-30.3 *
Belize	73.9	57.9	80.2	86.8	81.1	87.4	85.6
Brunei	100	100 *	100	100	102.9 *	102.4 *	95.8
Cape Verde	72.2	71.5	71.3	62.8	59.9	72.1	72.5
Comoros	59	63.6	57.2	52.8	43.9	49.7	61
Cyprus	78.5	30.5	50.6	19.8	54.7	44.8	-31.1 *
Djibouti	78.2	78.7	80.9	84.6	78	72.8	75.2
Dominica	55.9	44.6	47.6	81	78.6	89.6	42.1
Equatorial Guinea	35.7	-26.4 *	31.4	58.4	43.5	64	56.2
Fiji	75.8	62.4	35.1	49.5	98.2	71.7	78.2
Gabon	90.5	92.6	94.6	80.4	94.5	93.4	93.9
Gambia	58.6	54.6	40.9	51.3	59.9	57.2	50.7
Grenada	4.5	388.2 *	63.2	82.4	87.5	60.1	52.4
Guinea-Bissau	62.1	56.5	55	58.1	47.1	61.8	46.7
Guyana	15.6	25.3	-3.5 *	-4.7 *	20.4 *	-20.3 *	34 *
Kiribati	58.9	95.4	85.6	86	90	89.1	79.2
Maldives	48.2	66.7	53.3	49.1	71.4	72.2	67.2
Malta	89.7	99.6	98.4	91.2	100.5	88.6	61.3
Mauritius	64.7	69.8	53.3	49.3	5.6	83.6	71.6
Nauru	100	100 *	100 *	100 *	100 *	100	100
São Tomé and Príncipe	29.5	39.4	29.3	34.5	24	56.5	25.3
Seychelles	89.7	77.2	86.2	91.5	53.6	69.4	55.5
Solomon Islands	77.4	77.5	69.9	78.4	72.3	71.9	52.1
St. Kitts-Nevis	50	55.9	46.9	176.9 *	53.2	30.2	67
St. Lucia	34.1	43.3	60.2	31.5	32.4	15.3	66.7
St. Vincent and Grenadines	38	35.9	-5.9 *	28.6 *	47.4	67.2	38.5
Suriname	97.1	96.9	-45.5 *	-89.5 *	79.2 *	97.3	120.3 *
Swaziland	57.1	50.2	48.1	75.7	88.1	59.8	65.8
Tonga	80.6	71.3	73.7	79	77.9	76.8	83.1
Tuvalu	83.3	86.4	90.5	94.5	97	86.4	96.9
Vanuatu	79.3	91.8	93	49.4	49.9	-75	94
Western Samoa	56.1	66.8	67.4	31.6	71.1	80.3	66.1

* Indicates a negative net receipt from bilateral sources; that is, a net outflow of capital from the microstate to all sources of bilateral aid, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE IV-A

BILATERAL RECEIPTS

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	11.6	3.3	1.2	-6.1	21.6	44.7	10.1
Bahamas	240.7	243.4	826.7	-106.4	521.1	859.1	1028.2
Bahrain	193.3	572.6	468	316.3	302.8	121.1	-21.7
Barbados	15.9	22.8	15.2	-15.9	18.9	28.9	-3.7
Belize	8.8	7.7	16.6	23	23.6	16.7	20.2
Brunei	-30.3	23.8	7.5	-2.5	-3.6	-4.3	2.3
Cape Verde	36.6	44.7	45.7	40.6	42.3	81	62.6
Comoros	31.6	24.1	22.6	22.6	22.3	23.4	32.4
Cyprus	94.9	12	21.3	4.6	97.5	79.4	-29.7
Djibouti	52.3	46.8	54.3	110.6	80.5	57.4	66
Dominica	11.9	9.1	4.9	23.5	28.2	35.4	6.9
Equatorial Guinea	4.1	-2.4	3.8	10.4	7.7	20.1	25.8
Fiji	65.1	47.2	22.9	15.8	22.1	33.5	16.9
Gabon	84.2	162.5	258.2	48.8	192.2	288.9	401.3
Gambia	50.7	23.2	15.6	24.8	29.3	57.2	53.3
Grenada	0.3	-6.6	11.7	25.3	29.4	17	12.1
Guinea-Bissau	41.7	37.3	36.5	35.8	29.8	44.4	46.5
Guyana	13.4	14.4	-1.2	-1.1	7.2	-5.5	12.9
Kiribati	13.6	14.5	14.3	9.8	10.8	12.3	14.5
Maldives	10.5	6	4.8	2.7	7	11.7	16.2
Malta	89.7	365	56.8	10.3	20.9	17.1	17.1
Mauritius	61.3	51.9	23.5	29.6	1.7	45.9	67.1
Nauru	2.7	-4.3	-8	-0.2	2.3	45.7	0.8
São Tomé and Príncipe	1.8	3.9	3.4	3.9	3	7	4.6
Seychelles	28.7	24.4	18.8	22.5	15	23.4	13.6
Soloman Islands	23.3	22.1	21.6	20	15.9	21.5	36.6
St. Kitts-Nevis	2.1	1.9	1.5	-4.6	2.5	1.6	7.3
St. Lucia	4.6	4.2	5	1.7	2.3	1.8	10.2
St. Vincent and Grenadines	3.5	2.8	-0.3	1.2	3.7	8.4	5.2
Suriname	92.8	98.2	-0.5	-1.7	11.4	81.5	-38.5
Swaziland	32.6	24.2	25.5	36.5	28	25	24.8
Tonga	14.5	12.4	13.2	12.4	10.6	11.6	30.5
Tuvalu	4.5	5.1	3.8	5.2	3.2	3.8	24.9
Vanuatu	23.4	30.4	33.1	22.4	19.2	21.3	33.1
Western Samoa	13.8	15.1	20.9	4.3	14.5	18.4	23.4

Sources: Main: 1984-1987: United Nations Country-specific information
 1- 1981 - 1983: extrapolated, total capital flows less multilateral aid.
 extrapolated for the years 1984-1987 as well as
 1981-1983: Brunei, Maldives, Malta, Sao Tome and Príncipe

TABLE IV-A

MULTILATERAL RECEIPTS

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	2.9	3.1	2.5	2.1	1.1	0.8	0.7
Bahamas	4.1	7.3	3.6	3.3	0	13.8	2.9
Bahrain	3.2	2.8	1.5	10.5	-1.1	-1.2	-1.3
Barbados	22.1	25.8	18.8	14.2	9.1	8.1	15.9
Belize	3.1	5.6	4.1	3.5	5.5	2.4	3.5
Brunei	-	-	0	-	0.1	0.1	0.1
Cape Verde	14.1	17.8	18.4	24	28.3	31.4	23.8
Comoros	22	13.8	16.9	20.1	28.5	23.8	20.7
Cyprus	26	27.4	20.8	18.6	81	97.8	125.2
Djibouti	14.6	12.6	12.8	20.2	22.8	21.5	21.9
Dominica	9.4	11.3	5.4	5.5	7.7	4.1	9.5
Equatorial Guinea	7.4	11.5	8.3	7.4	10	11.3	20.1
Fiji	20.8	28.4	42.4	16.1	0.4	13.3	4.7
Gabon	8.8	12.9	14.7	11.9	11.2	20.4	26.1
Gambia	35.8	19.3	22.5	23.5	19.7	42.8	51.9
Grenada	6.3	4.9	6.8	5.4	4.1	11.3	11
Guinea-Bissau	25.4	28.7	29.9	25.8	33.5	27.5	53.1
Guyana	72.6	42.5	35.3	24.5	28.1	32.6	25
Kiribati	9.5	0.7	2.4	1.6	1.2	1.5	3.8
Maldives	11.3	3	4.2	2.8	2.8	4.5	7.9
Malta	10.3	1.5	0.9	1	-0.1	2.2	10.8
Mauritius	33.4	22.5	20.6	30.5	28.5	9	26.7
Nauru	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
São Tomé and Príncipe	4.3	6	8.2	7.4	9.5	5.4	13.6
Seychelles	3.3	7.2	3	2.2	13	10.2	11
Soloman Islands	6.8	6.4	9.3	5.5	6.1	8.4	33.7
St. Kitts-Nevis	2.1	1.5	1.7	2	2.2	3.7	3.5
St. Lucia	8.9	5.5	3.3	3.7	4.8	10	5.1
St. Vincent and Grenadines	5.7	5	5.4	3.1	4.1	4.1	8.3
Suriname	2.8	3.1	1.6	3.6	3.1	2.3	6.5
Swaziland	24.5	24	27.5	11.8	3.9	16.8	12.9
Tonga	3.5	5	4.7	3.3	3	3.5	6.2
Tuvalu	0.9	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.8
Vanuatu	6.1	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.9	3.6	18.5
Western Samoa	10.8	7.5	10.1	9.3	5.9	4.5	11.9

NOTES:

- '-' signifies no transaction (i.e. transaction = nil)
- a blank indicates information not available
- '0.0' indicates a small transaction of less than 005 \$USM

Sources: Main 1- 1984 - 1987 United Nations Country-specific information.
 2- 1981 - 1983 extrapolated, total capital flows less multilateral aid flows less multilateral aid

TABLE IV-B

BILATERAL RECEIPTS AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	67.60%	79.80%	53.10%	66.00%	54.40%	34.30%	31.90%
Bhutan	26.5	28.3	23.1	28.5	39	55.6	44
Botswana	72.3	75.7	69.9	72.3	53.3	80.3	68.4
Burundi	59.6	70.6	57.9	56.5	58.6	49.2	47.9
Chad	47.1	59.4	53.4	49.9	52.4	61.4	60.4
Congo	113.9	92.1	88.1	65.9	23.5	92.1	78.7
Costa Rica	51.3	67.9	80	76	64.7	71.2	95.6
El Salvador	65.2	74.5	60.8	76.5	80.4	90.2	94
Haiti	65.7	62.8	56	52.7	65.3	71.8	67.6
Honduras	65.7	43.7	44.1	39.7	63.1	77.2	85.9
Israel	97.3	101.9	100.6	100	100.6	100	101
Jamaica	57.4	57.1	71.1	82.3	51.5	42.7	64.3
Jordan	92.5	90.3	93.9	94.7	76.6	87.9	89.6
Laos	48	55.4	43.2	42	66.5	40.1	51.7
Lebanon	92	77.2	59.9	79.2	54.2	89.2	87.5
Lesotho	60.7	60.7	61	62.4	57.9	65.6	54
Liberia	94	93.8	131.6	* 117.9	* 116.3	* 110.9	* 109.8
Mauritania	72.1	65.4	64.4	70.2	77.6	76.7	51.5
Nicaragua	63.8	65.1	56.5	59.9	65.8	64.7	72.9
Oman	91.7	100	96.5	88.1	88.1	93.8	68.1
Panama	97.3	95.4	86.1	90.4	95.2	94.4	100.3
Papua New Guinea	88.7	93.2	88.4	92.8	90.3	71.4	66.6
Paraguay	49.6	67.1	73.2	52.3	38.1	57.1	69.3
Sierra Leone	59.3	68.8	55.6	71.2	39.1	68.8	77.7
Singapore	100.2	100	100.3	100.7	94	* 79.3	* 104.2
Somalia	48.4	74.4	57.4	58.3	60.5	73.1	71.8
Togo	54.5	78.9	46.6	53.9	48.6	45.9	69.2
Trinidad and Tobago	89.4	98.2	102.3	100.1	100.3	* -981.9	* -2.7
Uruguay	91.2	85.5	94.6	79.5	121.7	* 28.2	65.1
Yemen, P.D.R.	59.1	62	43.1	46.4	48.7	17.2	43

* Indicates a negative net receipt from bilateral sources; that is, a net outflow of capital from the small state to all sources of bilateral aid, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received

Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE IV-B

BILATERAL RECEIPTS

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	80.9	153.3	48.3	72.7	53.4	33	27.5
Bhutan	2.6	3.2	3	5.1	9.4	22.3	18.5
Botswana	80	89.8	90.9	131.7	84.5	125.8	147.3
Burundi	81.6	110.9	101.7	88.6	92.2	91.4	90.5
Chad	25.4	37.4	50	55.7	94.6	99.9	119.8
Congo	245.7	429.4	263.2	74.5	14.3	309.4	200
Costa Rica	51.1	75.1	214.7	221.2	257.1	236.2	231.9
El Salvador	122.9	165.4	190.5	224.7	301.8	298.4	396.9
Haiti	76.4	82.6	70.8	71.2	94.7	124.2	143.1
Honduras	142.6	78.5	106.9	149.6	237.5	230.1	211.9
Israel	1031.6	1580.5	2181.8	1985.1	2562.6	2297.5	2103.4
Jamaica	133.9	202.9	221.4	291.3	112.9	30.2	156.8
Jordan	1388.9	997.4	782	810.6	250.7	570.3	790
Laos	16.8	21.1	13	14.8	42.6	19.4	30.5
Lebanon	474.2	153.2	68.1	75.4	31.6	111.2	67.2
Lesotho	64.5	59.1	67	60	69.1	60.4	55.3
Liberia	616.9	450	-169.6	-287.2	-334.5	-284.7	-301.2
Mauritania	172.1	163.2	152.4	131.1	182.5	159.3	94.5
Nicaragua	196.5	101	97.1	96.3	76.7	111.2	129.1
Oman	170	79.4	200.5	231.2	161.1	273.1	24.5
Panama	1305.6	1603.7	686.2	1112.6	1588.8	1690.3	2321.3
Papua New Guinea	287.3	559.7	507.9	483.4	299.5	144.2	203
Paraguay	61.5	148.5	128.2	78.6	31.7	66.9	72.4
Sierra Leone	40.2	58.4	36.9	52	22.3	59.8	72.8
Singapore	1387.1	914.2	192.5	1322.8	-251.2	-86.7	757.4
Somalia	178.4	460.3	198.5	210.8	223.8	439.2	434.5
Togo	27.6	76.7	51.8	63	47.7	61.3	70.5
Trinidad and Tobago	43.7	44.8	68	146.4	-318.9	-92.3	-1.1
Uruguay	54.9	172.7	383.7	217	-150.8	17.7	164.4
Yemen, P.D.R.	53.4	109.1	35.6	45.8	59.2	9.4	42.3

Source: Main: 1984-1987, United Nations Country-specific information
 1981-1983: extrapolated, total capital flows less multilateral aid

TABLE IV-B

MULTILATERAL RECEIPTS

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	38.7	38.9	42.6	37.4	44.7	63.3	58.7
Bhutan	7.2	8.1	10	12.8	14.7	17.8	23.5
Botswana	30.7	28.8	39.1	50.4	74.1	30.9	68
Burundi	55.2	46.2	74	68.3	65.2	94.5	98.5
Chad	28.5	25.6	43.7	56	85.9	62.8	78.7
Congo	-29.9	36.8	35.5	38.6	46.4	26.5	54.3
Costa Rica	48.6	35.5	53.8	70	140.1	95.5	10.8
El Salvador	65.5	56.5	122.8	69	73.5	32.4	25.4
Haiti	39.9	48.9	55.6	63.9	50.3	48.7	68.6
Honduras	74.3	101.3	135.4	227.1	138.9	67.9	34.8
Israel	28.9	-29.5	-13.5	0.2	-14.1	-0.7	-21.2
Jamaica	99.3	152.7	89.8	62.7	106.4	40.5	87
Jordan	113.4	107	51.1	45.4	76.7	78.3	91.7
Laos	18.2	17	17.1	20.4	21.5	29	28.5
Lebanon	41.1	45.2	45.5	19.8	26.7	13.4	9.5
Lesotho	41.8	38.3	42.8	36.2	50.3	31.6	47.1
Liberia	39.3	29.7	40.7	43.7	47.1	27.9	27
Mauritania	66.5	86.5	84.1	55.7	52.8	48.3	88.9
Nicaragua	111.3	54.2	74.8	64.4	39.8	60.7	48.1
Oman	15.3	0	7.2	31.2	21.8	18.2	11.5
Panama	35.6	77.9	110.7	118.2	79.9	100.5	-6.7
Papua New Guinea	36.5	40.9	66.9	37.6	32.3	57.8	102
Paraguay	62.5	72.9	46.9	71.7	51.4	50.2	32.1
Sierra Leone	27.6	26.5	29.5	21.1	34.8	27.1	20.9
Singapore	-2.5	0.1	-0.6	-8.7	-16	-22.7	-30.5
Somalia	190.4	158.6	147.4	150.8	146.2	161.6	170.3
Togo	23	20.5	59.3	53.9	50.6	72.3	31.4
Trinidad and Tobago	5.2	0.8	-1.5	-0.1	1	101.8	41.8
Uruguay	5.3	29.3	21.9	55.9	26.9	45.1	88
Yemen, P.D.R.	37	66.8	47	53	62.4	45.3	56

NOTES:

- signifies no transaction (i.e. transaction = nil)
- a blank indicates information not available
- '0 0' indicates a small transaction of less than .005 \$USM

Sources: Main: 1- 1984 - 1987: United Nations Country-specific information
 2- 1981 - 1983: extrapolated, total capital flows less multilateral aid.

TABLE V-A

MULTILATERAL RECEIPTS AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	20.00%	48.40%	67.60%	-53.80%	4.80%	1.80%	6.40%
Bahamas	1.7	2.9	0.4	-3.2	0	1.6	0.3
Bahrain	1.6	0.5	0.3	3.2	-0.4	-1	5.7
Barbados	58.2	53.1	55.3	-835.3	32.5	21.9	130.3
Belize	26.1	42.1	19.8	13.2	18.9	12.6	14.8
Brunei	0	0	0	0	-2.9	-2.4	4.2
Cape Verde	27.8	28.5	28.7	37.2	40.1	27.9	27.5
Comoros	41	36.4	42.8	47	56.1	50.5	39
Cyprus	21.5	69.5	49.4	80.2	45.4	55.2	131.1
Djibouti	21.8	21.3	19.1	15.4	22.1	27.2	24.9
Dominica	44.1	55.4	52.4	19	21.4	10.4	57.9
Equatorial Guinea	64.3	126.4	68.6	41.6	56.5	36	43.8
Fiji	24.2	37.6	64.9	50.5	1.8	28.5	21.8
Gabon	9.5	7.4	5.4	19.6	5.5	6.6	6.1
Gambia	41.4	45.4	59.1	48.7	40.3	42.8	49.3
Grenada	95.5	-288.2	36.8	17.6	12.2	39.9	47.6
Guinea-Bissau	37.9	43.5	45	41.9	52.9	38.2	53.3
Guyana	84.4	74.7	103.5	104.7	79.6	120.3	66
Kiribati	41.1	4.6	14.4	14	10	10.9	20.8
Maldives	51.8	33.3	46.7	50.9	28.6	27.8	32.8
Malta	10.3	0.4	1.6	8.8	-0.5	11.4	38.7
Mauritius	35.3	30.2	46.7	50.8	94.4	16.4	28.5
Nauru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
São Tomé and Príncipe	70.5	60.6	70.7	65.5	76	43.5	74.7
Seychelles	10.3	22.8	13.8	8.9	46.4	30.3	44.9
Solomon Islands	22.6	22.5	30.1	21.6	27.7	28.1	47.9
St. Kitts-Nevis	50	44.1	53.1	-76.9	46.8	69.8	32.1
St. Lucia	65.9	56.7	39.8	68.5	67.6	84.7	33.3
St. Vincent and Grenadines	62	64.1	105.9	73.8	52.6	32.8	61.5
Suriname	2.9	3.1	145.5	189.5	21.5	2.7	-20.3
Swaziland	42.9	49.8	51.9	24.5	12.3	40.2	34.2
Tonga	19.4	28.7	26.3	21	22.1	23.2	16.9
Tuvalu	16.7	13.6	9.5	5.5	6.1	13.6	3.1
Vanuatu	20.7	8.2	7	5.1	7.5	-12.7	52.6
Western Samoa	43.9	33.2	32.6	68.4	28.9	19.7	33.6

* Indicates a negative net receipt from multilateral agencies; that is, a net outflow of capital from the microstate to multilateral agencies, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE V-B

MULTILATERAL RECEIPTS AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	32.40%	20.20%	46.90%	33.90%	45.60%	65.70%	68.10%
Bhutan	73.5	71.7	76.9	71.5	61	44.4	56
Botswana	27.7	24.3	30.1	27.7	46.7	19.7	31.6
Burundi	40.4	29.4	42.1	43.5	41.4	50.8	52.1
Chad	52.9	40.6	46.6	50.1	47.6	38.6	39.7
Congo	-13.9	* 7.9	11.9	34.1	76.3	7.9	21.4
Costa Rica	48.7	32.1	20	24	35.3	28.8	4.5
El Salvador	34.8	25.5	39.2	23.5	19.6	9.8	6
Haiti	34.3	37.2	44	47.3	34.7	28.2	32.4
Honduras	34.3	56.3	55.9	60.3	36.9	22.8	14.1
Israel	2.7	-1.9	* -0.6	* 0	-0.6	* 0	* -1
Jamaica	42.6	42.9	28.9	17.7	48.5	57.3	35.7
Jordan	7.5	9.7	6.1	5.3	23.4	12.1	10.4
Laos	52	44.6	56.8	58	33.5	59.9	48.3
Lebanon	8	22.8	40.1	20.8	45.8	10.8	12.4
Lesotho	39.3	39.3	39	37.6	42.2	34.3	46
Liberia	6	6.2	-31.6	-17.9	-16.4	-10.9	-9.8
Mauritania	27.9	34.6	35.6	29.8	22.4	23.3	48.5
Nicaragua	36.2	34.9	43.5	40.1	34.2	35.3	27.2
Oman	8.3	0	3.5	11.9	11.9	6.2	31.9
Panama	2.7	4.6	13.9	9.6	4.8	5.6	-0.3
Papua New Guinea	11.3	6.8	11.6	7.2	9.7	28.6	33.4
Paraguay	50.4	32.9	26.8	47.7	61.8	42.9	30.7
Sierra Leone	40.7	31.2	44.4	28.9	60.9	31.2	22.3
Singapore	-0.2	* 0	-0.3	* -0.7	* 6	* 20.7	* -4.2
Somalia	51.6	25.6	42.6	41.7	39.5	26.9	28.2
Togo	45.5	21.1	53.4	46.1	51.5	54.1	30.8
Trinidad and Tobago	10.6	1.8	-2.3	* -0.1	* -0.3	1083	102.7
Uruguay	8.8	14.5	5.4	20.5	-21.7	71.8	34.9
Yemen, P.D.R.	40.9	38	56.9	53.7	51.3	82.8	57

* Indicates a negative net receipt from multilateral agencies; that is, a net outflow of capital from the small state to multilateral agencies, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received.

Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE VI-A

TOTAL RECEIPTS FROM ARAB STATES (COUNTRIES AND AGENCIES)				
AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES				
	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	-12.80%	0.00%	-%	-%
Bahamas	-	-	-	-
Bahrain	75.5	39.7	116.3	14.4 *
Barbados	23.5	* -2.5	* -1.6	* -
Belize	-	-	-	-
Brunei	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Cape Verde	6.2	8.4	3.8	1.6
Comoros	15	17.5	13	0.6
Cyprus	9.5	1.7	0.4	4.5
Djibouti	33	18.5	45.4	13.6
Dominica	2.8	1.7	-0.3	* -
Equatorial Guinea	-	-1.1	* -0.3	* 0.2
Fiji	-	-	-	-
Gabon	-12.5	* -5.2	* 4.2	1.6
Gambia	2.1	2	-0.9	* -0.2 *
Grenada	-	-2.1	* -2.8	* -
Guinea-Bissau	4.7	7.4	5.8	3.5
Guyana	-6.4	* -1.1	*	-
Kiribati	-	-	-	-
Maldives	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Malta	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mauritius	6.2	4.3	-	3.1
Nauru	-	-	-	-
São Tomé and Príncipe	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Seychelles	-	2.5	2.4	4.5
Solomon Islands	-	6.8	8.4	1.7
St. Kitts-Nevis	-	-	-	-
St. Lucia	-	-	-	-
St. Vincent and Grenadine	-2.4	* -1.3	* -0.8	* -
Suriname	-	34.7	9.5	-25
Swaziland	-	-0.3	* -0.2	* -0.8 *
Tonga	-0.6	* -0.7	* -0.7	* -
Tuvalu	-	-	-	-
Vanuatu	-	-	-	-
Western Samoa	0.7	1	0.4	5.9

* Indicates a negative net receipt from multilateral agencies; that is, a net outflow of capital from the microstate to multilateral agencies, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received.

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE VI-A**BILATERAL RECEIPTS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES (\$US Millions)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda				-	-	-	-
Bahamas				-	-	-	-
Bahrain				237.5	121.7	141.5	-1.2
Barbados				-	-	-	-
Belize				-	-	-	-
Brunei							
Cape Verde				1.3	1.8	1.7	1.2
Comoros				4.5	4.3	2.4	0
Cyprus				2.2	3.1	0.7	4.3
Djibouti				33.5	12.3	28.9	10.4
Dominica				-	-	-	-
Equatorial Guinea				-	0	0.1	0.1
Fiji				-	-	-	-
Gabon				-7.5	-10.1	13.7	4.9
Gambia				0.9	0.8	-0.9	0
Grenada				-	-0.1	-	-
Guinea-Bissau				2.3	3	3.6	2.7
Guyana				-	-	-	-
Kiribati				-	-	-	-
Maldives							
Malta							
Mauritius				3.1	2	1.7	3.5
Nauru				-	-	-	-
São Tomé and Príncipe							
Seychelles				-0.2	0.6	0	0.6
Soloman Islands				0.2	1.3	2.4	1.2
St. Kitts-Nevis				-	-	-	-
St. Lucia				-	-	-	-
St. Vincent and Grenadines				-	-	-	-
Suriname				-	5	8	8
Swaziland				-	-	-	-
Tonga				-	-	-	-
Tuvalu				-	-	-	-
Vanuatu				-	-	-	-
Western Samoa				-	0.3	0.7	2.1

Sources: Main: 1- 1984 - 1987: United Nations Country-specific information.

TABLE VI-A**MULTILATERAL RECEIPTS FROM ARAB AGENCIES (\$US Millions)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda				0.5	0	-	-
Bahamas				-	-	-	-
Bahrain				9.2	-2	-2	-2.1
Barbados				-0.4	-0.7	-0.6	-
Belize				-	-	-	-
Brunei							
Cape Verde				2.7	4.1	2.6	0.2
Comoros				1.9	4.6	3.7	0.3
Cyprus				0	0	-	-
Djibouti				9.7	6.8	6.9	1.5
Dominica				0.8	0.6	-0.1	-
Equatorial Guinea				0	-0.2	-0.2	0
Fiji				-	-	-	-
Gabon				-0.1	-0.4	-0.7	2.1
Gambia				0.1	0.2	-	-0.2
Grenada				0	-0.6	-0.8	-
Guinea-Bissau				0.6	1.7	0.6	0.8
Guyana				-1.5	-0.4	-	-
Kiribati				-	-	-	-
Maldives							
Malta							
Mauritius				0.6	-0.7	-1.7	-0.6
Nauru				-	-	-	-
São Tomé and Príncipe							
Seychelles				0.2	0.1	0.8	0.5
Soloman Islands				-0.2	0.2	0.1	-
St. Kitts-Nevis				-	-	-	-
St. Lucia				-	-	-	-
St. Vincent and Grenadines				-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-
Suriname				-	-	-	-
Swaziland				-	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3
Tonga				-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-
Tuvalu				-	-	-	-
Vanuatu				-	-	-	-
Western Samoa				0.1	-0.1	-0.6	-

NOTES:

'-' signifies no transaction (i.e. transaction = nil)

a blank indicates information not available

'0.0' indicates a small transaction of less than .005 \$USM

Sources: Main: 1- 1984 - 1987: United Nations Country-specific information.

TABLE VI-B

TOTAL RECEIPTS FROM ARAB STATES (COUNTRIES AND AGENCIES)**AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	0.10%	5.10%	5.00%	2.30%
Bhutan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Botswana	5.9	4.1	-1.6	* -0.8
Burundi	8.4	5.2	6.6	11.7
Chad	-0.8	* -0.6	* 1.3	0.9
Congo	9.8	0.5	0	* 0
Costa Rica	0	* 0.7	-0.1	* -
El Salvador	0	* -	0	* -
Haiti	0.3	0.7	0.8	-
Honduras	1.5	1.2	0.2	-
Israel	-	-	-	-
Jamaica	-2.7	* -5.6	* -14.1	* 0.2
Jordan	74.6	142.6	71	46.3
Laos	3.1	0.2	3.1	-
Lebanon	-1.4	* 18.9	1	23.7
Lesotho	5.4	4.4	-2.2	* -1.2
Liberia	-0.1	0	-	-
Mauritania	37.9	36.2	30.1	12.1
Nicaragua	8.9	0.1	-	-
Oman	19.4	33.5	19.6	-32.2
Panama	-	-	-	-
Papua New Guinea	0.2	0.5	0.2	-0.1
Paraguay	0.5	0.2	-0.3	* -
Sierra Leone	22.5	8.6	8.5	4.7
Singapore	0	-	-0.5	0
Somalia	4.5	7.6	-2.5	* -1.2
Togo	3	11.3	7	2.7
Trinidad and Tobago	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	-	-	-	-
Yemen, P.D.R.	57.2	58.3	55.2	38.5

* Indicates a negative net receipt from multilateral agencies; that is, a net outflow of capital from the microstate to multilateral agencies, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received.

Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE VII-A

**TOTAL RECEIPTS FROM EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC)
AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	179.50%	* 30.40%	24.40%	47.70%
Bahamas	32.4	* 18.2	2	-0.7 *
Bahrain	-17.3	* 33.6	6.8	-79.9
Barbados	841.2	* 43.6	-4.6	* 18
Belize	34.3	29.6	-8.9	* 9.3
Brunei	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Cape Verde	47.4	39.9	62.5	51.5
Comoros	41.8	42.1	53.3	63.8
Cyprus	51.3	42.3	36.2	-31.3 *
Djibouti	54.5	63	30.8	59.6
Dominica	51	46.2	85.8	29.9
Equatorial Guinea	53.4	36.7	63.1	61.9
Fiji	45.5	22.2	41.5	40.7
Gabon	139	108.3	87.2	90.3
Gambia	30	37.8	59.2	41.5
Grenada	16.6	9.2	9.9	9.5
Guinea-Bissau	45.8	31.9	42.1	32.7
Guyana	-2.1	* 16.4	-1.5	* 19.5
Kiribati	49.1	41.7	41.3	31.7
Maldives	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Malta	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mauritius	40	-14.6	* 55.9	63.3
Nauru	-200	-34.8	* 1.3	-362.5 *
São Tomé and Príncipe	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Seychelles	68.7	63.9	57.6	42
Solomon Islands	47.1	39.5	23.4	50.6
St. Kitts-Nevis	-46.2	31.9	49.1	60.6
St. Lucia	46.3	22.5	16.1	47.7
St. Vincent and Grenadines	21.4	41	15.2	27.4
Suriname	136.8	52.1	90.9	141.6 *
Swaziland	63.9	44.3	30.9	31
Tonga	15.3	17.6	17.9	51.8
Tuvalu	65.5	54.5	43.2	46.7
Vanuatu	81.9	77.9	115.5	* 52.3
Western Samoa	-12.5	* 14.2	14.8	28.8

* Indicates a negative net receipt from multilateral agencies; that is, a net outflow of capital from the microstates to multilateral agencies, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received.

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE VII-A**RECEIPTS FROM EEC AND MEMBER COUNTRIES (\$US Millions)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda				-7	6.9	11.1	5.2
Bahamas				-33.4	94.8	17.1	-7.1
Bahrain				-56.5	101.2	8.1	18.3
Barbados				-14.3	12.2	-1.7	2.2
Belize				9.1	8.6	-1.7	2.2
Brunei							
Cape Verde				30.6	28.2	70.3	44.5
Comoros				17.9	21.4	25.1	33.9
Cyprus				11.9	75.5	64.1	-29.9
Djibouti				71.3	65	24.3	52.3
Dominica				14.8	16.6	33.9	4.9
Equatorial Guinea				9.5	6.5	19.8	28.4
Fiji				14.5	5	19.4	8.8
Gabon				84.4	220.1	269.6	386.1
Gambia				14.5	18.5	59.2	43.7
Grenada				5.1	3.1	2.8	2.2
Guinea-Bissau				28.2	20.2	30.3	32.6
Guyana				-0.5	5.8	-0.4	7.4
Kiribati				5.6	5	5.7	5.8
Maldives							
Malta							
Mauritius				24	-4.4	30.7	59.3
Nauru				0.4	-0.8	0.6	-2.9
São Tomé and Príncipe							
Seychelles				16.9	17.9	19.4	10.3
Soloman Islands				12	8.7	7	35.6
St. Kitts-Nevis				1.2	1.5	2.6	6.6
St. Lucia				2.5	1.6	1.9	7.3
St. Vincent and Grenadines				0.9	3.2	1.9	3.7
Suriname				2.6	7.5	76.2	-45.3
Swaziland				30.8	14.1	12.9	11.7
Tonga				2.4	2.4	2.7	19
Tuvalu				3.6	1.8	1.9	12
Vanuatu				37.1	30	-32.8	18.4
Western Samoa				-1.7	2.9	3.4	10.2

Sources: Main: 1- 1984 - 1987: United Nations Country-specific information.

TABLE VII-B

**TOTAL RECEIPTS FROM EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC)
AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	43.60%	53.00%	45.10%	50.30%
Bhutan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Botswana	51.9	34.3	41.4	45.2
Burundi	42.3	50	36.5	36.2
Chad	56.7	50.5	63.8	67.4
Congo	69.7	35.5	92.1	74
Costa Rica	4.4	11.6	24.1	19.6
El Salvador	1.7	4.6	7	8.6
Haiti	18.4	20.9	19.2	15.7
Honduras	7.6	13.9	7.8	10.7
Israel	7.5	3.5	4.5	10.8
Jamaica	19	10.6	14.4	14.1
Jordan	9.6	-56.1	* 12.9	39.3
Laos	7.7	-0.2	* 4.1	2
Lebanon	73.4	-5	* 44.1	26.3
Lesotho	23.5	31.1	39.3	28.6
Liberia	46.1	* 14.4	* 85.9	* 20
Mauritania	32.8	34.4	41.5	43.6
Nicaragua	36.7	43.2	46.1	50.8
Oman	66.2	43.1	50.8	116.9
Panama	-0.5	* -3.3	* 6.5	7.1
Papua New Guinea	17.9	7.4	-24.2	* 11.4
Paraguay	32.7	20.6	35	42.3
Sierra Leone	46.6	29.8	45.8	57.2
Singapore	39.5	-47.3	-349.3	33.6
Somalia	44.8	30.9	55.3	57.7
Togo	59.4	28.7	24.5	50.9
Trinidad and Tobago	-4.2	* 2.4	* 347.9	18.7
Uruguay	7.5	-0.5	29	26
Yemen, P.D.R.	5.1	10	-7.5	* 23.8

* Indicates a negative net receipt from multilateral agencies; that is, a net outflow of capital from the microstate to multilateral agencies, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received.

Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE VI-B**RECEIPTS FROM EEC AND MEMBER COUNTRIES (\$US Millions)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin				48	52	43.4	43.4
Bhutan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Botswana				94.6	54.4	64.8	97.2
Burundi				66.3	78.7	67.9	68.5
Chad				63.3	91.1	103.8	133.8
Congo				78.8	21.6	309.4	188.2
Costa Rica				12.7	46.2	80.1	47.5
El Salvador				5	17.1	23.2	36.2
Haiti				24.9	30.3	33.3	33.3
Honduras				28.5	52.4	23.2	26.3
Israel				148.2	89.2	102.6	224.5
Jamaica				67.1	23.3	10.2	34.3
Jordan				81.9	-183.5	83.4	346.4
Laos				2.7	-0.1	2	1.2
Lebanon				69.9	-2.9	55	20.2
Lesotho				22.6	37.1	36.2	29.3
Liberia				-112.2	-41.3	-220.4	-54.9
Mauritania				61.3	81	86.1	80
Nicaragua				59	50.3	79.3	89.9
Oman				173.8	78.8	147.9	42.1
Panama				-5.6	-55.5	116.9	163.8
Papua New Guinea				93.2	24.4	-48.8	34.8
Paraguay				49.1	17.1	41	44.2
Sierra Leone				34	17	39.8	53.6
Singapore				519.6	126.5	382.1	244.1
Somalia				162	114.5	332	349
Togo				69.4	28.2	32.7	51.9
Trinidad and Tobago				-6.2	-7.7	32.7	7.6
Uruguay				20.6	0.6	18.2	65.7
Yemen, P.D.R.				5	12.2	-4.1	23.4

Sources: Main: 1- 1984 - 1987: United Nations Country-specific information.

TABLE VIII-A

**GROSS RECEIPTS FROM CMEA COUNTRIES
AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987	
Antigua and Barbuda	-	-	-	-	
Bahamas	-	-	-	-	
Bahrain	-	-	-	-	
Barbados	-	-	-	-	
Belize	-	-	-	-	
Brunei	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Cape Verde	0.3	~ 1.4	~ 2.2	~	-
Comoros	-	-	-	-	
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	
Djibouti	-	-	-	-	
Dominica	-	-	-	-	
Equatorial Guinea	-	-	-	-	
Fiji	-	-	-	-	
Gabon	-	-	-	-	
Gambia	-	-	-	-	
Grenada	-	-	-	-	
Guinea-Bissau	8.6	~ 1.9	~ 6.5	^ 2.6	~
Guyana	7.1	^ 5.1	~ 7.8	~	-
Kiribati	-	-	-	-	
Maldives	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Malta	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Mauritius	-	-	-	-	
Nauru	-	-	-	-	
São Tomé and Príncipe	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Seychelles	7.5	~ 3.4	~ 9.7	~ 10.3	~
	6.9	^ 12.3	^	-	
Solomon Islands	-	-	-	-	
St. Kitts-Nevis	-	-	-	-	
St. Lucia	-	-	-	-	
St. Vincent and Grenadines	-	-	-	-	
Suriname	-	-	-	-	
Swaziland	-	-	-	-	
Tonga	-	-	-	-	
Tuvalu	-	-	-	-	
Vanuatu	-	-	-	-	
Western Samoa	-	-	-	-	

TABLE VIII-A**GROSS RECEIPTS FROM CMEA COUNTRIES (\$US Millions)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bahamas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bahrain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Belize	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brunei	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cape Verde	-	-	-	0.2	1	2.5	-
Comoros	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Djibouti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Equatorial Guinea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fiji	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gabon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grenada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea-Bissau	-	-	-	5.8	1.2	-	2.7
Guyana	-	-	-	-	1.9	2.3	-
Kiribati	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Maldives	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nauru	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
São Tomé and Príncipe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Seychelles	-	-	-	2	1	3.6	2.8
Solomon Islands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
St. Kitts-Nevis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
St. Lucia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
St. Vincent and Grenadines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suriname	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Swaziland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tonga	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tuvalu	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vanuatu	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Western Samoa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Sources: Main: 1- 1984 - 1987: United Nations Country-specific information.

TABLE VIII-A

~ indicates actual payments made in a given year as described in memorandum item. Percentage is calculated by dividing memo item payment by a revised total receipts denominator consisting of total receipts plus the separate memorandum item payment.

^ indicates not actual payments, but rather a commitment to make future payments. The CMEA commitment is calculated as a percentage of total relief committed to the specific country by all bilateral and multilateral parties in a given year.

* indicates a negative net receipt from CMEA sources; that is, a net outflow of capital from the micro-state to all CMEA sources of aid, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received.

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.

TABLE VIII-B

GROSS RECEIPTS FROM CMEA COUNTRIES					
AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES					
	1984	1985	1986	1987	
Benin	-	0	^ -	3.7	^
Botswana	-	-	-	-	-
Burundi	0.8	~ 0.3	~ 0.1	~ 0.1	~
Chad	-	-	-	-	-
Congo	3.7	~ 3.2	~ 0.7	~ 0.7	~
	14	^ -	1.3	^ -	
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-
El Salvador	-	-	-	-	-
Haiti	-	-	-	-	-
Honduras	-	-	-	-	-
Israel	-	-	-	-	-
Jamaica	-	-	8.2	^ -	-
Jordan	0.1	~ 1.6	~ 0.6	~ -	-
Laos	71	~ 63.3	~ 68.7	~ 67.5	~
	67.8	^ 81.8	^ 63.1	^ 51.3	^
Lebanon	-	18.5	^ -	-	-
Lesotho	0.4	~ 0.2	~ 0.2	~ -	-
Liberia	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	-	-	0	^ -	-
Nicaragua	34.4	~ 50.7	~ 53.9	~ 39.5	~
	70	^ 32.1	^ 54.3	^ 52.9	^
Oman	-	-	-	-	-
Panama	-	-	-	-	-
Papua New Guinea	-	-	-	-	-
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	2	~ 0.2	~ 6.2	~ -	-
	-	1.9	^ -	-	-
Singapore	-	-	-	-	-
Somalia	-	-	-	-	-
Togo	-	-	-	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	-	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-
Yemen, P.D.R.	51.2	~ 46.9	~ 70.8	~ 64	~
	76.3	^ 28	^ 66.1	^ 5.6	^

~ indicates actual payments made in a given year as described in memorandum item
Percentage is calculated by dividing memo item payment by a revised total receipts
denominator consisting of total receipts plus the separate memorandum item payment.

^ indicates not actual payments, but rather a commitment to make future payments
The CMEA commitment is calculated as a percentage of total relief committed to the
specific country by all bilateral and multilateral parties in a given year.

Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE VIII-B**GROSS RECEIPTS FROM CMEA COUNTRIES (\$US Millions)**

(same item)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	-	-	-	0	-	-	0
Botswana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burundi	-	-	1.3	0.4	0.1	0.1	-
Chad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Congo	-	-	4.3	2	2.2	1.8	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
El Salvador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Haiti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Honduras	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jordan	-	-	0.8	5.4	3.9	-	-
Laos	-	-	86	110.5	106.2	122.8	-
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lesotho	-	-	0.4	0.2	0.2	-	-
Liberia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
Nicaragua	-	-	84.3	119.8	200.8	115.8	-
Panama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Papua New Guinea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rwanda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	-	-	1.5	0.1	5.7	-	-
Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Somalia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Togo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yemen, P.D.R.	-	-	103.4	107.2	132.9	174.4	-

Sources: Main: 1- 1984 - 1987: United Nations Country-specific information.

TABLE IX-A

**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
ANTIGUA and BARBUDA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	-3.9	22.7	45.4	10.9
% Private Sector	194.9%	* 27.3%	49.6%	7.3%
% Official Receipts	-94.9%	72.7%	50.4%	92.7%
BAHAMAS				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	-103.1	521.1	872.9	1031.1
% Private Sector	137.8%	* 82.3%	88.5%	100.7%
% Official Receipts	-37.7%	17.7%	11.5%	-0.7%
BAHRAIN				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	326.8	301.6	119.9	-22.9
% Private Sector	24.0%	59.8%	-18.3%	* -25.8%
% Official Receipts	76.0%	40.2%	118.3%	125.8%
BARBADOS				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	-1.7	28.0	37.0	12.2
% Private Sector	1200.0%	* 63.2%	72.4%	-9.8%
% Official Receipts	-1100.0%	36.8%	27.6%	109.8%
BELIZE				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	28.5	29.1	19.1	23.6
% Private Sector	36.6%	5.2%	-28.8%	* -0.4%
% Official Receipts	63.8%	94.8%	128.8%	100.4%

TABLE IX-A

**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
BRUNEI				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	-2.5	-3.5	-4.2	2.4
% Private Sector	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
% Official Receipts	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
CAPE VERDE				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	64.8	70.8	112.4	86.4
% Private Sector	0.0%	-0.4%	* 1.7%	-0.3%
% Official Receipts	100.0%	100.4%	98.4%	100.3%
COMOROS				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	42.8	50.8	47.1	53.1
% Private Sector	-0.2%	* -0.2%	* 0.4%	0.4%
% Official Receipts	100.2%	100.0%	99.6%	99.6%
CYPRUS				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	23.2	178.4	177.1	95.5
% Private Sector	-40.9%	* 40.8%	32.9%	-56.2%
% Official Receipts	140.9%	59.2%	67.1%	156.2%
DJIBOUTI				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	130.8	103.2	78.9	87.8
% Private Sector	21.9%	21.1%	-45.8%	* -4.3%
% Official Receipts	78.0%	78.9%	145.9%	104.3%

TABLE IX-A

**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
DOMINICA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	29.0	35.9	39.5	16.4
% Private Sector	43.1%	52.6%	72.2%	0.0%
% Official Receipts	56.9%	47.4%	27.6%	100.0%
EQUATORIAL GUINEA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	17.8	17.7	31.4	45.9
% Private Sector	13.5%	4.5%	15.0%	8.5%
% Official Receipts	86.5%	95.5%	85.0%	91.3%
FJI				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	31.9	22.5	46.7	21.6
% Private Sector	-17.8%	* -5.8%	* -1.3%	* -29.2%
% Official Receipts	117.6%	105.3%	101.3%	129.6%
GABON				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	60.7	203.3	309.3	427.4
% Private Sector	-28.5%	* 66.7%	62.8%	14.3%
% Official Receipts	128.5%	33.3%	37.2%	85.7%
GAMBIA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	48.3	48.9	100.0	105.2
% Private Sector	-19.0%	* -5.7%	* -6.3%	* 1.0%
% Official Receipts	119.0%	105.9%	106.2%	99.0%

TABLE IX-A

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES

	1984	1985	1986	1987
GRENADA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	30.7	33.6	28.3	23.1
% Private Sector	4.9%	-3.3%	* 1.1%	-3.5%
% Official Receipts	95.1%	103.0%	99.3%	103.5%
GUINEA-BISSAU				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	61.6	63.3	71.9	99.6
% Private Sector	4.9%	3.6%	0.3%	-3.8%
% Official Receipts	95.1%	96.2%	99.6%	103.8%
GUYANA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	23.4	35.3	27.1	37.9
% Private Sector	-13.2%	* 10.8%	-48.3%	* -2.9%
% Official Receipts	113.2%	89.2%	148.3%	103.2%
KIRIBATI				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	11.4	12.0	13.8	18.3
% Private Sector	-4.4%	* -0.8%	* 2.2%	-0.5%
% Official Receipts	104.4%	100.0%	97.1%	100.5%
MALDIVES				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	5.5	9.8	16.2	24.1
% Private Sector	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
% Official Receipts	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

TABLE IX-A

**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
MALTA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	11.3	20.8	19.3	27.9
% Private Sector	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
% Official Receipts	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
MAURITIUS				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	60.0	30.2	54.9	93.7
% Private Sector	-2.5%	* -69.9%	* -12.4%	* 7.9%
% Official Receipts	102.5%	170.2%	112.4%	92.2%
NAURU				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	-0.2	2.3	45.7	0.8
% Private Sector	100.0%	* 100.0%	100.0%	87.5%
% Official Receipts	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	12.5%
SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	282.4	182.9	291.3	36.0
% Private Sector	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
% Official Receipts	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

TABLE IX-A

**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
SEYCHELLES				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	24.6	28.0	33.7	24.5
% Private Sector	37.8%	11.1%	8.9%	-22.9%
% Official Receipts	61.8%	88.9%	91.1%	122.9%
SOLOMON ISLANDS				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	25.5	22.0	29.9	70.3
% Private Sector	3.8%	6.4%	-2.7%	* 3.6%
% Official Receipts	95.7%	94.1%	102.7%	96.4%
ST. KITTS-NEVIS				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	-2.6	4.7	5.3	10.9
% Private Sector	238.5%	* 4.3%	-1.9%	* 30.3%
% Official Receipts	-138.5%	95.7%	101.9%	68.8%
ST. LUCIA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	5.4	7.1	11.8	15.3
% Private Sector	29.6%	1.4%	-1.7%	* 8.5%
% Official Receipts	70.4%	100.0%	101.7%	91.5%

TABLE IX-A

**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	4.2	7.8	12.5	13.5
% Private Sector	2.4%	17.9%	0.8%	0.0%
% Official Receipts	100.0%	82.1%	100.0%	100.0%
SURINAME				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	1.9	14.4	83.8	-32.0
% Private Sector	-168.4%	* 22.2%	83.3%	177.5%
% Official Receipts	268.4%	77.8%	16.7%	-77.5%
SWAZILAND				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	48.2	31.8	41.8	37.7
% Private Sector	32.4%	28.3%	-5.3%	* -7.7%
% Official Receipts	67.6%	71.7%	105.3%	107.7%
TONGA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	15.7	13.6	15.1	36.7
% Private Sector	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	41.7%
% Official Receipts	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	58.3%
TUVALU				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	5.5	3.3	4.4	25.7
% Private Sector	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
% Official Receipts	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TABLE IX-A

**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
VANUATU				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	45.3	38.5	-28.4	35.2
% Private Sector	43.5%	41.0%	59.5%	* -48.6%
% Official Receipts	56.5%	59.2%	40.1%	* 148.6%
WESTERN SAMOA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	13.6	20.4	22.9	35.4
% Private Sector	-47.1%	* 2.0%	0.4%	0.6%
% Official Receipts	147.1%	98.0%	100.0%	99.4%

* indicates a negative net receipt; a net outflow of capital from the micro-state to total private or official aid sources.

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE IX-A**NET CAPITAL FLOWS, PRIVATE SECTOR (\$US Millions)**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	-7.6	6.2	22.5	0.8
Bahamas	-142.1	429.1	772.8	1038.3
Bahrain	78.3	180.4	-21.9	5.9
Barbados	-20.4	17.7	26.8	-1.2
Belize	9.7	1.5	-5.5	-0.1
Brunei				
Cape Verde	0	-0.3	1.9	-0.3
Comoros	-0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.2
Cyprus	-9.5	72.7	58.3	-53.7
Djibouti	28.7	21.8	-36.1	-3.8
Dominica	12.5	18.9	28.5	0
Equatorial Guinea	2.4	0.8	4.7	3.9
Fiji	-5.6	-1.3	-0.6	-6.3
Gabon	-17.3	135.5	194.3	61
Gambia	-9.2	-2.8	-6.3	1.1
Grenada	1.5	-1.1	0.3	-0.8
Guinea-Bissau	3	2.3	0.2	-3.8
Guyana	-3.1	3.8	-13.1	-1.1
Kiribati	-0.5	-0.1	0.3	-0.1
Maldives				

TABLE IX-A**NET CAPITAL FLOWS, PRIVATE SECTOR (\$US Millions)**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Malta				
Mauritius	-1.5	-21.1	-6.8	7.4
Nauru	-0.2	2.3	45.7	0.7
Oman	182.8	102.1	206	41.6
São Tomé and Príncipe				
Seychelles	9.3	3.1	3	-5.6
Solomon Islands	1	1.4	-0.8	2.5
St. Kitts-Nevis	-6.2	0.2	-0.1	3.3
St. Lucia	1.6	0.1	-0.2	1.3
St. Vincent and Grenadines	0.1	1.4	0.1	0
Suriname	-3.2	3.2	69.8	-56.8
Swaziland	15.6	9	-2.2	-2.9
Tonga	0	-	-	15.3
Tuvalu	-	-	-	-
Vanuatu	19.7	15.8	-16.9	-17.1
Western Samoa	-6.4	0.4	0.1	0.2

TABLE IX-A**NET CAPITAL FLOWS, OFFICIAL SOURCES (\$US Millions)**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Antigua and Barbuda	3.7	16.5	22.9	10.1
Bahamas	38.9	92	100.1	-7.2
Bahrain	248.5	121.3	141.8	-28.8
Barbados	18.7	10.3	10.2	13.4
Belize	16.9	27.6	24.6	23.7
Brunei				
Cape Verde	64.6	70.9	110.6	86.7
Comoros	42.9	50.8	46.9	52.9
Cyprus	32.7	105.7	118.9	149.2
Djibouti	102	81.4	115.1	91.6
Dominica	16.5	17	10.9	16.4
Equatorial Guinea	15.4	16.9	26.7	41.9
Fiji	37.5	23.7	47.3	28
Gabon	78	67.8	115	366.4
Gambia	57.5	51.8	106.2	104.1
Grenada	29.2	34.6	28.1	23.9
Guinea-Bissau	58.6	60.9	71.6	103.4
Guyana	26.5	31.5	40.2	39.1
Kiribati	11.9	12	13.4	18.4
Maldives				

TABLE IX-A**NET CAPITAL FLOWS, OFFICIAL SOURCES (\$US Millions)**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Mauritius	61.5	51.4	61.7	86.4
Nauru	0	0.1	0	0.1
Oman	79.6	80.9	85.3	-5.7
São Tomé and Príncipe				
Seychelles	15.2	24.9	30.7	30.1
Solomon Islands	24.4	20.7	30.7	67.8
St. Kitts-Nevis	3.6	4.5	5.4	7.5
St. Lucia	3.8	7.1	12	14
St. Vincent and Grenadines	4.2	6.4	12.5	13.5
Suriname	5.1	11.2	14	24.8
Swaziland	32.6	22.8	44	40.6
Tonga	15.7	13.6	15.1	21.4
Tuvalu	5.5	3.3	4.4	25.7
Vanuatu	25.6	22.8	-11.4	52.3
Western Samoa	20	20	22.9	35.2

TABLE IX-B

**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
SMALL STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987	
CONGO					
Total Receipts (\$US M)	113.1	60.8	335.9	254.2	
% Private Sector	-6.5%	* -81.9%	* 11.7%	-35.0%	*
% Official Receipts	106.4%	181.9%	88.3%	135.0%	
COSTA RICA					
Total Receipts (\$US M)	291.2	397.1	331.7	242.6	
% Private Sector	8.8%	0.9%	12.5%	8.0%	
% Official Receipts	91.2%	99.1%	87.5%	92.1%	
EL SALVADOR					
Total Receipts (\$US M)	293.7	375.2	330.8	422.3	
% Private Sector	-0.3%	* -0.7%	* -5.1%	* -1.7%	*
% Official Receipts	100.3%	100.7%	105.1%	101.8%	
HAITI					
Total Receipts (\$US M)	135.1	145	173	211.7	
% Private Sector	0.9%	-4.1%	* -1.3%	* -2.4%	*
% Official Receipts	99.0%	104.1%	101.3%	102.4%	
HONDURAS					
Total Receipts (\$US M)	376.7	376.3	297.9	246.7	
% Private Sector	-6.0%	* 8.8%	-3.0%	* -4.8%	*
% Official Receipts	106.0%	91.2%	103.0%	104.7%	

TABLE IX-B

**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
SMALL STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
ISRAEL				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	1985.3	2548.5	2296.8	2082.2
% Private Sector	37.0%	24.8%	18.0%	42.9%
% Official Receipts	63.0%	75.2%	82.0%	57.1%
JAMAICA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	354	219.3	70.7	243.8
% Private Sector	19.4%	-37.5%	* -181.6%	* 1.2%
% Official Receipts	80.6%	137.8%	281.8%	98.8%
JORDAN				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	855.9	327.3	648.5	881.8
% Private Sector	16.9%	-77.2%	* 5.5%	35.4%
% Official Receipts	83.1%	177.2%	94.5%	64.6%
LAOS				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	35.2	64.1	48.4	59
% Private Sector	3.1%	42.3%	0.4%	0.2%
% Official Receipts	96.9%	57.7%	99.6%	99.8%
LEBANON				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	95.2	58.3	124.6	76.8
% Private Sector	40.4%	-42.5%	* 55.4%	-29.8%
% Official Receipts	59.6%	142.5%	44.6%	129.8%

TABLE IX-B

**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
SMALL STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
PAPUA NEW GUINEA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	521.0	331.8	202.0	305.0
% Private Sector	24.6%	22.3%	-11.1%	* -10.5%
% Official Receipts	75.4%	77.7%	111.1%	110.5%
PARAGUAY				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	150.3	83.2	117.1	104.5
% Private Sector	26.8%	12.5%	21.9%	13.0%
% Official Receipts	73.2%	87.5%	78.1%	87.0%
SIERRA LEONE				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	73.0	57.1	86.9	93.7
% Private Sector	17.5%	-21.7%	* -3.6%	* -3.9%
% Official Receipts	82.5%	121.9%	103.6%	103.9%
SINGAPORE				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	1314.1	-267.3	-108.4	726.8
% Private Sector	93.4%	78.1%	* -72.4%	130.3%
% Official Receipts	6.6%	20.9%	* 172.5%	* -30.3%

TABLE IX-B

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
SMALL STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES

	1984	1985	1986	1987
SOMALIA				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	361.6	370.0	600.9	604.8
% Private Sector	3.0%	5.5%	1.5%	8.8%
% Official Receipts	97.0%	94.5%	98.5%	91.2%
TOGO				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	116.9	98.2	133.6	101.9
% Private Sector	-26.8%	* -16.0%	* -20.1%	* -13.2%
% Official Receipts	126.8%	116.0%	120.1%	113.2%
TRINIDAD and TOBAGO				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	146.3	-317.8	9.4	40.7
% Private Sector	70.8%	97.3%	* -716.0%	* 41.5%
% Official Receipts	29.2%	2.7%	* 816.0%	58.5%
URUGUAY				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	273.0	-123.9	62.8	252.4
% Private Sector	73.3%	127.9%	* -3.8%	* 61.5%
% Official Receipts	26.7%	-27.9%	103.7%	38.5%

TABLE IX-B

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
SMALL STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES

	1984	1985	1986	1987
YEMEN, P.D.R.				
Total Receipts (\$US M)	98.7	121.6	54.7	98.3
% Private Sector	-4.5%	* 1.9%	-23.9%	* 13.0%
% Official Receipts	104.5%	98.0%	123.9%	87.0%

* indicates a negative net receipt; a net outflow of capital from the small state to private or official sources of aid.

Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.

TABLE IX-B**NET CAPITAL FLOWS, PRIVATE SECTOR (\$US Millions)**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	31.1	0.5	-42.3	-50.4
Botswana	16.1	6	-14.9	4.3
Burundi	4.6	8.3	-7	-8.6
Chad	-2.2	0.8	-2.3	0.4
Congo	-7.3	-49.8	39.2	-88.9
Costa Rica	25.6	3.7	41.5	19.3
El Salvador	-0.9	-2.5	-16.9	-7.3
Haiti	1.2	-5.9	-2.2	-5.1
Honduras	-22.6	33	-8.8	-11.8
Israel	733.6	631.3	414.3	892.6
Jamaica	68.8	-82.3	-128.4	2.9
Jordan	144.8	-252.7	35.9	312.3
Laos	1.1	27.1	0.2	0.1
Lebanon	38.5	-24.8	69	-22.9
Lesotho	-10	11.9	2	-5.8
Liberia	-399.6	-398.3	-342.4	-345.9
Mauritania	7.5	4.6	-4.5	-16.7
Nicaragua	7	3.4	6	15.8
Panama	1085.5	1555.5	1675.6	2302.8

TABLE IX-B**NET CAPITAL FLOWS, PRIVATE SECTOR (\$US Millions)**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Papua New Guinea	128.2	74	-22.5	-31.9
Sierra Leone	12.8	-12.4	-3.1	-3.7
Singapore	1227.2	-211.4	79.2	946.9
Somalia	10.7	20.5	9.1	53.3
Togo	-31.3	-15.7	-26.8	-13.5
Trinidad and Tobago	103.6	-309.1	-67.3	16.9
Uruguay	200.2	-158.5	-2.4	155.2
Yemen, P.D.R.	-4.4	2.3	-13.1	12.8

TABLE IX-B**NET CAPITAL FLOWS, OFFICIAL SOURCES (\$US Millions)**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Benin	79.1	97.6	138.5	136.6
Botswana	166.1	152.7	171.5	211
Burundi	152.2	149.2	192.8	197.6
Chad	114	179.7	165	198
Congo	120.3	110.6	296.7	343.2
Costa Rica	265.6	393.4	290.2	223.4
El Salvador	294.6	377.8	347.7	429.7
Haiti	133.8	150.9	175.2	216.8
Honduras	399.3	343.3	306.7	258.4
Israel	1251.7	1917.2	1882.5	1189.6
Jamaica	285.2	301.7	199.2	240.9
Jordan	711	580.1	612.6	569.5
Laos	34.1	37	48.2	58.9
Lebanon	56.7	83.1	55.6	99.7
Lesotho	106.3	107.5	90.1	108.2
Liberia	156.1	110.8	85.6	71.5
Mauritania	179.2	230.7	212.2	200.1
Nicaragua	153.7	113.1	165.8	161.4
Panama	145.4	113.1	115.2	11.8

TABLE IX-B**NET CAPITAL FLOWS, OFFICIAL SOURCES (\$US Millions)**

	1984	1985	1986	1987
Papua New Guinea	392.8	257.8	224.5	336.9
Sierra Leone	60.2	69.6	90	97.4
Singapore	86.9	-55.9	-188.7	-220.1
Somalia	350.9	349.5	591.8	551.5
Togo	148.2	113.9	160.4	115.4
Trinidad and Tobago	42.7	-8.7	76.7	23.8
Uruguay	72.8	34.6	65.1	97.2
Yemen, P.D.R.	103.1	119.2	67.8	85.5

TABLE X-A
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID TO MICRO-STATES

1984		1985		1986		1987	
	%		%		%		%
ANTIGUA and BARBUDA							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.K.	121.3 *	Canada	63.0	Canada	38.0	Italy	29.7
2. Canada	-16.4	U.K.	31.9	Japan	28.2	U.S.A.	19.8
3. Neth.	-6.6	U.S.A.	4.6	U.K.	24.8	Japan	16.8
BAHAMAS							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.S.A.	156.0 *	U.S.A.	42.2	Japan	94.4	Japan	129.3
2. Japan	-55.2	Japan	22.0	Sweden	9.8	U.S.A.	-19.4 *
3. France	31.8 *	Sweden	17.7	Belgium	9.2	Sweden	-9.3 *
BAHRAIN							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. Arab+	75.1	Arab+	40.2	Arab+	116.8	France	-308.8
2. Japan	39.7	France	37.0	U.K.	-24.9 *	Belgium	212.0 *
3. Italy	-16.6 *	Japan	30.6	Japan	-23.6 *	Japan	179.7 *
BARBADOS							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.K.	112.6 *	Japan	120.1	Japan	88.9	U.S.A.	108.1 *
2. Canada	-18.2	Switz.	-69.3 *	Sweden	17.6	Sweden	89.2 *
3. Sweden	17.0 *	U.K.	22.8	U.K.	-11.4 *	Canada	-81.1
BELIZE							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. Sweden	39.1	U.S.A.	55.1	U.S.A.	77.8	U.S.A.	64.4
2. U.K.	37.4	U.K.	21.2	Canada	32.9	Canada	25.7
3. U.S.A.	21.7	Belgium	11.4	Belgium	-21.0 *	U.K.	8.9
		Canada	11.4				
CAPE VERDE							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. Italy	16.0	Italy	17.7	Italy	46.8	F.R.G.	21.1
2. Sweden	14.8	Sweden	15.6	U.S.A.	9.9	Italy	13.7
3. Neth.	12.8	F.R.G.	14.7	F.R.G.	7.5	Neth.	13.1
		France	14.7				

TABLE X-A

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID TO MICRO-STATES

1984		1985		1986		1987	
	%		%		%		%
COMOROS							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. France	57.5	France	62.8	France	73.5	France	70.4
2. Arab+	19.9	Arab+	19.3	Arab+	10.3	Japan	10.2
3. Japan	9.7	Japan	5.4	Belgium	8.1	F.R.G.	9.3
CYPRUS							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. F.R.G.	928.3	F.R.G.	41.1	France	41.6	France	196.6 *
2. France	-578.3 *	France	34.8	U.K.	33.0	U.S.A.	-30.3
3. U.K.	-191.3 *	U.S.A.	17.4	U.S.A.	21.4	U.K.	19.5 *
DJIBOUTI							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. France	51.1	France	57.1	Arab+	50.3	France	65.8
2. Arab+	30.3	U.K.	15.4	Italy	26.8	Arab+	15.8
3. U.K.	8.3	Arab+	15.3	France	7.0	Italy	9.4
				U.S.A.	7.0		
DOMINICA							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.K.	59.1	U.K.	42.9	U.K.	68.4	Canada	56.5
2. Canada	26.8	Switz.	31.2	France	21.5	U.K.	18.8
3. Japan	11.1	Canada	22.0	Canada	6.5	France	15.9
EQUATORIAL GUINEA							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. France	75.0	France	55.8	Italy	58.7	France	55.8
2. F.R.G.	14.4	F.R.G.	15.6	France	31.3	Italy	14.0
3. U.S.A.	9.6	Italy	15.6	Belgium	-8.0	Neth.	8.1
FIJI							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.K.	30.4	Austrl.	57.9	Austrl.	33.1	Japan	39.1
2. N.Zeal.	21.5	Japan	21.3	Japan	31.6	Austrl.	34.9
3. Austrl.	12.7	N.Zeal.	15.4	U.K.	20.0	N.Zeal.	22.5

TABLE X-A

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID TO MICRO-STATES

1984		1985		1986		1987	
	%		%		%		%
GABON							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. France	90.2	France	73.2	France	71.1	France	74.3
2. Belgium	63.9	U.K.	15.8	F.R.G.	15.3	F.R.G.	9.8
3. Japan	-58.2	Japan	-14.1	U.K.	10.5	Italy	4.8
GAMBIA							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.S.A.	40.3	U.S.A.	34.1	Italy	28.7	U.K.	20.1
2. F.R.G.	33.1	F.R.G.	17.7	France	19.8	U.S.A.	18.8
3. Japan	13.7	France	12.3	U.K.	15.7	Italy	15.9
GRENADA							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.S.A.	83.0	U.S.A.	81.6	U.S.A.	64.7	Canada	67.8
2. Canada	7.5	Canada	15.0	Canada	24.7	U.S.A.	24.8
3. Belgium	6.3	U.K.	2.7	U.K.	7.1	U.K.	5.8
GUINEA-BISSAU							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. Neth.	26.8	Sweden	29.5	Sweden	25.0	Sweden	27.3
2. Sweden	19.8	France	22.8	Italy	23.6	Italy	22.8
3. France	14.0	Neth.	14.4	Neth.	14.2	Neth.	20.4
GUYANA							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. Japan	-209.1	U.K.	54.2	U.K.	210.9	U.S.A.	54.3
2. U.S.A.	181.8	Japan	50.0	Japan	-56.4	Canada	37.2
3. U.K.	154.5	F.R.G.	-6.9	U.S.A.	-54.5	F.R.G.	4.7
KIRIBATI							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.K.	54.1	U.K.	42.6	U.K.	37.4	Japan	44.8
2. Japan	26.5	Japan	25.9	Japan	35.0	U.K.	24.8
3. Austrl.	19.4	Austrl.	24.1	Austrl.	19.5	Austrl.	17.2

1984	%	1985	%	1986	%	1987	%
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MAURITIUS

1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. France	71.6	U.K.	-647.1 *	France	63.4	U.K.	30.1
2. Arab+	10.5	France	317.6	Japan	25.1	France	28.9
3. Japan	7.8	U.S.A.	294.1	U.K.	-10.5 *	Japan	13.0

NAURU

1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. Japan	300.0 *	Japan	134.8	Japan	98.5	Japan	462.5
2. F.R.G.	-200.0	F.R.G.	-34.8 *	F.R.G.	1.3	F.R.G.	-362.5 *
3. Austrl.	0.0	Austrl.	4.3	Austrl.	0.2	Austrl.	12.5

SEYCHELLES

1984		1985		1986		1987	
1 Belgium	37.3	France	52.7	Belgium	32.9	France	105.9
2 France	19.6	U.S.A.	13.3	France	32.1	U.K.	-44.1 *
3 U.K.	15.1	U.K.	12	U.S.A.	17.1	Japan	9.6

SOLOMON ISLANDS

1984		1985		1986		1987	
1 U.K.	49.0	Austrl.	35.2	Austrl.	49.8	Austrl.	50.3
2 Austrl.	28.5	U.K.	32.1	U.K.	24.7	U.K.	21.6
3 Japan	12	Belgium	11.3	Belgium	-17.2 *	Japan	14.5

ST. KITTS- NEVIS

1984		1985		1986		1987	
1 Sweden	134.8 *	U.K.	52	U.K.	62.5	U.K.	43.8
2 U.K.	-23.9	Canada	48	Canada	31.3	France	31.5
3 Canada	-8.7	Austrl.	0	Austrl.	0	Canada	23.3

ST. LUCIA

1984		1985		1986		1987	
1 U.K.	88.2	Canada	39.1	Canada	50	U.K.	59.8
2 Canada	5.9	France	34.8	U.K.	38.9	Canada	37.3
3 Austrl.	0	U.K.	21.7	Austrl.	5.6	Japan	2
				F.R.G.	5.6		
				France	5.6		

ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES

1984		1985		1986		1987	
1 U.K.	50	U.K.	40.5	Canada	60.7	U.S.A.	38.5
2 Canada	33.3	F.R.G.	37.8	U.S.A.	23.8	U.K.	28.8
3 Austrl.	8.3	Canada	21.6	U.K.	11.9	Canada	28.9
F.R.G.	8.3						

SURINAME

1984		1985		1986		1987	
1 Japan	76.5 *	Arab+	43.9	Neth.	88.3	Neth.	101.6 *
2 Neth.	64.7 *	Italy	28.1	Arab+	9.8	Italy	23.4 *
3 Belgium	-47.1	France	14	Belgium	2.3	Arab+	-20.8

TABLE X-A

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID TO MICRO-STATES

1984		1985		1986		1987	
	%		%		%		%
SWAZILAND							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1	U.K. 61.1	U.K. 35	U.S.A. 32	U.S.A. 48.4			
2	U.S.A. 19.2	U.S.A. 28.6	U.K. 15.2	Denmark 26.6			
3	Sweden 9.3	Canada 13.6	F.R.G. 10	F.R.G. 15.3			
			Sweden 10				
TONGA							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1	Austrl. 33.9	Austrl. 46.2	Austrl. 37.9	France 45.9			
2	Japan 26.6	N.Zeal. 25.5	Japan 31	Austrl. 23.6			
3	N.Zeal. 24.2	Japan 12.3	N.Zeal. 18.1	Japan 16.7			
TUVALU							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1	U.K. 67.3	U.K. 53.1	U.K. 42.1	U.K. 26.1			
2	Austrl. 21.2	Austrl. 28.1	N.Zeal. 31.6	N.Zeal. 25.7			
3	N.Zeal. 9.6	N.Zeal. 12.5	Austrl. 23.7	Austrl. 21.5			
VANUATU							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1	France 59.8	France 57.9	France 131.9	Austrl. 54.5			
2	U.K. 24.7	U.K. 22.5	U.K. -24.1	U.K. 53.3			
3	Austrl. 12.1	Austrl. 11.8	Austrl. -16.6	France -28.1			
WESTERN SAMOA							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1	U.K. -148.8	Austrl. 37.3	Japan 52	Japan 32.4			
2	N.Zeal. 88.4	N.Zeal. 26.8	Austrl. 19.2	Austrl. 28.2			
3	Austrl. 65.1	Japan 15.5	N.Zeal. 19.2	N.Zeal. 18.3			

* Indicates a negative net receipt; that is, a net capital outflow from the microstate to the source of bilateral aid, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new grants or loans received.

+ Arab countries in aggregate

Data unavailable for BRUNEI, MALDIVES MALTA, SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE

Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TABLE X-B
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID TO SMALL STATES

1984		1985		1986		1987	
	%		%		%		%
BENIN							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. Belgium	32.2	F.R.G.	32.8	F.R.G.	81.2	F.R.G.	110.9
2. Norway	30.5	Belgium	24.3	France	72.1	Norway	-59.3 *
3. F.R.G.	16.1	Neth.	12.9	Norway	-44.5 *	U.K.	-43.3 *
BOTSWANA							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.K.	30.1	F.R.G.	28.0	F.R.G.	34.3	F.R.G.	26.6
2. F.R.G.	30.0	U.K.	20.8	Canada	18.7	U.S.A.	14.3
3. U.S.A.	9.9	Norway	13.1	Sweden	17.3	Denmark	12.6
BURUNDI							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. France	23.8	France	21.0	Belgium	21.0	Belgium	19.3
2. Belgium	20.9	Belgium	20.0	F.R.G.	15.4	France	18.9
3. F.R.G.	15.9	Italy	18.1	France	13.5	F.R.G.	17.1
CHAD							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. France	60.0	France	35.4	France	46.7	France	61.9
2. U.S.A.	19.7	Italy	26.5	Italy	24.3	U.S.A.	13.4
3. Italy	8.3	U.S.A.	20.1	U.S.A.	10.0	Neth.	7.3
CONGO							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. France	77.6	France	-184.6 *	France	68.5	France	84.5
2. Belgium	13.3	U.K.	144.1	F.R.G.	17.1	Italy	9.6
3. Arab+	11.9	Canada	60.8	U.K.	7.7	F.R.G.	-5.0 *
COSTA RICA							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.S.A.	79.1	U.S.A.	77.4	U.S.A.	59.3	U.S.A.	69.4
2. Japan	15.0	U.K.	6.1	France	11.3	Neth.	7.8
3. Canada	2.4	Neth.	4.6	Japan	8.4	Canada	6.7

TABLE X-B

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID TO SMALL STATES

1984		1985		1986		1987	
	%		%		%		%
EL SALVADOR							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.S.A.	97.5	U.S.A.	94.4	U.S.A.	90.8	U.S.A.	89.7
2. Neth.	1.7	Italy	3.0	F.R.G.	7.6	Italy	3.3
3. Canada	0.9	F.R.G.	2.6	France	-4.9 *	F.R.G.	2.5
HAITI							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.S.A.	57.6	U.S.A.	57.0	U.S.A.	67.6	U.S.A.	64.3
2. F.R.G.	11.2	France	21.3	France	13.8	France	13.5
3. Canada	11.2	F.R.G.	8.1	F.R.G.	8.1	F.R.G.	7.5
HONDURAS							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.S.A.	79.5	U.S.A.	67.4	U.S.A.	78.1	U.S.A.	72.2
2. Neth.	5.0	Italy	8.0	Japan	12.3	Japan	12.4
3. Canada	4.6	Switz.	5.5	F.R.G.	5.4	F.R.G.	5.9
ISRAEL							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.S.A.	93.1	U.S.A.	96.4	U.S.A.	97.1	U.S.A.	88.5
2. F.R.G.	4.6	F.R.G.	2.8	F.R.G.	2.7	F.R.G.	6.9
3. Belgium	1.7	Switz.	1.0	Canada	0.8	Belgium	3.1
JAMAICA							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. U.S.A.	68.3	U.S.A.	51.4	Canada	77.8	U.S.A.	60.6
2. Italy	6.9	Japan	22.6	Japan	47.0	Canada	17.2
3. Canada	6.2	Canada	14.8	Arab+	-25.5 *	F.R.G.	9.6
JORDAN							
1984		1985		1986		1987	
1. Arab+	77.5	Arab+	180.6	Arab+	80.4	Arab+	49.9
2. Japan	14.2	U.K.	-95.1 *	France	6.8	France	20.9
3. U.K.	7.6	Italy	10.3	Japan	5.2	F.R.G.	12.6

TABLE X-B

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID TO SMALL STATES

1984		1985		1986		1987	
	%		%		%		%
LAOS							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1.	Sweden 45.9	Switz.	71.1	Sweden	46.9	Japan	45.9
2.	Japan 18.9	Sweden	12.2	Japan	26.8	Sweden	41.0
3.	Austrl. 18.9	Japan	10.6	Austrl.	18.0	Austrl.	13.8
LEBANON							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1.	France 78.5	Italy	-76.3 *	U.S.A.	61.2	U.S.A.	31.1
2.	Italy 5.8	U.S.A.	66.6	France	37.6	Arab+	27.1
3.	F.R.G. 4.5	France	40.5	Norway	-14.6	Italy	14.9
LESOTHO							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1.	U.S.A. 53.3	U.S.A.	27.5	U.S.A.	31.5	U.S.A.	34.4
2.	F.R.G. 19.3	U.K.	22.0	F.R.G.	24.2	F.R.G.	18.6
3.	U.K. -6.7	Sweden	14.3	U.K.	12.4	Sweden	14.6
LIBERIA							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1.	Japan 59.5 *	Japan	71.6 *	Belgium	32.9 *	Japan	88.7 *
2.	France 26.5 *	U.S.A.	12.3 *	France	25.9 *	Belgium	32.8 *
3.	U.K. 21.8 *	Belgium	-12.0	U.S.A.	24.9 *	France	-25.3
		U.K.	12 *				
MAURITANIA							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1.	Arab+ 41.8	Arab+	37.9	Arab+	35.8	France	40.4
2.	France 18.8	France	23.6	France	19.4	Italy	11.4
3.	U.S.A. 17.5	U.S.A.	20.3	Italy	12.6	Denmark	11.2
NICARAGUA							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1.	Neth. 26.2	Sweden	22.9	France	20.6	Neth.	25.3
2.	Sweden 16.9	Neth.	22.4	Neth.	17.3	Sweden	18.8
3.	Arab+ 15.6	Italy	12.4	Italy	12.8	France	14.9

1984		1985		1986		1987	
	%		%		%		%
PARAGUAY							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1. France	43.5	France	65.0	Japan	43.0	F.R.G.	80.7
2. Japan	40.2	U.K.	-42.3 *	France	35.9	Japan	38.6
3. Neth.	6.2	Japan	41.6	U.K.	17.5	France	-14.2 *
PANAMA							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1. Japan	128.3	Japan	112.0	Japan	92.6	Japan	69.9
2. U.S.A.	-27.8 *	U.S.A.	-7.7 *	F.R.G.	8.4	U.S.A.	20.9
3. Belgium,	1.9	Belgium	-3.4 *	U.K.	-1.1 *	Neth.	5.5
PAPUA NEW GUINEA							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1. Austrl.	82.1	Austrl.	84.7	Austrl.	158.7	Austrl.	104.9
2. U.K.	10.2	Japan	8.9	U.K.	-61.0 *	U.K.	-25.8 *
3. F.R.G.	8.1	F.R.G.	4.3	Canada	-7.2 *	Japan	8.8
SIERRA LEONE							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1. F.R.G.	31.0	U.S.A.	44.8	U.S.A.	20.1	F.R.G.	28.2
2. Arab+	26.2	F.R.G.	38.1	Italy	18.4	U.S.A.	15.1
3. U.S.A.	17.3	Japan	9.9	F.R.G.	13.7	Italy	12.9
SINGAPORE							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1. U.S.A.	36.2	U.S.A.	213.4 *	U.S.A.	694.7 *	Japan	52.8
2. U.K.	20.0	Japan	-61.4	F.R.G.	-439.3	U.S.A.	42.2
3. Japan	18.6	Belgium	-22.4	Japan	-202.8	Austrl.	-27.9 *
SOMALIA							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1. Italy	4.6	U.S.A.	25.5	Italy	56.7	Italy	44.9
2. U.S.A.	24.2	Italy	23.7	U.S.A.	18.7	F.R.G.	26.5
3. F.R.G.	17.0	F.R.G.	19.6	F.R.G.	10.6	U.S.A.	12.0
TOGO							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1. France	58.7	F.R.G.	24.5	Japan	31.3	F.R.G.	35.0
2. F.R.G.	29.5	Arab+	19.1	F.R.G.	22.3	France	24.1
3. U.S.A.	11.1	Canada	18.0	U.S.A.	16.3	U.S.A.	17.0

TABLE X-B

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID TO SMALL STATES

1984		1985		1986		1987	
	%		%		%		%
TRINIDAD and TOBAGO							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1.	Japan 80.3	U.S.A.	120.4 *	U.S.A.	98.4 *	U.S.A.	6090.9 *
2.	Canada 15.0	Japan	-20.4	F.R.G.	-29.7	Japan	-5918.2 *
3.	U.S.A. 11.6	U.K.	7.3	Japan	19.8	F.R.G.	-3400.0
URUGUAY							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1.	U.S.A. 89.9	U.S.A.	102.8 *	F.R.G.	111.9	U.S.A.	56.0
2.	Belgium 7.0	F.R.G.	-4.0	Canada	-68.4 *	Neth.	25.9
3.	Italy 5.2	Neth.	-2.7	Sweden	35.6	France	11.0
		Sweden	-2.7				
YEMEN, P.D.R.							
	1984		1985		1986		1987
1.	Arab+ 78.5	Arab+	-76.3 *	Arab+	61.2	Italy	31.3
2.	France 5.8	France	66.5	Japan	37.6	Arab+	27.1
3.	Japan 4.5	Denmark	40.5	Italy	-14.6	Denmark	14.9

* Indicates a negative net receipt; that is, a net capital outflow from the microstate to the source of bilateral aid, indicating that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new grants or loans received.

+ Arab countries in aggregate

APPENDIX III

TABLE I**MICRO-STATE GDP, RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS**

		1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
ANDORRA	a) GDP at current prices	202	212	317	408	498	548	712	766	836
	b) per capita	4695	4943	6895	8870	10595	11657	15145	16289	17781
	c) GDP at constant prices	487	519	557	596	656	685	712	732	738
	d) growth rates	10	6.5	7.3	7.1	10	4.5	3.9	2.9	0.8
ANTIGUA	a) GDP at current prices	173	200	238	277	341	370	412	423	439
	b) per capita	2754	3179	3715	4326	5328	5685	6333	6404	6646
	c) GDP at constant prices	274	295	320	348	374	398	412	429	436
	d) growth rates	7.5	7.7	8.4	8.7	7.6	6.3	3.5	4.3	1.7
BAHAMAS	a) GDP at current prices	1824	2110	2370	2625	2913	3006	3134	3090	3059
	b) per capita	7967	9057	9956	10848	11841	11976	12290	11885	11587
	c) GDP at constant prices	2329	2644	2740	2866	2932	2990	3134	3034	3064
	d) growth rates	2.9	13.5	3.6	4.6	2.3	2	4.8	-3.2	1
BAHRAIN	a) GDP at current prices	3906	3705	3187	3170	3359	3584	3903	4250	4364
	b) per capita	9457	8635	7161	6891	7086	7344	7759	8204	8188
	c) GDP at constant prices	3564	3492	3548	3504	3762	3856	3903	4075	4156
	d) growth rates	4.9	-2	1.6	-1.2	7.3	2.5	1.2	4.4	2
BARBADOS	a) GDP at current prices	1145	1198	1316	1449	1541	1698	1711	1687	1574
	b) per capita	4544	4737	5180	5704	6044	6632	6656	6539	6078
	c) GDP at constant prices	1411	1420	1566	1672	1731	1790	1711	1662	1596
	d) growth rates	2.4	0.7	10.3	6.8	3.5	3.4	-4.4	-2.8	-4

TABLE I

MICRO-STATE GDP, RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS

a GDP at current prices
 b per capita
 c GDP at constant prices
 d growth rates

		1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
BELIZE	a)	211	209	228	277	315	363	396	430	468
	b)	1302	1260	1333	1580	1749	1962	2098	2219	2364
	c)	252	254	266	297	323	363	396	413	443
	d)	2.0	1	4.6	11.6	9	12.2	9.3	4.2	7.2
BRUNEI	a)	3769	3482	2314	2753	2689	2996	3590	3816	3919
	b)	17132	15407	9972	11518	10977	11936	13969	14456	14516
	c)	3574	3521	3425	3494	3532	3494	3590	3721	3683
	d)	-0.1	-1.5	-2.7	2	1.1	-1.1	2.7	3.6	-1
CAPE VERDE	a)	136	143	194	248	286	282	328	341	385
	b)	431	441	586	734	828	798	905	913	1002
	c)	234	254	261	280	302	317	328	346	363
	d)	3.7	8.5	2.7	7.6	7.6	4.9	3.7	5.3	5.1
COMOROS	a)	107	114	162	196	207	199	244	245	273
	b)	245	252	345	403	411	379	449	435	466
	c)	225	231	235	239	246	242	244	248	252
	d)	4.2	2.7	2.1	1.6	2.7	-1.6	0.8	1.8	1.4
CYPRUS	a)	2279	2430	3094	3701	4276	4568	5511	5743	6639
	b)	3463	3653	4598	5442	6215	6573	7850	8101	9273
	c)	3787	3965	4116	4404	4781	5176	5511	5567	6042
	d)	8.8	4.7	3.8	7	8.5	8.3	6.5	1	8.5

TABLE I

MICRO-STATE GDP, RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS

a GDP at current prices
 b per capita
 c GDP at constant prices
 d growth rates

		1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
DJIBOUTI	a)	401	417	431	460	497	509	552	554	578
	b)	1096	1096	1097	1136	1194	1192	1255	1222	1238
	c)	450	457	463	493	523	531	552	546	563
	d)	-0.6	1.6	1.2	6.5	6.1	1.4	4	-1.1	3
DOMINICA	a)	90	99	112	126	146	157	167	177	187
	b)	1214	1350	1535	1721	1995	2174	2323	2463	2594
	c)	126	127	136	147	160	159	167	170	175
	d)	5.5	1.3	7.1	7.6	8.7	-0.4	5.3	1.8	2.7
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	a)	68	85	107	131	144	132	163	165	185
	b)	230	272	332	393	423	384	463	457	507
	c)	137	147	142	152	160	156	163	168	178
	d)	2.3	7.3	-3.8	7.5	5.3	-2.8	4.4	3.4	2.9
FIJI	a)	1178	1141	1290	1178	1110	1255	1228	1311	1407
	b)	1709	1632	1825	1625	1548	1740	1691	1791	1904
	c)	1056	1014	1083	1013	1031	1168	1228	1235	1280
	d)	8.3	-3.9	6.8	-6.5	1.8	13.2	5.1	0.6	3.6
GABON	a)	3561	3663	3468	3396	3403	3662	4431	4438	4864
	b)	3748	3719	3404	3225	3131	3263	3823	3708	3932
	c)	6018	6078	5166	4346	4200	4305	4431	4515	4607
	d)	2.0	1	-15	-15.9	-3.4	2.5	2.9	1.9	2

TABLE I**MICRO-STATE GDP, RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS**

a	GDP at current prices
b	per capita
c	GDP at constant prices
d	growth rates

		1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
GAMBIA	a)	172	201	156	210	244	256	298	306	339
	b)	238	270	204	266	300	306	346	346	374
	c)	245	249	259	267	271	283	298	304	318
	d)	-8.2	1.6	4.1	2.8	1.7	4.3	5.2	2.3	4.5
GRENADA	a)	102	115	130	150	166	182	200	210	217
	b)	1131	1281	1442	1671	1847	2000	2202	2309	2380
	c)	140	152	158	166	177	188	200	206	208
	d)	4.7	8.2	3.9	5.1	6.8	6.2	6.7	3	0.6
GUINEA-BISSAU	a)	264	248	230	165	155	198	235	251	134
	b)	307	284	259	182	167	210	243	255	133
	c)	191	184	193	203	217	227	235	242	249
	d)	7.0	-3.5	4.6	5.6	6.9	4.5	3.3	3	2.9
GUYANA	a)	444	462	520	349	414	256	256	219	239
	b)	564	585	656	441	522	323	322	274	296
	c)	300	303	305	306	296	285	256	272	293
	d)	2.2	1	0.4	0.3	-3.3	-3.5	-10.1	6	7.7
ICELAND	a)	2762	2871	3843	5336	5891	5335	6024	6490	6613
	b)	11558	11914	15750	21604	23657	21251	23622	25252	25436
	c)	5000	5182	5519	6003	5982	5993	6024	6085	5854
	d)	4.1	3.6	6.5	8.8	-0.3	0.2	0.5	1	-3.8

TABLE I

MICRO-STATE GDP, RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS

a GDP at current prices
 b per capita
 c GDP at constant prices
 d growth rates

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
KIRIBATI	a) 25	20	20	22	30	33	37	39	39
	b) 399	306	315	328	440	478	514	544	528
	c) 33	30	29	29	35	37	37	37	38
	d) 2.2	-9.3	-0.6	-1.2	21	4.1	-0.3	1.9	2.5
LIECHTENSTEIN	a) 509	529	807	1049	1162	1124	1432	1462	1529
	b) 18862	18862	19956	38853	41491	40149	51126	52224	54607
	c) 1041	1123	1203	1262	1347	1399	1432	1431	1430
	d) 3.8	7.9	7.2	4.9	6.8	3.9	2.3	0	-0.1
LUXEMBOURG	a) 3352	3457	4999	6095	6805	7178	8989	9336	11848
	b) 9157	9419	13584	16517	18392	19347	24100	24896	31343
	c) 6961	7164	7506	7727	8168	8712	8989	9265	9438
	d) 6.2	2.9	4.8	2.9	5.7	6.7	3.2	3.1	1.9
MALDIVES	a) 77	86	98	94	116	120	143	156	178
	b) 433	472	516	482	578	580	673	708	782
	c) 77	88	95	104	113	123	143	154	164
	d) 13.0	13.8	8.6	8.9	8.7	9.3	16.2	7.6	6.3
MALTA	a) 1001	1018	1304	1592	1835	1924	2316	2467	2786
	b) 2936	2959	3759	4560	5242	5466	6544	6929	7536
	c) 1672	1715	1782	1855	2011	2176	2316	2446	2553
	d) 0.9	2.6	3.9	4.1	8.4	8.2	6.5	5.6	4.4

TABLE I

MICRO-STATE GDP, RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS

a GDP at current prices
 b per capita
 c GDP at constant prices
 d growth rates

		1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
MARSHALL ISLANDS	a)	44	43	55	62	69	71	77	72	79
	b)	1224	1128	1402	1501	1643	1615	1664	1528	1618
	c)	48	47	57	65	71	72	77	69	69
	d)	2.7	-2.5	22.4	13.2	9.3	0.8	7	-9.8	0.1
MAURITIUS	a)	1041	1076	1463	1831	2069	2116	2556	2731	3036
	b)	1030	1055	1419	1757	1965	1988	2378	2515	2765
	c)	1654	1767	1940	2137	2281	2385	2556	2670	2825
	d)	4.8	6.9	9.7	10.2	6.8	4.6	7.2	4.5	7.8
MICRONESIA	a)	119	109	119	144	184	215	242	269	273
	b)	1414	1249	1327	1545	1920	2169	2351	2516	2484
	c)	144	156	167	182	199	223	242	251	254
	d)	2.1	8.3	6.7	9	9.1	12.1	8.8	3.7	1
MONACO	a)	246	256	356	430	463	462	569	588	646
	b)	9094	9482	13193	15912	17154	17107	21064	20992	23082
	c)	493	499	509	517	538	557	569	591	596
	d)	0.8	1.4	2	1.7	3.9	3.7	2	4	0.8
QATAR	a)	6870	6153	5053	5446	6038	6488	7360	6884	7473
	b)	20570	17188	13403	13894	14946	15634	17238	15644	16497
	c)	24200	17188	13403	13894	14946	15634	17238	15644	16497
	d)	2.8	-2.2	-3.7	0.1	4.7	5.3	2.7	-0.8	4

TABLE I

MICRO-STATE GDP, RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS

a GDP at current prices
 b per capita
 c GDP at constant prices
 d growth rates

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
ST. KITTS	a) 62	67	83	93	108	117	126	121	131
	b) 1440	1552	1938	2167	2578	2797	2999	2880	3114
	c) 2112	2205	2304	2307	2308	2383	2335	2360	2394
	d) 9.0	5.6	6.2	7.4	7	5.1	3	3.7	3.6
ST. LUCIA	a) 151	167	183	191	217	241	257	275	302
	b) 1239	1343	1450	1491	1682	1842	1932	2037	2206
	c) 184	195	206	211	236	247	257	261	278
	d) 5.0	6	5.8	2.1	12.1	4.6	3.9	1.6	6.6
ST. VINCENT	a) 103	113	127	142	161	174	194	178	193
	b) 1017	1106	1236	1366	1530	1640	1817	1648	1771
	c) 131	137	147	156	170	182	194	203	213
	d) 5.7	4.4	7.3	6.3	8.7	7	7	4.6	4.7
SAN MARINO	a) 159	163	242	304	336	347	435	457	485
	b) 7245	7429	10542	13229	14592	15096	18916	19857	21099
	c) 337	346	377	391	413	425	435	442	476
	d) 4.3	2.9	8.9	3.7	5.7	2.9	2.3	1.6	7.6
SÃO TOMÉ and PRÍNCIPE	a) 36	37	64	55	49	46	54	42	27
	b) 354	349	595	499	433	397	454	349	218
	c) 51	51	51	50	51	52	54	56	57
	d) -4.1	-1.6	1	-1.5	2	1.5	3.8	3.5	2

TABLE I

MICRO-STATE GDP, RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS

a GDP at current prices
 b per capita
 c GDP at constant prices
 d growth rates

		1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
SEYCHELLES	a)	151	169	209	249	284	308	373	373	409
	b)	2293	2521	3071	3613	4113	4405	5254	5260	5684
	c)	256	283	286	299	315	347	373	381	395
	d)	8.0	10.3	1.2	4.4	5.3	10.3	7.5	2.2	3.5
SOLOMON ISLANDS	a)	174	160	145	146	176	179	177	195	207
	b)	667	593	520	506	589	576	554	589	606
	c)	141	145	144	148	155	166	177	184	200
	d)	7.2	2.8	-0.7	2.3	5.4	6.9	6.7	4	8.2
SURINAME	a)	968	978	998	1098	1301	1520	1728	2077	2807
	b)	2582	2555	2560	2578	3204	3680	4096	4830	6408
	c)	1595	1627	1639	1537	1658	1728	1728	1782	1863
	d)	-1.9	2	0.8	-6.2	7.8	4.2	0	3.1	4.5
SWAZILAND	a)	507	367	463	559	576	672	751	821	955
	b)	793	558	684	804	807	918	1000	1065	1205
	c)	558	580	632	616	656	699	751	770	792
	d)	8.0	3.9	9	-2.5	6.6	6.5	7.5	2.5	2.8
TONGA	a)	65	56	67	74	88	97	101	122	124
	b)	696	594	711	783	924	1013	1053	1262	1280
	c)	92	97	95	99	102	103	101	106	108
	d)	2.5	5.4	-2.3	4.3	2.5	1.6	-2	5.3	1.9

TABLE I

MICRO-STATE GDP, RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS

a	GDP at current prices
b	per capita
c	GDP at constant prices
d	growth rates

		1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
TUVALU	a)	5	5	5	6	8	8	8	9	9
	b)	550	559	543	647	702	690	673	751	713
	c)	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	8	9
	d)	7.3	-2	-0.6	10	10.4	-4.3	2.5	4.8	1
VANUATU	a)	124	118	115	122	144	141	154	179	180
	b)	964	889	844	878	1005	966	1024	1171	1149
	c)	140	141	138	139	140	146	154	160	160
	d)	6.9	1.1	-2	0.4	0.6	4.5	5.2	4.1	0
WESTERN SAMOA	a)	99	85	90	100	119	109	113	120	123
	b)	628	543	573	634	755	693	713	759	777
	c)	108	115	115	117	116	118	113	112	106
	d)	1.3	6	0.6	1	-0.2	1.3	-4.5	-0.5	-5

CONCLUSION

The proliferation of many small states, especially between the 1960's and the 1990's, appeared at odds with the aspirations of liberal internationalists in the 1940's for greater integration at both the regional and international levels. Perhaps what may not have been appreciated then is the symbiotic relationship between centripetal and centrifugal forces in the international system. The establishment of regional communities with ever expanding areas of concern, the elaboration of international regimes, the post-war extension of international functionalism across scores of intergovernmental organisations and agencies have all served to bolster and reinforce the sovereignty of the nation-state, and most dramatically for those smallest states whose separate independence would have seemed impossible only forty years ago. The forces of integration and fragmentation are not in contention as much as they are mutually reinforcing.

A recognition of this complementarity has implications for the relevance of the viability question which attended the initial decolonisation of so many very small dependencies. In the introduction we noted the persistence of the notion of viability both in the process of decolonisation itself and in the early academic literature of micro-states. Though it was basically a metropolitan and tendentious concept, it shaped initial discussion about the future of very small states even among timid elites within the small territories themselves. If anything is now clear, it is that micro-states have survived, some of them have even thrived, in an international climate which has offered as many

opportunities as it has posed constraints. Initial scepticism about the prospects for micro-states has been largely diminished by their experience in an increasingly supportive world.

This is not to suggest, of course, that micro-states do not continue to face some severe problems, sometimes chronic, that are directly related to their very small size and the concomitant disabilities of insularity, remoteness, and a paucity of resources. The vulnerabilities which are so acutely experienced in micro-states have understandably dominated the literature, particularly since the Grenada Crisis which dramatically demonstrated the fragility of their security. And for many micro-states these vulnerabilities remain formidable challenges to the achievement of genuine self-reliance and a secure path of economic development.

However, their survival as equal and recognised members of the international system is not in question. If we are to understand viability as survivability then these states are survivors and are indeed viable. The quality of their separate statehood may still be an issue of concern. But their survival and their acceptance generally are not. Micro-states are no longer viewed as curiosities or anomalies. The ever lowering threshold of the decolonisation process set the stage for even the smallest European micro-states to assume a full role in international diplomacy and organisation.

The separate independence of so many very small communities is, of course, a further demonstration of a global resurgence of localism and particularism manifest in a variety of movements: the revival of national languages and cultures, the pressures for devolution among regions across Europe, the heightened or new political consciousness among aboriginal peoples, the continuing clamour for autonomy in the former Communist

states of Eurasia, and the vitality of secessionist movements, many of them emboldened by the successful independence of micro-states and by a recognition of the regional and international support systems which have reinforced their statehood. Quebec nationalists, for example, find federalist arguments against their independence galling when they consider the sovereignty of so many micro-states in their own hemisphere let alone elsewhere. Micro-statehood then is in part an expression of the politics of identity, an increasingly urgent subject of inquiry across the social sciences.

Full acceptance of micro-states in the international system has done much to settle issues of status and legitimacy which we considered at length in the first section of the study. These were central concerns in much of the literature which focused on the special problems of micro-state security. Clearly, very small size provoked questions of status for micro-states which in many cases frustrated their decolonisation and marred their independence.. In some instances, the status of micro-states or would-be micro-states was controversial because of the belief that very small size was seen to preclude the powers and capabilities for actual independence implicit in the legal principle of sovereignty; the viability argument again. In other cases, very small size was concomitant with a fragmentary territorial identity which weakened the claim for national self-determination through separate statehood. In these situations micro-states and very small dependencies aspiring to statehood were and are likely to be viewed as local communities of a neighbouring state rather than as national societies unto themselves.

Clearly, issues of status and acceptance continue to be principal concerns for micro-states, even those states which do not face major security threats. The government

of Liechtenstein, for example, has identified the assertion of its sovereignty and the acceptance of its statehood as its principal foreign policy objective. It is not surprising that the Principality's delegation to the United Nations gives priority to the Legal Committee. A prevailing international 'climate' of extantism has encouraged a respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, even the smallest. Even in those cases where states have been victims of invasion and gross interference, the offending state tended to defend its action in the context of respect for the legal international personality of the victim state. Iraq's policy in Kuwait was a dramatic exception.

All micro-states give great importance to the consolidation of their separate statehood in the norms and organised relations of the international system. Collective legitimisation and the recognition of formal sovereignty in themselves provide no small measure of security for even the most endangered micro-states. Much better to be Belize than East Timor. Indeed, Belize is a striking example of how status itself can be used to enhance a state's security in the face of a determined irredentist threat. Belize enjoyed some measure of foreign policy authority even prior to independence. This allowed the government of Belize to present its case at the United Nations albeit with the staunch support of Great Britain and the Commonwealth Caribbean states. Belize's security position is all the more reinforced by its full sovereignty and membership in CARICOM, the Commonwealth, the United Nations and now the OAS. Guyana too has successfully used membership in these bodies and especially effectively in the Non-Aligned Movement to build a constituency of support in her territorial dispute with Venezuela. Malta was able to take its conflict with Libya over the continental shelf directly to the U.N. Security

Council. In short, while sovereign status and recognised membership in international councils cannot in the end deter determined adversaries, as the case of Kuwait well illustrates, it is an inhibiting consideration for those governments which may threaten their smaller neighbours.

One of the conventional assumptions about small state security was the notion that small states were better positioned in a bi-polar system where they could play one power bloc off against another. It might be assumed, then, that the end of the Cold War, however welcome in other respects, represents an unfavourable development for small states in that their salience and leverage is weakened. Certainly, in recent years, there has been growing concern in the literature about the marginalisation of small states, particularly in Africa, but also in the Caribbean. This reflects the new urgency given in the post-Cold War period to the security and development interests of the Central and Eastern European states.

At the same time the end of the Cold War has brought favourable changes for many very small states. Fears of a Soviet-American struggle in the Pacific, for instance, with its attendant dangers of militarisation, have been put to rest, though other security concerns remain. Similarly in the Caribbean, while the United States will continue to be vigilant about developments in the region, particularly given their continuing unease with Cuba, many of the concerns surrounding the events in Grenada have receded.

The end of the Cold War rivalry in the Security Council led finally to the acceptance of the former U.S. Trusteeship Territories in the Pacific, even Palau, into the United Nations. Similarly, the admission without controversy of the smallest European

micro-states might not have been possible when Cold War rivalries had tainted so many issues not least of which was the admission of new members. Indeed, the tentative but real consensus between Russia and the United States, evident in the Kuwait crisis, may well serve the interests of very small states in the long run in spite of warnings from a number of Third World states about the dangers of condominium.

In short, the structures and the norms of the international system serve the status reinforcement and security interests of very small states. They do not provide a full security blanket, of course, particularly when the security threats to these states are of an order which are not easily addressed by a resort to intergovernmental organisations. The security threats that many micro-states are more likely to face are those of the drugs trade, money launderers and other criminal elements, resource piracy in their unprotected exclusive economic zones, a flow of refugees and migrants, and coups instigated by foreign based dissidents and supported by mercenaries. But even in these situations there is considerable scope for micro-states to call upon both regional and international sources for support. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, for example, has been instrumental in enforcing better regulation of vessels. With United Nations support, it was able to persuade Japanese compliance with efforts to rid the region of driftnets, the “walls of death.” The Commonwealth Consultative Group recognised the enormous potential for regional co-operation and Commonwealth and United Nations assistance to meet many of these threats: regional co-operation in intelligence gathering, surveillance and even policing; international assistance in terms of training programmes and infrastructural

support. Problems remain, to be sure, but the international system offers a wide range of supports for its smallest members in securing their most vital interests.

While both the structure of the international system and the climate of opinion now provide micro-states with new opportunities for status reinforcement and security enhancement, very small size imposes undeniable limitations on the extent to which micro-states can exploit the diplomatic prerogatives of their status to take advantage of those opportunities. Here, as we discovered in the second section of our study, the contrasts with larger small states are particularly dramatic. Apart from the oil rich economies, micro-states can mount only a modest diplomatic presence typically confined to mentor states, a few secondary capitals which are increasingly within their regions, and the United Nations and the Commonwealth. Similarly, micro-states can not expect to attract the diplomatic attention of other states in their own capitals. Even the major powers are inclined to rely on non-resident accreditation to represent their interests in most micro-states. Non-resident accreditation, the use of roving ambassadors and home-based 'foreign' missions, and particularly consular representation, are the typical mainstays of micro-state diplomacy in sharp contrast to even the poorest of the small states in the next population class.

The international relations of micro-states usually are conducted by a very small group of individuals with generalist rather than specialised skills. A discreet use of expatriates, or more typically, quiet advice from mentors and friends will supplement the diplomatic reach of micro-states. Do such obvious disabilities rule out anything but ceremonial diplomacy for these very small states? Certainly the problems of mounting an

effective diplomatic presence are regularly cited in the now large literature, particularly that of the 1980's, which focused on the vulnerabilities of very small states. Such concerns were and are wholly justified, given that the capacity to engage the international diplomatic community is one of the core privileges of sovereign statehood. Moreover, engaging the international system, even in selected issue areas, imposes enormous demands on the capacities of micro-states, not just in terms of personnel and costs, but perhaps more critically in information and intelligence so vital to an effective promotion of a state's interests in other capitals and in relevant international bodies.

Once again, however, the scope for micro-state diplomacy is more encouraging than initial impressions would suggest. Even with limited resources, the smallest and the poorest micro-states engage in a surprising range of relationships. In the case of the South Pacific and Caribbean states, for instance, regional organisations provide a major forum for both inter-regional diplomacy and contact with the outside world. Students of these micro-state regions, such as Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne, have consistently stressed the need for regional coordination in foreign policy and the presentation of regional solidarity to the outside world on common vital interests. As with regional co-operation in intelligence gathering and policing, regional diplomacy requires extreme sensitivity to national sensibilities and the constant cultivation of consensus. Where those are present, regional solidarity can do much to supplement and reinforce the diplomatic initiatives of individual states. This is particularly the case when a regional organisation can win Commonwealth and/or United Nations support for its initiatives as was the case with the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency.

One of the keys to successful representation is a skilled and well trained foreign service, however small. Many scholars of the Commonwealth Caribbean, for instance, have stressed the importance of the talent available to most governments in the region. It has led to an effective articulation of their interests at all levels. This is also evident in such micro-states as Iceland and Malta which have been particularly well served by gifted individuals. As we have seen, all the European micro-states have enlisted the service of talented and dedicated individuals to represent their interests in an astonishing range of capitals, albeit in honorary positions. As so many studies have stressed, micro-states can make up in a skilful, adroit, even manipulative diplomacy what they lack in terms of numbers and financial resources.

Again the Commonwealth Consultative Group emphasised the importance of training and assistance in this area. Certainly the Commonwealth and UNITAR training programmes for those entering the diplomatic service of micro-states are valuable means of strengthening the representational capacities of these states. So too is the Commonwealth initiative in setting up joint office facilities in New York for a number of its very small member states.

Once again the structure of the international system is very accommodating for micro-states, even in this critical area of sovereign responsibility. The United Nations itself, admittedly an expensive commitment, provides a setting where states can reach virtually the entire international community from one mission. Similarly, the Commonwealth provides an outreach to much of the world for those Pacific island micro-states which have chosen not to undertake the burdens of full United Nations membership.

(Most of even these states, however, belong to a number of U.N. specialised agencies.)

The experience of micro-states suggests that it is possible to have a very long reach with minimal investment.

Nor should it be assumed, as one finds in the writings of Holsti, for example, that micro-states are doomed to be local powers with virtually no impact on the larger global agenda. Iceland's assertion and defence of an extended economic zone to protect the lifeline of her fishery was eventually incorporated into the Law of the Sea. Malta's Ambassador Pardo was an inspiring leader of "the common heritage of man" principles which govern the Law of the Sea. Indeed, Malta's role in this area and in the efforts to establish a Mediterranean Convention powerfully demonstrate the potential for micro-state leadership. Fiji's initiatives have contributed to the concept of the archipelagic state in maritime law. And Vanuatu's leadership was critical in establishing the Association of Small Island States within the United Nations thus raising enormously the visibility of environmental and ecological concerns in very small islands. The recent United Nations conference in Toronto which focused on the dangers of global warming, a conference which drew many heads of government, is a testament to the potential for micro-state diplomatic initiative and achievement.

Though the capacity to represent your state's interests has always been viewed as a benchmark of sovereignty, most attention concerning the future of micro-states has been directed to their international economic relationships. It may seem axiomatic that countries of a few hundred thousand people, or less,

could hardly constitute national economies in any meaningful sense. The structural disabilities of limited resources and diseconomies of scale would seem to suggest inevitable patterns of extreme dependence barely disguised by the cosmetics of constitutional autonomy. Indeed, in most jurisdictions of similar size within existing states, notions of economic and political autonomy would seem sheer madness given the prevailing logic of national integration.

Most of the literature on micro-states in the last two decades has stressed the disturbing structural weaknesses which place these economies at such a disadvantage. When reviewing the indices of vulnerability outlined in the introduction we are constantly struck by the narrow range for manoeuvre and the excessive dependence on external forces well beyond the control of the very small state. Limited to a narrow range of economic activities, and usually to a single export product, they have little impact on their own markets and on their terms of trade. Moreover, they are at a bargaining disadvantage with all the players central to their own economic development: multinational corporations, foreign banks, external sources of official development assistance, and foreign owned shipping lines and import-export firms. Even in those areas promising for diversification, such rentier activities as off-shore finances, philately, remittances from migrants, and tourism, we are constantly reminded that these too are dependent on the regulatory and tax regimes of other countries, a volatile and perhaps declining philatelic market, the immigration controls of neighbouring states and the changing consumption patterns of metropolitan tourist markets. It sometimes reads as an impossible trap.

It is clear, as we indicated in the third section of this study, that micro-states do demonstrate very high levels of economic dependence by almost every measure, though this does not mean that micro-states have bought their sovereignty at the expense of a decline in prosperity or retrenchment on the peripheries of the international economy. Breaking the secure ties of colonial and protective relationships in a fiercely competitive world has not resulted in isolation and decline as so many cautious pre-independence leaders feared. Excluding the oil rich micro-states, which face serious problems of wealth management, and the European micro-states, which have all demonstrated enormous growth and prosperity in the post-war years, most micro-states enjoy relatively high levels of per capita income among developing economies. Indeed this actually works to their disadvantage in official development assistance which is so often predicated on per capita income levels. To be sure, some micro-states, certain South Pacific islands and sub-Saharan African states, are clearly classed among the least developed economies. Independence has brought little relief from chronic poverty. But in some cases at least, the explanations for their lack of progress in meeting development objectives lie as much in a history of colonial neglect, in the corruption and criminality of post-independence regimes and in Marxist-inspired strategies of limited world market engagement as in the disabilities of very small size and remoteness.

Micro-states as a class are not particularly disadvantaged compared to much larger small states in the next population group. Indeed, the differences between the small and the very small are not as pronounced as might be expected. While they share familiar problems of debt management, unfavourable terms of trade, and dependence on external

sources of capital, the combination of very small size and sovereignty has not put them at a marked disadvantage in comparison to larger neighbours or larger states with similar economic characteristics. This evidence in itself justifies our decision to view the economic performance of micro-states not against generalised abstractions rooted as they are in theories of development more relevant to the metropolitan states but rather to a large group of small economies in the next population class. This comparison gives empirical weight to any assessment of the consequences of very small size.

Certainly the resilience of the small economy and the flexibility of factors of production stressed by Keohane, Payne and others are evident in the most encouraging examples of micro-state economies. Malta, for example, has had to self-consciously pursue policies of restructuring which have seen the core areas of the economy shift from the defence sector, to shipbuilding and ship repair and servicing, and lately to an increasingly important high value export oriented manufacturing sector directed to European Union markets. For the past decade Malta has enjoyed the highest growth rates in Europe.

Iceland too is a model example of small economy resilience. The Icelandic workforce is educated, multilingual and versatile. It is not unusual for Icelanders to pursue two or three jobs simultaneously. Icelandic educational policy encourages graduates to study abroad, particularly in Great Britain, Scandinavia and North America. They return with a pool of "global knowledge and skills" which further strengthens the country's ability to adjust to external shocks. Certainly the decline in the North Atlantic cod was an external shock of extraordinary proportions and potentially catastrophic consequence.

That this particular case is so neglected in the literature on micro-state vulnerability only reinforces the importance of a more inclusive basis for comparative analysis.

The dramatic decline in cod stocks did not push Icelandic outports into a cycle of dependence and the national government into a crisis of welfare support. Either large sections of the communities where fishing plants closed moved on to other locations, usually the greater Reykjavik area, or existing plants were converted to alternative species. This is in complete contrast to the plight of the hapless fishing community in Newfoundland which now survives on a massive programme of federal transfers to the island's depressed outports. The post-crisis Icelandic fishery was characterised by even more stringent management of existing stocks, a greater exploitation of other species for discreet markets in the Far East and a renewed emphasis on quality which alone gives Iceland a huge advantage in high value markets. The Newfoundland fishery largely ignored alternative species, and did little to diversify its low value block product. Of course, this once again illustrates the power of jurisdiction. Iceland, as a sovereign state, was in a position to manage its fishery just as its policies on foreign investment insured that the industry in all aspects was domestically owned. Neither of these conditions applied to Newfoundland.

A further comment on the Icelandic gift of resilience is in order. In recent years Icelanders, recognising the absolute limit on the fishery's capacity to sustain ~~expected~~ growth levels, have turned instead to the export of knowledge-based ~~services~~. In this ~~sense~~ they are indeed in the vanguard of post-industrial societies. Now ~~their~~ export of fish and fish products is supplemented by the export of their historical experience and ~~know-~~

how in all areas of the fishery, from nets and trawler designs to processing techniques and computerised weigh scales to allow for on-board freezing and packaging. This export of expertise, encouraged in various programmes by the Icelandic government, is evident in scores of joint ventures from the Falklands to Namibia, from the Baltic states to the eastern most shores of Russia. A similar export of “know how” in other areas central to the Icelandic experience, central heating systems, local government, health care administration, hydroelectric and geothermal systems, is supplementing King Cod to ensure Iceland’s continued competitiveness in the global economy. Icelanders, because of their cosmopolitan education and their language skills, are well placed to exploit the new environment in spite of all the conventional disadvantages: very small size, remote location, a narrow resource base and inhospitable living conditions.

Indeed, even in terms of the last factor, Iceland is pursuing an aggressive campaign to promote tourism, particularly convention tourism “at the top of the world.” It is a skilful manipulation of the international tourist market which sees Reykjavik hotels fully booked in the dark days of Christmas week as visitors come to witness the largest fireworks display in Europe, swing at Europe’s largest disco, go on shopping binges in Reykjavik’s elegant but competitively priced boutiques and hold smart formal dinners on a glacier! Convention tourism has boomed as Iceland has marketed its unique northern landscape as a dramatic alternative to more familiar settings. In short, Iceland is a classic case of small economy flexibility and resilience even against such enormous odds of distance, size and climate.

There is also the invisibility factor which Keohane has stressed. Some years ago Shridath Ramphal worried about the lack of attention given to the world's smallest states. And John Kaminarides wondered if a cluster of states which represented only .03 of the world's population would continue to command any attention in the literature. It is safe to say that in terms of both the international public policy and academic communities the interests of these very small states do command now an attention disproportionate to their constituency in the global society. However, as Keohane and others have noted, there is an advantage to this invisibility or marginalisation. Some micro-states have been able to pursue development strategies which may be annoying in metropolitan states but which are mute enough to protect them from countervailing measures. The Isle of Man is just such an example. Though it is not a sovereign state, the fact that it is not a part of the United Kingdom, that it enjoys its own fiscal regime, independent even of the European Union, has opened areas of strategic development in the services sector. The success of these strategies has reversed the island's declining economy and its outward migration, the export of the brightest of its youth, a seemingly intractable problem until the 1970's. From time to time Members of Parliament at Westminster complain about the Isle of Man and the losses which its haven represents for the Exchequer. There are even ominous soundings of bringing the island into line, although convention would strengthen the Manx government's insistence on the recognition of its constitutional autonomy. In general, however, the Manx strategy has survived because it is too small to provoke a national debate or to win support for countervailing measures. Similarly, Luxembourg has been able thus far, in spite of increasingly hostile noises from Germany, to preserve its own

banking and financial service sector . Because the Grand Duchy is a full member of the Union it is well placed to argue its case: if Luxembourg were to lose its financial services autonomy, then money would simply move to the many alternative European off-shore centres. Luxembourg's loss would not be Europe's or Germany's gain. It would be to the advantage of Liechtenstein, Andorra, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.

Very small jurisdictions, even the state of Delaware, have tapped largely into the hugely expanding international off-shore financial services market. It is not a strategy without considerable risk. As Mark Hampton has pointed out, this is a sector which begs for regulatory vigilance and impeccable legal accountability. Its attractiveness to the most reliable market depends on its credibility in terms of these standards of integrity. The more established off-shore centres have an advantage in the respect of their credentials. It is not a sure ticket to micro-state Nirvana. But given the growth of the sector it continues to be an attractive and credible source of diversification. Consider the case of San Marino. This once again illustrates the importance of jurisdiction and status which alone make the development of this sector possible. A recent IMF report on the San Marino economy was on the whole positive and encouraging. The panel noted the dramatic diversification of the economy especially in terms of high value manufacturing and an intelligent expansion of the services sector. The financial and insurance sectors of the economy have grown impressively, directly as a result of the lack of confidence in the political stability of its all surrounding neighbour, Italy. As the political crisis in Italy deepened there was increasingly a lack of confidence in virtually every dimension of the system and Italians moved their assets to this little republic. For Italians anxious about their financial security

San Marino may seem to be a 'local' solution. But in an historical context and in constitutional arrangements it is very much a place apart. Just as San Marino was an asylum to over 100,000 refugees from Italian fascism, a huge strain on its territory, population and natural resources, so it is now once again a refuge of security for Italians who have lost confidence in their own institutions.

Tourism continues to be an encouraging area of development for most micro-states. The inherent problems of the tourism sector are well known and have been cited already in this study. Even so, tourism is the largest industry in the world and growing at an astonishing rate, particularly in Pacific Rim markets. Micro-states may feel inclined to engage the mainstream tourist market- McWorld as Samuel Barber recently presented it. There are certainly familiar risks of excessive leakage, environmental degradation and cultural compromise in such a strategy of Marriott-like engagement. But because the market is so huge and growing at a breathtaking rate, the opportunities for micro-states to offer a particular and discreet experience, especially at the high end of the market, are more favourable than ever. For every ten metropolitan tourists who want the familiar securities of the Marriott experience, there are one or two who will thrive on something very different. This represents an opportunity for the very small economy. A niche, a true niche, whether in tourism or a variety of other economic opportunities can yield large rewards even with a tiny penetration of the market. The growing number of tourists, especially Germans, for example, who are anxious to see the seabird cliffs in the Faeroe islands, a unique experience to be sure, are small in number but an increasingly important contribution to the growing Faroese tourism market. The expansion of markets,

particularly in the newly industrialised societies, lends diversification potential to the marketing of a country as a tourism destination. Prince Edward Island, for example, is increasingly sensitive to the growing Japanese tourism market, particularly in the shoulder season and for its high expenditure value. And this is not mass tourism of the Marriott variety. Rather it is rooted in the Island's distinct cultural heritage, albeit the life and times of a fictional little red-haired girl.

Some micro-states are better positioned to offer a unique experience than others. Malta is increasingly emphasising its archaeological sites, among the richest in Europe, and its history as a confluence of virtually every major Eurasian civilisation, to attract a more educated and higher value tourism market. The sun and sand destinations may find such alternatives to mainstream tourism more difficult though there is increasing emphasis on cultural heritage and authenticity in most of these societies to tap into a more discriminating market.

Services on all fronts continue to offer enormous potential for diversification in micro-state economies. Commonwealth Caribbean countries, for example, can exploit their literacy and educational levels to promote such sectors as data processing. It may seem a cliché but Internet is levelling the playing field. It is not surprising that so much attention now in the Association of Small Island States is given to strengthening the network facilities and capacities of member states. Their islandness and remoteness are increasingly less important. These states are well placed to take advantage of their neighbourhood. NAFTA may offer a more impressive list of opportunities for very small jurisdictions than it does disincentives and barriers.

In Luxembourg the growth of the financial services sector has largely compensated for a decline in steel production, the country's major industry. Revenues from the financial sector now account for over a third of the government's income. Services in Malta have grown at a rate of more than ten percent a year. Tourism alone has generated growth in a variety of tourism related services such as transport, real estate, and retail trade. Invisible earnings continue to be the principal props of the MIRAB economies of the South Pacific. While it is true that these sources of income are dependent on favourable external conditions, they are, as Geoffrey Bertram argued, the foundations for sustainable development in the islands. In any case, in the emerging global economy it is difficult for most states to be protected from external shocks.

Manufacturing continues to present formidable obstacles for many micro-states, particularly the smallest and most remote island states. For these states the structural impediments to diversification through manufacturing, as identified -for example- in Lino Briguglio's Vulnerability Index, will continue to frustrate efforts to develop a manufacturing sector in all but basic activities such as food processing. In those states where there has been considerable success it is because government has actively targeted the sector with a variety of export oriented programmes. Mauritius is a particularly encouraging example. With the establishment in 1971 of an Export Processing Zone supported by tax holidays, duty free imports and low-interest loans, Mauritius has been able to reduce its excessive dependence on sugar. The sector has witnessed enviable growth rates in employment and direct foreign investment. In 1995 EPZ export earnings accounted for nearly 70 percent of total export revenue, turning Mauritius into something

of an African tiger. While most of this production was in clothing and textiles, the government's efforts to diversify have resulted in the development of such products as watches and precision instruments, precious stones, jewellery and electronics.

The growth of the manufacturing sector in St. Lucia, now about 13 percent of Gross Domestic Product, has also depended on a variety of development incentives similar to those of Mauritius. Infrastructural development such as the new container base and deepwater port in Vieux Fort, has also encouraged direct foreign investment. In Malta the government has been particularly successful in encouraging high value export oriented industries through the Malta Development Corporation which is home to a variety of programmes including not only familiar incentives but rent-subsidized and government built factories and training grants. Especially targeted are high technology electronics and information technology companies. Traditional industries, textiles and footwear, have declined relatively in a climate of liberalisation while the high value sector, particularly electronics, has increased its share of output. Much of the success of Malta is attributable to the policies of liberalisation which have been vigorously pursued over the last decade. The government of Liechtenstein attributes its remarkable success in developing a high value manufacturing sector to the liberal climate in the country, the absence of red tape and its attractive setting for foreign investors. The Isle of Man government too emphasises the quality of life on the island as it woos particular targeted companies from the mainland.

Nonetheless there remain serious problems for most micro-states in their efforts to diversify their economies. Access to metropolitan markets is one serious hurdle. Some

micro-states do benefit from preferential trade through such agreements as Lomé, SPARTECA and the Caribbean Basin Initiative. However, these arrangements tend to favour traditional products, bananas and sugar, for example, over manufactures. They are further compromised by the existence of many loopholes and the strength of domestic interest groups in the metropolitan countries. While smaller countries tend to benefit from higher levels of per capita official development assistance, there are risks of declining aid levels given the current redirection of aid to Central and Eastern Europe, and the inability to access certain kinds of assistance because of per capita income thresholds.

Marine resources offer enormous potential for many very small island states in terms of artisanal fishing, aquaculture and marine agriculture but there remain formidable problems of investment and development exploitation. This is also true of the Exclusive Economic Zones which in terms of raising revenues for the near future are likely to be confined to licensing arrangements and access fees. Nevertheless, as the experience of the Falkland Islands illustrates, this can be a major source of revenue.

The opportunities for regional co-operation as an instrument of diversification are not generally encouraging. The most intractable problem for any regional community is to ensure the visible equitable distribution of resources across its membership. That has been one of the successes of CACM and may suggest narrower parameters for regional co-operation. In both the Caribbean and the South Pacific regional co-operation has not been all that successful in terms of trade. After all these small states are not complementary economies; they are indeed competitors in the larger global economy. Nor does there seem to be any real interest in pursuing a European approach to integration in these regions. At

the same time, there is ample scope for regional co-operation across a variety of critical areas: education, shipping, aviation, health care, research and development and a score of other activities which reduces the burdens for individual states while reinforcing their sovereignty. Perhaps most important, as Persaud noted, is the decentralisation of development banking which has strengthened the role and widened the opportunities for regional development banks.

In general, as we were able to see in the third section of this study, micro-states have fared relatively well in their years of independence, particularly when compared with larger and similarly situated small states in the next population class. As the Commonwealth Consultative Group noted, small does not mean helpless. And as sovereign states, micro-state governments have had a number of useful policy levers at their disposal. There are very encouraging examples of diversification in both indices of commodity concentration and geographic direction of trade as well as in sources of private sector capital and official development assistance. It is important to remind ourselves of the comparative context. As Godfrey Baldacchino and a growing number of scholars are emphasising it is not at all helpful to measure micro-state performance against abstract standards or models of development which are irrelevant and inappropriate for their experience. When compared to other small states, however, the micro-state experience has been modestly encouraging.

This relatively favourable picture of the micro-state experience would not suggest the sovereignty option to all very small communities. There is very little support for independence in the remaining overseas French territories for example. In many very small

dependencies there is, as Mike Faber pointed out, the counter appeal of “rights of access” and “subsidized services.” The people of these territories benefit enormously from the generous largesse of the French state and a lack of autonomy is a small price to pay for the benefits they receive. Similarly, the people of Aruba, now very conscious about security threats, particularly the drugs trade, have had second thoughts about independence and successfully petitioned the Dutch government to continue the terms of association. In other very small dependencies, such as Bermuda or the Cook Islands or the Isle of Man, continued association with the metropolitan power provides a reassuring presence for foreign investment and a measure of security. In any case these governments enjoy genuine independence in those areas critical to their own economic well being.

Other very small jurisdictions would not be so sanguine about limitations to their jurisdictional competence. Newfoundlanders, for example, deeply resent federal control over their offshore resources. The Faroese are increasingly impatient with the Danish government in the wake of the 1992 banking debacle. Nationalist sentiments are increasing across all political parties in the islands save the Unionists. Certainly, existing micro-states would not trade in their sovereignty. They are all committed to the protection of their identity and to the exercise of those prerogatives which sovereignty confers. Icelandic government leaders and Icelandic academics continually point to the island’s sovereignty, the capacity to protect their waters and to manage their own currency, as the single most important factor in Iceland’s post-war economic success.

For Iceland and for all micro-states this is simply a recognition of jurisdiction as a resource in itself. Many of these very small states were wholly dependent in their trade

relations on the metropolitan centre. Certainly they were dependent on that centre exclusively for sources of capital investment. Now they are able to present themselves to foreign governments, international corporations and multilateral organisations directly and on their own terms. Their status is an entry card into the world's boardrooms. These very small states function within a large network of supports and opportunities. Their vulnerabilities remain and for many their objectives will be confined to dependence management. There are dangers too which should not be underestimated.

In these closing years of the second millennium, however, when Lilliput and Brobdingnag mingle in the same corridors and share the same tables of international diplomacy, there are many reasons for tentative optimism.

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